Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c7.37
Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c7.37
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c7.37
(93) It is obvious that even this simplest account is far too sophisticated to have its roots in the period of Early Buddhism. Does this mean that the criticism of inference is a later development and that in the earliest period inference of some kind was admitted along with perception? If the Materialists were among the first thinkers in India to argue and thus develop the tarkaśāstra—it seems *prima facie* unlikely that they would have discarded anumāna so early, especially after realizing that it was the mainstay of the hetuśāstra. They had to argue very sharply against their opponents and they would have cut the ground beneath their feet if they denied the logical basis of their reasoning altogether and admitted its total invalidity. When we examine the reasoning behind some of Pāyāsi's experiments (*v. infra*, 136-9) we notice that he makes use of inference, though it is inference based on sense-perception, despite his fundamental assumptions, namely that the soul is visible or has weight being mistaken. Besides, the argument of the Materialists is put by the Buddhist in the form '*etam na jānāmi etam na passāmi*, tasmā tam natthi' and we have some reason to believe that the phrase 'jānāmi passāmi' is used in the Buddhist texts (*v infra*, 783) to denote 'perception and inductive inference based on perception' though Buddhism uses 'perception' in a wider sense to include extra-sensory perception If this is so, then in the context of the Materialist this phrase should mean 'sense-perception and inductive inference'. In other words perception has priority as the basic means of knowing though inference also plays a limited part when what is inferred is in principle verifiable by sense-perception.