Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c7.72

c7.72

(106) His technique of argument is throughout the same and his criticisms are almost invariably directed against some specific theory. We may illustrate this by taking a few passages. In criticizing the Buddhist theory of perception, he takes up the definition of perception in the Nyāyabindu (1.4), viz. ‘perception is free of construction (kalpanā’ podham) and is incorrigible (abhrāntam)’.^1 He argues as follows: ‘One should not say this since the sense of “free” (apohā) in the phrase “free of construction” is not to be found. Then is kalpanā itself to be excluded (apohyā)? What is kalpanā? Is the consciousness that arises with qualifications of quality, motion, species, etc., kalpanā, or is kalpanā the consciousness that produces memory or is it of the nature of memory, or does it arise from memory, or is it a reflection of the contact with speech, or is it the apprehension of speech, or is it of an unclear nature, or has it the nature of apprehending unreal objects, or is it itself unreal or is it the seeing of objects accompanied by inference (trirūpālliṅga-^2 gato’rthadṛś), or is it a reflection of objects past or future?’^3 'Now if kalpanā is the consciousness that arises with the qualifications of quality, motion, species, etc., does it arise from unmanifest qualifications of quality motion, species, etc., or from manifest (qualifications)? If it is from unmanifest qualifications, it will not do, as there would be no kalpanā since it cannot be produced by what is unmanifest. But if kalpanā arises from manifest qualifications of quality, motion, species, etc., does the knowledge of kalpanā (kalpanājñānam) have an object or have no object? If the knowledge of kalpanā has an object, it will not do, for even when it produces quality, motion, species, etc., it will not be kalpanā, owing to the incongruity of the presence of an appropriate object. If kalpanā has no object, then the absence of an object being itself the cause of kalpanā, there would not arise the qualifications of quality, motion, species, etc. If it is without an object, then there would be no knowledge of kalpanā, nor knowledge of no kalpanā (akalpanājñānam) but pure knowledge. If kalpanā has the nature of knowledge, all knowledge would be knowledge of kalpanā.'