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Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8: Chapter III: The Historical Background III—Non-Vedic II—Sceptics, Ājīvikas and Jains

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8

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Chapter III: The Historical Background III—Non-Vedic II—Sceptics, Ājīvikas and Jains

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(143) In this chpater we propose to make a detailed study of the doctrines of the Sceptics, which are mentioned in the Pāli Nikāyas. They have influenced Early Buddhism (*v. infra*, 739, 813) and directly concern us. We shall also briefly examine the epistemological and logical doctrines of the Ājīvikas and Jains, which seem to have a bearing on the thought of the Canon.

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(144) Traces of scepticism and agnosticism we find from the time of the Ṛgveda onwards (*v. supra*, 7). These instances are sporadic and there is no evidence of any widespread scepticism. Radhakrishnan says that the hymn to faith (śraddhā, R.V. 10.151) 'is not possible in a time of unshaken faith'¹ but there is nothing in the hymn itself to indicate the presence of scepticism at the time. This scepticism, as we said, found its latest expression in the *Nāsadīya* hymn (*v. supra*, 8-10), where it was extended to the very possibility of arriving at a final solution to a specific problem. This Ṛgvedic scepticism did not develop any further but we found certain undercurrents of doubt (vicikitsā) in the Brāhmaṇas (*v. supra*, 15). The doubt with regard to survival was first mooted in the Brāhmaṇas and appears in the Early Upaniṣads, where it was asked whether man can survive death, when nothing is left over to germinate in a next life (*v. supra*, 15). On the other hand, we found in the Upaniṣads a rational agnosticism approaching Kantian agnosticism, where Yājñavalkya rationally demonstrated the impossibility of knowing the ultimate reality or the ātman (*v. supra*, 43). Nevertheless, it was not an agnosticism proper in that it differed from Kantian agnosticism in one significant respect. For, although it was not possible to apprehend ultimate reality conceptually it was still considered possible to have some sort of direct acquaintance with it in deep sleep, in the next life or in a mystical state

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¹ Radhakrishnan and Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

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(145) These sceptical hints of the earlier Vedic thought and the agnostic trends of the Upaniṣads could have paved the way for the growth of sceptical schools of thought, but the impetus and the occasion for their arising seem to have been provided by the presence of diverse, conflicting and irreconcilable theories, pertaining to moral, metaphysical, and religious beliefs. When there is a welter of contending views, people naturally become curious as to which view is true and in the absence of a safe criterion of truth become suspicious as to whether any view at all could be true

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(146) When a school of thought strongly urged the belief in survival and another vehemently denied it and both were able to adduce on the face of it equally strong arguments for their respective points of view, one becomes doubtful as to which view if at all could be true. When the Kaṭha said, 'this doubt (*vicikitsā*) there is with regard to a man deceased; "he exists" say some, "he exists not" say others' (1 1.20), it is probably echoing at least the uncertainties with regard to the problem of survival entertained by the intellectuals at that time in the presence of a school of Materialists, who strongly denied survival.

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(147) That the intellectual confusion resulting from the presence of a diversity of views seems to have been the main motive for the birth of scepticism is apparent from the sayings and opinions ascribed to the Sceptics (ajñānikāḥ, ajñāninah) by Śīlāṅka commenting on the Sūtrakṛtāṅga. One has, however, to be cautious in picking out the sayings ascribed to the Sceptics from those attributed to the ajñānikāḥ or ajñāninah in general, since Śīlāṅka uses these terms in at least three senses. Sometimes he employs the word to denote 'the ignorant' religious teachers¹ following the usage of the Sūtrakṛtāṅga which uses the term in this sense at times (*v* annāṇiyā, 1.1 2 16). He also uses the term of the Buddhists who, he says, are 'more or less ajñānikas since they consider that karma done out of ignorance (he probably means "unintentionally") does not result in bondage'.² Most often, however, ajñānikāḥ, or ajñāninah is used as a technical term to denote the Sceptics following the usage of the Sūtrakṛtāṅga (*e.g.* 1.1.2.27, 1.12.2) and in this sense the word is defined either as 'those who claim that scepticism is best' (ajñānam eva śreya ityevaṃvādinām, Vol. I, fol. 35 on Sū. 1.1.2.17) or as 'those in whom no knowledge, *i.e.* scepticism, is evident' (na jñānamajñānam tadvidyate yeṣām te'jñāninah, *loc. cit.*; cp. ajñānam vidyate yeṣām, Vol. I, fol. 215 on Sū. 1.12.2). The term is also sarcastically defined as 'those who move in ignorance or those who show themselves off to the extent of being extraordinarily wise' (ājñānikāḥ) (ajñānena vā carantītyajñānikāḥ, ājñānikā vā tāvat pradarśayante, Vol. I, fol. 215 on Sū 1.12 2). When, however, Śīlāṅka makes the statement that, Ājīvikādayo Gośālamatānusārino'jñānavādapravṛttāḥ, *i.e.* 'the Ājīvikas and the others who are the followers of Gośāla's doctrines are a product of ajñānavāda',¹ (*op. cit.*, Vol. I, fol. 36), one is at a loss whether to translate ajñānavāda here as 'ignorance' or as 'scepticism' in the general or special senses. Since Śīlāṅka elsewhere identifies the 'followers of Gośāla's doctrines' as the Vainayikas,² (moralists) which Professor Basham finds a 'puzzling reference',³ it is unlikely that he thought of them as an offshoot of the Sceptics (ajñānavāda-) since he distinguishes the Vainayikas from the Ajñānikas.

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¹ samyagjñānavirahītā śramaṇā brāhmaṇāh, Vol I, fol 35 on Sū 1 1 2 16

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² Śākyā api prāyaśo' jñānikā avijñopacitam karma bandham na yātītyevaṃ vatas te 'bhyupagamayanti, Vol I, fol 217 on Sū 1 12 2

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¹ Professor Basham has not mentioned this statement where he has made a study of similar statements, *v op cit*, pp 174-7.

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² *Op. cit.*, Vol I, Fol. 151 on Sū. 1 6.27

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³ *Op. cit.*, p. 177. Basham's attempt to explain the Vainayikas as a later schismatic sect of the Ājīvikas(?) is unsatisfactory since the Vainayikas are known as early as the Pāli Nikāyas (cp venayiko, M I 140, cp. D I.174, santi eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā sīlavādā).

