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Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c6: Chapter I: Introductory and Bibliographical

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c6

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Chapter I: Introductory and Bibliographical

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Students of Indian Literature have long been conversant with the term ‘Ṣaḍ-darśana,’ ‘Six Systems of Philosophy.’ One cannot however fail to observe that this is a misnomer. It is true it is an old term; we read, for instance, in the Mahānirvāṇa-tantra—

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षड्दर्शनमहाकूपे पतिताः सर्वजन्तवः।
परमार्थे न जानन्ति पशुपाशनियन्त्रिताः॥

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Even here however the ‘Six Systems’ are spoken of somewhat vaguely and deprecatingly.

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Though the expression has the sanction of long usage behind it, it appears to have been not known in ancient times. This is clear from the fact that in the enunciation of the various branches of literature which a seeker after truth was advised to study, there is no mention of the ‘six darśanas’; and also it does not occur in the list of the several ‘vidyāsthānas,’ subjects of learning, provided by the Ancients. For instance, (1) we have the following list in the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad (7.1.2)—

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‘. . . The Ṛgveda, the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda, the Atharvaṇa, the Itihāsa-Purāṇa, the Veda of the Vedas, the Rites of the Fathers, Mathematics, Science of Portents, Science of Time, Logic, Ethics and Politics, Etymology, Science of the Veda, Science of Elementals, Science of War, Astronomy, Snake-charming and Fine Arts.’

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(2) Yājñavalkya in his Smṛti provides the following list of subjects of learning—

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पुराणन्यायमीमांसाधर्मशास्त्राङ्ग मिश्रिताः।
वेदाः स्थानानि विद्यानां धर्मस्य च चतुर्दश॥

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where we find mentioned only ‘Nyāya’ and ‘Mīmāmsā,’ standing respectively for Reasoning and Investigation, (3) The Great *Vāchaspati Mishra* (ninth century A.C.) is known to have written important works on all the *Darshanas*; he himself enumerates his works as—

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न्यायकर्णिका¹-तत्त्वसमीक्षा²-तत्त्वबिन्दुभिः³ । न्यायसांख्ययोगानां वेदान्तानां निबन्धनैः ॥

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where we do not find the mention of the regular ‘Six Systems.’

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(4) *Rājashekhara-Kāvyamīmāmsā* (tenth century A.C.) speaks of ‘*Vānmaya*,’ Literature, as consisting of *Purāṇa, Anvīkṣikī, Mīmāmsā* and *Smṛtitantra*; where we miss the names of *Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vedānta* and *Vaishēṣika*.

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(5) *Jayanta-Bhaṭṭa* in his *Nyāyamañjarī* (tenth century A.C.) speaks of ‘*Ṣaṭ-tarkī*,’ ‘the Six Theories’; but includes under the name, *Mīmāmsā, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, Arhata, Bauddha* and *Chārvāka*. The names of ‘*Vedānta*,’ ‘*Yoga*,’ ‘*Vaishēṣika*’ are absent here.

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(6) *Vishvasāratantra-Gurugītā* (twelfth century A.C.) speaks of the ‘Six Systems,’ as those of *Gautama, Kaṇāda, Kapila, Patañjali, Vyāsa* and *Jaimini*. Here alone we find the well-known ‘Six darshanas.’

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(7) *Haribhadra Sūri* (twelfth century A.C.) mentions the following—*Bauddha, Naiyāyika, Sāṅkhya, Jaina, Vaishēṣika* and *Jaimini*; here we miss the names of ‘*Vedānta*’ and ‘*Yoga*.’

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(8) *Jinadatta Sūri* (thirteenth century A.C.) names the following—‘Six darshanas’—*Jaina, Mīmāmsā, Bauddha, Sāṅkhya, Shaiva* and *Nāstika*; here we miss the names of *Nyāya, Vaishēṣika, Vedānta* and *Yoga*.

