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Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c9: Chapter IV: The Attitude to Authority

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c9

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Chapter IV: The Attitude to Authority

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(244) When we tried to classify the thinkers of the pre-Buddhistic era in accordance with their epistemological outlook and approach to problems, we found in Chapter I that the Vedic thinkers up to the time of Buddhism seemed to fall into three groups. Firstly, there were the traditionalists coming down from the period of the Brāhmaṇas who considered the sacred scriptures to be the most valuable source of knowledge. Secondly, there were the thinkers of the Āraṇyakas and Early Upaniṣads, who, while not entirely discarding scripture, thought that knowledge of reality was possible by reasoning and metaphysical speculation. While this second school of thinkers would have continued independently to evolve their own speculative theories there arose thirdly, the contemplatives of the Middle and Late Upaniṣads, who while relegating scripture to the realm of lower knowledge (aparā vidyā) and discarding reason (tarka) as an adequate means of obtaining knowledge of reality claimed that the only means of knowing reality was by having a personal and direct acquaintance or experience of it, by practising meditative techniques (yoga) and depending on the grace of God for the final vision or revelation.

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(245) A study of the ways of knowing of the non-Vedic thinkers shows that they can be classified along with the second and third groups of the Vedic thinkers. There is little doubt that the Materialists made use of reason both in evolving as well as in propagating their views though reason for them was on the whole subservient to perception. The Sceptics likewise seemed to have reasoned their way into scepticism though with the exception of the school of Sañjaya, they made little use of it since they kept aloof from controversy. The Ājīvakas were a mixed lot; they were primarily rational metaphysicians and dialecticians though some of them seem to have claimed personal intuitional insights. Similarly the Jains or at least their leader claimed personal and direct knowledge of things, while making use of reason in debate.

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(246) If therefore we take the pre-Buddhistic background of thought as a whole these thinkers fall into three classes according to the stress they laid on a particular way of knowing, viz.

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(1) The Traditionalists, who derived their knowledge wholly from a scriptural tradition and interpretations based on it. Prominent in this class were the brahmins who upheld the sacred authority of the Vedas

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(2) The Rationalists, who derived their knowledge from reasoning and speculation without any claims to extrasensory perception. The metaphysicians of the Early Upaniṣads, the Sceptics, the Materialists and most of the Ājīvakas fell into this class.

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(3) The ‘Experientialists’, who depended on direct personal knowledge and experience, including extrasensory perception on the basis of which their theories were founded Many of the thinkers of the Middle and Late Upaniṣads, some of the Ājīvakas and Jains are classifiable in this group. The Materialists, as empiricists, would also fall under this category if not for the fact that they denied the validity of claims to extrasensory perception.

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(247) This classification, however, should not be too rigidly interpreted so as to consider these groups as mutually exclusive Such was not the case, for the Traditionalists did not deny or fail to give a place to perception and reason. The Rationalists of the Early Upaniṣads likewise did not entirely do away with scripture, although the Materialists did The Ājīvakas and later the Jains also had their scriptures which they held in great respect. The Experientialists of the Middle and Late Upaniṣads in like manner give a very limited place to scripture though they discard reason altogether. So what we can claim for this grouping is that when we consider the epistemological standpoints of these groups as a whole, the essential or final knowledge claimed by them is said to be derived mainly if not wholly from each of the sources of knowledge emphasized by each group.

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(248) In examining the ways of knowledge recognized or accepted in Buddhism it would be pertinent to ask whether the Buddha or Early Buddhism can be classified under any of the above groups or to see what attitude Buddhism adopted towards them in respect of its own epistemological standpoint (249) There is a passage in the Saṅgārava Sutta which throws a good deal of light on this problem. Here the Buddha is talking with a brahmin student versed in the Vedas and Vedic lore, who asks him the following question: 'There are ... some recluses and brahmins who profess the basis of a religion (ādibrahmacariyakam) after finding a final and ultimate insight (diṭṭhadhammābhiññāvosānapāramippattā) in this life. Now where does the venerable Gotama stand among them?'¹ The Buddha replies as follows: 'I say that there is a difference among those who profess the basis of a religion after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life. There are .. some recluses and brahmins who are Traditionalists (anussavikā), who profess the basis of a religion after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life, such as the brahmins of the Three Vedas (Tevijjā). There are also ... some recluses and brahmins who profess the basis of a religion after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life on mere belief alone (kevalaṃ saddhāmattakena) such as the Reasoners (takkī) and Metaphysicians (vīmaṃsī, *lit.* speculators). There are other recluses and brahmins who profess the basis of a religion after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life by gaining a higher knowledge personally (sāmaṃ yeva) of a doctrine (dhammaṃ) among doctrines not traditionally heard of before. Now ... I am one of those who profess the basis of a religion after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life by gaining a higher knowledge personally of a doctrine among doctrines not traditionally heard of before.'²

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¹ Santi . . eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā diṭṭhadhammābhiññāvosānapāramippattā ādibrahmacariyaṃ paṭijānanti. Tatra bho Gotama ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā diṭṭhadhammābhiññāvosānapāramippattā ādibrahmacariyaṃ paṭijānanti, tesaṃ bhavaṃ Gotamo katamo ti? M II 211

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² Diṭṭhadhammābhiññāvosānapāramippattānaṃ ādibrahmacariyaṃ paṭijānantānaṃ pi kho ... vemattataṃ vadāmi Santi eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā anussavikā, te anussavena diṭṭhadhammābhiññāvosānapāramippattā ādibrahmacariyaṃ paṭijānanti, seyyathāpi brāhmaṇā Tevijjā Santi pana ... eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā kevalaṃ saddhāmattakena diṭṭhadhammābhiññāvosānaparamippattā ādibrahmacariyaṃ paṭijānanti, seyyathāpi Takkī Vīmaṃsī Santi eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu sāmaṃ yeva dhammaṃ abhiññāya diṭṭhadhammābhiññāvosānapāramippattā ādibrahmacariyaṃ paṭijānanti. Tatra ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu sāmaṃ yeva dhammaṃ abhiññāya diṭṭhadhammābhiññāvosānapāramippattāādibrahmacariyaṃ paṭijānanti, tesāham asmi M II 211.

