Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c14: Chapter IX: The Means and Limits of Knowledge

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c14

Language
English

Chapter IX: The Means and Limits of Knowledge

c14.2

(712) In this final chapter we propose to examine the means and limits of knowledge as recognized in the Pāli Canonical texts.

c14.3

(713) In Chapter IV, we noticed that when the Buddha classified his predecessors and contemporaries in respect of the ways of knowledge emphasized by them as the Traditionalists, the Rationalists and the 'Experientialists' (*v. supra*, 250), he identified himself as a member of the last group (*v. supra*, 249). In his address to the Kālāmas and to Bhaddiya Licchavi, where he criticizes six ways of knowing based on authority (*v. supra*, 251) and four ways of knowing based on reason (*v. supra*, 314) on the ground that beliefs based on authority or reason may turn out to be true or false (*v. supra*, 283, 308, 436, 442), he ends on the note that one should accept a proposition as true only when one has 'personal knowledge' (attanā va jāneyyātha, A. II.191) of it, taking into account the views of the wise (*v. supra*, 662).

c14.4

(714) This emphasis on personal and direct knowledge is found throughout the Nikāyas and in trying to determine the ways of knowing recognized in the Canon, it is necessary to see clearly what was meant by this kind of knowledge.

c14.5

(715) The fact that the Buddha claimed to be 'one of those' (tesāham asmi, *v. supra*, 249) recluses and brahmins, who had a 'personal higher knowledge' (sāmaṃ yeva ... abhiññāya, *loc cit*) of a doctrine not found among 'doctrines traditionally handed down' (pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu, *loc. cit.*) is clear evidence that the Buddha did not claim or consider himself to have an unique way of knowing denied to others. It ranks him in his own estimate as a member of a class of recluses and brahmins, who claimed to have a personal and a 'higher knowledge' of doctrines not found in the various traditions. Who could these 'recluses and brahmins' be, in the light of our knowledge of the historical background? (*v.* Chs. I, II, III).

c14.6

(716) We saw that the brahmin thinkers fell into three types on epistemological grounds—the Traditionalists of the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas, the Rationalists of the Early Upaniṣads and the ‘Experientialists’ of the Middle and Late Upaniṣads (*v. supra*, 76, 244). Since the Buddha dissociates himself from the first two classes (*v. supra*, 246) we may presume that he identifies himself among others with the brahmin thinkers of the Middle and Late Upanisads. From the time of the Early Upanisads, newly discovered doctrines not found in the traditional Vedic learning, were being taught. Śvetaketu had ‘learned all the Vedas’ (sarvān vedān adhītya ... Ch. 6.1.2) but had to be instructed by Uddālaka with a doctrine ‘whereby what he has not heard (presumably in the Vedic teaching) is heard’ (yenāśrutam śrutam bhavati, Ch. 6.1.3). Such doctrines as well as the doctrines constituting the ‘higher knowledge’ (parā vidyā) of the Middle and Late Upaniṣads (*v. supra*, 75) have to be reckoned among ‘the doctrines not traditionally handed down’ (ananussutesu dhammesu) referred to in the Pāli passage. The brahmin Rationalists have to be excluded from the class of thinkers, with whom the Buddha identifies himself, also for the reason that they did not claim to have a ‘higher knowledge’ (abhiññā) based on any kind of contemplative or meditative experience (dhyāna = P. jhāna, *v. supra*, 31), unlike the Middle and Late Upaniṣadic thinkers.

c14.7

(717) We have observed that these latter thinkers claimed a kind of knowledge, which was a matter of directly ‘seeing’ or intuiting ultimate reality (*v. supra*, 73) and which was usually described by the word *jñāna* (*v. supra*, 74). In a sense, the emphasis on *jñāna* or knowledge was common to all the Upanisadic thinkers, since knowledge came to be valued as the means of salvation at least from the time of the Āraṇyakas onwards (*v. supra*, 16). Thenceforth, there was a cleavage in the Vedic tradition between the *karmamārga* or ‘the way of ritual’ and the *jñāna-mārga* or ‘the way of knowledge’. Early Buddhism is aware of this distinction, for the Suttanipāta mentions the *yañña-patha* or ‘the way of ritual’ (*yañña-pathe* appamattā, Sn. 1045) as against the *ñāṇa-patha* or ‘the way of knowledge’ (ñāṇa-pathāya sikkhe, Sn. 868). But it is also necessary to emphasize the distinction between the two ways of knowledge recognized within the Upaniṣads—the intellectual or rational knowledge of the Early Upaniṣads and the intuitive knowledge of the Middle and Late Upaniṣads. Of these two, it is the latter way of knowing that Buddhism values.

c14.8

(718) There is more evidence that Buddhism recognizes the validity of the means of knowledge upheld by this latter class of thinkers, although its valuation of it and what was known by it was not the same. We noted that jñāna was upheld in the Middle and Late Upaniṣads, where knowledge was described as one of 'seeing' (*v. supra*, 73) In the Nikāyas it is said that the Buddha is a jñāna-vādin¹ or a jñānin². He is described as one who 'knowing, knows and seeing, sees having become sight and knowledge' (jānam jānāti passam passati cakkhubhūto ñāṇabhūto, M. I.111). 'The knowing and seeing One' (jānatā passatā, M. II.111) is a characteristic description of the Buddha and it is usually said of what he claims to know that he both 'knows and sees' (tam aham jānāmi passāmi ti, M I.329). The central truths of Buddhism are 'seen'. One 'comprehends the Noble Truths and sees them' (ariyasaccāni avecca³ passati,⁴ Sn. 229) Even Nirvāṇa is 'seen' (nibbānam passeyyan ti, M. I.511) in a sense analogous to the seeing of a man born blind after a physician has treated him (*loc. cit.*). The Buddha is one who 'has knowledge and insight into all things' (sabbesu dhammesu ca ñāṇa-dassī, Sn. 478) and 'the religious life is led under the Exalted One for the *knowledge, insight*, attainment, realization and comprehension of what is *not known*, not *seen*, not attained, not realized and not comprehended'.⁵ It is said that the statement 'I know, I see' is descriptive of one who claims to be a ñāṇavādin (ñāṇavādam ... vadamāno janām'imam dhammam passām'imam dhamman ti, A V 42, 44) and ñāṇavādam or the claim to such knowledge is closely associated with *bhāvanā- vāda* or the claim to mental culture and development through meditation.⁶

c14.9

¹ *Cp.* Samano pi Gotamo ñāṇa-vādo, aham pi ñāṇa-vādo, ñāṇa-vado kho pana ñāṇa-vādena arahati uttarimanussadhammā iddhipāṭihāriyam dassetum, D III 12 Note the connection between ñāṇavāda- and *uttarimanussadhamma-* (paranormal)

c14.10

² Ñānī ti ... Tathāgatassa etam adhivacanam, A IV 340

c14.11

³ *v supra*, 655.