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(148) Despite these variant uses of the terms ajñānikāḥ and ajñāninah on the part of Śīlāṅka, it is not difficult on the whole to pick out the references to the genuine Sceptics from the context. In one of these contexts he ascribes a statement which, if true, leaves us in no doubt that the conflict of theories and the consequent difficulty of discovering the truth was the *raison d'être* of scepticism. Barua has translated a part of this passage, leaving out the latter part (which is somewhat obscure) and has concluded from it that the Sceptics were stressing the moral dangers of subscribing to conflicting views as the reason for their scepticism.⁴ He has mistranslated the phrase, bahutaradoṣasambhavāt, after reducing it to 'bahu doṣāh' on his own and rendering it as 'many moral injuries’, whereas the context would have made it clear, had he translated the whole passage that bahutaradosa- here means ‘the multitude of (intellectual) confusions’ or the ‘magnitude of mistakes (arising from claims to knowledge)’. We may render this passage as follows: ‘For they (i.e. the Sceptics) say that those who claim knowledge (jñāninaḥ) cannot be stating actual facts since their statements are mutually contradictory, for even with regard to the category of the soul, some assert that the soul is omnipresent (*sarvagatam*) and others that it is not omnipresent (*asarvagatam*), some (say) it is of the size of a digit (*aṅguṣṭaparvamātram*) others that it is of the size of a kernel of a grain of millet (*śyāmākataṇḍulamātram*) some say it both has form and is formless (*mūrtam amūrtam*), some that it resides in the heart (*hṛdayamadhyavartinam*) and (others) that it is located in the forehead (*lalātavyavasthitam*), etc.—in respect of every category there is no uniformity in their assertions; there is no one with an outstanding intellect whose statements may be regarded as authoritative; even if such a person existed, he cannot be discovered by one with a limited vision according to the maxim that “one who is not omniscient does not know everything” for it is said “how can one desiring to know that a certain person is omniscient at a certain time do so if he is devoid of that person’s intellect, his knowledge and his consciousness”; owing to the absence of the knowledge of the means, it cannot properly be accomplished; it cannot be accomplished because of the mutual dependence (of the two); for it is said “without a super-knowledge (*viśiṣtaparijñāna-*) the knowledge of the means is not attained and as a result there is no attainment of the super-knowledge of the object”, knowledge cannot completely comprehend the nature of the object of knowledge, for it is said, “whatever is apprehended should have the parts, near, middle and outer but here only the near part is apprehended and not the others since it is determined by it (i.e. the nature of the object)”; as for exhausting the atom (*paramāṇuparyavasānatā?*) with the (knowledge of) the near portion, considering the unrepresented parts out of the three parts, it is not possible to apprehend the atom by those with a limited vision owing to the excellence of its nature; therefore, since there is no omniscient person and since one who is not omniscient cannot comprehend the nature of an object as it is constituted, since all the theorists (*sarvavādinām*) have conceived of the nature of the categories in a mutually contradictory manner and those who have claimed super-knowledge (*uttaraparijñāninām*) are at fault (*pramādavatām*) Scepticism is best owing to the magnitude of the mistakes that arise (from claims to knowledge) (bahutaradoṣasambhavāt)'.¹

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⁴ Barua, *op. cit*, p 330.

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¹ Tathāhi te ūcuḥ -ya ete jñāninas te parasparaviruddhavāditayā na yathārthavādino bhavanti, tathāhi-eke sarvagatamātmānaṁ vadanti, tathā'nye asarvagataṁ, apare aṅguṣṭaparvamātraṁ, kecana śyāmākataṇḍulamātraṁ, anye mūrtamamūrtaṁ hṛdayamadhyavartinaṁ lalātavyavasthitamityādyātmapadārtha eva sarvapadārthapurahsare teṣāṁ naikavākyatā, na cāuśayajñānī kaścidasti yadvākyaṁ pramāṇīkriyeta, na cāsau vidyamāno' py upalaksyate'rvāgdarśinā, 'na sarvajñaḥ sarvaṁ jānātī'ti vacanāt, tathā c'oktam-' sarvajño'sāviti hyetattatkāle'pi bubhutsubhiḥ tajjñānajñeyavijñānaśūnyairvijñāyate katham?'; na ca tasya samyak tadupāyaparijñānābhāvāt sambhavaḥ, sambhavābhāvaścetaretarāśrayatvāt, tathāhi-viśiṣṭaparijñānamṛte tadavāptyupāyaparijñānaṁ upāyamantareṇa ca nopeyasya viśiṣṭaparijñānasyāvaptir iti, na ca jñānaṁ jneyasyasvarūpaṁ paricchetum alam, tathāhi -yatkimupalabhyate tasyārvāgmadhyaparabhāgairnetarayoḥ, tenaiva vyavahitatvāt, arvāgbhāgasyā'pi bhāgatrayakalpanāt tatsarvārātīyabhāgaparikalpanayā paramāṇuparyavasānatā, paramāṇośca svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭatvādarvāgdarśanīnāṁ nopalabdhir iti, tadevam sarvajñasyābhāvādasarvajñasya ca yathāvasthitavastusvarūpāparicchedāt sarvavādināṁ ca parasparavirodhena padārthasvarūpābhyupagamāt yathottaraparijñānināṁ pramādavatāṁ bahutaradoṣasambhavād ajñānameva śreyaḥ, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, fol 215, 6 on Sū. 1.12 2.

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(149) Even if Śīlāṅka, writing in the ninth century, has rightly represented the views of the Sceptics, we have no right to assume that in the day of the Pāli Nikāyas they also held the same view. The sophisticated argument based on certain conceptions about the nature of knowledge in order to disprove the possibility of omniscience certainly appears *prima facie* to be late but the general thesis of the Sceptics, that the possibility of knowledge is doubtful since the claims to knowledge were mutually contradictory, may well go back to the period of the earliest Sceptics. Śīlāṅka often quotes this idea sometimes as a maxim of the Sceptics as, for instance, when it is said that 'they posit the theory that since those who claim knowledge make mutually contradictory assertions, they cannot be stating the truth'² and sometimes without specific reference to the Sceptic as for instance when he says that 'since the various theories claiming knowledge (jñānam) have arisen in contradiction to one another, they are not true; therefore, Scepticism is best of all '.³ Śīlāṅka speaks of the kind of investigation (mīmāṁsā-) and reflection (vimarśa-) which leads to Scepticism as follows: 'Is this theory claiming knowledge (kimetad-jñānaṁ) true or false? Scepticism is best since with an excess of knowledge, there is an increase of mistakes (dosātireka-)'.¹

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² Tairabhihitaṁ jñānavādinah parasparaviruddhārthavāditayā na yathārthavādinaḥ, *op cit*, Vol I, fol. 216 on Sū 1.12 2.

