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Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.155

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.155

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c8.155

(206) In introducing the 'fourth type of person' (cautthe purisajāe), who is a niyatiyavādin (niyativāïetti), the Sūtrakṛtāṅga (2.1.12) places the causal argument in the mouth of the Determinist as follows: iha khalu duve purisā bhavanti—ege purise kiriyamāïkkhai, ege purise nokiriyamāïkkhai, je ya purise kiriyamāïkkhai je ya purise nokiriyamāïkkhai, dovi te purisā tullā egatthā, kāraṇam āvannā, i.e. here are two persons, one person maintains (the efficacy of) action while the other person denies (the efficacy of) action, but both of them are (ultimately) equal and alike on account of the cause (being niyati)'. Here the crucial phrase kāraṇamāvannā seems to have presented a difficulty to the translator. Jacobi renders kāraṇamāvannā as 'they are actuated by the same force' (*op cit.*, p 317) but in a footnote (fn 2) he says that 'this is the interpretation of the commentators. But to the phrase kāraṇamāpannā they give here a meaning different from that in the following paragraphs. I therefore propose the following translation of the end of the paragraph "are equally (wrong), (err) alike as regards the cause (of actions)"' Dr Basham follows Jacobi's first translation, viz. 'Both equally and alike are affected by (a single) cause' (*op. cit.*, p 233). We have closely followed Śīlāṅka who says, ata ekārthāvekakāraṇāpannatvāditi niyati-vaśen'aiva tau niyatiyavādam aniyatiyavādam cāśritāviti bhāvaḥ,¹ i e. thus (both are) alike since they are affected by the same cause, the sense being that by the force of niyati alone they have followed the niyatiyavāda and the aniyatiyavāda Jacobi's second translation cannot be accepted since it is too much of a periphrasis which introduces concepts like 'wrong' and 'err' which are not found in or suggested by the context. But whether we translate kāraṇamāvannā as 'on account of the (same) cause' or 'as regards the cause' the significance that kāraṇa- had for the person using this term is clear from the example cited He takes the case of two persons alike in other respects except for the fact that one is a kiriyavādin and the other an akiriyavādin and finds that latterly they are both still alike. This is the application of Mill's Method of Difference with negative results and may be represented symbolically² thus:

Cites (1)