c14.12

⁴ Cp. Paramasaccam sacchikaroti, paññāya ca ativijjha passati, M II 112, 173

c14.13

⁵ Yam . . aññātam adiṭṭham appattam asacchikatam anabhisametam, tassa ñāṇāya dassanāya pattiyā sacchikiriyāya abhisamayāya Bhagavati brahmacariyam vussatī ti, A. IV.384

c14.14

⁶ Ñānavādañ ca . vadamāno bhāvanāvādañ ca jānām'imam dhammam passām'imam dhammam . ., A IV 42, 44

c14.15

(719) There is no doubt that 'knowledge and insight' (ñāṇadassana) or 'knowing and seeing' (jānāti passati) in the above sense is mainly though not exclusively (*v. infra*, 721) a by-product of 'mental concentration' (samādhi) in jhāna or yoga It is said that there is a causal relation between the attainment of mental concentration and the emergence of this knowledge and insight (*v. infra*, 724). This shows that it is qualitatively similar to the Upaniṣadic 'knowing' and 'seeing' which was also a result of dhyāna (cp. dhyāyamānaḥ, *v. supra*, 73).

c14.16

(720) This kind of direct intuitive knowledge was also claimed by some of the Ājīvikas (*v. supra*, 213) and at least the leader of the Jains who professed omniscience (*v. supra*, 311). The direct knowledge and vision of omniscience is in fact called ñāṇa-dassana (M. I.482, 519). Pūraṇa Kassapa and Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, who claimed omniscience, are called Jñāna-vādins or those who professed to have this kind of direct intuitive knowledge (cp. ubhinnaṃ ñāṇa-vādānaṃ ..., A. IV. 429). This is confirmed from what we learn from the Jain scriptures, where knowledge is said to consist of jñāna and darśana. On this Tatia observes: "The hoary antiquity of the Jain conception of *jñānāvaraṇa* and *darśanā-varaṇa* points to the antiquity of the distinction between *jñāna-* and *darśana-*. The Jain Āgamas use the terms *jāṇāi* and *pāsai* in order to express the two faculties of the soul."¹ These Ājīvikas and the Jain leader may therefore be reckoned among the Samaṇas with whom the Buddha identified himself (*v. supra*, 249, 715).

c14.17

¹ *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 71.

c14.18

(721) Though we left out the Materialists for the obvious reason that they did not claim any higher knowledge (*v. supra*, 142) there is good reason to believe that when Buddhism used the expression 'knowing and seeing' (jānaṃ passaṃ), it meant by it the direct knowledge gained by sense-perception as well. We find that the expression, 'I know...I see' (jānāmi...passāmi, *v. supra*, 90) was placed in the mouth of the Materialist who claimed to know only what could be directly perceived. We find this expression used in the Nikāyas to denote the direct knowledge derived from sense-perception. Thus in a context, where the conditions under which one's memory is said to become defective are stated (*v. infra*, 732), we find the following simile: '... just as if a man possessed of sight were to observe the reflection of his face in a basin of water disturbed, shaken, tossed about by (gusts of) wind and full of ripples, but fail to *know and see* (his face) *as it really is*'² (*yathā-bhūtaṃ na jāneyya na passeyya*).

c14.19

² Seyyathā pi...udapatto vāterito calito bhanto ūmijāto tattha cakkhumā puriso sakaṃ mukhanimittaṃ paccavekkhamāno yathābhūtaṃ na jāneyya na passeyya, S. V.123.

c14.20

(722) Now Keith seems to have noticed the essential affinity between the way of knowing of the Middle and Late Upanisads and that of Early Buddhism; he makes the following observation: 'The view of intuition as the source of true knowledge, and at the same time a decisive cause of emancipation from rebirth is characteristic of Buddhism as of the Upanisads, and explains why in neither do we find any serious contribution to epistemology. The Buddha, like the sage of the Upanisad, sees things as they truly are (*yathābhūtam*) by a mystic potency, which is quite other than reasoning of the discursive type. The truth of his insight is assured by it alone, for it is obviously incapable of verification in any empirical manner.'¹ He qualifies this statement when he adds that 'the Canon does not treat intuition (paññā) as being wholly distinct from, and unconnected with discursive knowledge . . . it is allied to deliberate and searching mental appreciation (yoniso manasikāro)' (*op. cit.*, p. 90).

c14.21

¹ *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 90

c14.22

(723) While we agree with Keith's comparison between the way of knowledge accepted in Buddhism and the Upanisads, in the light of the evidence that we have shown above, we cannot subscribe to his other remarks. Despite the qualitative similarity between the means of knowledge in the Middle and Late Upanisads and Buddhism, it is necessary to note that the latter gives a different orientation to and evaluation of this means of knowledge. This tends to present this knowledge in a different light altogether and makes less obvious the gap between the empirical and the mystical.

c14.23

(724) In the Upanisads one's knowledge and vision is not, in the final analysis, due to one's efforts but to the grace or intervention of Ātman or God (*v. supra*, 73). The emergence of this knowledge is conceived as something inexplicable and mysterious. This character warrants it being called a kind of mystical knowledge. But in the Buddhist account the mental concentration (samādhi) which is a product of training and effort, is a causal factor (upanisā) in the production of this knowledge: '. . . in the absence of right mental concentration and in the case of one not endowed with right mental concentration, the cause is absent (for the production of) the knowledge and insight of things as they really are' (. . . sammāsamādhimhi asati sammāsamādhivipannassa hatūpanisam hoti yathābhūtañāṇadassanam, A. III 200). It is a natural and not a supernatural occurrence: 'It is in the nature of things (dhammatā) that a person in the state of (meditative) concentration knows and sees what really is. A person who knows and sees what really is, does not need to make an effort of will to feel disinterested and renounce. It is *in the nature of things* that a person who knows and sees as it really is, feels disinterested and renounces. One who has felt disinterested and has renounced does not need an effort of will to realize the knowledge and insight of emancipation (vimutti-ñāṇadassanam). It is *in the nature of things* that one who has felt disinterested and renounced, realizes the knowledge and insight of emancipation'. (*Dhammatā esā . . . yam samāhito yathābhūtam jānāti passati. Yathābhūtam jānato passato na cetanāya karaṇīyam 'nibbindāmi virajjāmi' ti. Dhammatā esā . . . yam yathābhūtam jānam passam nibbindati virajjati. Nibbinassa . . . virattassa na cetanāya karaṇīyam 'vimuttiñāṇadassanam sacchikaromi' ti. Dhammatā esā . . . yam nibbinno viratto vimuttiñāṇadassanam sacchikaroti*, A. V. 3, 313.) Here the 'knowledge and insight' (ñāṇadassana) which is a means to an end and is often called paññā (*v. infra*, 797) as well as the final 'knowledge and insight of emancipation' (vimuttiñāṇadassana-), which is the end itself, are considered to be natural causal occurrences.