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(9) *Rājashekhara Sūri* (1348 A.C.) names *Jaina, Sāṅkhya, Jaiminīya, Yoga, Vaishēṣika* and *Saugata*. Here we do not find the names of *Vedānta* and *Nyāya*.

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(10) *Mallinātha’s* son (fourteenth century A.C.) speaks of *Pāṇini, Jaimini, Vyāsa, Kapila, Akṣapāda* and *Kaṇāda*; here we miss the *Yoga*.

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Thus we find that till so late as the fourteenth century the name ‘*Ṣaḍ-darshana*,’ ‘Six Systems of Philosophy,’ had not become stereotyped as standing definitely and specifically for the Six Systems now known as *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta*. The old division was into the two broad lines mentioned by Yājñavalkya, under the names ‘*Nyāya*’ and ‘*Mīmāṃsā*’; the term ‘*Nyāya*’ stands for what we understand by Reasoning, Argumentation, and ‘*Mīmāṃsā*’ for Investigation, Deliberation.

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The first step towards both these lay in the preparing of the ground for investigation; and it was necessary at the outset to lay down the ‘means’ that are available to the investigator for ‘knowing’ things; this was essential for all sound and valid ‘knowledge,’ which was the sole purpose of all Investigation. Thus it was that ‘*Nyāya*,’ ‘Reasoning,’ came in as the first essential; and this is the reason why the consideration of the Means of Knowledge, *Pramāṇas*, became the starting point of our philosophical works.

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From the earliest times, man has made a distinction between Matter—regarded, roughly, as what is tangible,—and Spirit—what is not tangible. Man has all along recognised this distinction between the ‘visible,’ which meets the Eye, and the ‘invisible,’ which is beyond the reach of the senses and is yet felt to be there. This well-recognised distinction we find stressed in the system which we know as the ‘*Sāṅkhya*.’ In the other group known as the *Nyāya*, we find expounded in detail the means and methods for the ascertaining of the real nature of things, both material and spiritual; this expounding is done on the basis of commonsense, and the aid of supernatural means of knowledge is not emphasised. The third group known as ‘*Mīmāṃsā*’ deals entirely with spiritual truths, which are not amenable to any ordinary means of knowledge—being cognisable only through the *Reliable Word*, Revelation.

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It is not easy to find proper justification for the later rigid division into the ‘Six Systems.’ These ‘Six Systems’ have been held to be—(1) *Sāṅkhya*, (2) *Yoga*, (3) *Nyāya*, (4) *Vaiśeṣika*, (5) *Mīmāṃsā*, and (6) *Vedānta*. As a matter of fact, however, there is ample justification for the view that we have only three ‘systems,’ and each of these three is presented to us in the form of a pair; each member of the pair being complementary to the other.

