Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.13

c8.13

(148) Despite these variant uses of the terms ajñānikāḥ and ajñāninah on the part of Śīlāṅka, it is not difficult on the whole to pick out the references to the genuine Sceptics from the context. In one of these contexts he ascribes a statement which, if true, leaves us in no doubt that the conflict of theories and the consequent difficulty of discovering the truth was the *raison d'être* of scepticism. Barua has translated a part of this passage, leaving out the latter part (which is somewhat obscure) and has concluded from it that the Sceptics were stressing the moral dangers of subscribing to conflicting views as the reason for their scepticism.⁴ He has mistranslated the phrase, bahutaradoṣasambhavāt, after reducing it to 'bahu doṣāh' on his own and rendering it as 'many moral injuries’, whereas the context would have made it clear, had he translated the whole passage that bahutaradosa- here means ‘the multitude of (intellectual) confusions’ or the ‘magnitude of mistakes (arising from claims to knowledge)’. We may render this passage as follows: ‘For they (i.e. the Sceptics) say that those who claim knowledge (jñāninaḥ) cannot be stating actual facts since their statements are mutually contradictory, for even with regard to the category of the soul, some assert that the soul is omnipresent (*sarvagatam*) and others that it is not omnipresent (*asarvagatam*), some (say) it is of the size of a digit (*aṅguṣṭaparvamātram*) others that it is of the size of a kernel of a grain of millet (*śyāmākataṇḍulamātram*) some say it both has form and is formless (*mūrtam amūrtam*), some that it resides in the heart (*hṛdayamadhyavartinam*) and (others) that it is located in the forehead (*lalātavyavasthitam*), etc.—in respect of every category there is no uniformity in their assertions; there is no one with an outstanding intellect whose statements may be regarded as authoritative; even if such a person existed, he cannot be discovered by one with a limited vision according to the maxim that “one who is not omniscient does not know everything” for it is said “how can one desiring to know that a certain person is omniscient at a certain time do so if he is devoid of that person’s intellect, his knowledge and his consciousness”; owing to the absence of the knowledge of the means, it cannot properly be accomplished; it cannot be accomplished because of the mutual dependence (of the two); for it is said “without a super-knowledge (*viśiṣtaparijñāna-*) the knowledge of the means is not attained and as a result there is no attainment of the super-knowledge of the object”, knowledge cannot completely comprehend the nature of the object of knowledge, for it is said, “whatever is apprehended should have the parts, near, middle and outer but here only the near part is apprehended and not the others since it is determined by it (i.e. the nature of the object)”; as for exhausting the atom (*paramāṇuparyavasānatā?*) with the (knowledge of) the near portion, considering the unrepresented parts out of the three parts, it is not possible to apprehend the atom by those with a limited vision owing to the excellence of its nature; therefore, since there is no omniscient person and since one who is not omniscient cannot comprehend the nature of an object as it is constituted, since all the theorists (*sarvavādinām*) have conceived of the nature of the categories in a mutually contradictory manner and those who have claimed super-knowledge (*uttaraparijñāninām*) are at fault (*pramādavatām*) Scepticism is best owing to the magnitude of the mistakes that arise (from claims to knowledge) (bahutaradoṣasambhavāt)'.¹