c14.24

(725) This difference in valuation is clearly brought out when we compare the views of Pūraṇa Kassapa and the Buddha on the nature of knowledge. Both claim to belong to the same class of thinkers on epistemological grounds. Pūraṇa Kassapa is a ñāṇa-vādin (*v. supra*, 720) and so is the Buddha (*v. supra*, 718). But their theories with regard to the genesis of knowledge are utterly different. Pūraṇa holds that 'there is no cause or condition for the lack of knowledge and insight . . . or for the presence of knowledge and insight' (natthi hetu natthi paccayo aññāṇāya adassanāya . . . ñāṇāya dassanāya, S. III. 126), while the Buddha holds that 'there was a cause and reason' (atthi hetu atthi paccayo, *loc. cit.*) for both. This is partly due to the fact that Pūraṇa was a niyati-vādin or a Strict Determinist (*v. supra*, 199), but even the Middle and Late Upaniṣadic thinkers in claiming that the arising of the final intuition of reality was due to the grace of Ātman or God (*v. supra*, 73) subscribe to a similar view.

c14.25

(726) In outlining the causes and conditions for the emergence or non-emergence of this (kind of) knowledge it is said: 'When one dwells with one's mind obsessed with and given to passion and one does not truly know and see the elimination of the passion that has arisen, it is a cause of one's failure to know and see . . . (likewise) ill-will, sloth and torpor, excitement and perplexity, and doubt (are causes of one's failure to know and see).¹ On the other hand, the cultivation of the seven factors of enlightenment (sattabojjhanga) is said to be a cause and condition for the arising of knowledge and insight.² (727) The five factors outlined above as what causes the lack of knowledge and insight are in fact the same as what is commonly known in the Pāli Nikāyas as 'the five impediments' (pañcanīvaraṇa-, D. I.73). According to the Buddhist theory, the elimination of these five factors is said to clear the way for the development of the jhānas or the meditative states of the mind: 'When these five impediments are eliminated he looks within himself and gladness arises in him and with gladness, joy; with his mind overjoyed his mind becomes at ease and with his body at ease he experiences happiness, being happy his mind becomes concentrated.'³ Then follows a description of the first up to the fourth jhānas.⁴ It is at this stage, on the attainment of the fourth jhāna 'when the mind is concentrated, pure, cleansed, free from blemishes, purged of adventitious defilements, supple, pliant, steady and unperturbed' (evaṃ samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgaṇe vigatūpakkilese mudubhūte kammaniye thite ānejjappatte, D. I.76) that he is said to 'turn and direct his mind to knowing and seeing' (ñāṇa-dassanāya cittaṃ abhinīharati abhininnāmeti, *loc. cit.*). The mind in this state is said to observe introspectively but directly one's consciousness associated with the body.⁵ In this same state he turns and directs his mind to 'psycho-kinetic activity' (iddhi-vidhāya, D I.77), to 'clair-audience' (dibbāya sotadhātuyā, D. I.79), to 'telepathic knowledge' (cetopariyañāṇāya, D. I 79), to the 'retrocognitive knowledge of past existences' (pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇāya, D. I.81), to the 'knowledge of the decease and survival of beings' (sattānaṃ cutūpapātañāṇāya, D. I.82), to the ‘knowledge of the destruction of defiling impulses’ (āsavakkhayañāṇāya, D. I.83). These six came to be known as the ‘six (kinds of) higher knowledge’ (chaḷabhiññā, *v. infra*, 752) in the Pāli Nikāyas but since the first is a case of ‘knowing how’ and not of ‘knowing that’¹ it came to be dissociated from the rest and these latter were known as the ‘five (kinds of) higher knowledge’ (pañcābhiññā, *v. infra*, 752).

c14.26

¹ Yasmıṃ .. samaye kāmarāgapariyuṭṭhitena cetasā viharati kāmarāgaparetena uppannassa ca kāmarāgassa nissaraṇaṃ yathābhūtaṃ na jānāti na passati ayam pi . hetu ayaṃ paccayo aññāṇāya adassanāya. byāpāda- .. thīnamiddha- .. uddhaccakukkucca- .. vicikicchā-, S V 127

c14.27

² Katamo pana bhante hetu, katamo paccayo ñāṇāya dassanāya, kathaṃ sahetu sapaccayo ñāṇaṃ dassanaṃ? Idha .. satisambojjhaṅgaṃ bhāveti .. pe . upekkhāsambojjhaṅgaṃ, S V 127, 128.

c14.28

³ Tass' ime pañcanīvaraṇe pahīne attanī samanupassato pāmujjaṃ jāyati, pamuditassa pīti jāyati, pītimanassa kāyo passambhati, passaddhakāyo sukhaṃ vedeti, sukhino cittaṃ samādhiyati, D I 73

c14.29

⁴ These correspond to the 'bhūmi-s' or the levels of consciousness described in the Akṣyupaniṣad, as studied by Przyluski and Lamotte, 'Bouddhisme et Upaniṣad' in *BEFEO*, Vol 32, pp 160 ff.

c14.30

⁵ Ayaṃ me kāyo rūpī . . . idañ ca pana me viññāṇaṃ ettha sitaṃ ettha paṭi-baddhaṃ ti, D. I 76

c14.31

¹ On this distinction, *v.* G. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, Ch. II, pp 25–60

c14.32

(728) We note here the operation of a causal process. The elimination of the impediments makes the mind concentrated in meditation and this in turn makes it possible for it to have knowledge and insight of things as they are (yathābhūtañāṇadassanam). This is why it is often said that ‘mental concentration is the cause of knowing and seeing things as they are’ (yathābhūtañāṇadassanassa upanisā samādhi, S. II.30). One first ‘obtains the attainment of virtue’ (sīlasampadam ārādheti, M I.200), this is followed by ‘the attainment of concentration’ (samādhisampadam ārādheti, M. I.201) and subsequently by ‘the attainment of knowledge and insight’ (ñāṇadassanam ārādheti, M. I.202).