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For instance, *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* form one pair; the theoretical philosophy is supplied by the former and the practical method of realising these philosophical truths are taught by the latter. It is for this reason that in the older literature, both of these have been called ‘*Sāṅkhya*’; and it was only later on, when people began to prefer analysis to synthesis, that the former came to be known as ‘*the Sāṅkhya without God*,’ and the latter, as ‘*Sāṅkhya with God*,’ the postulating of the ‘*Īśwara*,’ Lord, God, being the important point where the two sister-systems differed; though it was not noted that ‘God’ had no place in the *philosophy* of the *Yoga*,—He being posited there only as the object of devotion and meditation, leading up to final *Samādhi*, Absolute Communion.—The *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* form the second pair; though the case of these two is somewhat different from that of *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*. The *sūtras* of both *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* contain ‘philosophical’ matter; though even here much of the philosophical matter has been taken for granted by the *Nyāya*, as expounded in the sister-system; the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* has clearly declared that such of the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrines as have not been actually denied in so many words by the *Nyāya-sūtra* should be taken to be accepted by the *Nyāya*—(*Nyāya-Bhāṣya* on 1.1.4.). That these two systems are mutually complementary is shown by the fact that the avowed aim of the *Nyāya-sūtras* is found to be the propounding of a scheme of investigation and discussion regarding philosophical truths; as in their opinion, knowledge acquired otherwise remains shaky until it is corroborated by such investigation and discussion. These two systems have, since early times, been coalescing to such an extent that it is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether a certain manual written during the last two or three centuries is to be classed as ‘*Nyāya*’ or ‘*Vaiśeṣika*.’—Lastly as regards the *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Vedānta*, there has never been any justification for regarding them as two distinct ‘systems of Philosophy.’ They have always been, and continue to be, known as ‘*Pūrva*’ (Preliminary) *Mīmāṃsā* and ‘*Uttara*’ (Final) *Mīmāṃsā*. *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*—i.e., *Mīmāṃsā* proper—has never claimed to be a ‘*Darśana*,’ a system of Philosophy. In fact, so far as the *Sūtra* is concerned, it does not take cognisance of any philosophical topic except that of *Pramāṇa*; and these also are brought in only negatively, to show that *Dharma* is not within the purview of the ordinary *Pramāṇas*, Perception and the rest. The commentators have introduced such topics as the ‘ Soul ’ and the ‘ *Apūrva*,’ but only as corollary to its main theme of ‘ *Dharma*,’ Duty of Man; if there is no Soul and no *Apūrva*, there can be no point in performing *Dharma*, one’s *Duty*; hence these have been set forth by the later exponents; the Soul has been specially emphasised; but regarding any detailed investigation and consideration of this Soul, the older writers have deliberately referred the enquirer to the ‘ *Vedānta*.’ Says Kumārila at the end of his *Ātmavāda*, in the *Shlokavārtika*—

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इत्याह नास्तिक्यनिराकरिष्पुरात्मस्तितां भाष्यकृदत्र युक्त्या ।
दृढत्वमेतद्विषयः प्रबोधः प्रयाति वेदान्तनिषेवणेन ॥

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The term ‘ *Nāstikya* ’ (Atheism) in Indian Philosophy stands for the view that ‘ there is no *Soul*, there is no region other than the physical ’ (vide *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*); subsequently it came to stand for the view that ‘ there is no *God*.’—The term ‘ *Vedānta* ’ originally stood for the Upaniṣad-section of the Veda, the study whereof, as bearing upon the *Soul* and cognate subjects, is incorporated in the *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa.—We are alive to the fact that later on differences cropped up between the two ‘ *Mīmāṃsās* ’; but they always appertained to minor details; on the main issues, there has not arisen any serious controversy. *Vedānta* proper finds its ultimate sanction in the *Vedic texts*; and as regards the authority and interpretation of these texts, it accepts the conclusions of the sister-system; in fact, for all practical purposes, the *Vedānta* accepts the *tenets* of the *Mīmāṃsā*; hence the statement by the Vedāntin—‘ *Vyavahāre Bhaṭṭanayaḥ*.’

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[For examples of मीमांसान्याय-s adopted and used by Vedāntins see the Last Chapter.]

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The above facts also account for the designation of *Mīmāṃsā* proper as ‘ *Pūrva* ’ and that of *Vedānta* as ‘ *Uttara*.’ For the enquiry into *Brahman*—*Brahmajijñāsā*,—which can be carried on only on the basis of Vedic texts,—it is essential (*a*) that the authority and reliability of the Veda should be established beyond doubt,—and (*b*) that certain methods of interpreting those texts should be elaborated, in order to avoid confusion in the course of the study of the vast mass of Vedic material. Both these requirements have been met by *Mīmāṃsā* proper; and it is on the basis of the *Pūrva*, Preliminary, *Mīmāṃsā* that the Vedāntin has raised the edifice of *Vedānta* proper, which, on that account, is called *Uttara*, Final, *Mīmāṁsā*. And it is interesting to note that on the subject of the nature of the Soul and of Final Liberation, *Mokṣa*, the final aim of men, there is not much difference between the views of the great *Mīmāṁsaka* (*Kumārila*, for instance) and the Great *Vedāntin* (*e.g.*, *Śaṅkara*).

