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Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c19: Chapter XIV: (B) Scriptural or Verbal Cognition according to Prabhākara

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c19

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Chapter XIV: (B) Scriptural or Verbal Cognition according to Prabhākara

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[Prakaraṇa-Pañchikā, p. 87 et saq.] The ‘Śāstra’—Scriptural or Verbal Cognition—has been defined as the cognition of something not before the Eyes, brought about by the knowledge of words. Verbal Cognition therefore is that Cognition of things imperceptible—i.e., not cognised by other Means of Cognition—which proceeds from Mind-Soul contact aided by the knowledge of ‘Sounds’; the ‘Sounds’ meant here being those in the form of letters; as these alone are audible by the ear; all sounds heard are in the shape of letters, there being no such thing as mere Dhvani, Indistinct Sound. The ‘Sound’ therefore that is spoken of in this connection is only a composite of Letter-Sounds related to something (which forms its Denotation); such indistinct Sounds as those of the crowing of birds is not really what is heard.—(Bṛhatī, p. 155); in every case the Sound that is heard is in the form of letters; in the case of Words there are as many units of Perception, i.e., Audition, as there are letters composing them; and the idea that we have of having heard one Word is due to the close proximity and quickness in which the several Letter-Sounds are heard. This idea of the ‘Word’ however has to be regarded as a Unit, as it is only thus that it could have a single Denotation.

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The comprehension of this Denotation of Words is not got at through the Sense-organs; because the Sense-organ brings about the perception of only the Letter-Sounds. In the Letters themselves, however, there is a certain potency which brings about the apprehension of the Denotation of the Word composed of those Letters. It is for this reason that Letters have been held to be the Means of Verbal Cognition. ‘The Word is nothing more than the Letters—ga and the rest,—and it is this that is spoken of as Shabda, Word, and there is nothing apart from the Letters’,—says the Bṛhatī (p. 63).—But the Word alone, as composed of the Letter-Sounds, is not sufficient to bring about the comprehension of the meaning; it is only the Sentence composed of such words that brings about the Cognition; and what is eternal too is only the relation of the Sentence with its meaning. (*Ṛjuvimalā*, p. 135.)

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As a matter of fact, the Perception of each letter (of the Word) vanishes as soon as it appears; and so also the perception of each Word composing a Sentence. Hence it has been held that every such Perception leaves behind an Impression which leads on to the Perception of the next letter in the Word; and so on,—the Impression left by these Letter-perceptions combines with that left by the last Letter of the Word, and thus brings about the idea of the Word as a whole, which brings about the idea of the meaning [though according to Prabhākara, all this happens for the first time in the experience of any one person, only when the Word thus cognised is found used in a Sentence—see below].—Each Word has thus to be regarded as having the potency of bringing about the comprehension of the meaning. In a case where, even on the due hearing of the Letters of the Word, no meaning is comprehended, it has to be admitted that some necessary auxiliaries to that comprehension are wanting. Thus the conclusion is that, in the ultimate analysis, it is the Letter-Sound that is the root-cause of Verbal Cognition; and what is true of the Letters as composing the Word is true also of the Words as composing the Sentence. This theory of ‘Impressions’ left by Letters has been justified on the ground that no other hypothesis can explain the well-known facts of experience. (See *Bṛhatī*, pp. 160-161.)

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The next question is—What is meant by the ‘*Artha*’—‘Meaning’, ‘Denotation’—of the Word?

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The *Artha*, Meaning, of the Word is what is expressed or denoted by it; and what is denoted by the Word is something to which it bears a relation which is independent of,—and not created and established by—any personal agency.

