Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c19.9

c19.9

The Mīmāṃsaka lays stress upon this denotativeness—i.e., the relation between the Verbal Expression and the Idea Expressed—being inborn, Eternal, because if it were not so, the validity of the Scriptural texts would be based upon the whim of the agencies creating and setting up the said Relation, or of the person uttering those texts. And thus, as he denies all personal agency in the composition of the Veda, there would ipso facto be no validity in the Vedic texts themselves. Nor can the Mīmāṃsaka accept the Logician's point of view, by which the denotativeness of words is created and fixed by ‘Convention’ among people who introduce, and make use of, the Words for the first time,—according to the Logician, created by God Himself. This view necessitates the postulating of a ‘God’ as the Creator of all Words and their denotations, and hence of the Veda itself; and this militates against the Mīmāṃsā-doctrine of the Eternality and Self-Sufficiency of the Veda, which must be independent of all personal influence of any kind. In fact, if the denotativeness of Words depended solely upon ‘Convention,’ the Veda would be reduced to the position of a meaningless jumble of words; because, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, the pre-eminent function of the Veda lies in the enjoining of certain acts as bringing about an Apūrva—an imperceptible, Subtle Force—leading to a definite result; and as this Force is something of which no Person could have any direct knowledge, except through the Veda—how could the denotativeness of those words of the Veda be fixed by any Convention? And as no Convention could be found applicable to these words, these would, according to the Logician's view, have to be regarded as absolutely meaningless. If a Creator, God, were admitted, then as this God, being omniscient, would be possessed of the direct knowledge of the said Apūrva, He would be in a position to lay down the Conventions with regard to the denotativeness of Words,—including the Word denoting the Apūrva. But to the Mīmāṃsaka the idea of an omnicient Person, like God, or any one else, is wholly unacceptable; hence for the sake of the Veda, his all-in-all, he finds it necessary to stick to the view that all Words and their Denotations are eternal, ever-lasting, independent of all conventions and agencies and influences.—(Vide *Prakaraṇa-pañchikā*, p. 133 et. saq.)