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³ Na ca tāni jñānāni parasparavirodhena pravṛttatvāt satyāni tasmādajñānameva śreyaḥ, *op cit.*, Vol. I, fol. 34 on Sū. 1 1.2 14.

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(150) Even the reference to the conflicting theories about the ātman may be attributed to the early Sceptic, since each one of the theories stated were current by the time of the Pāli Nikāyas and all of them could be traced to the period of the Early Upaniṣads. Thus the pantheistic ātman, which is 'made of everything' (sarvamayaḥ, idammayaḥ adomayaḥ, Bṛh. 4.4.5) would be omnipresent (sarvagatam) while the transcendent ātman defined negatively (neti neti, Bṛh 3.9.26) would not be so. Again at Kaṭha 2.3.17, the ātman is of 'the size of a digit' (*anguṣṭamātraḥ*), while at Chāndogya 3.14.3, the ātman is 'smaller than a kernel of a grain of millet'² (atmā aṇīyān śyāmākataṇḍulāt). Again at Bṛhadāraṇyaka 2.3.¹, Brahman which is identical with the ātman is said 'both to have form and also be formless' (mūrtam caivāmūrtañ ca). Likewise at Kaṭha 2.3.17 the ātman 'resides in the heart' (hṛdaye sanniviṣṭaḥ) while at Aitareya Āraṇyaka 2.1.4.6 it (i.e. brahman=ātman) is located in the head (śiro'śrayata). It is not at all surprising that the Sceptics would have been quick to see these contradictions in the Upaniṣads in an age when the Vedāntic interpretation (or for that matter, the interpretations of Deussen or Radhakrishnan) which tries to synthesize all these contradictions, was not known.

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¹ Kimetadjñānam satyamutāsatyamiti? Yathā ajñānameva śreyo yathā yathā ca jñānātiśayastathā tathāca doṣātireka iti, *op. cit.*, Vol I, fol. 35 on Sū. 1.1.2.17.

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² Here the Upaniṣad is itself possibly trying to explain the contradictions in previous theories by turning them into paradoxes since it also says that the ātman 'is greater than the earth', etc.

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(151) The sophisticated argument against the concept of omniscience appears to be too involved or complicated to belong to the early Sceptics but here again we need not doubt that they would have questioned the possibility of omniscience in an age when there was more than one claimant to omniscience. The leader of the Jains claimed omniscience according to the evidence of both the Buddhist as well as the Jain texts (*v. infra*, 311) and so did Pūrana Kassapa (*v. infra*, 196). Omniscience is claimed for Makkhali Gosāla in the later Tamil texts Civañānacittiyār and Nīlakēci as Prof. Basham has shown (*op. cit.*, p. 276), though there is no evidence that he himself claimed omniscience. It is not unlikely that since the Buddha argued against the claims to omniscience on the part of religious teachers (*v. infra*, 311), the Sceptics would likewise have done so. The sayings which state that with a limited knowledge no one can know that any person is omniscient, e.g. 'nāsarvajñaḥ sarvajñaṁ jānāti'; 'sarvajño' sāviti hyetattatkāle pi bubhutsubhiḥ tajjñānajñeyavijñānarahitair gamyate katham' are also quoted elsewhere¹ and may possibly have been old sayings of the Sceptics. Another saying bearing on this topic specifically attributed to the Sceptics and criticized, reads as follows: 'All teachings are like the utterances of barbarians since they have no (epistemic) basis' (chinnamūlatvāt mlecchānubhāṣaṇavat sarvaṁ upadeśādikam, *op. cit.*, Vol I, fol. 35 on Sū. 1.1.2.17). This was possibly directed mainly against those who claimed to speak with authority on the presumption of their omniscience. On the basis of these sayings we may perhaps surmise that they argued that since the human intellect was limited no one could claim to know everything with such a limited intellect. They may have even extended this argument to arrive at their Scepticism. None of the metaphysical theories claiming to be true, which are the products of such a limited intellect, can be known to be true, since they are mutually contradictory Now, no new theory can also be true since it is bound to contradict one or more of the existing theories. Therefore nothing can be known to be true. Thus the contradictions of metaphysics and the impossibility of omniscience may have led them to accept Scepticism. One thing we need not doubt and that is that these Sceptics more than any other thinkers of their age appear to have been struck by the fact that the conflicting theories not of one tradition but of all schools seemed to cancel each other out And in this respect the Sceptics were really the children of the age in which they lived.

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¹ *v. op cit.*, Vol. I, fol 35 on Sū. 1 1 2 16.

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(151A) That the period immediately preceding the rise of Buddhism was one in which there was an interminable variety of views on matters pertaining to metaphysics, morality and religion is clear from the references to them in the Buddhist and Jain texts. The Brahmajāla Sutta (D. I.12-38) refers to fifty-eight schools of thought other than the four schools or types of Sceptics referred to. It is not improbable that some of these are only possible schools not current at the time (*v. supra*, 141) but there are good grounds to think that many of them were actually existing schools in view of the independent literary sources which refer to them. Similarly, the Sūtrakṛtāṅga mentions three hundred and sixty-three schools. This list is artificially made up mainly but not solely on the basis of the categories of Jainism itself¹ but there would be little reason to deny the existence of the four main schools of Kriyāvāda, Akriyāvāda, Ajñānikavāda and Vainayikavāda and probably several subgroups among them. A brief account of the doctrines of some of these schools is given in several contexts of the Sūtrakṛtāṅga (1.1.1.8-18, 1.2.1-28, 1.6.27, 1.12 2-11, 2 1.14-30, 2.2.79) and these accounts do not appear to be in the least artificial.