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This Relation is that of the Denoter-Denoted, *i.e.*, the Denotative Relation. Even though we do not comprehend the Meaning of a Word when we hear it for the first time, yet it cannot be denied that the Denotative Potency of the Word is something that belongs to it by its very nature, it is inherent in it. In our experience, when we are listening to the conversation between two elderly persons, and fail to comprehend the meaning of the Words used by them, there arises in our minds an uncertainty as to whether or not the Words are expressive of any meaning at all; we proceed to reason in our minds that if the Words were entirely inexpressive, they could not convey any sense to the person to whom they are addressed;—from his behaviour, however, it is clear that he does derive the idea of something out of the words; and yet, if the Words are really expressive how is it that they do not convey any meaning to ourselves? The only explanation for this apparent anomaly must lie in the fact that in the person to whom the Words are addressed, there is something, some peculiar Power, which is wanting in ourself; this power must be in the shape of the knowledge of what is denoted by the Word; it is such Power alone whose presence in the man is indicated by his behaviour. We can have no idea of the man having the knowledge of any ‘Saṅketa,’ or Convention, bearing upon the expressiveness of the Word,—i.e., some such conventional law as that ‘this Word denotes this meaning,’ upon which law some philosophers have based the denotativeness of Words. Until we are ourselves cognisant of the meaning of the Word, we cannot form the idea of any such law bearing upon it, and the knowledge of the said law presupposes the knowledge of the meaning. From this it follows that the only power present in the person comprehending the meaing of a word consists in his knowledge of the fact that the Word is expressive of such a meaning. This proves that the expressiveness of the Word is something that belongs to it by its very nature, and is not created or produced by any person or thing. As this inherent expressive potency of the Word is sufficient to explain all phenomena of Verbal Expression and Cognition and Usage, there can be no justification for attributing the expressiveness to a Convention. In the case of some Words—such as Proper Names—such a Convention has to be admitted—which applies certain names to certain persons. But in the case of common names—such as ‘cow’, ‘jar’, ‘man’ and so forth—there is no justification for postulating any Convention. Consequently the relation of all such Words to their meanings must be held to be Eternal.

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Exactly the same is true of the Sentence also; the relation of which to its meaning is Eternal; ‘the relation between the Sentence and the Meaning of the Sentence is inborn, Eternal’—says Prabhākara (Bṛhatī, p. 135), on which the Ṛjuvimālā remarks—‘The inborn character of the Relation is in reference to the Sentence itself; because the mere Word, simply by itself, expresses no meaning, it expresses a meaning and is comprehended only when occuring in a Sentence; and what is expressive by its very nature is the Sentence, and not any single Word by itself.

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The Mīmāṃsaka lays stress upon this denotativeness—i.e., the relation between the Verbal Expression and the Idea Expressed—being inborn, Eternal, because if it were not so, the validity of the Scriptural texts would be based upon the whim of the agencies creating and setting up the said Relation, or of the person uttering those texts. And thus, as he denies all personal agency in the composition of the Veda, there would ipso facto be no validity in the Vedic texts themselves. Nor can the Mīmāṃsaka accept the Logician's point of view, by which the denotativeness of words is created and fixed by ‘Convention’ among people who introduce, and make use of, the Words for the first time,—according to the Logician, created by God Himself. This view necessitates the postulating of a ‘God’ as the Creator of all Words and their denotations, and hence of the Veda itself; and this militates against the Mīmāṃsā-doctrine of the Eternality and Self-Sufficiency of the Veda, which must be independent of all personal influence of any kind. In fact, if the denotativeness of Words depended solely upon ‘Convention,’ the Veda would be reduced to the position of a meaningless jumble of words; because, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, the pre-eminent function of the Veda lies in the enjoining of certain acts as bringing about an Apūrva—an imperceptible, Subtle Force—leading to a definite result; and as this Force is something of which no Person could have any direct knowledge, except through the Veda—how could the denotativeness of those words of the Veda be fixed by any Convention? And as no Convention could be found applicable to these words, these would, according to the Logician's view, have to be regarded as absolutely meaningless. If a Creator, God, were admitted, then as this God, being omniscient, would be possessed of the direct knowledge of the said Apūrva, He would be in a position to lay down the Conventions with regard to the denotativeness of Words,—including the Word denoting the Apūrva. But to the Mīmāṃsaka the idea of an omnicient Person, like God, or any one else, is wholly unacceptable; hence for the sake of the Veda, his all-in-all, he finds it necessary to stick to the view that all Words and their Denotations are eternal, ever-lasting, independent of all conventions and agencies and influences.—(Vide *Prakaraṇa-pañchikā*, p. 133 et. saq.)