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This interrelation and interdependence between the two *Mīmāṁsās* has been clearly indicated by *Śaṅkarācārya*, in his *Śārīraka-bhāṣya*, on Sūtra 3.3.53. The *Adhikaraṇa* beginning with this *Sūtra* is meant to establish the existence of the *Soul* as something distinct from the Body. A preliminary objection is raised to the effect that "this matter has been already dealt with in the very beginning of the *Śāstra*, where the Existence of the Soul as the *Enjoyer* of the results of acts has been established." And this objection has been answered by the following statement—"it is true that it has been so established by the *Author* of the *Bhāṣya* (*Shabara*), but nothing has been said on the point by the *Author* of the *Sūtra*; while in the Vedānta-Sūtras under explanation (3.3.53. *et seq.*), the *Author* of the *Sūtra* itself has dealt with it directly; and it is clear that what *Shabara Svāmi* has declared in Adhyāya I of his *Bhāṣya*, he has derived from the present *Vedānta-Sūtra* itself; and it is for this reason that when the *Revered Upavarṣa* (the ‘*Vṛttikāra*,’ of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā) found it necessary,—in course of his work on the First, Preliminary, Investigation,—to prove the Existence of the Soul, he contented himself by saying that he was going to explain this under the *Śārīraka* (*Vedānta-Sūtra*); in the present connection we are going to discuss the Existence of the Soul in relation to the *Upāsanās*, acts of worship and meditation, that have been enjoined in the Veda; and we are doing this for the purpose of showing that the question of the Existence of the Soul has a bearing upon the *entire Śāstra*—the *whole Philosophy* (of *Mīmāṁsā*, with its two parts, *Karma* or *Pūrva*, Mīmāṁsā and *Uttara* Mīmāṁsā)."

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The words and expressions used in these passages are significant. (1) The *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* has been referred to as ‘*Śāstra-pramukha*, Beginning of the *Śāstra* ’;—(2) it is again referred to as ‘*Prathama-Tantra*, the Preliminary Investigation ’;—(3) the two *Mīmāṁsās* together have been spoken of as ‘*Kṛtsna-Śāstra*,’ ‘the whole Philosophy.’

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The interdependence and interrelation of the two *Mīmāṃsās* is further indicated by the following facts:—

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(i) The immediate purpose of both the *Mīmāṃsās* was to save the *Vaidika Dharma* from the onslaughts of the *Bauddha* and other *Non-Vaidika Dharmas*.

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(ii) *Kumārila* holds that the *Ātman* is eternal—different from the body, the sense-organs and *Buddhi*—(*Shlokavārtika*—*Ātma*, 7.) It is imperishable. (*Ibid.*, 147.)

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(iii) *Ātman* is omnipresent—(*Tantravārtika*—Translation, p. 516).

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(iv) *Ātman* is ‘*jñānashaktisvabhāva*,’ (of the nature of consciousness), eternal, omnipresent. (*Shlokavārtika*—*Ātma*, 73.)

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(v) *Ātman* is ‘of the nature of pure consciousness’ (*Tantravārtika*—Translation, p. 516. Text, p. 381, l. 5.)

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(vi) As regards the *parama-puruṣārtha*, summum bonum, and its attainment, *Kumārila’s* view is thus summed up—(See *Tantravārtika*—Text, pp. 240-241, Translation, p. 321.)

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(a) Knowledge of *Ātman* helps the Man, as also the sacrificial performance.

