Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.73

c8.73

(173) If we compare the doctrines of the above three schools of Sceptics with the account given above of the scepticism of Pyrrho, it would be interesting to observe that both hold that (1) there were no beliefs or opinions which were true or false and therefore (2) we should give no positive answer to any of the logical alternatives It would also be seen that (3) the four logical alternatives mentioned in Timon's account (i.e. is, is not, both is and is not, neither is nor is not) are identical with that of Sañjaya, the Buddhists and perhaps also of the three schools of Sceptics as we have shown below (*v. infra*, 184). Lastly (4) the value of the sceptical attitude is said by Pyrrho to lie in the fact that it promotes speechlessness (aphasia) and mental imperturbability (ataraxia), which seem to be the states of mind regarded as ideal by the above schools of Sceptics since they held that anything that caused mental instability was a hindrance. Because of Pyrrho's love of quietism, Burnet¹ thinks that Pyrrho is more of a quietist than a sceptic and is inclined to regard him as being nearer the Buddhist ideal: 'We see that those who knew Pyrrho well described him as a sort of Buddhist *arhat* and that is doubtless how we should regard him. He is not so much a sceptic as an ascetic and a quietist'. But when we see that Pyrrho's scepticism as well as his quietism are shared by the above schools of Sceptics, it would be more appropriate to regard him as having a closer kinship with them rather than with the Buddhists, who were opposed to their scepticism.