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We have seen that the denotation of words—i.e., the relation between Words and their Denotation—is Eternal, without beginning or end. Now as regards the Eternality of the Words themselves, it has been pointed out that we comprehend the meaning of Words by observing their use among experienced people on various occasions. If then, at each time the older man speaks of a thing, he were to create a new name for it for the occasion,—which name could disappear as soon as uttered,—necessary corollaries of the view that the Word is evanescent,—then what basis would the younger man have for observing the frequent use of the Word and thereby ascertaining its meaning? As each time that the thing is spoken of, he would be face to face with a newly created Word, never heard before; and under the circumstances, the meaning of the Word would remain ever uncomprehended and incomprehensible; and until the Word affords some Cognition, it cannot be regarded as a Valid Means of Cognition (*pramāṇa*). Consequently, unless the Logician is prepared to deny this character to the Word, he must accept it as Eternal. Then there arises the question—“If the Word is Eternal, why is it not *always* present in our Consciousness?” The answer to this is that, though the Words is ever present, yet, in order that it may become cognised, it stands in need of certain auxiliary aids that serve to manifest it and render it cognisable, or present it to our consciousness.

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This manifestive agency consists in the Effort put forth by the man who utters the Word. The Logician regards this Effort as the *Cause* producing the Word; but in reality, it is only a force or agency that serves to *manifest* to our Consciousness the Word that is already in existence, but imperceptible. And as these Efforts may be many, there need be no incongruity in the same Word being uttered, and heard, by several persons; whenever the manifestive agency is present and active the Word will become manifested and heard. Hence if there are several men putting forth the Effort for uttering a Word, it is only natural that there should be several manifestations of the Word. That it is the same Word that is cognised in each of these cases is proved by our direct Cognition of all of these as one and the same. And this is another reason for regarding the Word as *Eternal*. The Effort put forth by the speaker is not in itself sufficient to account for the Cognition of the Word; and in that case we could not account for the non-cognition of the Word by the deaf. In fact, the Effort tends to manifest the Word only through certain effects that it produces in the auditory organ of the person standing by.

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The several steps in the physiological process of speech have been thus explained:—(1) The speaker puts forth an Effort, (2) this Effort brings the Speaker's Soul into contact with the Air enclosed within his lungs, (3) in obedience to the impulse imparted by the Effort, the Air in the lungs is expelled outwards, (4) in its upward progress, it comes into contact with the vocal chords, (5) these contacts modify the character of the said Air, (6) on issuing from the mouth, the Air passes onwards and reaches the auditory organs of the persons standing near enough to be reached by the Air-waves,—the extent of the reach of this Air depends upon the greater or less degree of the initial Effort of the Speaker; (7) on reaching the said Auditory Organs, the Air-waves produce in those organs a certain change that is conducive to its power of making the Sound audible. Thus it is this faculty of the Auditory Organ that is the direct Agent manifesting the Word to the Consciousness of the Persons to whom the Auditory Organs belong. As the Air-current is endowed with a certain momentum, by virtue of which it keeps moving onwards—when it has passed out of the Auditory Organ, the Sound also passes out and the audition ceases, the person hears the Sound no longer.