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(152) When we consider this historical background, it is only to be expected that the Sceptics should appear at this time. In the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, they are called the 'annāṇiyā' (Skr. ajñānikāḥ), i e. the 'ignorant ones' or 'sceptics' or 'those who deny knowledge' (*v. supra*, 147), translated as 'agnostics' by Jacobi (SBE., Vol. 45, pp. 241, 315). They are mentioned in a few places (Sū. 1.¹.2.17, 1.6.27, 1.21.1-2, 2.2 79) and are considered one of the four important schools of thought. But the information given about them in the texts themselves is meagre. It is said that 'the speculations (vīmamsā) of the Sceptics do not land them in ignorance (as they ought to), when they cannot instruct themselves in the truth (param), how can they instruct others' (annāṇiyāṇaṃ vīmamsā annāne na viniyacchaī, appaṇo ya param nālaṃ, kuto annānusāsıuṃ), Sū. 1.1.2.17). Jacobi translates annāne na viniyacchaī, as 'cannot lead to knowledge' (*op. cit.*, p. 241) but this is not supported by the text or the commentary. Even if we translate, na vi-niyacchaī (Skr. na vi-niyacchati) as 'cannot lead to', annāne (Skr.

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¹ Śīlāṅka makes up the list of 363 'schools' as follows (*v. op cit*, Vol I, fol. 212, 3)

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| (1) Kriyāvādıns | 180 | (kriyāvadināmasītyadhikm śatama bhavatı) |
| (11) Akriyāvādıns | 84 | (akriyāvadinām . caturasīti) |
| (111) Ajñānıkas | 67 | (ajñānikānām . . saptaṣaṣṭih) |
| (iv) Vainayııkas | 32 | (vaınayııkānām . . . dvātrımśat) |
| | --- | |
| | 363 | Total |

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(1) The 180 Kriyāvādıns are as follows the variables are—the *nine* categories of Jainısm such as *jīva-*, etc, the *two* principles of *svatah* and *paratah*, the *two* attributes of *nitya-* and *anitya-*, the *five* concepts of *kāla,-* *sāvabhāva-,* *niyati-,* *iśvara-* and *ātman-* This gives 9×2×2×5=180
(ii) The variables are—the *7* categories of *jīva-*, etc, taken negatively, the *two* principles of *svatah* and *paratah*, the *six* concepts (note the difference of these concepts from those enumerated in (1)), viz *kāla-,* *yadṛcchā-,* *niyati-,* *svabhāva-,* *īśvara-,* *ātma-* This gives 7×2× 6=84.
(111) For Ajñānıkas, *v* ınfra, 157
(iv) The variables are the *four* duties (of *manas-,* *vāk-,* *kāya-*, and *dāna-*) towards *seven* types of people, 7×4=28.

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ajñāne) is not 'knowledge' but the opposite of it; the commentary explains the phrase as follows: 'Ajñāne' ajñānaviṣaye 'na niyacchati' na niścayena yacchati, nāvatarati (*op. cit.*, Vol. I, fol. 35), which means, the '(speculations) do not definitely take them or place them in the realm of ignorance'. What is meant is that their scepticism should lead them logically to the conclusion that they know nothing whatsoever, but in fact their 'reflections have the features of knowledge' (paryālocanasya jñānarūpatvāt, *loc. cit.*) and 'one cannot understand' (na budhyate, *loc. cit.*) how they claim to know such propositions as 'ignorance is best' (ajñānameva śreyaḥ, *loc. cit.*), etc. So when they claim that they are Sceptics they are (according to this Jain criticism) in fact claiming to have some knowledge as revealed by their *dicta* and thereby they are contradicting themselves. The other context in which something informative is asserted about the Sceptics states that 'these Sceptics being "experts" are uncommitted' (asamthuyā=asambaddhāḥ) (commentary, *op. cit.*, Vol I, fol. 215); Jacobi translates as "reason incoherently" (*op. cit.*, p. 316) but they have not overcome doubt; unskilled they teach the unskilled and utter falsehood without discrimination' (aṇṇāṇiyā tā kusalāvī santā, asanthuyā no vitigicchatinnā, akoviyā āhu akoviyehiṃ, anānuvīttu musaṃ vadanti, Sū. 1.12.2).

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(153) Though the Sūtrakṛtāṅga itself tells us little, Śīlāṅka's commentary, as we have already seen, is more informative. The main difference that we notice between Śīlāṅka's account and that in the Pāli Nikāyas is that the former stresses the intellectual grounds for their scepticism, while the emphasis in the latter is on the practical value or the pragmatic reasons for Scepticism. While the general argument for scepticism appears to have been the one we outlined above (*v. supra*, 148), an often quoted saying of the Sceptic throws a little more light on the rational basis of their scepticism. It is said that the Sceptics hold that 'scepticism is the best since it is difficult to gauge the thought processes of another' (paracetovṛttīnāṃ duranvayatvādajñānameva śreyaḥ, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, fol. 35 on Sū. 1.1.2.17, cp. paracetovṛttīnāṃ duranvayatvāt, *op. cit.*, Vol I, fol. 216 on Sū. 1.12.1). The difficulty of knowing another's mind seems to be one of the reasons why the Sceptics held to their other dictum that 'all teachings are like the utterances of barbarians since they have no (epistemic) basic' (*v. supra*, 151). Śīlāṅka himself following the Sūtrakṛtāṅga makes use of this idea in another connection and observes that 'owing to the difficulty of knowing another's mind, they do not grasp what is intended by the words of their teacher and thus repeat the other's words like a barbarian without understanding the real meaning'.¹ This idea seems to be borrowed from the Sceptics The fact that Śīlāṅka himself does not as a Jain believe that one cannot know another's mind is clear from his criticism of this sceptical view. He says it is false (asat), because the Sceptics themselves cannot believe this. For they put forward views such as 'scepticism is best' (ajñānameva śreyaḥ, *v. supra*, 147) intended to instruct others. He quotes in his favour a non-sceptical view which says that 'the inner mind of another can be apprehended by his external features, gestures, movements, gait, speech and the changes in his eyes and face' ²

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¹ Evam paracetovṛttīnām duranvayatvādudapeṣṭurapı yathāvasthitavivakṣayā grahaṇāsambhavānnıścayārthamajānānā mlecchavadaparoktam anubhāṣanta eva, *op cit*, Vol. I, fol. 35 on Sū 1.1 2 16