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(250) We find here the Buddha classifying his predecessors and contemporaries in respect of their ways of knowing into three classes, *viz.* (1) the Traditionalists (Anussavikā), (2) Rationalists and Metaphysicians (Takkī Vīmaṁsī), and (3) the 'Experientialists' who had a personal higher knowledge of the truth of their doctrines He also identifies himself with members of this third group These groups appear *prima facie* to be the same as the groups we found after a historical analysis of the background of Early Buddhist thought.

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(251) Let us start with the criticism of the anussavikā Now we find that anussava- is only one of many alleged means of knowledge criticized in the Pāli Nikāyas. It heads a list of ten possible ways of claiming knowledge which are condemned as unsatisfactory by the Buddha in addressing the Kālāmas (A. I.189) and on another occasion in a discourse to Bhaddiya Licchavi (A. II 191-3). On examining this list it will be noticed (*v. infra*, 259) that six of the items have reference to knowledge which is claimed on the basis of some sort of authority It would therefore be better to consider the authoritative criterion of knowledge as a whole and inquire into the Buddhist attitude to it.

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(252) The argument from authority may take many forms. If we confine ourselves to the Indian context, we find that many different types of knowledge from authority were accepted as valid by Indian thinkers. A brief résumé of these different types as recognized in post-Buddhist thought would not only help us to see the Early Buddhist criticism of authority in a better light, but also enable us to distinguish between the earlier pre-Buddhistic claims to knowledge based on authority, from the later forms.

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(253) That the argument from authority was accepted by the orthodox schools is evident from the fact that śabda was accorded the dignity of a pramāna (i e a valid means of knowledge) by all of them excepting the Vaiśesika. The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā preserves the earliest and the most orthodox view of śabda and uses the term to denote the authority of the Vedas alone. Even among Vedic assertions priority is claimed for the injunctive statements, i e commands (vidhi) and prohibitions (nisedha) while explanatory assertions (arthavāda) are given a secondary status (M S. 1 2.1) inasmuch as they are said to be dependent on the former. We see here reflected the attitude of the earliest ritualistic brahmins who valued the karmakānda alone above all else and upheld the absolute authority of the Vedas (*v.* our first group of Vedic thinkers).

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(254) In contrast to this attitude is that of the Naiyāyikas for whom śabda means verbal testimony in general without specific reference to the Vedic scriptures and stands for the testimony of experts. Vedic statements are included only as a special case of such testimony and are authoritative because God is all-knowing and presumably trustworthy (N.S. 2.¹.68), the existence of God being independently proved by a metaphysical analogical argument (sāmānyatodṛṣṭa).

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(255) The testimony of people who may be of any class, 'ṛṣīs, āryas or mlecchas'¹ relate to empirical facts (dṛṣṭārtha) while that of the Vedas relates to non-empirical facts (adṛṣṭārtha). Even if the early Nyāya was atheistic,² it is not likely that the Vedas were rejected altogether for it seems to have been argued that the human authors of the Vedas, namely the ṛṣīs, were āptas or reliable persons whose statements even with regard to non-empirical facts may be accepted (N.B. 1.1.8, 2.1.68). But what is significant is that the Mīmāmsā claim to an absolute authoritativeness of the Vedas is criticized (N.S. 2.2.13–40) and that its authority is considered derivative from the general authority of reliable testimony, in this school which specialized in the study of logic. The Vaiśeṣika school, which became closely attached to the Nyāya, not only criticizes the absolute claim to authority of the Vedas (V.S. 2.2.21–37, 6.1.1. ff.) but does not treat śabda as a separate pramāṇa at all. It nevertheless subsumes both tradition (aitihya) as well as verbal testimony (śabda) under inference³ and treats scriptural statements as śabda or testimony acceptable on the reliability of the seers. We thus see logicians of the Nyāya school treating the scriptural statements of the Vedas as a sub-class of verbal testimony and the metaphysicians of the Vaiśeṣika school treating them as a sub-class of inferential propositions. This attitude to the Vedas seems to bear some affinity to that of our second group of Vedic thinkers (*v. supra*, 244).

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¹ ṛṣy-ārya-mlecchānāṃ samānaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ, NB 1.1.7. *v.* Ānanda Āśrama Series No 91, p. 25.

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² *v.* Garbe, *Philosophy of Ancient India*, p 23, cp Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, Vol 3, p. 133

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³ *v.* Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol 2, p. 182.

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(256) The other schools represent a point of view midway between that of the Mīmāmsā and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The Sāṅkhya as a metaphysical system accepts reliable assertions (āptavacana) as an independent source of knowledge (S.K. 4). Unlike the Naiyāyikas, it admits its non-personal authorship (S.P.S. 5.46) and independent validity (S.P.S. 5 51) but it makes the Vedas superfluous by saying that the saved do not need it and the unsaved cannot grasp it (S.P.S. 5.47). Furthermore, it undermines its foundations by relying on reason alone in deducing its metaphysics. The Yoga likewise, while nominally accepting scripture as a separate source of knowledge (Y S 1.7), treats it as being of secondary utility in developing the highest yogic intuition (Y.B. 1.48). The Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara treats Vedic statements as falling within the scope of śabda, which for him is an independent pramāṇa. However, unlike the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṁsā, and like the others, it regards assertive statements as being of the same status as injunctive statements, but here again knowledge through the pramāṇas is sublated in the highest intuition Incidentally it will be noticed that all these schools of Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Advaita Vedānta, while utilizing and upholding reason and granting the validity of scripture, claim the possibility of an ultimate personal knowledge which relegates both inference and scripture to a lower status. The Sāṅkhya comes closest to upholding reason but since it finds that its metaphysics leads to the conclusion that all empirical and rational knowledge is the result of a confusion between puruṣa and buddhi, it has to rely on yoga to resolve this confusion