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(b) Such Vedic texts as—‘*Ya ātmā apahatapāpmā vijaro vimṛtyuḥ vishoko vijighitso’pipāsaḥ satyakāmaḥ satyasaṅkalpaḥ so ‘nveṣṭavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavyaḥ*,’—‘*Mantavyo boddhavyaḥ*’—‘*Ātmanamupasīta*’ ‘*Sa sarvāṅshcha lokānāpnoti tarati shokamātmavit*’—‘*Sa yadi pitṛkāmo bhavati saṅkalpādēvāsya pitaraḥ samuttiṣṭhanti tena pitṛlokamabhisampadyatē*’—‘*Sa khalvevam yo veda, etc. etc.*’—There are two kinds of ‘aims’ attainable by man, Happiness and Final Deliverance (the Highest Good);—they are attained by means of pure self-knowledge obtained by means of Enquiry and Reflection;—the ‘Highest Good’ consists in ‘absorption into the regions of Brahma.’

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Though what is said in *Shlokavārtika* (*Sambandhā-kṣepaparihāra*, 103-104) as to ‘the knowing of Soul’ not being enjoined ‘for the purpose of Final Deliverance’ would appear to be inconsistent with the above from *Tantravārtika*,—yet in reality it is not so. The explanation is given by the *Nyāyaratnākara*, which says that there are two kinds of ‘self-knowledge’ taught in the Upanisads,—one which discriminates the *Ātman* from the Body, etc., and the other, which helps in Meditation, etc.—It is the former that is spoken of as not leading to ‘Final Deliverance’; as its sole purpose lies in convincing the man that there is an ever-lasting Entity within him for whose sake the sacrifices are to be performed. That this is so is made clear by the statement that ‘there is no other result save the attainment of Heaven.’—This apparently refers to the result of sacrifices. Certainly *Kumārila* cannot be taken as holding that there is no other result save Heaven; in several passages he has spoken of *Mokṣa*. The conclusion is that *Mokṣa* is attained through the second kind of ‘self-knowledge.’

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(vii) To crown all, we have the declaration at the end of *Ātmavāda* in *Shlokavārtika* to the following effect—‘Thus has the author of the *Bhāṣya*, with a view to refute Atheism, established, by means of reasonings, the existence of *Ātman*; conviction regarding this becomes strengthened by a careful study of the *Vedānta*.’

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Of course one cannot ignore the later controversies that arose between the followers of the two teachers: specially in regard to ‘*Karmakāṇḍa*’—i.e., the Vedic texts bearing upon the active aspect of *Dharma*,—which the later Vedāntin insisted upon regarding as almost valueless,—quite unmindful of the fact that the Great Āchārya has repeatedly asserted that the due performance of the said active aspects of *Dharma* is absolutely essential—specially for the purification of the mind, without which no real progress can be possible towards the attainment of *Jñāna*. In fact it was in this reconciliation between the two schools of thought that lay the value of the work of *Śaṅkarāchārya*, in whose system there is scope for both, within their own special spheres. The following passage from the *Śarīraka-Bhāṣya* (on *Sū.* 4.1.8.) clarifies the entire viewpoint of *Śaṅkarāchārya*.

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‘We accept as settled the following conclusion:—All acts of permanent obligation—accompanied or not accompanied by knowledge—which have been performed before the rise of the ultimate True Knowledge,—either during the present life or in previous ones,—all such works act as means of the extinction of evil dessert obstructing the attainment of True Knowledge,—and thus become the cause of such attainment, subserving the more immediate causes,

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such as *Śravaṇa*, *Manana*, etc. These Acts therefore operate towards the same ultimate result as the Knowledge of *Brahman*.'

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As regards the special field occupied by *Mīmāmsā* proper, *Jaimini* in his *Sūtrās* has propounded the subject of his enquiry as *Dharma* (Sūtra 1),—then he sets forth his idea of what *Dharma* (Duty of Man) is,—where we are told that it consists in *what has been enjoined in the Veda as conducive to welfare* (Sūtra 2);—he then explains why the ordinary means of Cognition, Perception, Inference and the rest, cannot be of much use in this connection (Sūtra 4);—and how the *Revealed Word* can be the only infallible guide in this matter (Sūtra 5),—and proceeds in the rest of Pāda i, to explain how and why the ‘Revealed Word,’ which is the *Veda*, is to be accepted as an infallible source of knowledge;—this is followed in the rest of *Adhyāya* I, by a detailed examination of the question as to what portions of the *Veda* are to be regarded as actually laying down, enjoining, what should be done and what should not be done.—Having thus cleared the ground in the first *Adhyāya*, *Jaimini* proceeds, in the remaining eleven *adhyāyas*, to set forth in detail the methods of understanding the import of Vedic texts.

