Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.54

c8.54

(164) The sacrificial brahmins of the Brāhmaṇas proper, who continued in the Upanisadic period recommending the path of action (karmamārga-), were undoubtedly against the claims to metaphysical and intuitive knowledge on the part of the Upanisadic thinkers. However, there is no reason to think that they were sceptics or agnostics in the matter of knowledge. They certainly claimed the veracity of certain ethical propositions. The modified theory of the path of action (karmamārga- or karmapatha-) to be found in the Īśā Upanisad and later in the Bhagavadgītā is less averse to knowledge. The Īśā, while condemning those who delight in knowledge as being in greater darkness than those who are ignorant,² nevertheless speaks of some kind of knowledge with which immortality is obtained (vidyayāmṛtam aśnute, *op. cit.*, 11). Barua calls the thinkers of the Kena Upanisad, viz. the Keniyas, 'sceptics' (*op. cit.*, pp. 261, 319). However, they were properly agnostics, who denied the possibility of conceptual or sensory knowledge of reality³ while not denying that reality 'was known by an awakening' (pratibodhaviditam⁴). Likewise, faith (śraddhā) in the Upaniṣads was never divorced from knowledge and there is no evidence of a faith movement in the Upaniṣads, which decried knowledge. It is those who have both knowledge and faith⁵ who attain immortality. Moreover, faith (śraddhā) is said to accompany both tapas and knowledge.⁶