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There is another important distinction made with regard to the authority of the Vedas, which has to be briefly examined before we investigate the fact and/or nature of the Early Buddhist criticism of the authoritarian claims of the Vedic thinkers. We find in post-Buddhistic times a controversy in the orthodox schools as to whether the Vedas derived their authority from a personal authorship, human or divine (pauruṣeya), or from the lack of personal authorship (apauruṣeya). The Naiyāyikas deduced the reliability of the Veda from the omniscience and trustworthiness of a personal Being (Īśvara) who revealed it or from the reliability of the seers who uttered the Vedic statements. On the other hand the Mīmāṁsakas asserted the reliability of the Vedas on the grounds of their eternity and argued that it had no human authors or divine founders and hence it was not affected by the defects of an instrument of knowledge (kāraṇadoṣa). Since it dealt with matters which were unverifiable it could not be contradicted The Advaita Vedānta agrees with the Mīmāṁsā in this matter though it affects a compromise with the personal (pauruṣeya) view in claiming that God resuscitates the Vedas at the beginning of each epoch. It would be pertinent to investigate whether the Buddhist criticisms have any bearing on this problem (258) The different senses of sabda and the different forms of authoritative knowledge claimed in the post-Buddhistic philosophical tradition make it possible for us to see that the argument from authority took the following forms at least in this tradition:
(1) The authority of Vedic scripture (a) as being eternal, flawless and irrefutable in that it has no personal author or authors, human or divine; (b) as being revealed by an omniscient and perfect Being; (c) as statements of reliable (wise and good) persons.
(2) The authority of tradition, strictly non-scriptural but associated with the Vedic tradition (smṛti, aitihya).
(3) The authority of non-Vedic traditions.
(4) The authority of any reliable person.

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(259) We stated that of ten possible ways of claiming knowledge criticized by the Buddha (*v. supra*, 251) six had reference to the acceptance of authority. These six in their order of appearance are as follows: (1) anussavena, (2) paramparāya, (3) itikirāya, (4) piṭakasampadāya, (5) bhavyarūpatāya, (6) samaṇo no garu The mention of anussava in the top of the list and the singling out of the anussavikā as the first class of thinkers, who found a religion on anussava, possibly betrays the importance which was attached to anussava as a source of knowledge at this time. When we find that anussava is used in reference to the Vedic tradition we are led to believe that according to Early Buddhism this tradition was accepted on anussava.

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(260) If we make a preliminary classification of what the words appear to mean in terms of the forms of authoritative knowledge they have reference to, we may group them as follows for purposes of discussion: The authority of
(1) the Vedic tradition as accepted on anussava though this term is not restricted to this sense.
(2) tradition in general, not necessarily Vedic (paramparā-)
(3) scripture in general as a collection of sacred sayings or *dicta theologica* of a religious group (piṭaka-sampadā-)
(4) testimony of experts (bhavyarūpatā-, samaṇo no garu)
(5) report or hearsay (itikirā-) Let us examine the respective claims and criticisms made.

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(261) Anussava has been translated by Woodward as 'report' (G.S. II.200) and Miss Horner uses the same word very often in her translations of the term (M.L.S. II.199, 360, 400) but renders it on two occasions by 'tradition' (M.L.S. III.6, 20). What is puzzling is that she has rendered the term as 'report' even where the Vedic tradition is clearly indicated by the word (M.L.S. II 360, 400). Now the word is certainly used in the sense of 'hearsay' or 'report' in certain popular contexts (J. IV 441) and this sense has even been given semi-technical recognition where it is said that Kālī is the 'chiefest among laywomen who believe on hearsay' (aggam upāsikānam anussavappasannānam, A. I.26) for she is said to have overheard a conversation that took place between two people about the excellence of the Buddha and his teaching and attained the rank of sotāpanna thereby (DPPN., 1.587).

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(262) But this sense looks very odd and unsatisfactory when the reference is clearly to the Vedic tradition. The Vedic brahmins certainly did not accept the Vedic scriptures on the basis of report. When it was said that the anussavikā profess a religion on anussava and the brahmins of the Three Vedas are said to be doing this, it is surely not the case that they were propounding a religion on just hearsay but on the unquestioned authority of their religious texts traditionally handed down. The translation of anussava as 'tradition' seems to suit this context better than 'report'. But even 'tradition' does not seem to convey fully the meaning of the term as may be evident from examining another context (M. II 170).

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(263) Here (Cankī Sutta) the Buddha is conversing with a brahmin student who has 'mastered the Vedic scriptures' (tevijjake pāvacane katam). The latter wishes to know the Buddha's views on the claims of the brahmins 'who came absolutely to the conclusion that this alone is true and all else is false' (ekamsena nittham gacchanti: idam eva saccam mogham aññam, *loc. cit*) in respect of that which is a 'scriptural statement or hymn' (mantapadam, *loc. cit.*) of the ancient brahmins. The Buddha replies that neither the present brahmins nor their teachers nor their teachers' teachers up to several generations nor even the 'original seers who composed and uttered the hymns' (pubbakā isayo mantānam kattāro mantānam pavattāro, *loc. cit*) claimed direct personal knowledge of the truth of their statements saying 'I know this, I see this: this alone is true, all else is false' (aham etam jānāmi, aham etam passāmi idam eva saccam mogham aññam, *loc. cit.*) In such circumstances, it was a 'blind tradition' (andhaveṇi, *loc. cit.*) and the faith (saddhā) of the brahmins in the categorical truth of these statements was 'baseless' (amūlikā). To this it is replied that 'the brahmins do not merely go by faith in this matter, they also go by anussava' (na kho 'ttha ... brāhmanā saddhāya yeva payirupāsanti anussavā p'ettha payirupāsanti, *loc. cit.*). The significance of this reply is lost if anussava is translated by 'report' as Miss Horner does. It would seem from this context that the brahmins were claiming the absolute authority and validity of Vedic scripture not merely out of faith in a tradition but out of faith in a sacred, holy or revelational tradition. The brahmin's reply has the effect of saying that the brahmins revere (payirupāsanti) the Vedas not out of faith alone, but on the grounds of revelation as well.