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The next question that arises is—"What is the change in the Auditory Organ which renders it capable of manifesting Sound?" What happens is that the Air-waves issuing out of the Speaker's mouth, strikes the first layer of Air enclosed within the hearer's Tympanum and produces in the latter a peculiar modification whereby it is rendered capable of manifesting Sound and making it audible. To this end, the Mīmāṃsaka postulates the presence, in the ear-cavity, of the fixed layer of Air, for the purpose of affording a screen of resistance to the Sound-waves; against which screen these waves strike and thereby effect the change in the Auditory Organ. It is a well-recognised fact that Air cannot produce any effects unless it meets with a certain degree of resistance. Even though the Auditory Organ consists of Ākāsha, and Ākāsha is one only, yet the Ear-Drum is distinct in each person—each being limited in its power and scope by virtue of the Merit-Demerit of the person to whom it belongs. Then again, the change produced in the Sound-waves is not in the *Ākāsha* of the Ear, but in the Air enclosed within the Ear-Drum; and as this latter differs in each person, all men need not hear the Sound that may be heard by one of them. That all this diversity is due to *Air-waves* is also indicated by the fact that when Sound-waves travel with the wind, the Sound is heard at a greater distance than when they travel against the Wind.

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Lastly, each time that we hear a Word (or Sentence) uttered, we at once recognise it as being the *same*, and not as different in each case. Even though it may be uttered in varying degrees of loudness, yet all the difference that we are cognisant of is that in the tone or pitch of the Sound,—not in the *Word* itself, which latter is always recognised to be the *same*.

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For these reasons the conclusion is that the Word (and Sentence) has no cause bringing it into existence,—and thus it has the same *Eternality* that belongs to *Ākāsha* and such other things.

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The above leads us on to the question of the exact denotation of Words: Does the Word (name of things, noun) denote the *Universal* (Class) or the *Particular* (Individual) or both? The ground for doubt on this point (as expounded by *Shabara*, above) is that while the *Cognition* brought about by the Word pertains to the *Class*, the *Action* that follows the Word (*i.e.*, the Injunction) pertains to the *Individual*. This same view has been expressed by *Prabhākara* (*Bṛhatī*. MS., p. 36, b)—who holds the *Anvitābhidhāna* theory of Verbal Expression, according to which the *Denotation* of a Word is cognisable only through its connection with a particular *action*; hence, as each Sentence would appertain to some *action*, which by its very nature, must appertion to an *Individual*, his theory would appear to lend support to the Individualistic theory of Denotation.

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The practical purpose of the present enquiry lies in the fact that, if all Words denoted Individuals, there could be no differentiation of rules into *General* and *Special*—*i.e.*, the General Law and its exceptions—and thus it would not be possible for the former to be set aside by the latter; and this would give rise to much confusion in the actual interpretation of the Vedic texts bearing upon the rules regarding actions. But *Prabhākara* in his characteristic manner, has turned this question also on to the main subject of the First Discourse—*i.e.*, the reliability of the Veda relating to *Dharma*. The *Pūrvapakṣa* view therefore, according to him would be that—" it being doubtful whether Words denote Universals or Particulars, the exact meaning of the Vedic texts must remain doubtful, and this vitiates the validity and authority of the Vedic texts."

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The answer to the above, *i.e.*, *Prabhākara's Siddhānta* on this question—is that in reality, there is nothing doubtful regarding the denotation of Words; it is the *Universal* that is denoted by the Word, because it serves the purpose of actions. (Su. 33). The reason for this as given by *Prabhākara* (and also by *Shabara*, —see above) is that, if the Word denoted the Individual or Particular, we could not explain such Injunctions as ' The altar is to be built like a kite '; as it would be impossible for altars to be made in every case like a particular kite. The word ' kite,' therefore, must denote the Class, the ' Universal '; and that alone can form the denotation of the Word which is found to be related to a Sentence (Injunction),—and here, as we find the Individual or Particular kite incapable of being so related,—the Word must be taken as denoting the ' Universal ' or *Class*. The *Bṛhatī* (MS., p. 37 b) puts forth the objection that—" though all this may be true in the case of the particular Injunction cited (with the word 'kite'),—in the case of other Sentences, it is equally evident that the Word cannot be taken as denoting the ' Universal '; hence the matter of the exact denotation of Words remains as doubtful as ever, and that fact vitiates the authority of the Vedic Sentence." In answer to this, it is pointed out that, as a matter of fact, we find that the injunctive function of an Injective Sentence cannot be accomplished until its words afford some idea of " commonality "; consequently all actions must be related to that *Commonality* or *Community*, or ' *Universal*'—or *Class-Character*,—and not to the Particular or Individual; the idea of the Particular or Individual, where necessary, is obtained indirectly, through that *class-character* with which it is inseparably connected.