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² ākārairıṅgitairgatyā ceṣṭayā bhāṣitena ca netravaktravikāraiśca gṛhyate 'ntargatam manaḥ, *op cit*, *Vol. I*, fol 35 on Sū 1 1.2 17

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(154) Here again, we do not know on what grounds the Sceptic held the view that one cannot know another's mind but it is evident that this theory itself could have led him to scepticism If one cannot know another's mind, communication is impossible and knowledge no longer becomes objective. We may profitably compare this view with that of the Greek sophist, who believed in the incommunicability of what we claim to know. In Gorgias' book³ on 'Nature or the Non-existent', he sets forth three propositions, viz (1) that nothing exists, (2) that if anything exists it cannot be known, and (3) that if it can be known, the knowledge cannot be communicated. The Ajñānikas seem to have agreed with propositions (2) and (3) but not (1) since quite consistently with their scepticism they could not categorically hold that 'nothing exists' but only that 'nothing could be known to exist'. This is the same as proposition (2), thus granting the possibility of existence. Now Gorgias proves proposition (2) by showing that knowledge is identical with sense-perception and that since sense-impressions differ with different people, no two people can have the same sense-impressions with regard to an object Therefore knowledge, which must necessarily be objective, is not possible because of this subjectivity. For the same reason this knowledge being identical with sensation, cannot be communicated. The Indian Sceptics may possibly have reasoned on similar lines, though one cannot be quite certain about this, due to the lack of any definite evidence. The argument against the possibility of complete knowledge (*v. supra*, 148) seems to give a faint indication of this. Here it was said that whatever we apprehend has the three parts, near (arvāk-), middle (madhya-), and outer (para-) and that we in fact apprehend only the near part (tasyārvāgbhāgasyevopalabdhiḥ, *loc. cit.*). Now this is certainly true of visual perception and in a sense of sense-perception in general. We see only the near side (the side facing us) of objects, so that what each person sees of the object would be different according to the individual perspective. So if we are arvāg-darśinaḥ (a term which is frequently used in the sayings of Sceptics) or 'near-side-seers', our knowledge at least of physical objects, being dependent on our individual perspectives, would be subjective since these perspectives would be different with different individuals. In the absence of objectivity, there is no knowledge at all and the private experiences or impressions of the different individuals would be incommunicable. Whether the early Sceptics would have employed such reasoning or not it is difficult to say but they certainly seem to have held that one could not know another's mind and this seems to have been one of the grounds of their Scepticism.

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³ W T. Stace, *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*, pp 116-7

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(155) As we have seen, Śīlāṅka's account stresses the intellectual basis of their scepticism rather than the pragmatic or moral reasons for it, but the fact that they were also present is evident from some of his observations about the Sceptics. According to Śīlāṅka 'the Sceptics . . . conceive that even if there was knowledge it is useless (niṣphalam) since it has many disadvantages (bahudoṣavat)' (Ajñānikānām . . . jñānam tu sadapi niṣphalam bahudoṣavaccetyevamabhyupagamavatām, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, fol. 215). This shows that they not only considered knowledge to be impossible but that it was useless. In enumerating the sixty-seven 'types' of Sceptics, Śīlāṅka puts the question of the Sceptic in two forms, viz. 'Who knows that the soul exists? Of what use is this knowledge? Who knows that the soul does not exist? Of what use is this knowledge? etc.' (san jīvaḥ ko vetti? kiṃ vā tena jñānena? asan jīvaḥ ko vetti? kiṃ vā tena jñānena? *op. cit.*, Vol. I, fol. 36 on Sū. 1.1.2.20; also Vol. I, fol. 212). The second of these forms is clearly meant to imply that they adopted Scepticism on pragmatic considerations as well.

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(156) Śīlāṅka does not shed any more light on what the Sceptics considered as the defects or disadvantages (doṣa-) of knowledge but as we shall see the accounts in the Pāli Nikāyas pay a good deal of attention to this aspect of their scepticism. But since we shall be dealing with each school of Sceptics mentioned in the Brahmajāla Sutta separately, we may briefly state here what the Sceptics seem to have considered to be the defects or disadvantages of knowledge. The sense in which the term dosa- is used by Śīlāṅka in elucidating the views of the Sceptics is not very clear. In the passage in which knowledge was condemned ((*v. supra*, 148) as giving rise to a multitude of dosa- (bahutaradosasambhavāt), it was apparent from the context that the word meant 'intellectual confusions' and not 'moral injuries' as suggested by Barua (*v. supra*, 148), who was probably influenced by the picture of the Sceptic as drawn in the Buddhist texts The other uses (e g 'the greater the knowledge the greater the dosa', yathā yathā ca jñānātiśayas tathā tathā ca dosātireka-, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, fol. 35 on Sū 1.1.2.17) were less clear and dosa- could here have meant (ambiguously) 'moral disadvantages'. In the Brahmajāla Sutta, however, we find that the first two schools of Sceptics held that there were undesirable psychological and moral consequences of claiming knowledge under conditions, when it was impossible to know the facts for certain According to the first school (*v. infra*, 159), we have a liking or bias for (chando, rāgo) a proposition and a dislike or a bias against its contradictory (doso, paṭigho), when we come to accept it as true without valid grounds. Since this is grounded on one's prejudices for and against, the proposition itself is said to be false and its acceptance wrong or mistaken (musā). Now, uttering a falsehood or doing a wrong thing is a source of remorse (vighāto) and is a moral danger (antarāyo). According to the second school (*v. infra*, 166), the bias for or against is an entanglement (upādānam) which is again a moral danger (antarāyo) The third school (*v. infra*, 167) seems to have been impressed by the psychologically and morally disastrous consequences of debating their theories, on the part of those who claimed to know and believe in them. We must not forget that during this period not only were there a variety of theories but a good many of them were being hotly debated (*v. infra*, Ch. V), resulting in one party having to undergo the miseries of defeat. Sometimes these debates seem to have given rise to bickering and quarrels among the contending parties. This third school of Sceptics, if not the first and second as well, seem to have concluded that all this self-imposed unhappiness was due to baseless claims to knowledge and that Scepticism was superior to making such claims It is probable that these were among the defects or disadvantages (dosa-) of knowledge spoken of in some of Śīlāṅka's quotations from the Sceptics. If so it would be seen that there were both pragmatic as well as intellectual grounds for their scepticism (157) As we have mentioned (*v. supra*, 151) Śīlāṅka speaks of sixty-seven 'types' of Sceptics in order to make up the figure three hundred and sixty-three, the number of schools of thought, mentioned in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga. But they are neither schools nor types and the list is artificially made up mainly but not solely out of the concepts of Jainism itself. He takes the nine categories (navapadārtha-) of Jainism, each according to the seven forms of predication (saptabhaṅgakāḥ). This gives sixty three (i.e. 9×7) forms of sceptical questions, which are considered to represent sixty three 'types' of Sceptics asking these questions. The last four 'types' are more interesting and possibly represent a kind of question, which the Sceptics themselves asked. They are as follows:

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(i) Sati bhāvotpattiḥ ko vetti? Who knows whether there is an arising of psychological states?

