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Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c7: Chapter II: The Historical Background II—Non-Vedic I—Materialism

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c7

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Chapter II: The Historical Background II—Non-Vedic I—Materialism

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(82) The impact of Materialist thinking on the thought of the Canon is strong (*v. infra*, 637) and it therefore seems desirable to study the epistemological doctrines of the Materialists in so far as they seem to have a bearing on the thought of the Canon.

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(83) It is customary to regard Materialism as a heterodox school, which grew up in violent opposition to Vedic thought, but our study of the concept of Lokāyata has shown that Materialist philosophy emerged within the Brāhmaṇical fold as part of its logical and metaphysical (lokāyata-) speculations. Even scholars, we notice, trace the origins of Materialist thinking to the thought of the Early Upaniṣadic period.

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(84) Das Gupta, followed in this respect by Jadunath Sinha¹ and Chattopadhyaya,² finds 'references to the lokāyata doctrine (by which he means Materialism) ... in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad VIII, 7, 8, where Virocana ... went away satisfied with the view that the self was identical with the body';³ but this is not full-fledged Materialism since this particular brand of *dehātmavāda*, as Das Gupta calls it (*loc. cit.*), entertains a belief in the after-life which is quite explicit (Ch. 8.8.5). Ruben, on the other hand, as we have seen (*v. supra*, 22) traces the origins of Materialism to the thought of Uddālaka even calling him a Materialist. There are undoubtedly certain materialistic trends in the thought of Uddālaka⁴ but we must remember that his ultimate reality Being (sat) has the quality of sentience (tad aikṣata bahu syām, Ch. 6.2.3) and creatures in some sense survive bodily death (Ch. 6.9.2.3). It nevertheless could have furnished the germs of a Materialist philosophy if these inconsistencies were got rid of.

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¹ *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 230.

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² *Lokāyata*, p. 45.

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³ *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. III, p. 528.

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⁴ Note his materialist conception of the mind (manas), which is formed of the finest essence of food (anna-) (Ch. 6.6.1).

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(85) It is perhaps not without significance that the second school of Materialists (i.e. according to the interpretation of Śīlāṅka¹) mentioned in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga (2.1.10=SBB. 2.1.22, Vol 45, p. 343) makes use of Uddālaka's *a priori* premiss that 'Being cannot come out of Non-Being' (katham asataḥ saj jāyeta, Ch 6.2 2) when it says, sato natthi vināso asato natthi sambhavo, which Jacobi translates, 'what is, does not perish, from nothing nothing comes' and which literally means, 'there is no destruction of Being, there is no origination of Non-Being'. If so Uddālaka would be the father of Indian Materialism, in the sense in which all Materialism, according to Burnet,² is said to depend on the theory of Parmenides, who was the first philosopher of Being in Greek thought to make use of this premiss

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¹ *On Sū 2 1 10*, Vol II, fol 17, sa ca Sāṃkhyamatāvalambī Lokāyatamatāvalambī vā nāstiko, i e he depends on the Sāṅkhya theory. or is a nāstika depending on the Materialist theory

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² *Early Greek Philosophy*, London and Edinburgh, 1892, pp 194-5, Hegel, Erdmann, Schwegler *et al* traced the origins of idealistic thought to Parmenides but Burnet says, 'Parmenides is not as some have said the father of idealism On the contrary, all materialism depends upon his view'

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(86) Finally, it will be noticed that the Materialists themselves seem to trace their doctrines to the Early Upaniṣads when they quote a statement attributed to Yājñavalkya in the Upaniṣads in support of their doctrines ³ It is significant that this same Yājñavalkya asks a question which has materialistic implications when, comparing man to a tree, he says, 'a mortal when cut down by death by what root does he grow up? For if with its roots they should pull up a tree, it would not come into being again '⁴ We find this same analogy used in the Mahābhārata where, as the context shows, the materialist conclusion is clearly drawn. 'If the root of a tree that is cut down does not grow up again, though its seeds germinate, where is the person who having died comes back again '⁵ It is therefore highly significant when the commentary to the Dīgha Nikāya speaking of the epistemic origins of the materialistic theories says that some 'accept Materialism on the basis of such arguments as 'beings are like tree-leaves (or trees and leaves), which when they fall, do not grow up again'.¹

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³ 'tad āhuḥ, "vyñānaghana evaitcbhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tānyevanuvinaśyati na pretya saṃjñāstī" ti,' *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, by Sāyaṇa-Mādhava, Ed V S Abhyankar, Second Edition, Poona, 1951, p 5, the quotation is from Bṛh 2 4 12.

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⁴ yat samūlam āvṛheyuh vṛkṣaṃ na punar ābhavet martyaḥ svin mṛtyunā vṛkṇaḥ kasmān mulāt prarohati, Bṛh 3 9 28 6

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⁵ Chinnasya yadī vṛkṣasya, na mūlam praturohati, bījānyasya prarohanti mṛtaḥ kva punar esyati, Śrīmanmahābhāratam, Śāntiparva, 184 14, Ed T R Krishnacharya and T R Vyasacharya, Vol 12, Bombay, 1907, p 294

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(87) If Materialism grew up as a product of the incipient rational temper of this period, it is not surprising that references to this doctrine should be found by the time of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, which mentions a class of people who hold 'this is the world, there is no other'² and deny survival.³ Later, in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, it had to be reckoned among the theories current at that time, for here reference is made to several speculative theories about the nature of reality and one of them is the 'doctrine of elements' (bhūtāni, 1.2). This may be identified either with the Materialist theory in the Buddhist texts, which upheld the reality of the four elements, viz. earth, water, fire and wind (cātummahābhūta-),⁴ or the Materialist doctrine mentioned in the Jain texts, which held that the five elements (pañcamahabbhūyā, Sū. 2.¹.10), viz. earth, water, fire, wind and air were alone real and that all things were composed of them.

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¹ Yathā rukkhapannāni patitāni na puna virūhanti, evam sattā ti ādinā takkena vā ucchedam gaṇhanti, DA I 120.