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(264) We may inquire whether anussava has such a meaning in the Vedic tradition. There is no doubt that in the Upanisads what was heard as Vedic teaching was considered divine (daivam) or holy (Bṛh. 1.4 17). But there is no attested instance ofánu + √śru used in reference to the Vedas in the Vedas, Brāhmanas or the classical Upanisads. In early Vedic usage anu + √śru is used merely in the sense of 'hearing about' (anusuśrāva kaścana, A.V. 11.4.25d) but in an Upanisadic use the significance of the prefix anu is felt where it is said that 'one hears again' in one's dreams what one has heard in waking life (śrutam anuśṛnoti, Praśna 4.5). By the time of the Yoga Sūtra of Patañjali 'ānuśravika-' is however used in the sense in which śruta was used in the Upanisads to denote 'Vedic teaching' (*dṛṣtānuśravikaviṣayavitṛṣṇasya vaśīkārasaṃjñā vairāgyam*, Y.S. 1.15; *v.* Comy. gurumukhād anuśrūyata ityanuśravo vedaḥ) and after that anu + √śru has the connotation of 'hearing from the Vedic tradition'.¹ Monier Williams gives the following meanings for anu + √śru (*s.v.* Sanskrit-English Dictionary), 'to hear repeatedly, especially from a sacred authority, anu-śrava, Vedic tradition (acquired by repeated hearing); anu-śruta, handed down by Vedic tradition'.

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¹ Cp ṛco yajūṃsi sāmāni nirame yajñasiddhaye ... sādhyās tair ayajan devān ityevaṃ *anuśuśruma*, Harivaṃsa, 1.1 38–40, *v* Śrīmān Mahābhāratam Harivaṃsaparvan, Ed. E Kinjawadekar, Poona, 1936, p. 6.

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(265) This shows that sometime before the Y.S. and probably during the time of Early Buddhism anussava had come to mean the 'sacred Vedic tradition'. The word was better fitted to convey the idea than just śruta- because of the force of the prefix anu- implying a repeated systematic handing down of a tradition (cp. gītam pavattam saṃhitam tad *anugāyanti* tad *anubhāsanti* bhāsitam *anubhāsanti* vācitam *anuvācenti*, D. I.241; M. II.169, 170). Now in what did the sacredness or authority of the Veda depend on for these pre-Buddhistic Vedic thinkers. Was it on 'the continuity (unbrokenness) of the tradition and the absence of a known personal author' (sampradāyāvicchede sati asmaryamānakartrkatvāt) as the Mīmāmsā contends according to the Naiyāyikas.¹ Certainly the continuity of the tradition had weight but it is unlikely that at this time the conception of the non-personal authorship of the Vedas was at all seriously entertained.

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(266) The Vedas were undoubtedly considered to have been handed down by an unbroken succession of teachers right down to historical times and this continuity of the tradition is tacitly assumed or in part asserted in the Buddhist criticisms as well If they were considered to be divine in character it was because they were derived from God Himself according to the Vedic thinkers of these times.

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(267) According to the earliest account of the divine origin of the Vedas² they are produced by the sacrifice of the Cosmic Person (Purusa, RV. 10 90). At a time when monistic principles of explanation were current, the Vedas were produced from them Thus the Vedas as well as even the original rsis (rsayah prathamajāh) at times are derived from Skambha, the Ontological Framework (AV. 10 7.14) or Kāla, Time (AV. 19 54 3) or Vāk (vāgaksaram ... vedānām mātā, Tait. Br. 2 8 8.5). But before long the origin of the Vedas is ascribed to a personal divine being, possibly due to the influence of the Purusa-sūkta; Prajāpati is very often credited with the task of creating it. Thus, Prajāpatih Somam rājānam asrjata, tam trayo vedā anvasrjyanta (Tait. Br. 2.3.10 1), Prājāpatyo vedah (Tait Br 3 3 2 1) In the Ś.Br., too, it is he who creates the Veda (6.¹.1 8). It is significant that Prajāpati is identified with Brahmā in the Brāhmanas Prājāpatyo Brahmā (Tait. 3 3 8.3), Prājāpatyo vai Brahmā (Gopatha Uttarabhāga 3.18). It should also be noted that in the Brāhmanas, Brahmā is very intimately associated with the Three Vedas (yenevāmum trayyai vidyāyai tejo rasam prāvrhat tena Brahmā Brahmā bhavati, Kauś Br. 6 11; atha kena brahmatvam kriyata iti trayyā vidyayeti bruyāt, Ait Br. 5.33, atha kena brahmatvam (kriyate) ityanayā traiyyā vidyayeti ha brūyāt, Ś.Br. 11.5 8 7)

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¹ Sarvadarśanasamgraha, Ed V S Abhyankar, Poona, 1951, pp 270–71

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² At RV 7.66 11, however, the rc (rcam) is created (dadhuh) by the kings Varuna, Mitra and Āryaman

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(268) When we come to the earliest phase of the Upanisads we find Prajāpati continuing in his rôle as creator of the Vedas (Ch 4.17 1–2)

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He is also a teacher of religious students (Bṛh. 5.².1, Ch. 8.7–12). This rôle is soon taken over by Brahmā who is represented as the creator as well as the first teacher of the Vedas. A fact that needs to be taken account of is that while the conceptions of Brahman (neut.) as well as Brahmā (masc.) are found in the Brāhmaṇas,¹ the essential identity of the two is shown in the Brāhmaṇas by the formula that 'Brahman became Brahmā on his own' (Brahma brahmābhavat svayam, Tait. Br. 3.12.9.3). This identity is important in observing the close affinity that subsists between the two especially in the early Upaniṣads. This identity has again possibly been influenced by the Puruṣa-sūkta. Thus it is said at Bṛh. 1.4 1 that in the beginning this world was Ātman alone in the form of a Person (puruṣavidhaḥ) and soon after (Bṛh. 1.4.10) that in the beginning the world was Brahman which knew Himself (with the thought) 'I am Brahmā'.