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(ii) Asati bhāvotpattiḥ ko vetti? Who knows whether there is no arising of psychological states?

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(iii) Sadasati bhāvotpattiḥ ko vetti? Who knows whether there is and is no arising of psychological states?

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(iv) Avaktavyo bhāvotpattiḥ ko vetti? Who knows whether the arising of psychological states is impredicable? Śīlāṅka comments that the 'other three possibilities of predication do not apply in the case of the arising of psychological states'¹. The question of 'the arising of consciousness' (saññuppāda-) is one on which there seems to have been a good deal of speculation during the period of the Pāli Nikāyas and four different theories on this subject are mentioned in the Poṭṭhapāda Sutta (D. I.180). This could have easily provoked these sceptical questions, but what is interesting is the fourfold mode of predication adopted. It is possible that Śīlāṅka did this merely to complete the figure of sixty-seven and his explanation that this subject does not admit of the other forms of predication is too puerile to be taken seriously. But it is also not unlikely that the Sceptics in fact adopted a fourfold scheme of predication as we have suggested (*v. infra*, 184) in discussing the evidence from the Pāli texts.

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¹ Uttaraṁ bhaṅgatrayam . . . bhāvotpattau na sambhavatīti, *op. cit*, Vol I, fol 213.

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(158) The Pāli term used to refer to the Sceptics, namely, *Amarāvikkhepikā*, seems to be a nickname and has probably been correctly translated as 'eel-wrigglers' (Prof. Rhys Davids, SBB., Vol. II, pp. 37 ff.). It is however a word whose meaning is obscure and the commentary offers two explanations of it. It is said that it may mean 'those who are confused by their endless beliefs and words'.¹ The alternative explanation is that amarā stands for a species of fish, who are in the habit of running about in the water, constantly emerging and diving down so that it is difficult to get hold of them and that similarly this theory (Scepticism) runs hither and thither without arriving at a definite conclusion.² The fact that the commentator gives two alternative explanations of the word shows that he himself was uncertain about its meaning. The latter is probably to be preferred since amarā as meaning endless (pariyantarahita-) is far-fetched. Vācāvikkhepa- is used as a synonym of amarāvikkhepa-,³ and probably means 'verbal jugglery' in view of the fact that these thinkers would have appeared in the eyes of their opponents to evade committing themselves with regard to the truth or falsity of a proposition. When Ajātasattu refers to the theory as just vikkhepam he probably means the same, i.e. 'jugglery' or 'confusion'.

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¹ Amarāya diṭṭhiyā vācāya vikkhepo ti amarāvikkhepo DA. I 115.

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² Aparo nayo. Amarā nāma macchajāti, sā ummujjana-nimujjanādivasena udake sandhāvamānā gahetum na sakkoti. Evam eva ayam pi vādo ito c'ito ca sandhāvati gāhaṁ na upagacchati ti amarāvikkhepo vuccati, *loc. cit.*

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³ . . vācāvikkhepam āpajjati amarāvikkhepam, D. I 27.

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(159) The Buddhist texts refer to and briefly define the views of different schools of Sceptics. They are spoken of collectively as 'some recluses and brahmins who wriggle like eels. For when a question is put to them on this or that matter they resort to verbal jugglery and eel-wriggling on four grounds'.⁴ The first of these schools is described as follows: 'Herein a certain recluse or brahmin does not understand, as it really is, that this is good or this is evil. And it occurs to him: I do not understand what is good or evil as it really is. Not understanding what is good or evil, as it really is, if I were to assert that this is good and this is evil, that will be due to my likes, desires, aversions or resentments. If it were due to my likes, desires, aversions or resentments, it would be wrong. And if I were wrong, it would cause me worry (vighāto) and worry would be a moral danger to me (antarāyo). Thus, through fear of being wrong (musāvādabhayā) and the abhorrence of being wrong, he does not assert anything to be good or evil and on questions being put to him on this or that matter he resorts to verbal jugglery and eel-wriggling, saying: I do not say so, I do not say thus, I do not say otherwise, I do not say no, I deny the denials (*lit.* I do not say, "no, no")'.¹

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⁴ Santi . . eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā amarāvikkhepikā, tattha tattha pañham puṭṭhā samānā vācāvikkhepaṁ āpajjanti amarāvikkhepaṁ catūhi vatthūhi, D. I 24.

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¹ 'Idha ... ekacco samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā idaṁ kusalan ti yathābhūtaṁ na ppajānāti, idaṁ akusalan ti yathābhūtaṁ nappajānāti. Tassa evaṁ hoti: Ahaṁ kho idaṁ kusalan ti yathābhūtaṁ nappajānāmi, idaṁ akusalanti yathābhūtaṁ nappajānāmi Ahañ c'eva kho pana idaṁ kusalan ti yathābhūtaṁ appajānanto, idaṁ akusalan ti yathābhūtaṁ appajānanto idaṁ kusalan ti vā vyākareyyaṁ, idaṁ akusalan ti vā vyākareyyaṁ, tattha me assa chando vā rāgo vā doso vā paṭigho vā tam mam'assa musā Yam mam'assa musā so mam'assa vighāto. Yo mam'assa vighāto so mam'assaa ntarāyo ti. Iti so musāvādabhayā musāvādaparijegucchā n'ev'idaṁ kusalan ti vyākaroti na pana idaṁ akusalan ti vyākaroti, tattha tattha pañhaṁ puṭṭho samāno vācāvikkhepaṁ āpajjati amarāvikkhepaṁ: Evam pi me no Tathā ti pi me no Aññathā ti pi me no. No ti pi me no. No no ti pi me no ti D. I 24-5.