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² ayam loko nāsti para iti mānī, 1 2 6.

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³ yeyam prete vicikitsā manusye 'stītyeke nāyamastīti caike, 1.1.20

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⁴ Cp. attā rūpī cātummahābhūtiko, D. I.34, cātummahābhūtiko' yam puriso, D. I 55.

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(88) Since we are concerned only with the epistemological theories propounded and the nature of the arguments adduced in support of their doctrines by the Materialists contemporary with the rise of Buddhism, we shall confine ourselves to these aspects of their doctrines. It is, however, difficult to determine with any degree of exactness what portion or proportion of these doctrines could have been contemporary with this period, since most of the informative accounts that we have of the Materialists are of a later date. We would therefore adopt the method of stating those doctrines, which we suspect have a bearing, direct or indirect, on the thought of this period, even when the form in which they are stated is comparatively late and then endeavour in the light of the material available from the Early Jain and Buddhist sources to sift what may be early from the late.

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(89) When we consider the epistemological theories of the various schools of Materialists, we find that with regard to the opinions and theories held on the problem of the means of knowledge, it is possible to classify them into three groups, viz. (1) those who upheld the validity of perception alone and denied inference and other forms of knowledge, (2) those who upheld the validity and priority of perception, but admitted inference in a limited sense, denying other forms of knowledge, (3) those who denied all means of knowledge including perception.

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(90) Group (1) is the best known. In Mādhava's (14th c.) Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, which is the *locus classicus* for a clear and concise statement of what appears to be the widest known school of materialism, it is said that 'this school holds that perception is the *only* source of knowledge' (pratyakṣaikapramāṇavāditayā, p. 3). Earlier in the Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha of Śaṅkara (8th c.) it is stated that according to the Materialists 'only the perceived exists, the unperceived does not exist by reason of its never having been perceived'.¹ Perhaps, still earlier, in a reference to materialistic doctrines, where the account is not technical or elaborate, we find it said that the Materialists held perception to be the only source of knowledge. 'Understand, intelligent One, that no one exists hereafter; regard not that which is beyond the reach of your senses, but only that which is an object of perception'.² It is not possible to determine how early this reference in the Rāmāyaṇa could be but we find that the theory set forth here is associated with the Materialists and is criticized in the Pāli Nikāyas D. II.328, 330). Kassapa is here arguing with the kṣatriya Pāyāsi (*v.

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infra*, 136–9), who has performed a series of experiments, all based on the assumption that it is possible to verify the existence of a soul by sense-experience This shows indirectly that the Materialists represented, could only be satisfied by the evidence of the senses The argument of the Materialist is stated by his opponent as follows. 'I do not know this, I do not see this; *therefore* (tasmā) it does *not* exist' (Ahaṃ etaṃ na jānāmi, ahaṃ etaṃ na passāmi, tasmā taṃ natthī ti, *loc. cit.*). This is countered by the argument that it is wrong to infer from 'I do not see *X*' that '*X* does not exist'.³ An example is given of a man born blind (jaccandho puriso) who says he cannot see black or white forms (kaṇhasukkāni rūpāni), forms of various colours, the stars, the sun or the moon and argues that since he does not see them, such things do not exist. Pāyāsi is made to admit that such things do exist and that therefore the argument that what one does not see, does not exist, is false. We saw in the above quotation from the Rāmāyaṇa that it was implied that there was no hereafter, since the hereafter is beyond the reach of our senses (i.e. of perception) and therefore the hereafter does not exist. It is the logic of this same argument that is assailed here.

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The Materialist could, however, still maintain his case for perception by arguing that even though one may be blind, visible objects exist because they are perceived by others, whereas the other world is in principle unobservable by anybody and therefore cannot be presumed to exist. This objection is implied in the question that Pāyāsi proceeds to ask, viz. 'who tells you, Kassapa, that the gods exist' (ko pan'etam bhoto Kassapassa āroceti atthi devā . . ., *loc. cit.*). What is meant is that in the case of physical objects we can go on the information of others who have perceptual evidence of them, even if we are blind but in the case of the hereafter we cannot expect such information since no one can be presumed to have any perceptual evidence of its existence. This is met by the rejoinder that the 'other world cannot be observed in the way he thinks by the human eye' (na kho . . . evaṃ paraloko datthabbo yathā tvaṃ maññasi iminā maṃsacakkhunā, *loc. cit.*) but that it is still observable by some by means of 'clear, paranormal, clairvoyant vision' (dibbena cakkhunā visuddhena atikkantamānusakena, *loc. cit.*). It is claimed that there are recluses and brahmins who devote their lives to meditating in the forest and developing their faculty of clairvoyant vision, whereby they can observe this world and the next (imaṃ eva lokaṃ passanti paraṃ eva, *loc. cit.*).

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The Materialist is not impressed by this argument since he repeats that he is still of the former opinion,¹ presumably because he does not believe in the possibility of extrasensory perception and further discussion on these lines is dropped.

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¹ pratyakṣagamyamevāstu nāstyadṛṣṭamadṛṣṭataḥ, 2 2 3 Ed. M Raṅgācārya, Madras, 1909, p 5.

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² sa nāsti paraṃ ity etat kuru buddhiṃ mahāmate, pratyakṣaṃ yat tad ātiṣṭha parokṣaṃ pṛṣṭhataḥ kuru, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, 108 17, *v.* Ed Śrīnivāsa Śāstri Katti, Vol 2, p 992.

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³ Cp Cowell, SDS, p 14, 'when you deny the existence of an object on the ground of its not being perceived, you yourself admit an inference of which non-perception is the middle term'.

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¹ Kiñcā'pi bhavaṃ Kassapo evam āha, atha kho evaṃ me ettha hoti; iti pin'atthi paraloko, n'atthi sattā opapātikā, N'atthi sukatadukkaṭānaṃ kammānaṃ, phalaṃ vipāko ti, i e. although the reverend Kassapa says so, I am still of the opinion that there is no other world, no surviving beings, and no result or effect of good or evil deeds. Later (D. I., p 352) it is said that he was convinced by these arguments.

