Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.33

c8.33

(154) Here again, we do not know on what grounds the Sceptic held the view that one cannot know another's mind but it is evident that this theory itself could have led him to scepticism If one cannot know another's mind, communication is impossible and knowledge no longer becomes objective. We may profitably compare this view with that of the Greek sophist, who believed in the incommunicability of what we claim to know. In Gorgias' book³ on 'Nature or the Non-existent', he sets forth three propositions, viz (1) that nothing exists, (2) that if anything exists it cannot be known, and (3) that if it can be known, the knowledge cannot be communicated. The Ajñānikas seem to have agreed with propositions (2) and (3) but not (1) since quite consistently with their scepticism they could not categorically hold that 'nothing exists' but only that 'nothing could be known to exist'. This is the same as proposition (2), thus granting the possibility of existence. Now Gorgias proves proposition (2) by showing that knowledge is identical with sense-perception and that since sense-impressions differ with different people, no two people can have the same sense-impressions with regard to an object Therefore knowledge, which must necessarily be objective, is not possible because of this subjectivity. For the same reason this knowledge being identical with sensation, cannot be communicated. The Indian Sceptics may possibly have reasoned on similar lines, though one cannot be quite certain about this, due to the lack of any definite evidence. The argument against the possibility of complete knowledge (*v. supra*, 148) seems to give a faint indication of this. Here it was said that whatever we apprehend has the three parts, near (arvāk-), middle (madhya-), and outer (para-) and that we in fact apprehend only the near part (tasyārvāgbhāgasyevopalabdhiḥ, *loc. cit.*). Now this is certainly true of visual perception and in a sense of sense-perception in general. We see only the near side (the side facing us) of objects, so that what each person sees of the object would be different according to the individual perspective. So if we are arvāg-darśinaḥ (a term which is frequently used in the sayings of Sceptics) or 'near-side-seers', our knowledge at least of physical objects, being dependent on our individual perspectives, would be subjective since these perspectives would be different with different individuals. In the absence of objectivity, there is no knowledge at all and the private experiences or impressions of the different individuals would be incommunicable. Whether the early Sceptics would have employed such reasoning or not it is difficult to say but they certainly seem to have held that one could not know another's mind and this seems to have been one of the grounds of their Scepticism.