Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c19.15

c19.15

The answer to the above, *i.e.*, *Prabhākara's Siddhānta* on this question—is that in reality, there is nothing doubtful regarding the denotation of Words; it is the *Universal* that is denoted by the Word, because it serves the purpose of actions. (Su. 33). The reason for this as given by *Prabhākara* (and also by *Shabara*, —see above) is that, if the Word denoted the Individual or Particular, we could not explain such Injunctions as ' The altar is to be built like a kite '; as it would be impossible for altars to be made in every case like a particular kite. The word ' kite,' therefore, must denote the Class, the ' Universal '; and that alone can form the denotation of the Word which is found to be related to a Sentence (Injunction),—and here, as we find the Individual or Particular kite incapable of being so related,—the Word must be taken as denoting the ' Universal ' or *Class*. The *Bṛhatī* (MS., p. 37 b) puts forth the objection that—" though all this may be true in the case of the particular Injunction cited (with the word 'kite'),—in the case of other Sentences, it is equally evident that the Word cannot be taken as denoting the ' Universal '; hence the matter of the exact denotation of Words remains as doubtful as ever, and that fact vitiates the authority of the Vedic Sentence." In answer to this, it is pointed out that, as a matter of fact, we find that the injunctive function of an Injective Sentence cannot be accomplished until its words afford some idea of " commonality "; consequently all actions must be related to that *Commonality* or *Community*, or ' *Universal*'—or *Class-Character*,—and not to the Particular or Individual; the idea of the Particular or Individual, where necessary, is obtained indirectly, through that *class-character* with which it is inseparably connected.