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Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c7.28

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c7.28

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English

c7.28

(91) It is, however, clear from the above that the Materialists at this time attached great importance to perception as a means of knowledge, even if it is not clear whether they did hold that it was the only means of knowledge. It is not possible to ascertain whether the metaphysics of materialism preceded its epistemology or vice versa but there is undoubtedly an intimate connection between them. Śīlāṅka, the ninth-century¹ commentator on the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, seems to think that the denial of the unverifiables on the part of the Materialist is based on their epistemology and results from the acceptance of perception alone as the only means of knowledge. Speaking of the Materialists he says, ‘they argue (pramāṇayanti) as follows *there is no soul apart from the* (material elements such as) *earth, etc., because there is no means of knowledge to apprehend it* and the only means of knowledge is perception and not inference or the rest since with the latter there is no direct sense-contact with the object and error results, as a result of error and owing to the presence of obstacles they (i.e these means of knowledge) would be of a defective nature and one cannot have confidence in any of them, it has been said that “one who runs on uneven ground groping his way about (*lit.* trusting on his hands, feet, etc ) depending largely on inference is bound to fall”—this is the characteristic of inference, scripture and the rest (of the means of knowledge) for (with them) one has to move as it were by groping one’s way because there is no direct contact with objects, *therefore, perception is the only means of knowledge* (pratyakṣamevaikam pramāṇam) *and by means of it one cannot apprehend a soul different from the elements and as for the consciousness* (caitanyam) *found in their midst, it manifests itself only when the elements come together in the form of a body like the intoxicating power when the ingredients are mixed’*.² This passage tells us why the Materialists relied only on perception and how their philosophical beliefs depend on this. Perception is the only valid means of knowledge since the others are liable to error, as there is no direct sense-contact with the object in their case; therefore, there cannot be a self-identical soul since one cannot perceive it. This shows that their metaphysical beliefs had an epistemological basis according to this account of Śīlāṅka. It may be seen that from the earliest times the more sceptical minded were inclined to doubt or deny the existence of what they did not see. Much of Ṛgvedic scepticism was based on this principle (*v. supra*, 7). It would therefore not be implausible to suggest that the birth of the Materialist philosophy in India may have taken place when the principle that what one does not see does not exist, was more or less systematically worked out.¹

Cites (1)