Meaning of the Sentence according to Prabhākara

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It has been seen that according to *Prabhākara*, people learn the meaning of Words only by watching the usage and activity of older people. When a set of words is addressed by one person to another,—whereupon the latter person acts in a certain manner, it is clear to the observer that the meaning of the words pronounced must have been in the form of an Injunction to do what the other person has done. In the case of Words where such an interpretation is not possible, the comprehension of the meaning must depend upon something indirectly connected with the Injunction. This is the reason why Prabhākara has asserted in connection with the definition of Verbal Cognition that the object cognised must be one that has not been already cognised by another means of Cognition; and this can be so always in the case of the Injunctive Sentence. All words with the Imperative or similar terminations express the Injunction directly, while other words denote things related to that Injunction; such things, for instance, as the name of the Act enjoined, the person enjoined and so on. This leads to the view that the whole direct denotation of the Veda must lie in the enjoining of something to be done. This goes directly against the view of the Vedāntin that the direct denotation of the more important texts lies, not in the laying down of something to be done, but in the pointing out of certain well-accomplished entities like Brahman, the Super-Soul. As against this Vedanta view, it has been pointed out (Bṛhatī., p. 47) that, though such may be the case with a few words, yet the comprehension of the denotation of those words also could be obtained only by observing the usage of older persons, and this usage must always lie in the form of an Injunction addressed by one person to another for the doing of a certain act; thus ultimately the denotation of all Words must lie, directly or indirectly, with something to be done. The Vedānta-texts also speak of the Super-Soul as something which one is enjoined to know and meditate upon, in order to escape from the cycle of Births and Deaths.

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Thus then, if the meaning of the Words can be known only when they occur in Injunctive Sentences, it follows that every Word must denote things only as related to the other factors of the Injunction, and no word can be comprehended as having any denotation when taken apart from such Sentence. Says Prabhākara (Bṛhatī, p. 135)—‘What is eternal is the Relation which the Sentence bears to what it expresses,’—on which the Ṛjuvimālā remarks—The Word, alone by itself, never expresses any meaning; it is only the Sentence that does it; as is clear from the fact that we learn the meaning of Verbal expressions only from the usage of older people,—and this usage is only in the form of Sentences; and every single Word is understood only in so far as it is related to the other words in the Sentence; hence it becomes established that what is expressive of the meaning is the Sentence only, not any Word alone by itself.—(Ṛjuvimālā, p. 135.)

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Herein we have what has been called the Anvitābhidhāna Theory of Verbal Expression. This forms a distinctive feature of the Prabhākara School of Thought,—and it has the tacit support of the Sūtra (1.1.25) and also of Shabara (Trs., p. 44, and 132 of Bib. Ind. Text).

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Says the Bṛhatī (p. 188)— वाक्यार्थेन व्यवहार; that is, all usage is through the Sentence and its meaning. How is this to be reconciled with the assertion in the Bhāṣya that ‘the Word ‘cow’ denotes the Class or Universal distinguished by the dewlap’?—how too can this be regarded as ‘eternal,’ when it is based upon the usage of experienced people? In order to meet this difficulty which involves an inconsistency between the Premiss and the Conclusion,—the Bhāṣya has provided an explanation later on, under Sū. 1.1.25.

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On this the Ṛjuvimālā remarks—The ‘Conclusion’ stands for the declaration of the Eternality of the Relationship, and the ‘Premiss’ stands for the ‘beginninglessness of the usage.’ The inconsistency between these two has been explained away in the Bhāṣya, where it has been pointed out that words express the meaning of the Sentence only through the comprehension of the meaning of the words themselves. (See Bhāṣya under 1.1.25).