c14.33

(729) Now the word paññā (wisdom) is often used to denote this ‘knowledge and insight’ which results from concentration in so far as it pertains to salvation (*v. infra*, 797). It normally has a wider connotation and is used to denote ‘intelligence comprising all the higher faculties of cognition.² The five impediments (pañcanīvaraṇa-) are often defined as ‘defilements of the mind and factors which weaken wisdom’ (cetaso upakkilese paññāya dubbalīkaraṇe, M. I.181, 270, 276, 521; II.28). The alleged observation on which this theory is based is that, as we saw above (*v. supra*, 727) ‘when the mind is emancipated from these five defilements, it is supple, pliant, lustrous, firm and becomes rightly concentrated for the destruction of the defiling impulses’ (yato ca . . . cittam imehi pañcahi upakkilesehi vimuttam hoti, tam hoti cittam mudu ca kammaniyañ ca pabhassarañ ca na ca pabhangu sammā samādhiyati āsavānam khayāya, A. III.16, 17). In this state it is said that ‘he directs his mind to those things which have to be realized by one’s higher knowledge in order to realize them by one’s higher knowledge’ (abhiññā-sacchikaranīyassa dhammassa cittam abhinin-nāmeti abhiññā-sacchikiriyāya, *loc. cit.*) and here we find enumerated the usual six kinds of higher knowledge he is capable of (sace ākankhati, *loc. cit.*) having (A. III. pp 17–19).

c14.34

² PTS Dictionary *s v*, on this term see Mrs Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, 1914, pp. 94, 130, 201; *Compendium of Philosophy*, pp 40, 41, 102

c14.35

(730) We find here the simile of gold-ore, which is compared to the mind. Gold-ore is said to have the defilements (jātarūpassa upakkilesā, A. II.16) of iron, copper, tin, lead, and silver (ayo, loham, tipu, sīsaṃ, sajjham, *loc. cit.*) but when it is purified, it shines with its natural lustre (cp. also S. V 92, 93) In a Brāhmanic context a simile of this sort, functioning as an analogical argument (*v. supra*, 14), would have constituted the proof of the statement that the mind shines forth with its natural lustre and acquires the faculties of extrasensory knowledge and vision, when purged of its defilements. But in the Pāli Nikāyas, unlike in the Jain literature (*v. suprā*, 243) upamā or 'comparison' is not considered a separate means of knowledge but only as an aid to understanding. It is often said that 'a simile ... is employed in order to make clear the sense' (upamā ... katā atthassa viññāpanāya, M. I.155; III 275, It.114) or that 'some intelligent people understand the meaning of what is said by means of a simile' (upamāya idh'ekacce viññū purisā bhāsitassa atthaṃ ājānanti, A IV.163).

c14.36

(731) Since sīla or 'virtue' is a prior requirement for the development of samādhi or 'concentration' (*v. supra*, 728), a causal relationship is established between sīla and paññā (wisdom). This explains the saying that 'wisdom becomes brighter with conduct' (apadāne sobhati paññā, A. I.102) and also the statement that 'wisdom is cleansed by virtue and virtue is cleansed by wisdom—where there is virtue there is wisdom and where there is wisdom there is virtue' (sīlaparidhotā ... paññā paññāparidhotam sīlam yattha sīlam tattha paññā yattha paññā tattha sīlam. D. I.124).

c14.37

(732) The five impediments (*v supra*, 726) constituting the emotional factors as well as mental and physical lassitude (thīnamiddha) not only prevent the mind from being concentrated and thus affect the emergence of jhānīc (extrasensory) perception but affect our cognitive faculties even in normal consciousness. A brahmin named Saṅgārava comes to the Buddha and asks the question: 'What is the cause and reason why at times even hymns which have been recited for a long period do not clearly appear (before one's memory) not to speak of hymns not so recited, while at other times even hymns not recited for a long time are easily remembered, leave alone hymns recited for a long time?'¹ It is replied that this happens when the mind is affected by one or more of the five impediments which tend to cause forgetfulness (A. III.230-6).

c14.38

¹ Ko nu kho .. hetu ko paccayo, yen'ekadā dīgharattam sajjhāyakatā pi mantā na ppatibhanti, pageva asajjhāyakatā? Ko pana .. hetu ko paccayo, yen'ekadā dīgharattam asajjhāyakatā pi mantā paṭibhanti, pageva sajjhāyakatā ti? A III.230.

c14.39

(733) Not only was the origin of knowledge conceived differently (*v. supra*, 725) in Buddhism despite the qualitative likeness in the way of knowing between the Early Buddhist and the Upaniṣadic thinkers (*v. supra*, 719), but there was no agreement regarding the content of knowledge as well. The Upaniṣadic thinkers conceived of the Ātman or the ultimate reality as being seen or perceived (dṛṣṭam), heard or learnt (śrutam), mentally conceived (matam) or rationally understood (vijñātam) (*v. supra*, 70, 71), while in the Middle or Late Upaniṣads the Ātman or Brahman was 'attained' (prāptaḥ, Kaṭha, 2, 3.18) by the yogic process. But all that is claimed to be known by these means, including the last, is rejected in Buddhism, e.g. yam p'īdaṃ diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ mutaṃ viññātaṃ pattaṃ ... manasā: tam pi n'etaṃ mama, n'eso'ham asmi, na m'eso attā ti (M. I.136). This is probably the reason why we find in the Buddhist texts an apparently ambivalent attitude towards ñāṇa. On the one hand, it is valued as a means of knowledge necessary for salvation (see, however, *infra*, 798, 799), while on the other hand what is directly known by it is discarded as not being the knowledge of the ultimate reality. Thus while it is said that 'the one who is sceptical should train himself in the path of intuitive knowledge—the Recluse has proclaimed his doctrines after intuitively understanding them' (kathaṃkathī ñāṇapathāya sikkhe, ñatvā pavuttā Samaṇena dhammā, Sn. 868), we also find statements which criticize ñāṇa—as inadequate for salvation, e.g.:

c14.40

Passāmi suddhaṃ paramaṃ arogaṃ
diṭṭhena saṃsuddhi narassa hoti
etābhiñānaṃ 'paraman' ti ñatvā
suddhānupassī ti pacceti ñāṇaṃ.
Diṭṭhena ce suddhi narassa hoti
ñāṇena vā so pajahāti dukkhaṃ
aññena so sujjhati sopadhīko
Sn. 788, 789.

c14.41

*i.e.* 'I see the pure and the transcendent, without defect—by seeing is man's salvation; knowing this, seeing the pure and apprehending it as the transcendent, he falls back on intuitive knowledge. If man's salvation is by 'seeing' and he abandons sorrow by intuitive knowledge, he is saved in a different way (from the true way), being still subject to limitations (also cp. Sn. 908, 909).

