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Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.208

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.208

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English

c8.208

(227) This Trairāśika doctrine which found it necessary to posit three kinds of souls and perhaps three kinds of worlds corresponding to them as well as three kinds of being, appears therefore to be quite early. The evidence points to its having its origin in a sect of Ājīvikas (in the loose sense) independently of Gosāla, though it may have accepted Gosāla's leadership or merged with the followers of Gosāla later on. It is to this doctrine that Basham traces the necessity for the Trairāśika to posit a third possibility: 'The Ājīvika postulate of a third possibility, neither being nor non-being, must have formed a convenient logical basis for the unusual doctrine that some souls were compelled to return even from *nirvāṇa*. These would be classified in the third category, *sadasat*—emancipated from *saṃsāra* and yet not emancipated' (*op. cit.*, p. 275). We agree with this conclusion though not in the form in which Dr Basham states it, since the third possibility is not 'neither being nor non-being' but 'both being and non-being' (sadasat), which has to be distinguished from the former since the distinction was drawn in the time of the Pāli Nikāyas. The thesis of this school is, as we said, stated in the Pāli Nikāyas as '*sassato ca asassato ca attā ca loko ca*' which would probably have been equivalent to '*sanasanjīvaśca lokaśca*' in the terminology of the Trairāśika. This, it may be observed, is not a logical proposition which is contradictory as would appear from its form (since it seems to violate the Law of Excluded Middle) but an empirical proposition which is contingent (*v. infra*, 579). Thus, for this school the three logical alternatives would be: (1) p, (2) notp, (3) p.notp and not the usual two (1.p, 2 not-p) according to the Aristotelian schema.

Cites (2)