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The Ṛjuvimālā (pp. 190-191) has summed up this controversy in the following words:—

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There are some people whose mind is led away by the declamatory descriptions of the Creation and Dissolution of the World; to this class belong Kaṇāda, Gautama and their followers. These people declare that God is the one Cause, Creator, of the whole Universe. They argue thus—“We see that every composite object comes into existence through the coming together—Conjunction—of their component parts;—all worldly things, the Body and the various Regions, are composite in their nature;—the conjunction of component particle is found to go on till the

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*Diad*—the Two-Atom Compound; which Diad also is *composite*, being composed of two atoms. The conjunction between the two Atoms is brought about by the action—vibration—of the two Atoms; and this Vibration in the Atoms is due to the conjunction of Souls influenced by the Unseen Force (of Destiny);—this Unseen Force is non-intelligent, unconscious, by its nature;—and as a matter of fact no non-intelligent entity is found to act except under the guidance of an intelligent operator. This operator of the Unseen Force could not be those same Souls that are themselves under the influence of that same Force;—because they are not cognisant of this Force—which is made up of their own Merit-Demerit, of which however they themselves are not conscious—and the operator of the Force must be one who knows it;—hence all this leads us to postulate an Intelligent Being apart from the said Souls; and this Controller and Operator of these Unseen Forces is one possessed of very superior Intelligence. Thus the entire Universe comes to be regarded as having had a beginning and having been brought to the present stage through a long series of products beginning with the Atomic Diad, brought about by conjunctions due to vibrations in the Atoms due to the said Unseen Force, under the Control of the Great Operator of Superior Intelligence. Thus having had a beginning, the World must come to an end. How then can there be a *beginningless usage of Experienced People* upon which all Verbal Usage could be based?"

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The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to the above is as follows: [*Rjuvimālā*, p. 191]:—All this argumentation may be very soul-satisfying. But what has got to be explained is—how is it that the entire World of Composite Things becomes dissolved all at once simultaneously. At the present time we find that while one thing is coming into existence, another is disappearing; when such is the fact of common experience, who can deny the beginningless tradition of usage among experienced people? Then again, if the ordinary Intelligent Beings—the ordinary Souls—are unable to control Destiny, by reason of their being non-cognisant of their own Destiny,—then how can an entirely distinct Soul (the Super-Soul, God) be the Controller? The absence of the knowledge of the Destiny of Souls would be there in His case also. Specially because the idea is that all Cognition (knowledge of things—) proceeds from Mind-Soul contact through Sense-object—

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contacts,—all these contacts being due to Destiny; and all these *contacts* could not be there, for the cognising (and controlling) of Destiny (even by God) . . . Nor is it right to regard God's Cognition as eternal; because the fact universally recognised is that every Cognition is produced and destroyed; so that God's Cognition also must be the same.—Further, what is the meaning of the ‘control’ exercised by God? The only ‘control’ that is inferable is one of the same kind as that exercised by the Carpenter over the Implements; but no such ‘control’ is possible in the case of God. As for ‘Destiny’ itself, its action can be no other than its coming into existence; and this is brought about by such acts as sacrificing and the like. The God-Idea therefore is too flimsy to receive serious attention. That is why the *Bhāṣya* and the *Bṛhatī* have taken no notice of it. (*Ṛjuvimālā*, pp. 190-191.)

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Veda is not the Work of a Personal Author According to Prabhākara.

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According to *Prabhākara*, we can derive a truly valid *Verbal Cognition* only from Words and Sentences contained in the Veda. This, he says, is clear from the very name given to the Means of Cognition, ‘*Śāstra*’ which means *Scripture*, or more precisely, *Scriptural Injunction*. As a necessary corrolary to this, it is held that, apart from the Words found in the Scriptures, no Words can provide any Cognition of things not already known through other means of knowledge; all words used in common parlance are mostly only such as denote things that can be cognised through Perception and Inference also; while things not cognised through these can be rightly cognised only when described by words of unquestionable authority and trustworthy character. From this it follows that Cognitions provided by Words other than these,—and all non-Vedic Words and Sentences belong to this other category—can have no inherent validity by themselves.

