Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c14.46

c14.46

(738) The Buddhist theory of truth (*v. supra*, 596) also makes it clear that truth and therefore knowledge is objective, as telling us the nature of ‘things as they are’ (yathābhūtam). The knowledge of things as they are consists in knowing ‘what exists as “existing” and what does not exist as “*not existing*” ’ (santam vā atthī ti ñassati asantam vā natthi ti ñassati, A V.36). ‘Knowing things as they are’, it is said, ‘wherever they are, is the highest knowledge’ (etad anuttariyam . . . ñāṇānam yadidam tattha tattha yathābhūtañānam, A. V.37). What is taught by the Buddha is claimed to be objectively valid. ‘Whether the Tathāgata preaches the dhamma to his disciples or does not preach it, the dhamma remains the same’ (desento pi Tathāgato sāvakānam dhammam tādiso va adesento pi hı dhammo tādiso va, M. I.331).