c14.42

(734) This is not a contradictory attitude. It only means that this kind of knowledge is necessary but not sufficient for salvation. This is made clear by the statement that ‘the Exalted One had declared that there is no salvation from belief, hearing (or learning) or intuitive knowledge . . . nor does he say that it is possible by the absence of belief, hearing (or learning) or intuitive knowledge’ (na diṭṭhiyā na sutiyā na ñāṇena . . . ti Bhagavā visuddhim (v. l) āha, adiṭṭhiyā assutiyā aññāṇā . . . no pi tena, Sn. 839). What this means is that belief (=saddhā, sammādiṭṭhi- *v. supra*, 672), learning or hearing from a teacher (*v. supra*, 672) and the development of knowledge or the verification of what is accepted as a belief, are necessary but not sufficient conditions for salvation. Even ‘the knowledge and insight of things as they are’ (yathābhūtañāṇadassana-, S. II.30; V 432; A. IV.336), which is had by means of ñāṇa- is only a means to an end and not the end itself, which is ‘salvation’ (cp. sammāñāṇassa sammāvimutti pahoti, M. III.76) or ‘the knowledge and vision of salvation’ (vimutti-ñāṇadassana-, M. I.145, A. III.81, S. V.162).

c14.43

(735) There is yet another difference, which is apparent in the Early Buddhist attitude towards the data of intuitive experience, which differentiates it from that of the Middle and Late Upaniṣadic thinkers. The Buddhist considered it possible to misinterpret this experience and draw erroneous inferences from it (*v. infra*, 790). We thus find that Buddhism does not make the claim of the mystic that this knowledge was derived from a supernatural source in an unaccountable manner but that it is a product of the natural development of the mind, and due to the operation of causal processes It does not regard the content of this experience (like the mystic) as identical with ultimate reality. Buddhism also believes that erroneous inferences could be drawn from these experiences At the same time it does not decry normal perception but like the Materialists draws many of its conclusions on the basis of it (*v. infra*, 784) It would be misleading to call this mystical or intuitive knowledge in the context of Buddhism in view of the utterly different attitude to and evaluation of it. We shall, therefore, refer to this kind of knowledge as ‘extrasensory perception’ in the Buddhist context.

c14.44

(736) When it was said that this knowledge was to be had ‘personally’ or ‘individually’ (sāmaṃ) it is necessary to point out that what is meant is not that this knowledge was incommunicable or subjective The primary reason for the frequent use of ‘sāmaṃ’ to qualify the verb from √dṛś in these contexts, seems to be to emphasize the fact that this knowledge is to be had by directly seeing 'oneself' and not indirectly by hearing it from some source (as in the Vedic tradition). Thus it is said that a 'monk does not hear that in such and such a village there was a beautiful girl or woman but has *himself seen her*' (Idha ... bhikkhu na h'eva kho sunāti amukasmim nāma gāme ... itthī vā kumārī vā abhirūpā ... api ca kho *sāmaṃ passati*, A. III.90). The distinction is drawn as to whether 'one has seen it oneself or has heard it from a tradition' (sāmam diṭṭho vā hoti anussavasuto vā, M. I.465). At a time when a statement would have appeared authoritative only if it was handed down by a long line of teachers (*v. supra*, 294), the Buddha emphasizes that 'he has seen it by himself ... and that he is not saying so after having heard from another recluse or brahmin' (diṭṭhā mayā ... tam kho nāññassa samaṇassa vā brāhmaṇassa sutvā vadāmi, It. 58). 'Would it be proper', he says, 'for him to say so ... if he had not known, seen, experienced, realized and apprehended with his wisdom' (mayā c'etam ... aññātam abhavissa adiṭṭham aviditam asacchikatam aphassitam paññāya ... vadeyyam, api nu me etam ... patirūpam abhavissā ti, M. I.475). He preaches what he has himself verified to be true but he claims that he could instruct an honest and intelligent person to verify for himself what he had verified: 'Let an intelligent person come to me, sincere, honest and straightforward; I shall instruct him and teach the doctrine so that on my instructions he would conduct himself in such a way that before long he would himself know and himself see ...' (etu viññū puriso asaṭho amāyāvī ujujātiko: aham anusāsāmi, aham dhammam desemi; yathānusiṭṭhaṃ tathā paṭipajjamāno na cirass'eva *sāmañ ñeva ñassati sāmam dakkhiti*, M. II.44). 'The dhamma' is described as 'bearing fruit in this life before long, an invitation to "come and see", leading to the goal and verifiable by the wise' (... dhammo sandiṭṭhiko akāliko ehipassiko opanayiko paccattam veditabbo viññūhi, M. I.37). This shows that this knowledge was not claimed to be a private experience, which could not be communicated.

c14.45

(737) We saw that while the Vedic brahmins upheld hearing (the scriptures) or testimony as the supreme source of knowledge the main school of the Materialists upheld perception and probably what could be directly inferred from it (*v. supra*, 93, 94) as the only means of knowledge. It is true that even in the Vedic tradition when it came to a matter of deciding between the testimony of sight and hearing, the decision was in favour of the former (*v. supra*, 69) and the Maitrī Upaniṣad takes the stand that perception was the most reliable means of knowledge (*v. supra*, 69), but it was the Materialists who underlined the importance of perception even to the extent of discarding other means of knowledge. The Buddhists seem to have been influenced by the Materialists in their emphasis on perception, although perception here is both sensory as well as extrasensory ‘Who would believe’, it is said, ‘that this earth and the majestic mountain Sineru would be consumed by fire, *except on the evidence of sight*’ (ko saddhātā ayañ ca pathavī Sineru ca pabbatarājā dayhissantī ti . aññatra diṭṭhapadehı, A. IV.103)

c14.46

(738) The Buddhist theory of truth (*v. supra*, 596) also makes it clear that truth and therefore knowledge is objective, as telling us the nature of ‘things as they are’ (yathābhūtam). The knowledge of things as they are consists in knowing ‘what exists as “existing” and what does not exist as “*not existing*” ’ (santam vā atthī ti ñassati asantam vā natthi ti ñassati, A V.36). ‘Knowing things as they are’, it is said, ‘wherever they are, is the highest knowledge’ (etad anuttariyam . . . ñāṇānam yadidam tattha tattha yathābhūtañānam, A. V.37). What is taught by the Buddha is claimed to be objectively valid. ‘Whether the Tathāgata preaches the dhamma to his disciples or does not preach it, the dhamma remains the same’ (desento pi Tathāgato sāvakānam dhammam tādiso va adesento pi hı dhammo tādiso va, M. I.331).