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(91) It is, however, clear from the above that the Materialists at this time attached great importance to perception as a means of knowledge, even if it is not clear whether they did hold that it was the only means of knowledge. It is not possible to ascertain whether the metaphysics of materialism preceded its epistemology or vice versa but there is undoubtedly an intimate connection between them. Śīlāṅka, the ninth-century¹ commentator on the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, seems to think that the denial of the unverifiables on the part of the Materialist is based on their epistemology and results from the acceptance of perception alone as the only means of knowledge. Speaking of the Materialists he says, ‘they argue (pramāṇayanti) as follows *there is no soul apart from the* (material elements such as) *earth, etc., because there is no means of knowledge to apprehend it* and the only means of knowledge is perception and not inference or the rest since with the latter there is no direct sense-contact with the object and error results, as a result of error and owing to the presence of obstacles they (i.e these means of knowledge) would be of a defective nature and one cannot have confidence in any of them, it has been said that “one who runs on uneven ground groping his way about (*lit.* trusting on his hands, feet, etc ) depending largely on inference is bound to fall”—this is the characteristic of inference, scripture and the rest (of the means of knowledge) for (with them) one has to move as it were by groping one’s way because there is no direct contact with objects, *therefore, perception is the only means of knowledge* (pratyakṣamevaikam pramāṇam) *and by means of it one cannot apprehend a soul different from the elements and as for the consciousness* (caitanyam) *found in their midst, it manifests itself only when the elements come together in the form of a body like the intoxicating power when the ingredients are mixed’*.² This passage tells us why the Materialists relied only on perception and how their philosophical beliefs depend on this. Perception is the only valid means of knowledge since the others are liable to error, as there is no direct sense-contact with the object in their case; therefore, there cannot be a self-identical soul since one cannot perceive it. This shows that their metaphysical beliefs had an epistemological basis according to this account of Śīlāṅka. It may be seen that from the earliest times the more sceptical minded were inclined to doubt or deny the existence of what they did not see. Much of Ṛgvedic scepticism was based on this principle (*v. supra*, 7). It would therefore not be implausible to suggest that the birth of the Materialist philosophy in India may have taken place when the principle that what one does not see does not exist, was more or less systematically worked out.¹

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¹ Glasenapp, *Der Jainismus*, p 107

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² On Sū 1 1 8, Vol I, fol 15, tathā (te) hi evam pramāṇayanti—na pṛthivyādi-vyatirikta ātmā’sti, tadgrāhakapramāṇābhāvāt, pramāṇam cātra pratyakṣameva, nānumānādikam tatrendriyeṇa sākṣādarthasya sambandhābhāvādvyabhicārasam-bhavaḥ, sati ca vyabhicārasambhave sadṛśe cābādhāsambhave dūṣitaṃ syād iti sarvatrānāśvāsaḥ, tathācoktam—‘hastasparśādivāndhena, viṣame pathi dhāvatā anumānapradhānena, vinipāto na durlabhaḥ’ anumānaṃ cātropalakṣaṇamāgam-ādinām api, sākṣādartha sambandhābhāvāddhastasparśaneneva pravṛttiriti, tasmāt pratyakṣamevaikam pramāṇam, tena ca bhūtavyatirikasyātmano na grahaṇam, yattu caitanyaṣ temūpalabhyate, tad bhūteṣv eva kāyākāraparinateṣv abhivyajyate madyāṅgesu samuditeṣu madaśaktivad iti

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¹ Cp those who did not believe in gods or sacrifices in the Ṛgveda (RV. 8, 70 7, 71 8, 10 38.3), these contexts mention the 'godless man' (adevah)

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(92) Whatever the views held by the Materialists contemporary with or prior to Early Buddhism, there is every reason to believe that group (1) taken as a whole denied the validity of inference altogether. This is evident from the accounts given of the Materialist criticisms of inference in Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasaṁgraha (1457-9), Kamalaśīla's Pañjikā (*ibid.*), Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī² and the Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha (Ch. I). In this respect group (2) is in agreement with group (3), which also criticizes anumāna (inference). A fairly adequate account of these group (1) criticisms of inference have been given by Das Gupta³ and Jadunath Sinha⁴ and we do not propose to repeat this here. A brief account of the group (1) criticisms of inference as taught in the Nyāya school is given by Radhakrishnan and Moore⁵ although the criticisms of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa are specifically directed against the conceptions of inference found both in the schools of the Nyāya as well as the Buddhists (*v. infra*, 105, 106). Of these accounts, Jayarāśi's criticisms are the most specific and elaborate while the simplest and the most general account appears to be that given in the Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha. The gist of the argument here is that inference cannot be shown to be a valid mode of knowledge unless it can be proved that there are good grounds for knowing the truth of universal propositions (vyāpti) as well as their necessity. Now universal propositions or universals cannot be known by perception, for perception whether external or internal (i.e. introspection) is of particulars, with which we are acquainted through sense-experience or introspection. They cannot be claimed to be known through inference for this would lead to infinite regress. It cannot be testimony for this is either a form of inference or implies inference and if we accept testimony we would have to believe anything whatsoever on authority. Nor can it be analogy (upamāna) for this merely relates a name to a thing named. Likewise, the necessary connection between causes and effects asserted by universal propositions cannot be established and the connection may very well be a coincidence.

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² Ed Pandit S. S Nārāyaṇa Śukla, Benares, 1936, pp 108, 109, *v.* anumānaprāmāṇyākṣepaḥ

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³ HIP, Vol. III, 533 ff.

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⁴ HIP, Vol. I, 235 ff.