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This theory becomes divested of much of its apparent absurdity when we realise the fact that, the Scriptural Word alone is free from all defects in its source (as it has no *source* at all), and hence inherently valid; and hence no other Words can be regarded as affording invariably valid Cognitions; specially when it is found that in common parlance, most of the Cognitions obtained through Words of ordinary men turn out to be invalid and unreliable. Hence at best, Cognitions derived from Non-Scriptural Words can be regarded to be of the same kind as Remembrance; and hence of doubtful validity. And as Cognitions of doubtful validity cannot be accepted as ‘Cognition’ proper, which, by its very nature, must be always valid, the conclusion is irresistible that Non-Scriptural words cannot provide any Cognition, in the proper sense of the term; they are mere translators or reflectors or describers of what is in the mind of the person uttering the words; and the validity of these reflectors can be ascertained only by other means of knowledge. It is in reference to such Non-Scriptural words that we have the saying— पदमप्यधिकाभावात्स्मरणं विशिष्यते, that is, ‘the Word is nothing more than what provides Remembrance’ (Shlo. Vā. Shabda 107).

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This cannot be true of the words of the Veda. Because in the case of non-Vedic Words, its invalidity or doubtful validity is based upon the generally untrustworthy character of speakers, —which is due to many such causes as wrong information, wrong understanding, incapacity to use the right words, and so on. In the case of the Words of the Veda, on the other hand, as they do not emanate from a Speaker or author, there can be none of these causes to which the falsity of the assertion may be due. In the case of the words of ordinary men, even when we find them providing a reasonably connected sense, there is always a lurking suspicion that there may be some defect in the source from which the speaker has derived the information that he is seeking to convey by means of the words in question; and for this reason we can never be absolutely sure of the validity of the Cognition provided by such words, which, for this reason cannot be regarded as the ‘Means of Right Cognition’, Pramāṇa. Even in cases where ordinary words do afford valid Cognitions, it is not the Words that bring about the Cognitions directly; what occurs is that on hearing the Words, we find that they convey a certain information, and then we proceed to reason that,—‘the speaker is a trustworthy person as not one of the grounds of untrustworthiness—such as greed and the like,—is found in him, hence what he says must be true; hence the information conveyed by his word must be true.’ Thus in these cases, the Words are not the Direct Cause of the valid Cognition, they only indirectly indicate the presence of the Cognition in the Speaker’s mind, in so far as the hearer is concerned, the Words are not the *Means of Valid Cognition, Pramāṇa;*—at any rate, not independently of the Inference that is involved in the process of the Cognition in the Speaker's mind. All such cases involve a clear *inferential process*; such as for instance, as—‘This speaker has a particular Cognition in his mind, because he has pronounced these words (and he is a reliable person).’

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This view of *Verbal Cognition* and *Shabda-Pramāṇa* has been set forth in the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (pp. 15 et seq); where we read—It is only the *Veda* that can be called *Shabda-Pramāṇa*; and that also only when containing an *Injunction*; words of common parlance cannot be so, because the Cognition produced by them is purely inferential. When, for instance, we hear a man saying something, our mind goes through the following reasoning—‘This man speaks of such and such a thing—this he must be speaking of after having known what he speaks of,—hence what he says must be true’. The speech of the man is an effect of his knowledge, and hence from the Effect (Speech) we infer its Cause (the man’s knowledge). Thus all ordinary *Verbal Cognition* is *inferential*, while that provided by the *Veda* alone is purely *Verbal*. It is true that all Words are endowed with an inborn denotative potency, but in the case of the ordinary speakers of the world, this inborn potency of the Word becomes obscured by the suspicions regarding the capacity and trustworthy character of the person concerned. On the other hand, in the case of the *Veda*, there being no speaker concerned, there can be no grounds for such suspicion, and the inherent Potency remains unobscured.

