Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c7.32
Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c7.32
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- English
c7.32
(92) Whatever the views held by the Materialists contemporary with or prior to Early Buddhism, there is every reason to believe that group (1) taken as a whole denied the validity of inference altogether. This is evident from the accounts given of the Materialist criticisms of inference in Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasaṁgraha (1457-9), Kamalaśīla's Pañjikā (*ibid.*), Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī² and the Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha (Ch. I). In this respect group (2) is in agreement with group (3), which also criticizes anumāna (inference). A fairly adequate account of these group (1) criticisms of inference have been given by Das Gupta³ and Jadunath Sinha⁴ and we do not propose to repeat this here. A brief account of the group (1) criticisms of inference as taught in the Nyāya school is given by Radhakrishnan and Moore⁵ although the criticisms of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa are specifically directed against the conceptions of inference found both in the schools of the Nyāya as well as the Buddhists (*v. infra*, 105, 106). Of these accounts, Jayarāśi's criticisms are the most specific and elaborate while the simplest and the most general account appears to be that given in the Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha. The gist of the argument here is that inference cannot be shown to be a valid mode of knowledge unless it can be proved that there are good grounds for knowing the truth of universal propositions (vyāpti) as well as their necessity. Now universal propositions or universals cannot be known by perception, for perception whether external or internal (i.e. introspection) is of particulars, with which we are acquainted through sense-experience or introspection. They cannot be claimed to be known through inference for this would lead to infinite regress. It cannot be testimony for this is either a form of inference or implies inference and if we accept testimony we would have to believe anything whatsoever on authority. Nor can it be analogy (upamāna) for this merely relates a name to a thing named. Likewise, the necessary connection between causes and effects asserted by universal propositions cannot be established and the connection may very well be a coincidence.
Cites (4)
- Nyāyamañjarī — Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Sanskrit
- Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha — Mādhava, Sanskrit
- Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā — Classical Tibetan
- Tattvasaṃgraha — Śāntarakṣita, Sanskrit