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⁵ *Op cit*, pp. 236-46

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(93) It is obvious that even this simplest account is far too sophisticated to have its roots in the period of Early Buddhism. Does this mean that the criticism of inference is a later development and that in the earliest period inference of some kind was admitted along with perception? If the Materialists were among the first thinkers in India to argue and thus develop the tarkaśāstra—it seems *prima facie* unlikely that they would have discarded anumāna so early, especially after realizing that it was the mainstay of the hetuśāstra. They had to argue very sharply against their opponents and they would have cut the ground beneath their feet if they denied the logical basis of their reasoning altogether and admitted its total invalidity. When we examine the reasoning behind some of Pāyāsi's experiments (*v. infra*, 136-9) we notice that he makes use of inference, though it is inference based on sense-perception, despite his fundamental assumptions, namely that the soul is visible or has weight being mistaken. Besides, the argument of the Materialists is put by the Buddhist in the form '*etam na jānāmi etam na passāmi*, tasmā tam natthi' and we have some reason to believe that the phrase 'jānāmi passāmi' is used in the Buddhist texts (*v infra*, 783) to denote 'perception and inductive inference based on perception' though Buddhism uses 'perception' in a wider sense to include extra-sensory perception If this is so, then in the context of the Materialist this phrase should mean 'sense-perception and inductive inference'. In other words perception has priority as the basic means of knowing though inference also plays a limited part when what is inferred is in principle verifiable by sense-perception.

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(94) Another reason for surmising that inference in this sense is possibly a part of the early doctrine of Materialism of at least one of the schools is that it appears to have been held by group (2), represented by the views ascribed to Purandara in Kamalaśīla's Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā ¹ The statement ascribed to Purandara² is as follows·

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¹ 1482-3, p 41, *v.* Das Gupta, *op cit*, Vol III, p 536, fn 2

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² Tucci has shown that Purandara was a 'Cārvāka-mate granthakāra' (an author of a book on Materialism), *v.* 'A Sketch of Indian Materialism', PIPC., 1925, p 36.

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Purandaras tv āha, lokaprasiddham anumānam Cārvākairapīṣyata eva yattu kaiścillaukikam mārgamatikramya anumānamucyate tannisiddhyate, i.e. Purandara says that it is well known that even the Materialists accept inference although they object to people (kaiścit) employing inference beyond the limits of sense-perception (*lit.* beyond the path of this world). This view attributed to Purandara is confirmed by the references made to him by the Jain commentator Vādideva Sūri who, as Das Gupta has pointed out,¹ quotes in his commentary Syādvādaratnākara (II.131) on his Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra a sūtra of Purandara, viz. pramāṇasya gaunatvād anumānādarthaniścayadurlabhāt, i.e. from the very nature of this means of knowledge, it is difficult to determine (the existence of transcendent) objects by means of inference(?). The sense of this sūtra is however made clear by Vādideva's comment, laukikahetūnām anumeyāvagame nimittaṁ sa nāsti tantrasiddheṣv iti na tebhyaḥ parokṣārthāvagamo nyāyyo 'ta idamuktam anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ. Das Gupta's translation of this passage appears to be more of the nature of a commentary than a translation.² We may translate it more or less literally as follows: 'since in transcendent proofs (tantrasiddheṣu, *lit.* what is proved in religious texts) the basis for inference is absent unlike in the case of perceptual inferences, a knowledge of transcendent objects cannot be had (nyāyyo, *lit.* inferred) by them;

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therefore has it been said that "it is difficult to determine (the existence of transcendent) objects by means of inference".' This shows the existence of a school of Materialists who admitted perception and empirical inference but discarded metaphysical inference on the grounds that what was in principle unperceivable was unknowable. For a valid inference to be possible, it is necessary to establish the truth of a universal proposition (vyāpti), which reveals a concomitance between a hetu and an anumeya (==sādhya-, cp. laukikahetūnām anumeyāvagame) and this is not possible unless both are in principle observables. It is difficult to say whether this school asserted that there was a necessary connection between cause and effect or merely held that the concomitance or sequence was only probable and therefore the inference was only probable. It is worth noting that one of the objections against inference brought out by group (1) was that there was no necessity in the concomitance, despite our repeated observation of several instances.

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As Jayanta says in elucidating the theories of the Materialists, 'universality (vyāpti) is not established even by the observation of several instances (bhūyodarśanagamyā'pi) since there is the possibility of error even after observing a thousand instances though we come to the conclusion that smoke and fire are concomitant (sahacārī, *lit.* go together) by observing several instances we cannot know that there is no smoke in the absence of fire despite this repeated observation'.¹ But whether they made this latter qualification (which, incidentally, is the same as the objection that Hume raised against causation and inference²) or not, it is clear that in limiting the inferable to the sphere of the verifiable, they were tacitly assuming the truth of the Verification Principle³ and it is therefore this group rather than group (3) (*v. supra*, 89) which deserves to be called a positivist⁴ school of thought Purandara's statement that it is well known (lokaprasiddham, *lit* known the world over) that the materialists accepted inference does not make sense unless they or the majority of them had in fact accepted the validity of both perception and inference in the above sense up to that time.

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That the reference to this school is not confined to Purandara's statements and their exposition is evident from the reference made to it by the Jain commentator Gunaratna who in his Tarkarahasyadīpikā commenting on the phrase, mānaṁ tvakṣajameva hi, in verse 83 of the Saddarśanasamuccaya says that 'the particle "hi" in this phrase is added to denote a distinction, the distinction being that at times (kvacana) the Cārvākas welcome inferences such as "smoke" (implies fire) which are limited to stating what is within the reach of the world but not transcendent inferences (alaukikamanumānam) which (claim to) establish (the existence of) heaven, what is unseen (adṛṣṭa), etc.'¹ The fact that Vāsideva Sūri and Guṇaratna are Jains and the other reference was in a Buddhist work shows that at least the Buddhist and Jain tradition was well aware of the existence of this school. When we consider this in the light of what we know of the Materialists from the Early Buddhist and Jain sources it seems probable that these early Materialists or at least one school among them believed in the validity of *both* perception and inference while giving priority to perception and restricting inference within the limits of the verifiable.

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¹ *Op cit*, Vol III, p 536, fn 2.

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² 'Thus since in the supposed supra-sensuous transcendent world no case of hetu agreeing with the presence of its sādhya can be observed, no inductive generalization or law of concomitance can be made relating to that sphere.'