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It will be seen that for *Jaimini*—in fact for all Indian philosophers,—the connotation of the term ‘*Dharma*’ is very much wider than that of its usual rendering, ‘Religion’; it stands for *the whole duty of Man*, the performance of which is conducive to his welfare—here, in this world, during present life, as also elsewhere, after death.

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Unfortunately for us, the examples that *Jaimini* and his commentators chose for illustrating the rules of interpretation were all drawn from sacrificial rituals. Naturally, during their time, every serious student was familiar with these rituals and hence these were regarded as providing most suitable examples. Latterly, however, sacrificial ritual has gradually all but disappeared from the life of the Hindus; and this has led to the neglect of the study of the *Mīmāmsā-Śāstra* itself. Attempts were made off and on to illustrate the more important of *Jaimini*’s Principles (*Nyāyas*) by means of examples drawn from the practices current among the later Hindus; and we have a number of manuals, called ‘*Adhikaraṇa-Kaumudī*’—by *Devanātha Thakkura* and *Rāmakṛṣṇa* among others—where the Principles are illustrated by examples drawn from other fields of human activity.—All along however these *Mīmāṃsā Nyāyas* have continued to exercise their due influence on other matters,—in fact, on all matters that are affected by the right interpretation of authoritative texts. This has been specially manifested in the domain of Law; and decisions of even modern courts of law have been found to be influenced by these *Nyāyas* of Jaimini. One glaring instance of the application—rather misapplication—of one of these is afforded by the judgment of the Privy Council which has declared the adoption of an only son to be *legal*, on the authority (misunderstood) of a *Mīmāṃsā Nyāya*. It is as follows:—

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*Gautama* has declared—‘One should not give away, nor adopt, an only son,—because he serves the purpose of the perpetuation of the line of his ancestors.’ This sentence contains two statements—(a) ‘One should not adopt, or give away in adoption, an only son,’ and (b) ‘He serves the purpose of perpetuating the line’; the latter sentence is meant to provide a reason for the prohibition contained in the former statement. In a Bombay case, it was argued by an eminent lawyer,—and the argument was ultimately accepted by the Privy Council,—that the first statement cannot be mandatory, because an injunction or a prohibition which is sought to be justified by reason cannot be mandatory. In support of this view reliance was placed upon an *adhikaraṇa* of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* (Sūtra 1.2.27.) and the case was decided accordingly; the prohibition was *not* mandatory, hence the adoption of an only son is *not illegal*; ever since this view has prevailed.—Even a cursory examination, however, of the *Adhikaraṇa* concerned will show that the legal authorities have entirely misunderstood the *Nyāya* concerned. What the *Nyāya* really stands for is that—‘When a certain sentence consists of two statements,—one in the form of an Injunction or Prohibition, and another in the form of a reason in support thereof,—no mandatory force attaches to the *latter* statement.’—That such is the *Nyāya* as propounded in *Mīmāṃsā* can be found out by any one who comes to look into any of the authoritative works on *Mīmāṃsā*—from *Shabara* downwards.—Incidentally it may be pointed out that the lawyers concerned did not take the trouble to find out if there were other texts bearing on the question. As a matter of fact, there is at least one other text which prohibits the said adoption—and does *not* adduce a reason for it. *Shaunaka* has declared—नैक्पुत्रेण कर्तव्यं पुत्रदानम्प्रयतः—‘The man with an only son should carefully avoid the giving away of the son.' (Vide *Hindu Law in Its Sources.*)