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(160) This description as it stands obviously admits of more than one interpretation. On a very literal interpretation of it, it need not represent the point of view of a Sceptic at all, unless we mean by a Sceptic a person who suspends his judgment on the truth or falsity of a proposition, in the absence of adequate evidence or grounds for believing in its truth or falsity. If this class of thinkers merely refused to assert that something was positively good or evil, unless they had objective grounds for doing so, without being misled by subjective bias due to their likes and dislikes, they would not be Sceptics but critical thinkers recommending the outlook of science or intelligent commonsense. The only difference from scientific scepticism, which advocates the suspension of judgment in the absence of good evidence or valid grounds for asserting the truth or falsity of a proposition, would be that these thinkers did not merely consider that it was intellectually unsatisfactory not to suspend judgment under such circumstances, but that it was a moral danger (antarāyo) as well not to do so.

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(161) Such an evaluation, however, is *prima facie* improbable. For if they suspended judgment only until knowledge was possible without ruling out the possibility of knowledge altogether, they would not have been known to their opponents as having persistently refused to commit themselves by asserting or denying all the logically possible alternatives at least in respect of ethical propositions. It is, therefore, very probable that they not merely denied knowledge of ethical propositions but claimed that such propositions were, in principle, unknowable, and that if we held that such propositions were either true or false, as the case may be, we would be guided by our prejudices.

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SBE., Vol. 45, p. 385). As Jacobi points out, in the commentary on the Uttarādhyayana Sūtra (18.23), it is said that the Sceptics (Ajñānavādinaḥ) 'contend that knowledge is not necessary for salvation but *tapas*'¹ is, and Jacobi commenting on this says that 'this seems identical with the karmapatha'.

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¹ SBE., Vol 15, p. 83, fn. 2.

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(164) The sacrificial brahmins of the Brāhmaṇas proper, who continued in the Upanisadic period recommending the path of action (karmamārga-), were undoubtedly against the claims to metaphysical and intuitive knowledge on the part of the Upanisadic thinkers. However, there is no reason to think that they were sceptics or agnostics in the matter of knowledge. They certainly claimed the veracity of certain ethical propositions. The modified theory of the path of action (karmamārga- or karmapatha-) to be found in the Īśā Upanisad and later in the Bhagavadgītā is less averse to knowledge. The Īśā, while condemning those who delight in knowledge as being in greater darkness than those who are ignorant,² nevertheless speaks of some kind of knowledge with which immortality is obtained (vidyayāmṛtam aśnute, *op. cit.*, 11). Barua calls the thinkers of the Kena Upanisad, viz. the Keniyas, 'sceptics' (*op. cit.*, pp. 261, 319). However, they were properly agnostics, who denied the possibility of conceptual or sensory knowledge of reality³ while not denying that reality 'was known by an awakening' (pratibodhaviditam⁴). Likewise, faith (śraddhā) in the Upaniṣads was never divorced from knowledge and there is no evidence of a faith movement in the Upaniṣads, which decried knowledge. It is those who have both knowledge and faith⁵ who attain immortality. Moreover, faith (śraddhā) is said to accompany both tapas and knowledge.⁶

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² Tato bhūya iva te tamo ya u vidyāyāṃ ratāḥ, 9.

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³ Na tatra cakṣur gacchati na vāg gacchati na manah na vidmo na vijānīmo yathaitad anuśiṣyāt, 3; cp. 7, 2 2 3.

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⁴ 2.4. Radhakrishnan translates the phrase as 'when it is known through every state of cognition' and quotes in support a cryptic comment of Śaṅkara (bodhaṃ bodhaṃ prati viditam) but this surely contradicts what is stated one verse earlier, namely that 'it is not understood by those who understand it' (avijñātaṃ vijānatāṃ, 2 3).

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⁵ Bṛh 6 2 15, te ya evam etad viduḥ, ye cāmī araṇye śraddhāṃ satyam upāsate, ..

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⁶ Muṇḍ. 1.2 11, tapaḥ śraddhe ye hy upavasanty araṇye śāntā vidvāṃso ...

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(165) It is not intrinsically impossible that there were a set of thinkers in the Vedic tradition who, because they believed in the efficacy of rituals and the value of faith, pronounced that knowledge, whether empirical, metaphysical, or intuitive was a hindrance to moral progress and salvation. But their existence is not testified in the literature itself and it would be methodologically unsound to believe in their existence since we would have to depend on an *argumentum e silentio*. Even if they existed without leaving a trace of their doctrines in the Vedic literature, they cannot be identified with the first school of Sceptics as we know them from the passage under discussion. For in that case they should not declare the impossibility of knowledge but merely denounce it as morally dangerous. As we have shown (*v* supra, 148–150) it is unlikely that this first school of Sceptics would have come into being before the air was polluted (or rather enriched) with a multitude of contending theories. Thus people came to feel on the one hand that knowledge was uncertain and on the other that claims to knowledge were morally dangerous in that one might believe in what was in fact untrue and/or lead a factious and contentious life engaged in dispute and debate in defending one’s beliefs. It is in such circumstances that we can expect to find an intellectual scepticism at the theoretical level coupled with the practice of the good life as it was traditionally known or best understood at the time.

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(166) The description of the second school of Sceptics is almost identical with that of the first except for the difference that according to these thinkers, to be led to believe in a proposition by one’s likes, desires, aversions and resentments would be an entanglement (upādānaṃ, D. I 25–6). Such entanglement would be a source of worry (vighāto) and as such a moral danger (antarāyo). Upādāna- literally means ‘grasping’ or ‘clinging’ (PTS. *Dictionary*, *s v* sense 2) but since these words express a pro-attitude¹ in that we grasp what we like or desire but not what we hate or are averse to, it would be better to translate the word as ‘entanglement’ or ‘act of involvement’. For it is obviously intended to include the objects that we like as well as dislike Prof. Rhys Davids translates the word as ‘grasping condition of the heart which causes rebirth’ (*op cit*, p 38) but this, as standing for a concept of the Sceptics, need not, and indeed cannot, from the context have the same technical significance as it has in Buddhism. In the Buddhist context the word commonly means ‘the entanglement or involvement that leads to becoming or survival in the next life’