c14.47

(739) The importance of eliminating subjective bias and of getting rid of habits of mind that cause people to fall into error is often stressed. It was the Sceptics who paid the greatest attention to this subject. The first school of Sceptics said that truth cannot be arrived at and it was always a subjective factor such as attachment (chando), passion (rāgo), hate (doso), or repulsion (paṭigho), which makes one accept a proposition as true (*v. supra*, 159). We have already seen that the Buddha’s attitude to the debate (*v. supra*, 688) was similar to that of the Sceptics, most of whom avoided debate because of the vexation that it caused (*v. supra*, 338) We similarly see the influence of the above doctrine of the Sceptics where it is said that there are ‘four ways of falling into injustice’ or untruth (agati-gamanāni, A II 18), namely out of attachment (chanda-), hatred (dosa-), ignorance (moha-), and fear (bhaya-), the arhat or the ‘ideal person’ in Buddhism is not misled in any of these four ways (D. III.133). The difference from Scepticism is that this does not result in Buddhism in total scepticism with regard to the possibility of truth. One's emotions, whether it be one's likes or dislikes, can distort the truth and the Buddha warns his disciples: 'If others were to speak ill of me, the Dhamma and the Order, do not bear any hatred or ill-will towards them or be displeased at heart... for if you were to be enraged and upset, will you be able to know whether these statements (criticisms) of others were fair or not?'¹ On the other hand, 'if others were to speak in praise of me, my Dhamma or my Order, you should not be happy, delighted and elated at heart... for if you were to be happy, delighted and elated, it will only be a danger to you...'.² The Buddha himself claims to be neither pleased at the praise of others nor displeased at their abuse. He encourages his disciples to develop this same attitude (tatra ce... pare Tathāgatam akkosanti... tatra... Tathāgatassa na hoti āghāto... tatra ce... pare Tathāgatam sakkaronti... na hoti ānando... Tasmātiha... tumhe ce pi pare akkoseyyum... tatra tumhehi na āghāto... karaṇīyo... pare sakkareyyum... tatra tumhehi na ānando... karaṇīyam, M. I.140). When Sāriputta, his own disciple, says in praise of him: 'I have such faith in the Exalted One that I do not think that there ever has been, nor will there ever be a recluse or brahmin who has greater understanding and knowledge than the Exalted One',³ he quietly rebukes him with the remark, 'have you examined the minds of the perfectly enlightened Exalted Ones of the past... the future... or my own mind in the present'.⁴ To this Sāriputta replies that he has not. The Buddha thereupon remarks, 'then why have you uttered a statement so grand, bold, made a categorical claim and uttered a lion's roar to the effect that "I have such faith..."'⁵ This incident displays the basically objective attitude of the Buddha, who demanded that for statements to be significant and true, they must be based on evidence that warrants their assertion and not on the grounds of our subjective prejudices.

c14.48

¹ Mamam vā... pare avaṇṇam bhāseyyum dhammassa vā avaṇṇam bhāseyyum Saṅghassa vā avaṇṇam bhāseyyum, tatra, tumhehi na āghāto appaccayo na cetaso anabhiraddhi karaṇīyā... tatra ce tumhe assatha kupitā vā anattamanā vā api nu tumhe paresam subhāsitam dubbhāsitam ājāneyyāthā ti? D. I.3.

c14.49

² Mamam vā... pare vaṇṇam bhāseyyum dhammassa vā vaṇṇam bhāseyyum Saṅghassa vā vaṇṇam bhāseyyum tatra tumhehi na ānando na somanassam na cetaso ubbillāvitattam karaṇīyam... tatra ce tumhe assatha ānandino sumanā ubbillāvitā tumham yev'assa tena antarāyo, *loc. cit.*

c14.50

³ Evam pasanno aham bhante Bhagavati, na cāhu na ca bhavissati na c'etarahi vijjati añño samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā bhiyyo'bhiññātaro, D. I.99.

c14.51

⁴ Kin nu... ye te ahesum atītam addhānam arahanto Sammāsambuddhā, sabbe te Bhagavato cetasā ceto paricca viditā... kim pana aham te etarahi... cetasā ceto paricca vidito, D. III 100.

c14.52

⁵ Atha kim carahi te ayam... uḷārā āsabhī vācā bhāsitā, ekaṃso gahito, sīhanādo nadito, evam pasanno aham..., D. III.100.

c14.53

(740) The impact of desire on belief is clearly recognized in Buddhism. One of the causal statements made is that 'on account of desire there is clinging' (taṇhāpaccayā upādānam, M. I.261). This 'clinging' is described as four-fold, viz. clinging to sense-pleasures (kāmupādānam), to rituals (sīlabbatupādānam), to *metaphysical beliefs* (diṭṭhupādānam) and to *soul- (or substance-) theories* (attavādupādānam) We are here only concerned with the latter two. This means that we believe in certain metaphysical theories and soul- or substance-theories because we are impelled by our desires to believe in them.¹ These desires are analysed as three-fold, viz. the desire for sense-gratification (kāma-taṇhā, M. I.48, 299; III.250), the desire for personal immortality (bhava-taṇhā, *loc. cit.*) and the desire for annihilation (or the desire for power?² vibhava-taṇhā, *loc. cit.*). These specific desires are not correlated with any particular beliefs in the Pāli tradition, but most probably it would have been thought that those whose desire for personal immortality (bhava-taṇhā) was strong would have believed in 'a theory of personal immortality' (bhava-diṭṭhi, A. I.83), while those who had a strong desire for annihilation (vibhava-taṇhā) would have believed in an 'annihilationist (Materialist) theory' (vibhava-diṭṭhi, M. I 65). The beliefs in soul and substance thus not only have their origins in our linguistic habits (*v. supra*, 133, 533) but is also rooted in a craving in us to believe in them. The acceptance of a causal impact of our desires on our beliefs did not, however, result in scepticism with regard to the possibility of knowledge, since according to the Buddhist theory, causation was not deterministic (*v. infra*, 764) and desires therefore did not necessitate all our beliefs The stress laid on the importance of eliminating subjective bias is therefore probably due to a realization of this impact of desire on belief. The objectivity that should be achieved in introspection after attaining the fourth jhāna is described as follows:

c14.54

¹ Cp Stebbing, *op cit*, pp. 404-5, 'there seems to be a deep-rooted tendency in the human mind to seek what is identical, in the sense of something that persists through change . . . Hence the search for an underlying entity, a persistent stuff, a substance . . Hence the popularity of substance theories in science.