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(269) It is this reality sometimes referred to as Brahman (neut.) and more often as Brahmā (masc.) who is the first teacher of the Vedas. We see in the list of successive teachers at Bṛh. 2.6.1–3 and again at Bṛh. 4 6 1. and 6.5.1–4 that the line is traced right up to Brahman (neut.) which is translated by Radhakrishnan, inconsistently with the grammar and consistently with the meaning as Brahmā (PU. p. 210). The Upaniṣads themselves are not consistent in this usage.² At Ch. 8.15 we find it expressly stated that Vedic knowledge comes from Brahmā (masc.) who discloses it to Prajāpati who in turn tells Manu who tells human beings (taddhaitad brahmā prājāpatye uvāca . . .). Even when in the Middle and Late Upaniṣads the personal conception of Brahmā (masc.) came to be sharply distinguished from Brahman (neut.), the importance of this personal conception of Brahmā as the first deliverer of the Vedas and the creator of the world was so great that the earlier idea was still retained. At Muṇḍaka 1.¹.1 all knowledge is traced to Brahmā (masc ) the first born of the gods and the maker of the universe (brahmā devānām prathamaḥ sambabhūva viśvasya kartā . . .). Similarly at Śvet 6.18 the ultimate source of all knowledge (i.e. Brahman (neut.)) (cp. Śvet. 1.7) creates Brahmā (masc.) and delivers the Vedas to him. We may, therefore, conclude from this that at some time after the period of the AV. and before the Middle Upaniṣads there was a strong belief that the Vedas were created or taught by an omniscient personal Being, who came to be identified with Brahmā; at this time the Vedas were considered to be a sacred tradition and its sanctity lay primarily in the fact that it was ultimately heard from and handed down by Brahmā (or Prajāpati who is identified with Brahmā) in an unbroken tradition. When anussava is thus used by the brahmins versed in the Vedas as represented in the Buddhist texts to refer to the ground on which the Vedic scriptures were accepted, it seems to signify that the authority and veracity of the scriptures lay in the fact that they have been systematically heard (anu-śruta) by each generation of teachers going right back to the teacher, namely the omniscient Brahmā himself (cp. sarvavid brahmā, Gopatha Br. Pūrvabhāga, 2.18).

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¹ Keith, Ṛgveda Brāhmaṇas Translated, HOS , Vol 25, p. 27.

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² At Bṛh 2.4 10 where the Vedas and Vedic literature are said to have been breathed forth by the Great Being (mahadbhūtam) and at Bṛh. 4.5.11 where the entire world is thus breathed forth the impersonal conception dominates but this is probably due to the agnostic non-dualistic metaphysical theory propounded here

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(270) That the brahmins who upheld the Vedic and the Brāhmanic tradition did so on the grounds that the knowledge contained therein was derived from a superhuman source seems to be implied, though it is not actually stated as such, in a criticism that brahmins are supposed to have directed against the class of religious teachers to which the Buddha belonged. Subha, the brahmin student, is upholding the superiority of householders' (gahattha) life to that of the recluse (pabbajita) (M. II.197), this point of view is reminiscent of the earlier Pūrvamīmāṁsā thinkers who valued the three aims of life (trivarga) namely dharma, the practice of the ceremonial religion, artha the pursuit of wealth and kāma the pursuit of worldly pleasure and decried mokṣa or salvation as unattainable in this life. He speaks of five virtues which the brahmins are expected to cultivate, namely truth (saccam), austerity (tapam), religious practice (brahmacariyaṁ),¹ study (ajjhenam) and generosity (cāgam)—virtues which are all emphasized at Tait. Upaniṣad 1 9–11. The Buddha criticizes these ethical recommendations on the grounds that neither the brahmins nor their teachers up to several generations nor even the original seers claimed to know the consequences of practising these virtues after realizing the fact with their higher knowledge (abhiññā sacchikatvā)

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¹ It is clear from the general context that brahmacariya- here means the practice of the ceremonial religion and not 'celibacy', cp the Tait Upaniṣad 1 9–11, where the importance of offspring (prajā), begetting (prajananaḥ) and procreation (prajātiḥ) and also the necessity of 'not cutting off the line of progeny' (prajātantum mā vyavacchetsīḥ) is stressed

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although the Buddha himself could do so. Subha is enraged at this and says that one of the senior brahmins, Pokkharasāti, was of the opinion that these recluses and brahmins who claim 'an adequate spiritual kind of knowledge and vision' (alamariyañāṇadassanavisesaṃ) which is superhuman (uttarimanussadhammā) are making an assertion that is ridiculous (hassakaṃ), worthless, empty and vain. For how can a *mere human* (manussabhūto) have such a kind of knowledge (M. II.200, 201). This statement that superhuman knowledge is not possible (netaṃ ṭhānaṃ vijjati, *loc. cit.*) for a mere human being and that the claim to such knowledge was ridiculous seems to imply or suggest by contrast that the knowledge of the Vedic and Brāhmaṇic tradition was not based on personal human claims to knowledge but on the fact that the tradition itself is inspired, revealed or was of a superhuman origin. If this interpretation is correct, we may conclude that the early Buddhists were aware of the brahmins' claim that at least the knowledge pertaining to matters of morality and religion in the Vedic tradition was of a superhuman or divine origin.