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¹ On the use of this word see P. H Nowell-Smith, *Ethics*, Penguin Books, pp 112–21

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(upādānapaccayābhavo, D. II.57) but there is no need to believe that these Sceptics, would have had such a definite belief in survival or rebirth, though they would not have dismissed the possibility. If as was said in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, the Sceptics too entertained beliefs about heaven and salvation (*v. supra*, 613) it is possible that they held them on pragmatic grounds without claiming actual knowledge. For, if Śīlāṅka's observations are correct, a favourite dictum of theirs was 'Of what use is this knowledge' (kim vā tena jñānena? *v. supra*, 155) as they did not believe that claims to knowledge had any pragmatic value. However, based on what is implied from the context, the more probable explanation is that this school of Sceptics merely considered it undesirable to be involved in beliefs based on one's likes or dislikes. They held this view not on the grounds that such involvement would lead to rebirth or survival but rather because such beliefs would be a source of worry and mental disquietude (vighāta-). In any case, it is clear that this school of thinkers, unlike the first, adopted Scepticism primarily out of moral considerations rather than for intellectual reasons although the latter were not absent.

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(167) The next school of sceptical thinkers is said to argue as follows: 'I do not know, as it really is, what is good and what is evil and not knowing, if I were to pronounce that this is good or this is evil, then I would have to join issue, argue and debate with recluses and brahmins, learned, subtle, hair-splitters, skilled in controversy, who go about debunking with their intellect the theories of others. If I were to join issue, argue and debate with them, I would not be able to explain to them. If I were unable to explain to them, that would cause me worry (vighāta-) and be moral danger (antarāyo).' Thus because he fears and detests interrogation (anuyoga-)¹ he does not 'pronounce this to be good nor that to be evil'.²

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¹ This is a technical term associated with the debate defined in the Caraka Saṃhitā, *v* infra, 322

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² Ahaṃ kho idaṃ kusalan ti yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāmi, idaṃ akusalan ti yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāmı Ahañ c'eva kho pana idaṃ kusalan ti yathābhūtam appajānanto, idaṃ akusalan ti yathābhūtam appajānanto idaṃ kusalan ti vā vyākareyyam—santi hi kho pana samaṇabrāhmaṇā paṇḍitā nipuṇā kataparappavādā valavedhirūpā vobhindantā maññe caranti paññāgatena diṭṭhigatāni -te mam tattha samanuyuñjeyyum samanugāheyyum samanubhāseyyum. Ye maṃ tattha samanuyuñjeyyum samanugāheyyum, tesāham na sampāyeyyam Yesāhaṃ na sampāyeyyaṃ so mam'assa vighāto so mam'assa antarāyo ti Iti so anuyogabhayā anuyogaparijegucchā n'ev'idaṃ kusalan ti vyākaroti, na pan'idaṃ akusalan ti vyākaroti ..., D. I 26.

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seems to be clear from this that there was much in common between these three schools or types of Sceptics and that they valued mental stability if not the cultivation of some sort of ideal state of mind.

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(171) Apart from the few hints that we get about these Sceptics from Buddhist and Jain sources, we have not been able to trace any positive reference to them elsewhere in Indian thought. But the account given of the scepticism of Pyrrho, who is said to have been influenced by Indian thought,¹ bears a remarkable similarity to the point of view of these Sceptics. The quotation preserved by Aristocles from one of Timon's prose works and which is supposed to represent the views of Timon's teacher, Pyrrho, reads as follows: 'He himself (Pyrrho) has left nothing in writing but his disciple Timon says that the man who is to be happy must look to these three things: (1) what is the nature of things, (2) what attitude should we take to them, and (3) what those who take this attitude will gain by it. He says that he declared that things were in an equal degree indifferent and unstable and incapable of being tested. For this reason neither our senses nor our opinions are true or false. So we must not put our trust in them but be free from beliefs and inclinations and unshaken, saying of each thing in turn that it no more is than it is not or that it both is and is not or that it neither is nor is not. And those who take this attitude, Timon says will first gain speechlessness (ἀφασία) and then imperturbability (ἀταραξία)'.²

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¹ ERE., Vol. 11, p. 228, *v* 'Sceptics', he is said to have 'studied philosophy under Indian Gymnosophists and Chaldean Magi'.

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² *Loc cit.*, p 229

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(172) One difference that we seem to observe on the surface is that Pyrrho's scepticism appears to be all-embracing while the scepticism of the three schools outlined above seems to have been more or less confined to moral propositions. But this appearance is deceptive. With regard to all three of these schools, it is stated, that they gave sceptical answers 'when questioned on each and every matter' (tattha tattha pañham puṭṭho, D.I, pp. 24, 25, 26). The reason for high-lighting the ethical examples was probably due to the Buddhists themselves being mainly concerned with this aspect of their teachings just as much as the account given by Sīlāṅka of the different 'types' of Sceptics (*v. supra*, 157) gave one the impression that the Sceptics were mainly interested in the concepts and categories of Jainism.

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(173) If we compare the doctrines of the above three schools of Sceptics with the account given above of the scepticism of Pyrrho, it would be interesting to observe that both hold that (1) there were no beliefs or opinions which were true or false and therefore (2) we should give no positive answer to any of the logical alternatives It would also be seen that (3) the four logical alternatives mentioned in Timon's account (i.e. is, is not, both is and is not, neither is nor is not) are identical with that of Sañjaya, the Buddhists and perhaps also of the three schools of Sceptics as we have shown below (*v. infra*, 184). Lastly (4) the value of the sceptical attitude is said by Pyrrho to lie in the fact that it promotes speechlessness (aphasia) and mental imperturbability (ataraxia), which seem to be the states of mind regarded as ideal by the above schools of Sceptics since they held that anything that caused mental instability was a hindrance. Because of Pyrrho's love of quietism, Burnet¹ thinks that Pyrrho is more of a quietist than a sceptic and is inclined to regard him as being nearer the Buddhist ideal: 'We see that those who knew Pyrrho well described him as a sort of Buddhist *arhat* and that is doubtless how we should regard him. He is not so much a sceptic as an ascetic and a quietist'. But when we see that Pyrrho's scepticism as well as his quietism are shared by the above schools of Sceptics, it would be more appropriate to regard him as having a closer kinship with them rather than with the Buddhists, who were opposed to their scepticism.

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