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¹ bhūyodarśanagamyā'pi na vyāptir avakalpate sahasraśo'pi taddṛṣṭe vyabhicārāvadhāranāt bhūyo dṛṣṭvā ca dhūmo'gnisahacārītīgamyatām anagnau tu sa nāstīti na bhūyodarśanādgatiḥ, Nyāyamañjarī, p 109

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² *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Vol I, Part III, Section XIV Cp p 169 'If we define a cause to be an object precedent and contiguous to one another and where all the objects resembling the former are placed in a like relation of priority and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter, we may easily conceive that there is no absolute nor metaphysical necessity, that every beginning of existence should be attended with such an object'

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³ Warnock, *English Philosophy since 1900*, pp 44 ff

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⁴ Basham speaks of 'the positivism of Ajita' (*op cit*, p. 271) but he does not clarify his usage Warder (*v infra*, 97) uses the term of group (3) but as we have shown this is quite unjustifiable

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(95) The third group of Materialists, as classified according to their epistemological theories, is represented by Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa's Tattvopaplavasiṁha, which is the only extant authentic text of the Materialists (lokāyata). Although this work was published in 1940, very few scholars seem to have taken note of it. Ruben (1954),² Jadunath Sinha (1956)³ and Sharma (1960)⁴ make no reference to it in discussing the philosophy of the Materialists and Chattopādhyāya (1959), who professes to make a specialized study of lokāyata-,⁵ begins his book by lamenting the lack of any treatise of this school.

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² *Op. cit.*, however, he has more recently written an article on this subject entitled, 'Über den Tattvopaplavasiṁha des Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa eine Agnostizistische Erkenntniskritik' appearing in, 'Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud-und Ostasiens und Archiv fur indische Philosophie, Band II', 1958, pp. 140–53

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³ *Op cit*

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⁵ *Op cit.*, p 6, '. . . in the ocean of uncertainty concerning the lost Lokāyata the only piece of definite information is that we are left with no original work on it'.

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(96) The Tattvopaplavasiṁha refers to another work of the same school, the Lakṣaṇasāra (p. 20) or the 'Essence of Definition (?)', which may be his own work since after criticizing two of the characteristics of perception (avyabhicāri, vyavasāyātmakam) according to the Nyāya definition (N.S. 1.¹.⁴) he refers the reader to the above work for the criticism of the other characteristic (avyapadeśyam). As the editors have pointed out (pp. iii, iv), the reference in Śrī Harṣa's Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya to a school of the Lokāyatas, which like the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism and the school of Śaṅkara is said to have denied the validity of all means of knowledge (pramāṇas) is most probably a reference to this school.

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¹ P. 306, hi śabdo'tra viśeṣaṇārtho vartate, viśeṣaḥ punas Cārvākairlokayātrānirvahaṇapravaṇam dhūmādyanumānam iṣyate kvacana, na punaḥ svargādṛṣṭādiprasādhakam alaukikaṁ anumānaṁ iti.

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⁴ C. D. Sharma, *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1960.

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(97) The interest of this school for us lies in the fact that it seems to throw some light on a school of thought mentioned in the Nikāyas, which represented a standpoint of absolute nihilism or logical scepticism in rejecting all views but which at the same time has been called an ‘annihilationist’ (ucchedavāda-) or Materialist school (*v. infra*, 335). It also appears to explain a certain usage (*v. infra*, 116) of a phrase attributed to the early Materialists which would otherwise be inexplicable. Warder has seen in this branch of Lokāyata philosophers ‘not materialists but positivists according to modern ideas’ (*op cit*, p. 52) and says that ‘we may perhaps connect Jayarāśi Bhatta’s theory with Sañjaya Belatthiputta in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta, which, however, is stated as merely agnostic or sceptic without positivist content’ (*ibid*, p 53). He calls Jayarāśi Bhatta ‘a positivist’ (*ibid.*) and this branch of Lokāyata as ‘the positivist branch’ (*ibid.*) which rejected perception whereas the ‘ordinary Lokāyata as described in the Tattvasamgraha and elsewhere allows perception as the only means of cognition’ (*ibid.*). He adds that this ‘positivist trend may have been a later development in the Lokāyata-Cārvāka school rather than an early rival branch of Bārhaspatya’ (*ibid.*) The editors of this text have also expressed the view that this work ‘carries to its logical end the sceptical tendency of the Cārvāka school’ (p 1) and have raised the question as to whether the author of this work is a mere sophist who has no views of his own, although they themselves do not think so (p xiii).

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(98) We may state at the outset that we do not agree with Warder’s assessment of this philosophy as positivism and our objection is not that he is, as he says at the end of his paper, applying ‘modern philosophical terms’ to ‘ancient doctrines’ (*v. op cit.*, p. 62) Nor can we see much of a connection between this philosophy and the views expressed by the sceptic Sañjaya And since this early school of absolute nihilists or logical sceptics, who have also been called materialists, seems to contain the basic concepts of this philosophy we are more inclined to entertain the possibility that the germinal ideas or the roots of this school go back to the period of the Pālı Nikāyas and that this school was possibly an early rival branch of the other school which at that time accepted at least the validity of perception if not of inference as well

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(99) Since this work has been untranslated¹ and largely ignored since its publication it seems desirable to give a brief account of its nature and contents before we form any conclusions about it. The work claims to be, as the editors have shown (pp. xi, xii) a text of the Lokāyata school. The author quotes Bṛhaspati who is sometimes mentioned by name with great respect (pp. 45, 88) and is once called the Sūtrakāra- (p. 79). In the second paragraph of his work he cites the proposition 'earth, water, fire, air are the real elements (tattvāni); by their combination (arise) the body, the senses, objects and consciousness'¹ which Guṇaratna in his Tarkarahasyadīpikā quotes² as the statement of Vācaspati (=Bṛhaspati). He also quotes with approval the sayings 'the worldly path should be followed... fools and the wise are alike in the eyes of the world'³ which he attributes to the wisest of men (paramārthavidbhiḥ).

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¹ Except for a brief extract of the criticism of anumāna in the Nyāya school, given in Radhakrishnan and Moore (*op cit*, pp 236–46)

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¹ pṛthivyāpastejovāyuriti tattvāni tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviṣayasaṃjñā, p 1.