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(271) The late word for 'revelation' in the Indian tradition namely *śruti* (P. suti) is found in one of the earliest books of the Pāli Canon, the Suttanipāta, but its usage is obscure and it does not seem to have a clear-cut sense of 'divine revelation' as opposed to 'human tradition' as defined later in the Mānavadharmaśāstra 2 10 (śrutis tu vedo vijñeyo dharmaśāstraṃ tu vai smṛtiḥ). The PTS. Dictionary gives the following meanings of the term as occurring at Sn. 839, 1078 (na diṭṭhiyā, na sutiyā, na ñāṇena): 'hearing, tradition, inspiration, knowledge of the Vedas' (*s.v.* suti) and at another place (*s.v.* ñāṇa), translates 'diṭṭhi, suti, ñāṇa' as 'doctrine, *revelation*, personal knowledge'. There is a pun on the word when we examine the context, which makes it possible for the word to be interpreted to mean 'the Buddhist tradition'. The commentarial explanation (Mahāniddesa, I.188) at least of the word in the negative form (assutiyā) certainly does not favour the meaning of '*revelation*' or 'Vedic tradition'. It explains suti- as 'what is heard or learnt' and says that such hearing or learning is desirable (savanaṃ pi icchitabbaṃ) and is of two sorts, the hearing from other sources or traditions (parato ghoso) and the hearing of Buddhist texts (suttaṃ, geyyaṃ ...). In the classical Upaniṣads the word *śruti-* occurs three times merely in the sense of the 'hearing of the ear' (Bṛh. 3.4.2; 4.3.27) or the 'hearing of the sound of the soul when one's ears are closed with one's hands' (Ch. 3.13.8). It cannot therefore be argued that the word ‘suti’ means ‘revelation’ in the later sense of the term, though the meaning of ‘Vedic tradition’ cannot be ruled out entirely in translating the term at Sn. 839 and 1078 at least in the positive occurrence ‘sutiyā’. The sense of ‘Vedic tradition’ or even ‘revelation’ may be attributed to suti- in certain contexts of the Suttanipāta, which are very much reminiscent of the use of the term to denote ‘what was learnt from the Vedic tradition’ in the Upaniṣadic uses. For instance, when it is said that “some claim salvation (suddhim, *lit.* purification) by suta-” (sutenāpi vadanti suddhim, Sn 1079) the reference can very well be to ‘the acceptance of the Vedic revelation’ though it may also be interpreted as the (literal) hearing of the ātman as at Ch. 3.13.8 (*v* supra, 71).

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(272) One logical difference between the use of suta- or suti- on the one hand and of anussava- on the other is that the latter denotes fairly clearly a definite means of knowledge whereas in the uses of suta- (Skr. śruta-) and suti- (Skr. śruti-) in both the Upaniṣadic and Early Buddhist contexts, the distinction between śabda (= śruta) as a prameya or ‘object of knowledge’ and of śabda as a pramāṇa or a ‘means of knowledge’ can only be determined by studying these contexts.

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(272A) Let us now advert our attention to the criticism of anussava as a means of knowledge in the Buddhist texts We found three possible senses in which the word is used: (1) as used of the Vedic tradition the word could mean ‘divine revelation’, systematically handed down, (2) it could also have meant ‘authoritative tradition’ the source of its authority being not clearly perceived or defined—in this sense it could have meant any tradition including or other than the Vedic, (3) lastly, it could have meant a ‘report’ come from mouth to mouth (cp. J. I 158, which comments on the particle ‘kira’ used in statements conveying information received from ‘hearsay’, as anussavatthe nipāto, i.e a particle in the sense of ‘hearsay’)

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(273) In the Buddhist texts we find an indirect criticism of the claim that the Vedas constitute a divine revelation and a direct criticism that the Vedic tradition was authoritative

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(274) The indirect¹ criticism of the claim to revelation is met with in the Tevijja Sutta Here it is said that none of the teachers of the Vedic tradition, not even the original seers have had a direct knowledge or vision of Brahmā. They have not claimed to have 'seen Brahmā face to face' (Brahmā sakkhidiṭṭho, D. I.238) and they did not say, 'we know this, we see this (namely) where, in which direction and in which place Brahmā is' (mayam etam jānāma mayaṃ etam passāma yattha va brahmā yena va brahmā yahiṃ va brahmā ti, D. I.239).

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¹ The Buddha is here not primarily concerned with criticizing the authority of the Vedic tradition but the claims made about the nature of Brahmā and the way of fellowship with him

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(275) Radhakrishnan concludes from examining this Sutta that the 'Buddha does not like the idea of basing the reality of Brahman on Vedic authority, for when once we admit the evidence of revelation there is no end to it' (IP. I. p. 467). This conclusion appears to be strictly unwarranted by the context, which makes it clear that the Buddha is merely denying that the knowledge of/or about Brahmā in the Vedic tradition is not based on a direct vision or revelation of Brahmā at all, whatever the views the Buddha may have had on the validity of revelation itself. The Buddha does not *prima facie* appear to be averse to the 'idea of basing the reality of Brahman on Vedic authority' provided a valid claim to a real, personal knowledge of Brahmā was made by at least one of the teachers, on whom this tradition was based. The criticism made here is that the Vedic tradition as such is not, and cannot claim to be, a revelation. It is not a denial of the possibility of revelation altogether, though of course, the admission of such a possibility would be incompatible with the non-theistic character of Buddhism.

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(276) We have already referred to the direct criticism of the Canki Sutta (*v. supra*, 263) where the Buddha criticizes the claims of the brahmins to the absolute and exclusive authority and validity of scripture (mantapadam) on the grounds that none of the seers claimed direct personal knowledge of its truth. This is in fact an express denial that the Vedic seers or their successors were experts whose testimony could be trusted in regard to what they said, by virtue of the fact that they themselves did not claim expert personal knowledge of the validity of what they asserted. This denial of any special insight to the seers was tantamount to a denial that they were competent persons (āpta-) whose testimony could be accepted.