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It is interesting to note in this connection that Kaṇāda (in the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra* 1.1.3; 2.3.32; 9.2.3; and 10.2.9—regarding the Veda as the work of a Person (God),—has declared that *Verbal Cognition*, is nothing apart from *Inferential Cognition*, as all words emanating from *persons* provide only *Inferential Cognitions*, and there is no such thing as purely *Verbal Cognition*; hence ‘*Shabda*’ need not be regarded as a distinct *Pramāṇa*, Means of Cognition. From this it is clear that *Shabda* as a distinct Means of Cognition can be acknowledged only by those who regard the *Veda* as *Eternal*, and not the work of an author. (See below)

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Just as in the case of the other Pramāṇas, so here also, if we regard the term ‘Shāstra’ as an Accusative Abstract Noun—*Shiṣyatē yat tat*—equivalent to ‘*Shiṣṭi*’,—then it is synonymous with Verbal (or Scriptural) Cognition; but if it is taken as an Instrumental Abstract Noun—*Shiṣyaē anēna*—then it is synonymous with the Word providing Verbal Cognition.

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This ‘Word’—which, according to *Prabhākara*, is the same as *Scriptural Text*—is of two kinds:—(1) Those actually found in the Veda and (2) those, the presence of which in the Veda is inferred. To the latter class belong all those texts that are inferred as supplying the basic authority for the Injunctions of actions contained in the *Smṛtis*,—whose sole claim to authority rests upon the fact that they contain no Injunctions save those vouched for by Vedic texts.

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It may be observed here, as remarked by the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (p. 101), that the ‘*Shāstra*,’ or Vedic Injunction often stands in need of some factors being supplied from without; *e.g.*, the text that speaks of a certain action merely as accomplishing a certain desirable result, stands in need of some such Injunctive words as that ‘this act should be done’; and these words have to be supplied. Similarly, certain texts stand in need of certain well-ascertained facts of experience; *e.g.*, for ascertaining the true significance of the injunction ‘*Udbhida yajēta*,’ ‘one should perform the *Udbhid*,’ it is necessary to call in the help of ordinary experience; the word ‘*Udbhid*’ in ordinary language means a tree; so the text might well be taken to mean that ‘one should perform the tree’; but here our experience steps in and tells us that such a performance would be an impossibility and it is only an account of this impossibility that we are led to take the word ‘*Udbhid*’ in the text as the name of a particular sacrifice, which is the correct interpretation. (*Vide Mīmā. Sū. 1.4.2.*)

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Then, as regards the question as to how to determine the facts of certain words forming a single Sentence or text,—the principle adopted is that just as a number of letters denoting a certain conceptual unit is regarded as one Word, so when a number of words express a single complete conceptual Idea, they are regarded as one Sentence. (*Mīmā. Sū. 2.1.16—see below—the Principle of Syntactical Convention.*)

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CHAPTER XIV: VERBAL COGNITION ACCORDING TO PRABHĀKARA

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We have seen that the Veda is not the work of a Person or Author. This is proved by the fact that all words and things denoted by them are Eternal (see above), and there is no other means (save the Veda) available for the Knowledge of *Dharma*,—including as it does the notion of such supersensuous thing as *Apūrva* and the like; and the Veda itself, as only a collection of words speaking of such things, must be Eternal, and as such independent of all authorship.

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The *Bṛhatī* (p. 403) asks—‘What is the meaning of the opponent’s assertion that the Veda is an *Effect*, a product? It has been proved that Words are eternal and so also is the relation of Words with their Denotations; what else then is there in the Veda which could be a product? The answer is that what is meant by the opponent regarding the Veda as an *Effect* or *product* is that it is dependent upon other Means of Cognition; and he argues that the fact of the Veda being so is shown by the presence there of such words as ‘*Babara, the son of Pravahaṇa*’ and so forth. The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer is that all such instances adduced by the other party are capable of being explained away and they do not prove the said dependence of the Veda. The rest of it can be learnt from the *Bhāṣya* (see above).

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