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² Guṇaratna's quotation adds caitanya as a by-product of the rest, yaduvāca Vācaspatiḥ, pṛthivyāpastejovāyuriti tattvāni tatsamudāye śarīraviṣayendriyasaṃjñā, tebhyaścaitanyam, *op cit*, p. 307 It may also be noticed that viṣaya- is placed before indriya- in this The addition of caitanya- strongly suggests that this was the view of the school which admitted an emergent ātman considered a by-product, which Śīlāṅka distinguishes from the other school (*v. infra*, 115).

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³ laukiko mārgo'nusarttavyaḥ... lokavyavahāramprati sadṛśau bālapanditau, p 1

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(100) And now begins the problem. He speaks of the tattvas (four elements) of the Lokāyata, but shows that we have no grounds for affirming that they are real. He uses an epistemological argument: 'We can talk of a means of knowledge (māna) only if it is valid (sallakṣaṇanibandhanam mānavyavasthānam, *lit.* the determination of a means of knowledge depends on its having the characteristic of existence) and the proof of the (existence of the) objects of knowledge (meyasthitiḥ) depends on the means of knowledge but if there is no means of knowledge (tadabhāve) how can we speak of the real existence of both (objects as well as means of knowledge)'.⁴ This is not claimed to be a disproof of Bṛhaspati's proposition (quoted above) for it is said that in asserting that earth, etc., were tattvas he was indirectly referring to (pratibimbanārtham, *lit.* reflecting) the fact that if even what is widely accepted as real does not bear critical examination (vicāryamānāni na vyatiṣṭhante), then what of other things (kiṃ punar anyāni). But this is surely a departure from the materialist thesis, for how can a person who does not believe in the objective existence of the material elements be called a materialist? Jayarāśi, therefore, cannot be reckoned a materialist, as far as his theory of the external world is concerned. He seems to deny the real existence of both this world as well as the next, in denying the reality of all tattvas and his work as its name implies is intended to 'upset all principles' (tattva-upaplava-) epistemological as well as ontological, and he claims to have done so at the end of his work (tadevam upaplutesu tattvesu, p. 125).

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⁴ sallakṣaṇanibandhanam mānavyavasthānam, mānanibandhanā ca meyasthitiḥ, tadabhāve tayoh sadvyavahāraviṣayatvam katham... p. 1.

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(101) His epistemological argument (assuming that his disproof of the pramānas is valid) only goes to prove that we do not or cannot *know* that there are real objects of knowledge and not that such objects do not exist. In other words, his argument should have led him to scepticism and not to nihilism But it is important to observe that nowhere in his work does he claim to be a sceptic or grant the possibility of the existence of things even if he cannot know them. On the contrary he even uses metaphysical arguments (*v. infra*, 104) to disprove the existence of the soul He is therefore not a sceptic but an absolute nihilist in his metaphysics though he may be called a logical sceptic in so far as he is sceptical of (i e. doubts or denies) the possibility of knowledge.

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(102) Though he is not a materialist, we may perhaps concede that he shows a certain partiality for materialism in that he seems to imply that the material tattvas have a greater claim to reality by the common consent of the world (loke prasiddhāni, p 1) On pragmatic grounds (vyavahāraḥ kriyate) he says that we should believe in the existence of the body, of physical objects (ghaṭādau) and of pleasure (sukha-) (p. 1) and recommends as a wise saying that the 'way of the world (laukiko margah) should be followed'. As he thus seems to recommend the materialist way of life, we may call him a pragmatic but not a metaphysical materialist.

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(103) Jayarāśi's work is almost exclusively devoted to epistemology, if not for a brief section in which he criticizes the ātman-theories of Nyāya (pp. 74–8), Jainism (pp. 78–9), Sāṅkhya (pp. 79–81), Vedānta (pp. 81–2) and Mīmāmsā (pp. 82–3). We shall translate a section in which he criticizes a Vedānta theory (not that of Śankara) of the ātman since this would throw some light on the nature of his reasoning and the question as to whether he is a positivist. He is criticizing the theory that the soul (or pure ego) is of a blissful nature (ānandarūpam) and is absolute (kaivalyam). He proceeds as follows:¹ 'Those who posit the blissful nature and absoluteness of the soul do not speak with reason. Why? If the soul has a blissful nature and it is introspective (svasaṃvedyam), then this experience will be present (prasaktam) in its saṃsāric state, in which case the effort to attain salvation is futile. If on the other hand this is not experienced in the saṃsāric state, the soul would have the nature of being enveloped with primeval defilements. Just as a jar when concealed under a cloth is not recognized as a jar, the soul when smeared with defilements is not known as a soul but this (argument) is false, since there is no congruity (vaiṣamyāt) between the instance and the example. In the case of our not recognizing the jar when it is hidden beneath the cloth there is no contact of the jar with the organ of sense, owing to the cloth concealing it and in its absence the sense-cognition of the jar does not take place. But here in the case of what is covered with defilements, what is concealed? The concealment of the experiencer and the object of experience cannot take place for the experiencer (vedaka-) and the experienced (vedyam) are of the nature of the soul. As in the case of the consciousness (vijñānam) of the Buddhists (Bauddhānām), it is experienced in the presence or the absence of objects. Since introspectibility is of the nature of the soul, it is experienced in the presence or the absence of defilements, as owing to the inactivity (akiñcitkaratvāt) of the defilements the soul persists as a different object. But if the defilements are identical with the soul, then in saying "the defilements are removed", are you not saying that the soul is removed, in which case it can be objected that there is no salvation!'² (104) In all his criticisms of the ātman-theories, Jayarāśi is employing dialectical arguments to disprove his opponent's thesis. In the above instance, it would be seen that he takes up the proposition p (ātmā ānandarūpam), put forward by his opponent. He then says that p implies the truth either of q (ātmā ānandarūpam svasaṃvedyam) or not-q (ātmā ānandarūpam avedyam) Both lead to contradictions showing that p is false. q implies r (moksārthaprayāso niṣphalaḥ), which contradicts one of the propositions or assumptions of his opponent's system. Not-q is self-contradictory, since q is self-evident (cp. vedyam vedyakañ ca ātmasvarūpam eva). Therefore, his opponent's thesis p, is false. They are not the arguments of a positivist,¹ who wishes to show that no meaning can be attached to the concept of an ātman (soul) and hence it should be dispensed with, but the kind of argument that any metaphysician would employ against (to use a phrase of F. H. Bradley)² his 'brother metaphysician'.