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(277) That the brahmins whom the Buddha converses with, are not the most orthodox brahmins of the Vedic tradition, has been the contention of Thomas¹ partly following Oldenberg.² We, on the contrary, are maintaining that Early Buddhism was acquainted with the most orthodox Brāhmanic literature of the main Vedic schools (caraṇas)¹ in criticizing one of its most treasured conceptions, namely the sacred authority of the Vedic tradition. Since it would strictly fall outside the scope of our inquiry to examine the evidence that would go to prove the acquaintance that Buddhism shows of the main stream of the Vedic and Brāhmanic tradition and since this criticism affects our main contention in this Chapter, we have briefly indicated in an Appendix (*v.* Appendix I) how we differ from Thomas in his evaluation of the Tevijja Sutta made in the light of his presuppositions.

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¹ *History of Buddhist Thought*, pp. 82–91.

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² *Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus*, pp. 283 ff.

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¹ *v.* Wijesekera, 'A Pali Reference to Brāhmana-Caraṇa-s' in *Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vol 20, Parts 3–4, pp. 294–309.

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(278) The general criticism of anussava as a valid means of knowledge is such that it could apply to any of the three meanings, which we ascribed to the term, namely divine revelation, authoritative tradition and report. The Buddha says: 'There are five things which have a twofold result in this life. What five? (Belief based on) faith, likes, *anussava*, superficial reflection and approval of a theory thought about ...; even if I hear something on the profoundest revelation (tradition or report) (svānussutam) that may be empty, hollow and false, while what I do not hear on the profoundest revelation (tradition or report) may be factual (bhūtam), true and not otherwise. It is not proper (na alam) for an intelligent person, safeguarding the truth to come categorically (ekamsena) to the conclusion in this matter that this alone is true and whatever else is false'.² At this, his interlocutor asks: 'To what extent, Gotama, is there safeguarding of the truth. To what extent does one safeguard the truth, we question Gotama on the safeguarding of truth?'³ The Buddha replies: 'If a person has heard (from a revelation, tradition or report) then in saying "this is what I have heard" (from a revelation, tradition or report), he safeguards the truth, so long as he does not as yet come categorically to the conclusion that it alone is true and whatever else is false.’¹

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² Pañca kho ime dhammā diṭṭhe va dhamme dvidhā vipākā. Katame pañca? Saddhā, ruci, anussavo, ākāraparivitakho, diṭṭhinijjhānakkhanti ... Api ca svānussutam yeva hoti tañca hoti rittam tuccham musā, no ce pi svānussutam, tañca hoti bhūtam tuccham anaññathā Saccam anurakkhatā viññunā purisena nālam ettha ekamsena niṭṭham gantum: idam eva saccam mogham aññan ti. M. II 170, 1.

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³ Kittāvatā pana, bho Gotama, saccānurakkhanā hoti? Kittāvatā saccam anurakkhati? Saccānurakkhanam mayam bhavantam Gotamam pucchāmā ti. *Loc. cit.*

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¹ Anussavo ce pi ... purisassa hoti, evam me anussavo ti vadaṃ saccaṃ anurakkhati, na tveva tāva ekaṃsena niṭṭhaṃ gacchati, idameva saccaṃ mogham aññan ti *Loc cit*

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(279) We find here the Buddha asserting that a belief based on anussava can have the twofold result of turning out to be either true or false. Even if the assertion be from the most reliable revelation, tradition or report (anussava), there is no guarantee that it is true and it may very well be false. The right attitude to take is to suspend judgment regarding the truth of the assertion or proposition thus heard and say that ‘I have heard p from anussava- but I do not claim to know p since p may be false!’ This is clearly a rejection of revelation, tradition or report as a pramāna or a valid means of knowledge. For the truth or falsity of such a statement is to be judged by factors other than that of its claim to be the most reliable or authoritative revelation, tradition or report (svānussutam). The criticism also seems to presuppose that it is possible to determine the veracity of all the assertions by other means than that of revelation, etc., in so far as it is stated that what is accepted as reliable may prove to be in fact true or false. At the same time it should be noted that there is no rejection of revelation, tradition or report as being necessarily false since the possibility of truth is not ruled out. The attitude recommended towards these propositions bears some similarity to that of the Sceptics (amarāvikkhepikā) who likewise suspended judgment when faced with propositions, which may be true or false but differs radically from it, in view of the possibility, positively entertained, of knowing whether these propositions were in fact true or false *in this life itself* (note *diṭṭheva dhamme dvidhā vipākā*).

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(280) In the Sandaka Sutta there is a criticism of religion based on anussava which throws a little more light as to why anussava was regarded as unsatisfactory as a means of knowledge. Here the speaker is Ānanda but he is supposed to be reporting² what the Buddha himself has declared (tena bhagavatā ... akkhātā, M. I.518, 521). The second of the religions which are unsatisfactory but not necessarily false is said to be one based on anussava. It is said: ‘Herein a certain religious teacher is a Traditionalist (anussaviko) who holds to the truth of anussava (anussava-sacco) and preaches a doctrine according to anussava, according to what is traditionally handed down (itihīti-haparamparāya), according to the authority of scripture (piṭaka sampadāya) Now a teacher who is a Traditionalist and holds to the truth of anussava would have well-remembered it (sussatam pi hoti) or ill-remembered it (dussatam) and it would be true (tathā pi hoti) and it would be false (aññathā) On this an intelligent person reflects thus—this venerable teacher is a Traditionalist . . so seeing that his religion is unsatisfactory (anassāsikam) he loses interest and leaves it'.¹

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² Not in the sense that he is alleged to be reporting every Sutta which begins with the words, evam me sutaṃ.