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We thus see that there are no ‘Six Systems’ of Indian Philosophy; there may be *three*; but they are all collectively conducive to the welfare of man. For instance, the *Sāṅkhya* teaches men the first essential distinction between Matter and Spirit, and shows that the latter is the more important of the two, the former only subserving the purposes of the latter:—

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पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य—says the *Kārikā*. The *Yoga* provides the method duly leading to the realisation of this pre-eminent truth;—the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* provides the ratiocinative factor,—the method of proving to the sceptic the correctness of the said distinction between Matter and Spirit; and finally, we have the two *Mīmāṃsās* which together lead us on to the realisation of the *Highest Truth*,—that all is *one*, there is no multiplicity or plurality, which is all purely illusory and so forth. The ultimate sanction for this Truth rests in, and is provided by, the Revealed Word of the Veda, and the exact import of this Word is understood with the help of certain broad principles expounded in the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras*.

Bibliography of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā

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We have seen how and why it was found necessary to evolve a methodology for understanding the true import of Vedic texts. The earliest work that is available to us on this subject is the *Sūtra* of Jaimini.

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As regards the date of these *Sūtras*, nothing definite can be known. These ancient *Sūtrakāras* are found to be referring to each other; e.g., Jaimini mentions Bādarāyaṇa (*Mī. Sū.* 1.1.5) and Bādarāyaṇa mentions Jaimini (*Brahma-Sūtra* 3.2.40). All attempts, therefore, that have been made to fix the dates, or coin the chronology of these systems have been futile and unconvincing.

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This work, as generally known to us, consists of *twelve Adhyāyas*: but there is a belief,—which appears to have some foundation,—that there are four more *Adhyāyas* of the ‘*Jaiminīya-Sūtra*’ known as the ‘*Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa*.’ Indeed a work bearing this title was actually published at Benares in 1894; it consists of the Sūtras of Jaimini—said to be Adhyāyas 13, 14, 15 and 16—along with a comparatively recent commentary called Bhāṭṭa-Chandrikā, by one Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa. References to the ‘Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa’ of Jaimini are found in Rāmānuja’s Shrī-bhāṣya under 5.3. That this ‘Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa,’ or simply ‘Saṅkarṣa’ as he calls it, was commented upon by Shabara is clear from the Shabara-Bhāṣya itself; under Sū. 10.4.32 and 12.2.11, the Bhāṣya contains the words ‘Saṅkarṣe vakṣyatē,’ and ‘Saṅkarse vakṣyati.’ On looking into the Sūtras as printed in the Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa, we find that the first point of Shabara’s reference (under 10.4.32) appears under Sūtra 14.4.20. of the Saṅkarṣa, where we meet with the Sūtra वनस्पतिस्विष्टकृद्विकारत्वात् and the words of Shabara under reference are स्विष्टकृद्विकारश्च वनस्पतिरिति सङ्कर्षे वक्ष्यते । The second point of reference, however, is not equally clear. The words of Shabara (under 12.2.11) are—औषधार्था अवहननार्था वा यथा पत्नीति सङ्कर्षे वक्ष्यते । In the Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa, the only passage relevant to this appears to be under 13.1.11. But the identity of these two is not quite clear. There is a manuscript of the Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa in the Adyar Library—with the Bhāṣya of Dēvasvāmi.

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Anyway, this printed Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa does not appear to bear any signs of being the उपासनाकांड, ‘Section of Veda dealing with Worship and Devotion,’ which the Editor, the late Mahā. P. Rāmamishra Shāstrī, calls it in the footnotes at the end of his edition of the Shāstradīpikā; wherein he quotes Rāmānuja’s assertion regarding Jaimini’s Sūtra consisting of sixteen Adhyāyas; the four concluding ones apparently constituting the said उपासनाकांड. From the clear reference to the वनस्पतिस्विष्टकृत् noted above, the printed संकर्षणकांड, would appear to be the संकर्ष mentioned by Shabara, and the additional four Adhyāyas of Jaimini, mentioned by Rāmānuja, must be totally different from the संकर्षणकांड, —if it deals, as P. Rāmamishra says it does, with the उपासनाकांड.