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¹ Ye'pi ānandarūpam ātmanaḥ, kaivalyam abhidadhati te'pi yuktivādino na bhavanti Katham? Yady ātmanaḥ ānandarūpaṃ svasaṃvedyañ ca, tadā saṃsārāvasthāyām api tat vedyaṃ prasaktaṃ, tataś ca moksārthaprayāso niṣphalaḥ. Atha saṃsārāvasthāyāṃ na vedyate anādimalāvaguṇṭhitaṃ ātmanaḥ svarūpaṃ, yathā paṭāntarite ghaṭe ghaṭabuddhir na bhavati, evaṃ malāliptet ātmani ātmabuddhir na bhavati, tad etad ayuktam, dṛṣṭāntadārṣṭāntikayoḥ vaiṣamyāt—paṭāntarite ghaṭe paṭabuddhir na bhavati patāntardhāne sati indriyeṇa sākam sambandho nāsti tadbhāvād ghaṭe nendriyajaṃ vijñānam sampadyate Iha tu punaḥ malāvaguṇṭhanena kasya vyavadhānam kriyate? na vedyavedakayor vyavadhānaṃ kriyate Vedyaṃ vedakañ ca ātmasvarūpam eva—yathā Bauddhānāṃ svasaṃvedyaṃ vijñānam tac ca viṣayasadbhāve 'pi vedyate tadabhāve'pi vedyate, yathātmanaḥ, svasaṃvedyaṃ svarūpam malasadbhāve'pi vedyate tadasadbhāve'pi vedyate, malasyākiñcitkaratvād ātmano 'rthāntaratvenāvasthānāt Atha tādātmyena sthitāni malāni, tadā'malāny apanīyante' kimuktaṃ bhavati? Ātmā'panīyate, tataś ca moksābhāvaprasangaḥ, pp. 81, 82.

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² For a similar argument, *v* Sthiramati, *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*, Edition par Susumu Yamaguchi, Nagoya, 1934, pp. 60 ff.

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¹ Cp Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, p 151, Sections 5 631–3

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² *Appearance and Reality*, Second Edition, London, 1906, p 1, 'He is a brother metaphysician with a rival theory of first principles'

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(105) The rest of Jayarāśi's work is devoted entirely to the discussion of epistemological topics. He criticizes theories of the validity of knowledge put forward by the Mīmāṃsā school (pp 22–7) and the Buddhists (pp. 22–32). Almost half the work is concerned with the criticism of the validity of perception as upheld in the Nyāya (pp 2–22), by the Buddhists (pp. 32–58), in the Mīmāṃsā (pp. 58–61) and the Sāṅkhya (pp. 61–4) It is followed by the criticism of the theory of inference (anumāna) in the Nyāya (pp 64–74) and of the Buddhists (pp 83–109). The concluding section is a criticism of knowledge based on authority (śabda-, āptokti-), where the apauruṣeya- theory (pp 116–20) and the views of the grammarians (pp 120–5) are discussed. A page or two is devoted to the criticism of the arthāpatti (presumption)—theory of Mīmāṃsā, as well as upamāna (comparison) and abhāva (negation) as means of knowledge (pp. 109–13) Sambhava- (inclusion) and aitihya- (report) are dismissed in two sentences (p. 113), the former being subsumed under inference (anumāna) and the latter under scriptural tradition (āgama). The space devoted to each possibly reflects to some extent the importance attached to these theories at the period in which he wrote, but we cannot fail to observe that he begins his work with the criticism of perception and then only goes on to discuss the problems of the validity of knowledge in general Consider-ing also the space allotted to the criticisms of perception one gets the impression that the author thought that if perception, which was universally accepted and that even by some of the Materialist schools, was demolished, it goes without saying that no means of knowledge could be valid.

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(106) His technique of argument is throughout the same and his criticisms are almost invariably directed against some specific theory. We may illustrate this by taking a few passages. In criticizing the Buddhist theory of perception, he takes up the definition of perception in the Nyāyabindu (1.4), viz. ‘perception is free of construction (kalpanā’ podham) and is incorrigible (abhrāntam)’.^1 He argues as follows: ‘One should not say this since the sense of “free” (apohā) in the phrase “free of construction” is not to be found. Then is kalpanā itself to be excluded (apohyā)? What is kalpanā? Is the consciousness that arises with qualifications of quality, motion, species, etc., kalpanā, or is kalpanā the consciousness that produces memory or is it of the nature of memory, or does it arise from memory, or is it a reflection of the contact with speech, or is it the apprehension of speech, or is it of an unclear nature, or has it the nature of apprehending unreal objects, or is it itself unreal or is it the seeing of objects accompanied by inference (trirūpālliṅga-^2 gato’rthadṛś), or is it a reflection of objects past or future?’^3 'Now if kalpanā is the consciousness that arises with the qualifications of quality, motion, species, etc., does it arise from unmanifest qualifications of quality motion, species, etc., or from manifest (qualifications)? If it is from unmanifest qualifications, it will not do, as there would be no kalpanā since it cannot be produced by what is unmanifest. But if kalpanā arises from manifest qualifications of quality, motion, species, etc., does the knowledge of kalpanā (kalpanājñānam) have an object or have no object? If the knowledge of kalpanā has an object, it will not do, for even when it produces quality, motion, species, etc., it will not be kalpanā, owing to the incongruity of the presence of an appropriate object. If kalpanā has no object, then the absence of an object being itself the cause of kalpanā, there would not arise the qualifications of quality, motion, species, etc. If it is without an object, then there would be no knowledge of kalpanā, nor knowledge of no kalpanā (akalpanājñānam) but pure knowledge. If kalpanā has the nature of knowledge, all knowledge would be knowledge of kalpanā.'

