Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.29

c8.29

ajñāne) is not 'knowledge' but the opposite of it; the commentary explains the phrase as follows: 'Ajñāne' ajñānaviṣaye 'na niyacchati' na niścayena yacchati, nāvatarati (*op. cit.*, Vol. I, fol. 35), which means, the '(speculations) do not definitely take them or place them in the realm of ignorance'. What is meant is that their scepticism should lead them logically to the conclusion that they know nothing whatsoever, but in fact their 'reflections have the features of knowledge' (paryālocanasya jñānarūpatvāt, *loc. cit.*) and 'one cannot understand' (na budhyate, *loc. cit.*) how they claim to know such propositions as 'ignorance is best' (ajñānameva śreyaḥ, *loc. cit.*), etc. So when they claim that they are Sceptics they are (according to this Jain criticism) in fact claiming to have some knowledge as revealed by their *dicta* and thereby they are contradicting themselves. The other context in which something informative is asserted about the Sceptics states that 'these Sceptics being "experts" are uncommitted' (asamthuyā=asambaddhāḥ) (commentary, *op. cit.*, Vol I, fol. 215); Jacobi translates as "reason incoherently" (*op. cit.*, p. 316) but they have not overcome doubt; unskilled they teach the unskilled and utter falsehood without discrimination' (aṇṇāṇiyā tā kusalāvī santā, asanthuyā no vitigicchatinnā, akoviyā āhu akoviyehiṃ, anānuvīttu musaṃ vadanti, Sū. 1.12.2).