c14.55

² Both interpretations are possible since 'vibhava' means both 'power' and 'annihilation' in the Nikāyas (*s v* PTS Dictionary) The latter is the usual interpretation given in the commentaries (see *Dialogues* III 208) At D I 32, we find vibhava- used as a synonym of uccheda- (annihilation) and vināsa- (destruction) sato sattassa ucchedam vināsam vibhavam

c14.56

'Just as one person should objectively observe another, a person standing should observe a person seated or a person seated a person lying down, even so, should one's object of introspection be well-apprehended, well-reflected upon, well-contemplated and well-penetrated with one's knowledge'.¹ This emphasis on the importance of getting rid of our prejudices and habits of mind, which make us fall into error reminds us of Bacon's 'idols',² which according to him interfere with the objectivity of our thinking.

c14.57

¹ Seyyathā pi . añño vā aññaṃ paccavekkheyya, ṭhito vā nisinnaṃ paccavekkheyya, nisinno vā nipannaṃ paccavekkheyya, evam eva . . . paccavekkhaṇānimittaṃ suggahītaṃ hoti sumanasikataṃ sūpadhāritaṃ suppaṭividdhaṃ paññāya . . , A III 27

c14.58

² *v* Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, p 566.

c14.59

(741) We may next inquire as to what means of knowledge constitute this alleged objective 'knowledge and vision' (ñāṇadassana-) or 'knowing and seeing' (jānāti passati). We may dismiss verbal testimony since the above 'seeing' was sharply distinguished from it (*v. supra*, 736) and we have ample evidence (*v. supra*, Chs. IV and VIII) that it was not considered a genuine means of knowledge. We may also dismiss reasoning in the sense of takka- (indirect proof, or *a priori* proof) as an unsatisfactory means of knowledge according to Buddhism. This is probably the reason why 'the dhamma' is said to 'fall outside the scope of *takka*- but be verifiable by the wise' (dhammo . . . atakkāvacaro . . . paṇḍitavedanīyo, M I 167). Since comparison or upamā is also not recognized as a means of knowing (*v. supra*, 730), we are left with perception (normal and paranormal) and inference based on perception (in the sense in which this was understood by the second group—group (2)—of Materialists, *v. supra*, 94). By examining the terminology and descriptions of knowledge in the light of the claims of knowledge, we find that it was these means of knowledge, which are denoted by the phrase 'jānāti passati' and the word 'ñāṇadassana-'.

c14.60

(742) We have already observed that the phrase 'jānāti passati' was used to denote the knowledge derived from perception on the part of the Materialists (*v. supra*, 721) and the yogic intuition of the Mystic (*v. supra*, 719). If we take the words for 'seeing' we find that they are used in the Nikāyas to denote normal as well as extrasensory perception. Thus at A. III.208 (cp. 299) the word 'diṭṭhaṃ' is used for what is 'observed' by sight,³ at Ud. 68, 'diṭṭha-' is used to denote what is ‘perceived’¹ by the touch of blind men. At It. 58, ‘diṭṭha-’ is used to refer to what is ‘seen’² by the Buddha by means of extrasensory perception. It is necessary to note that ‘diṭṭhi-’ (belief) is sharply distinguished from diṭṭha- in the sense of what is perceptually observed, e.g. diṭṭhi-gatan ti etaṃ apanītam etaṃ Tathāgatassa Diṭṭhaṃ etaṃ Tathāgatena, M. I.486). The Niddesa which belongs to the Nikāyas, commenting on the verb ‘addakkhi’ which means ‘he saw’ says it could mean ‘he saw with his telepathic knowledge . . . retrocognitive knowledge . . . his human eye or divine eye’ (paracitta-ñāṇena vā addakkhi, pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇena vā . . . maṃsacakkhunā vā . . . dibbena cakkhunā . . . Nd 1.323). This means that ‘see’ may denote normal or paranormal (extrasensory) perception Likewise dassana- is used for ‘visual perception’ (A. III 325) as well as in a wider sense of ‘perception’ which includes both sensory and extrasensory perception (e.g. āsavā dassanā pahātabbā, M. I.7) Ñāṇa-dassana-, as we saw (*v. supra*, 719) was used generally to denote the knowledge derived from extrasensory perception. When the Buddha says that ‘there arose in him the knowledge and insight that Uddaka Rāmaputta had died the previous night’ (ñāṇañ ca pana dassanaṃ udapādi, abhiḷdosakālakato Uddako Rāmaputto ti, M I.170), we have to presume that this knowledge and insight was had by means of extrasensory perception, although the Comy. tries to make out that omniscience is here intended.³

c14.61

³ Api nu tumhehi diṭṭhaṃ vā sutaṃ vā ayaṃ puriso pānātipātaṃ pahāya . . . taṃ enaṃ rājāno gahetvā hananti

c14.62

¹ *Diṭṭho . . . jaccandhehi hatthī*

c14.63

² *Diṭṭhā . . . mayā sattā apāyaṃ upapannā.*

c14.64

³ *Ñāṇañ ca pana me ti mayham sabbaññutañāṇaṃ udapādi*, MA II.186

c14.65

(743) It may be observed that ñāṇa-dassana- is also used to denote the knowledge of salvation which is normally distinguished from it and is called ‘the knowledge and insight of salvation’ (vimutti-ñāṇadassana-) as opposed to ‘the knowledge and insight of things as they are’ (yathābhūta-ñāṇadassana-) (*v. supra*, 724), e g. ‘there arose in me the knowledge and insight that my salvation is unshakable, that this is the last birth and that there is no further birth’ (ñāṇañ ca pana me dassanaṃ udapādi: akuppā me vimutti, ayam antimā jāti natthi dāni punabbhavo, M. I 167, III.162). Ñāṇa-dassana- in this sense is equivalent to aññā (final knowledge), a term which is exclusively used to denote this knowledge of final salvation (e.g idha bhikkhu aññaṃ byākaroti, M. III 29, aññāya nibbutā dhīrā, S. I 24, sammadaññā vimuttā, M. II.43).

c14.66

(744) The psychology of perception in the Nikāyas has been studied by Dr Sarathchandra, who is impressed by the empiricist approach to the subject found here. He says that 'what is most interesting in the analysis of mind contained in this literature is its empiricist approach and the fact that this approach produced results which are strikingly similar to those produced by modern psychologists using introspective methods...I believe that these are the first speculations putting forward a naturalistic view of mind and the closest in the ancient world to present-day psychological theories'.¹ The *raison d'être* of this new theory of perception according to Dr Sarathchandra is that 'Buddhism having cast aside the current conceptions about the soul, had to advance an alternative hypothesis to explain such functions of the senses as seeing, hearing, smelling or tasting which, in the Upaniṣadic philosophy, were activities of the Ātman residing in the respective sense-organs' (*op. cit.*, p. 3).