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¹ . . idh' ekacco satthā anussaviko hoti anussavasacco, so anussavena itihītiha-paramparāya piṭakasampadāya dhammaṃ deseti Anussavikassa kho pana . satthuno anussavasaccassa sussatampi hoti dussatampi hoti, tathā pi hoti aññathā pi hoti Tatra viññū puriso iti paṭisañcikkhati Ayam kho bhavaṃ satthā anussaviko . So anassāsikaṃ idaṃ brahmacariyaṃ ti iti viditvā tasmā brahmacariyā nibbijja pakkamati M I 520

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(281) We find here a good reason why an assertion that was handed down as a revelation, tradition or report was held to be untrustworthy. For even assuming that its origins were reliable it may be well-remembered (sussutam = Skr. su-smṛtam) or ill-remembered and the lapses of memory on the part of people transmitting a revelational or authoritative tradition or report can seriously affect the content of it so that what was originally a true proposition may in the course of time be so badly distorted as to make it false or unreliable

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(282) It is not so clear as to what is meant by 'tathāpi hoti aññathāpi hoti'. Miss Horner's translation 'he is both right and wrong' (MLS II 200) is grammatically unjustifiable for satthuno (genitive case) cannot obviously be the subject of hoti. The subject of hoti is that which is sussatam and dussatam, namely the tradition (understood) Now aññathā (*lit.* otherwise) is an adverbial usage and its opposite anaññathā functions adjectivally and means 'true', e g tam ca hoti bhūtam taccham *anaññathā* (M II.170) Aññathā therefore may be presumed to mean 'false' while tathā would appear to mean the opposite from the context, namely 'true'. This usage is found elsewhere as well, tam tatheva hoti no aññathā, i e. all of it would certainly be true and not false, D. III.135. So in this context the sentence would mean that 'the tradition (anussava) would be true as well as false'. But it would be self-contradictory to say that a tradition is true or false in the same sense at the same time Although there may be a conception of partial truth (paccekasacca, *v infra*. 599–601) in the Buddhist texts, it is unlikely that what is being said, is that every tradition is partially true or has some truth in it, and is partially false and has some falsity in it as well. On this interpretation all traditions and reports would have some truth in them. It seems even to tally with the explanation as to why a religion based on anussava is criticized only as being ‘unsatisfactory’ (anassāsikam) and not a ‘false religion’ (abrahmacariyakaṃ) since there is an element of truth in it.

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(283) But this explanation does not seem to be probable since it contradicts what was already said in the Caṅkī Sutta (*v. supra*, 278) where it was pointed out that even the profoundest tradition (revelation or report) may turn out to be entirely false. The statement can be interpreted to mean either ‘(a tradition) is (partly) true and (partly) false’ or ‘(a tradition) is (sometimes) true and (sometimes) false’. The first of these two interpretations is not different in meaning from the above. The second is to be preferred since it confirms what was already said in the Caṅkī Sutta. On this interpretation a revelation, tradition or report though ‘well-remembered’ may be false and though ‘ill-remembered’ may be true since there are four alternative possibilities.

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| 1. sussataṃ tathā | 3. dussataṃtathā |
| 2 sussataṃ aññathā | 4. dussataṃ aññathā |

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So what is probably meant is that a tradition (revelation or report) may be well-remembered or ill-remembered, and even if well-remembered, it may be true or false, for the reliability in the transmission of a tradition is no guarantee of its intrinsic truth.

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(284) Still, a fact to be considered is that in this Sutta a religion based on anussava is criticized as being unsatisfactory rather than as being false. The reason for this would become clear if we note the fact that the ‘religions’ that are condemned as false are (1) Materialism (M. I.515), (2) a religion denying moral values (i.e. that there is no puñña or pāpa, M. I.516), (3) a religion denying moral responsibility (i.e. there is no cause—hetu—for moral degeneration, regeneration or salvation (M. I.517), and (4) a religion denying freewill (akiriyāvāda, M. I.517-8), It would seem that the four religions deemed to be unsatisfactory and not necessarily false would not have the defects of the four false religions. This means that in this context anussava could not have referred to the traditions of the Materialists or of any of the other three false religions. Therefore judging from the context the religion based on anussava here would have been one which, in some sense, asserted survival, the reality of moral values, moral responsibility and freewill. On the other hand it is clear that when anussava was used in reference to a specific tradition it was almost invariably the Vedic tradition (M. II.170, 211). Now quite independently of the Buddhist texts we know that the Vedic and Brāhmanic religion at this time sponsored a belief in survival, had a code of ethics and a conception of moral reward and retribution Although the Buddha criticizes the ancient seers (pubbakā isayo) for their lack of knowledge, he has the highest regard for them as virtuous men (isayo pubbakā āsum saññatattā tapassino, i.e. the ancient seers were restrained ascetics, Sn. 284 ff). The brahmins are likewise in the Buddhist texts represented as saying of the Buddha that he upholds kamma and freewill and does not desire evil for the brahmin race (samano Gotamo kammavādī kiriyavādī apāpapurekkhāro brahmaññāya pajāya D. I.115, M II.167). There is no bitterness or open antagonism towards the Vedic tradition nor a downright condemnation of it ¹ The evidence points to the fact that the Buddhists were more opposed to the Materialists than to the Vedic tradition and that the Buddhist criticism of the Vedic tradition is of a different character from that of the Materialists.

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¹ *v.* Oldenberg, *Buddha*, Tr. Hoey, London, 1882, pp 170 ff

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(285) The Materialist condemnation of the Vedic tradition, as we have shown above, was absolute According to them the authors of the Vedas were both utterly ignorant as well as vicious; they are called 'buffoons, knaves and demons'² (*v* supra, 121) but the Buddhists held that the original seers who were the authors of the Vedas merely lacked a special insight (abhiññā) but did not doubt their honesty or virtue (sīlam ca ajjavam ... avannayum, i e. they praised virtue and rectitude, Sn. 292). The Materialists categorically repudiated the Vedas as false (anṛta), self-contradictory (vyāghāta) and repetitious (punarukta). Among the false beliefs taught in the Vedic tradition the Materialists would point to the belief in sacrifices, in a soul, in survival, in moral values and in moral retribution. The Buddhists on the other hand seemed to have held that the traditional beliefs of the Vedas were not wholly false. They criticized the Vedic conception of the sacrifice and denied the concept of a soul but agreed with the Vedas in asserting survival, moral values and moral retribution which are among the beliefs which formed part of the right philosophy of life (sammādiṭṭhi) as defined at M. III.72.¹

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