Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.35

c8.35

(155) As we have seen, Śīlāṅka's account stresses the intellectual basis of their scepticism rather than the pragmatic or moral reasons for it, but the fact that they were also present is evident from some of his observations about the Sceptics. According to Śīlāṅka 'the Sceptics . . . conceive that even if there was knowledge it is useless (niṣphalam) since it has many disadvantages (bahudoṣavat)' (Ajñānikānām . . . jñānam tu sadapi niṣphalam bahudoṣavaccetyevamabhyupagamavatām, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, fol. 215). This shows that they not only considered knowledge to be impossible but that it was useless. In enumerating the sixty-seven 'types' of Sceptics, Śīlāṅka puts the question of the Sceptic in two forms, viz. 'Who knows that the soul exists? Of what use is this knowledge? Who knows that the soul does not exist? Of what use is this knowledge? etc.' (san jīvaḥ ko vetti? kiṃ vā tena jñānena? asan jīvaḥ ko vetti? kiṃ vā tena jñānena? *op. cit.*, Vol. I, fol. 36 on Sū. 1.1.2.20; also Vol. I, fol. 212). The second of these forms is clearly meant to imply that they adopted Scepticism on pragmatic considerations as well.