Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c19.7

c19.7

This Relation is that of the Denoter-Denoted, *i.e.*, the Denotative Relation. Even though we do not comprehend the Meaning of a Word when we hear it for the first time, yet it cannot be denied that the Denotative Potency of the Word is something that belongs to it by its very nature, it is inherent in it. In our experience, when we are listening to the conversation between two elderly persons, and fail to comprehend the meaning of the Words used by them, there arises in our minds an uncertainty as to whether or not the Words are expressive of any meaning at all; we proceed to reason in our minds that if the Words were entirely inexpressive, they could not convey any sense to the person to whom they are addressed;—from his behaviour, however, it is clear that he does derive the idea of something out of the words; and yet, if the Words are really expressive how is it that they do not convey any meaning to ourselves? The only explanation for this apparent anomaly must lie in the fact that in the person to whom the Words are addressed, there is something, some peculiar Power, which is wanting in ourself; this power must be in the shape of the knowledge of what is denoted by the Word; it is such Power alone whose presence in the man is indicated by his behaviour. We can have no idea of the man having the knowledge of any ‘Saṅketa,’ or Convention, bearing upon the expressiveness of the Word,—i.e., some such conventional law as that ‘this Word denotes this meaning,’ upon which law some philosophers have based the denotativeness of Words. Until we are ourselves cognisant of the meaning of the Word, we cannot form the idea of any such law bearing upon it, and the knowledge of the said law presupposes the knowledge of the meaning. From this it follows that the only power present in the person comprehending the meaing of a word consists in his knowledge of the fact that the Word is expressive of such a meaning. This proves that the expressiveness of the Word is something that belongs to it by its very nature, and is not created or produced by any person or thing. As this inherent expressive potency of the Word is sufficient to explain all phenomena of Verbal Expression and Cognition and Usage, there can be no justification for attributing the expressiveness to a Convention. In the case of some Words—such as Proper Names—such a Convention has to be admitted—which applies certain names to certain persons. But in the case of common names—such as ‘cow’, ‘jar’, ‘man’ and so forth—there is no justification for postulating any Convention. Consequently the relation of all such Words to their meanings must be held to be Eternal.