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Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.225

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.225

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c8.225

(234) Śīlāṅka first explains the phrase, vibajjavāyam (ca viḅyāgarejjā), saying that it means 'one should expound the theory which unravels separate meanings' (pṛthagarthanirṇayavādam vyāgṛṇīyāt, *op cit.*, Vol. I, fol. 256) and then goes on to suggest two alternative meanings for the term vibhajjavāda-: 'Either vibhajya-vāda- is *syādvāda*, which he should expound as it is nowhere at fault, is comprehensive since it is not contradicted by conventional usage, and is validated by one's own experience; or he should analyse, i e distinguish the senses properly (samyagarthān... pṛthakkṛtvā) and make his statement, vız. he should speak of permanence from the substantial standpoint and of impermanence from the modal standpoint, likewise (he may say that) all things exist from the point of view of their own substance, place, time and states and do not exist from the point of view of other substances, etc, thus has it been said "he who would not entertain everything as existing from the four points of view of its form, etc, and as not existing from the opposite points of view, cannot take any stand"—he should resort to analytical statements of this sort '³ This explanation is largely based on Jain epistemological beliefs, but the general sense of vibhajja-vāda that Śīlāṅka speaks of was probably the original sense. It shows that the early Jains like the Buddhists who were to follow them made use of analysis in understanding the meanings of statements (*v. infra*, 446 ff.).