c14.67

¹ *Buddhist Psychology of Perception*, The Ceylon University Press, Colombo, 1958, Introductory Note, p. viii. This was originally presented as a Ph D. thesis, viz The Psychology of Perception in Pali Buddhism with special reference to the theory of bhavanga, Ph D (London), 1948.

c14.68

(745) In our opinion, this explanation puts the cart before the horse. It is not that Buddhism casts aside the concept of the soul and then evolves a completely new theory of perception altogether but that the approach of Buddhism results on the one hand in the elimination of metaphysics and on the other in the retention and development of some of the empiricist findings in the Upaniṣadic theories of perception. Let us illustrate this. The Buddhist account gives a strictly causal explanation of the origin of sense-cognition without recourse to any of the Upaniṣadic metaphysical concepts. Visual cognition, for example, results from the presence of three conditions (1) an unimpaired internal sense-organ of sight (ajjhattikaṁ...cakkhu aparibhinnam hoti, M. I.190), (2) external visible forms entering into the field of vision (bāhirā ca rūpā āpāthaṁ āgacchanti, *loc. cit.*), and (3) an appropriate² act of attention on the part of the mind (tajjo ca samannāhāro hoti, *loc. cit.*). When these conditions are satisfied, it is said that 'there is a manifestation of this kind of perception' (viññāṇa-bhāgassa pātubhāvo hoti, *loc. cit.*). All the above conditions, it is said, must be satisfied for the production of the above result. If condition (1) is satisfied but not (2) and (3), or if conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied but not (3), the result will not take place (*v.* M. I.190, lines 20 to 28). All this is in accordance with the Buddhist causal theory (*v. infra*, 766) but nevertheless the elements of the above hypothesis are traceable to the Upaniṣads and this Dr Sarathchandra (*op. cit.*, pp. 21, 22) does not seem to have noticed. Taking the ten sensory and motor organs together the Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad points out that 'the material elements cannot exist without the cognitive elements nor the cognitive elements without the material elements and from either alone no form would be possible'.¹ Except for the fact that the 'cognitive elements' are here metaphysically conceived as the agents of the sensory functions, there is a recognition of the mutual causal dependence of sensible objects and their respective cognitions. Likewise the importance of attention for sense-cognition is recognized in the Upaniṣads where it is said, 'my mind was elsewhere, I did not see, my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear, for with the mind does one see and with the mind hear' ²

c14.69

² Tajjassa ti tadanurūpassa, i e tajja- means appropriate to it, MA II 229. Sarathchandra says that 'samannāhāro' here can refer to either 'an automatic act of sensory attention' or a 'deliberate act directed by interest' (*v. op cit*, p 21). He prefers the former and adds that 'the Sanskrit is preserving the original meaning of the term' (*op cit*, p 22) but the Śālistamba Sūtra (quoted by him) merely has 'tajja- manasikāram pratītya', i e on account of the reflection resulting from it (*v.* ed N. A Śāstri, Adyar, 1950, p 15; cp. Mādhyamaka Vṛtti, ed. Poussin, p. 567.

c14.70

¹ Yaddhi bhūtamātrā na syur na prajñāmātrāḥ syur, yad vā prajñāmātrā na syur na bhūtamātrāḥ syuh, na hy anyatarato rūpaṃ kiñcana sidhyet, 3 8

c14.71

² Anyatra manā abhūvaṃ nādarśam, anyatra manā abhūvaṃ nāśrauṣam iti manasā hy eva paśyati, manasā śrṇoti, Bṛh 1 5 3

c14.72

(746) While we have rendered viññāṇa- in the above passage (i.e. M. I.190) as 'perception' Sarathchandra translates it as 'sensation' (*op. cit.*, p 21) and has a theory about it. He says that viññāṇa- in these contexts has been often 'interpreted to mean cognition' (*op cit.*, p. 4) but that it meant 'not full cognition, but bare sensation, a sort of anoetic sentience' (*loc. cit.*); later he says that 'viññāṇa in the earliest texts was almost synonymous with saññā' (*op. cit.*, p 16). This interpretation is based on the analysis of a single context (M. I.111, 112) and the alleged confirmation of this sense from the Abhidhamma (*op. cit*, pp. 4, 25). Sarathchandra promises to 'analyse the various meanings of 'viññāna' (*op. cit.*, p. 4) but this promise is not fully kept (*v. op cit.*, pp. 16–21) since he has failed to discuss those contexts in which viññāna- and the verbal forms of vi + √jñā have a distinctly cognitive connotation.

c14.73

(747) Let us examine some of these contexts. The sense of 'knowledge' for viññāṇa- is quite clear where it is said that 'the Tathāgata should be examined in order to *know* (viññāṇāya, *lit.* for the knowledge of), whether he is perfectly enlightened or not’.¹ Defining viññāṇa- it is said that ‘one discriminates (by means of it), therefore is it called knowledge’ (vijānātī ti ... tasmā viññānan ti vuccati, M. I.292); ‘what does one discriminate—one discriminates the pleasurable from the painful and the neutral’ (kiñ ca vijānāti: sukhan ti pi ... dukkhan ti pi ... adukkhamasukhan ti pi, *loc. cit.*). Paññā, a term which means ‘understanding’ and has a clearly cognitive import is placed on a par with viññāṇa-. It is said that ‘the states of paññā and viññāna are intermingled; it is not possible to analyse and specify the difference—what one understands, one knows and what one knows, one understands’ (yā ca paññā yañca viññāṇam ime dhammā samsaṭṭhā no visamsaṭṭhā, na ca labbhā imesam dhammānam vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaranam paññāpetum. Yam pājānāti tam vijānāti, yam vijānāti tam pajānāti, M. I.292). It will be seen that vijānāti is used synonymously with pajānāti, a word which is employed to denote the ‘cognizing’ of the four truths² A difference between the two words is, however, mentioned—‘paññā- is to be cultivated and viññāna- comprehended, this is the difference’ (paññā bhāvetabbā viññāṇam pariññeyyam, idam nesam nānākaraṇam, M. I.293). In other words, viññāna- seems to be the general term for ‘cognition’, while paññā is more or less restricted in connotation to the cognition of spiritual truths. In a Sutta, which says that ‘man is composed of six elements’ (chadhāturo’yam ... puriso, M. III.239), the statement is made that ‘it is with viññāna- that one understands something’ (tena viññāṇena kiñci jānāti, M III.242). This is in fact a continuation of the sense in which we find the word used in the Upaniṣads (*v. supra*, 70).

First 72 of 285 passages. Read on

Linked texts (138)