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¹ ^1 Pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham abhrāntam, p 32

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² ^2 *Lit* ‘the middle term which has the three characteristics (of a valid syllogism)’ viz ‘the existence (of the middle term) in the probandum, in what is like the *probandum* and its absence in what is not (like the *probandum*)’ (anumeye’tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāstitāsati), *v.* Randle, *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, pp. 181 ff., cp. H. N Randle, *Fragments from Dinnāga*, London, 1926, pp. 22–5; also, Bochenski, *Formale Logik*, p 503, 53 10 and 53 11. He gives the formal rules as
(1) M is present in S (the fire on the mountain)
(2) M is present in XP (there is smoke in the kitchen which has fire)
(3) M is not present in X-Not-P (there is no smoke in the lake which has no fire).

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³ ^3 Iti na vaktavyam, kalpanāpodhapadasya apohyārthāsambhavāt. Nanu kalpanaiva apohyā? Ke’yam kalpanā? Kim guṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣanotpāditam vijñānam kalpanā, āho smṛtyutpādakam vijñānam kalpanā, smṛtirūpam vā, smṛtyutpādyam vā, abhilāpasaṃsarganirbhāso vā, abhilāpavatī pratītir vā kalpanā, aspaṣtākarā, vā, atāttvikārthagrahīturūpā, vā, svayam vā’tāttvikī, trirūpālliṅgagato’ rthadṛgvā, atītānāgatārthanirbhāsā vā? Tad yadī guṇacalanajātyādi viśeṣanotpāditam vijñānam kalpanā; tat kim avidyamānaguṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣanotpādyatvena kalpanā, uta vidyamānotpādyatvena? Tad yadī avidyamānaguṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣanotpādyatvena kalpanātvam tad ayuktam, avidyamānasya janakatvābhāvād eva akalpanātvam. Atha vidyamānaguṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣanotpādyatvena kaplanā, tat kim saviṣayam

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'Now if kalpanā is the knowledge that produces memory, it will not do, for memory arises even from the seeing of forms, etc., and that is not kalpanā.'

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(107) It will be noticed from the above that Jayarāśi's method of attack consists in taking the concept of kalpanā, suggesting various alternative definitions, showing that some of these definitions (e g. smṛtyutpādakam jñānam kalpanā) do not apply, while others (e.g gunacalanajātyādiviśeṣanotpāditam vijñānam kalpanā) lead to contradictions. The concept of kalpanā is therefore presumed to be self-contradictory and a definition which contains this concept is untenable Since the best definitions of perception are all untenable, it is assumed that no true account of perception is possible and therefore perception as a means of knowledge is invalid.

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(108) The criticism of the Nyāya account of perception proceeds on similar lines. The author takes up the definition of perception as given kalpanājñānam, nirviṣayam vā? Tad yadı saviṣayam sat kalpanājñānam, tad ayuktam, guṇacalanajātyādijanyatve'pi na kalpanātvam arthasāmarthyasamudbhavatvasyānatıvṛtteḥ Atha nirviṣayam sat kalpanā tadā nirviṣayatvam eva kalpanātve kāraṇam na guṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣaṇajanyatvam; yadī ca tan nirviṣayam, tadā na kalpanājñānam, nāpyakalpanājñānam, jñānamātratā syāt, jñānātmatayā ca kalpanātve sarvaṃ jñānaṃ, kalpanājñānaṃ syāt

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Atha smṛtyutpādakam jñānaṃ kalpanā, tad ayuktam, rūpādidarśanād apı smṛtır utpadyate, na ca kalpanātvam *Op cit*, pp 32-3 in the Nyāyasūtra (1.1.4), viz. 'Perception arises from contact between sense-organ and object, is determinate (avyapadeśyam), non-erroneous (avyabhicārī) and non-erratic (vyavasāyātmakam)'.¹ Jayarāśi argues as follows:² 'It is non-erroneous (avyabhicārī) . . . (the text is here defective and words have been omitted) . . . Does its non-erroneousness consist in its arising from an abundance of non-defective causes or in the absence of obstacles or in the efficiency of the process or in any other way? If its non-erroneousness arises from an abundance of non-defective causes, in what way is the non-defective nature of the causes known? It is not from perception, since the proficiency of the eye, etc., is beyond the grasp of the senses. Nor is it from inference, since one does not apprehend a basis for inference (lingāntara-). Is not (then) this very knowledge the basis, which gives rise to the knowledge of its excellence? If so, the mutual dependence results in a difficulty. And what is it? A suspicion of defect in a cognition which arises in dependence on the virtues and defects of the senses, is not dispelled as in the case of a consciousness of sound produced by the effort of a person'.

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¹ indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicārī vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam, p. 2.

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² Tac cāvyabhicārī . . kim aduṣṭakārakasandohotpādyatvena, āhosvid bādhārahitatvena, pravṛttisāmarthyena, anyathā vā? Tad yady aduṣṭakārakasandohotpādyatvena avyabhicāritvam, saiva karaṇānām aduṣṭatā kenāvamyate? Na pratyakṣena, nayanakuśalāder atīndriyatvāt; nāpyanumānena liṅgāntarānavagateḥ. Nanu idam eva jñānam liṅgam taduttham tasya viśiṣṭatām gamayati; yady evam itaretarāśrayatvam duruttaram āpanīpadyate Kiñca indriyāṇām guṇadoṣāśrayatve tadutthe vijñāne doṣāśaṅkā nātivartate pumvyāpārotpāditaśabdavijñāna iva, *op cit*, p. 2

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(109) Jayarāśi seems to have picked out the characteristic of avyabhicārī despite the fact that avyapadeśya- occurs earlier in the definition in order to spotlight the fact that since perception cannot be shown to be non-erroneous it must be erroneous. This he demonstrates by suggesting different senses of avyabhicārī and arguing that the truth of none of them can be established.

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Cites (45)