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In fact, the printed commentary declares at the very outset as follows:—“In the foregoing twelve discourses the sage has expounded a few principles of interpretation, based upon the distinction of acts into ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary;’ the following four discourses are going to bring together a few stray Vedic texts and determine their exact meaning by means of the same principles; hence (i.e., because these deal with stray texts), there is no need here to point out the contextual connection of each topic with what has preceded it.'—Of the Sūtras, however, the printed commentary provides the *Pratīkas*, the opening words, only.

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An attempt might be made to obtain some idea of the contents of these four Discourses with the help of the printed commentary and also the older commentary by Dēvasvāmi, a manuscript of which has been obtained from Madras, with the help of Dr. C. Kunhan Raja,—only if we could fix the text of the Sūtras also.

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The *Mīmāmsā-Grantha-Prakāshaka-Samiti* of Poona is advertising the publication of what it calls the ‘*Siddhānta-bhāṣya* (*Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa*).’—On enquiry we learn that this also is the commentary by Dēvasvāmī.

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The twelve Adhyāyas—styled ‘*Dvādaśalakṣaṇī*’—of these Sūtras were commented upon by several writers; the oldest of these known to us—but by name only—and also by a detailed exposition of his views by *Shabara*,—is Upavarṣa, who has been reverentially spoken of by *Shabara* (and also by *Shaṅkarāchārya*) as ‘*Bhagavān Upavarṣaḥ*.’ This same Upavarṣa has been generally identified with the ‘*Vṛttikāra*,’ whose views have been set forth in detail in the *Shabara-Bhāṣya*; though doubts have been raised in regard to this identification.—Other commentators, known to us so far only by name, as mentioned in some of the more important works, are—(1) *Bhartṛmitra*; mentioned by the *Nyāyaratnākara* of *Pārthasārathi* and the *Kāśikā* of *Suchorita Mishra*, on verse 10 of the *Shlokavārtika*, and believed by my late revered tutor *Mahāmahopādhyāya* Pandit *Chitradhara Mishra* of Darbhanga, to be the earliest commentator on the Sūtras;—(2) *Bhavadāsa*, mentioned by *Kumārila* in *Shlokavārtika* 1.63;—(3) *Hari*, referred to in the *Shāstradīpikā* of *Pārthasārathi* under 10.2.59-60.—These, however, are known only by their names; the earliest commentary that has been available to us so far is that by *Shabara* or *Shabara-svāmin*, known to the world as ‘*Shabara-bhāṣya*.’ This is the work on which the entire literature of *Pūrva-Mīmāmsā* is based.

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*Shabara-svāmin* is known among Pandits as a senior contemporary of the great ‘*Vikramāditya*,’ the founder of the ‘*Samvat*’

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era, and hence believed as having lived in 57 B.C. Indeed they quote a *Shloka* which speaks of Shabara as the father of *Vikramāditya*—

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ब्राह्मणयमभवद्वराहमिहिरो ज्योतिर्विदामग्रणीः
राजा भर्तृहरिश्च विक्रमन्ृपः क्षत्रात्मजायामभूत् ।
वैश्यायां हरिश्चन्द्रवैद्यतिलको जातश्च शङ्कुः 'कृतीः
शूद्रायाममरः षडेव शबरस्वामिद्विजस्यात्मजाः ॥

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Here the persons spoken of as sons of *Shabara* are—(1) *Varāhamihira*, the great astronomer, from his *Brāhmaṇa*-wife, (2) King *Bhartṛhari* and (3) King *Vikrama*, from his *Kṣattriya*-wife, (4) *Harichandra*, the great *Vaidya* and (5) *Śaṅku*, the learned, from his *Vaishya*-wife, and (6) *Amara*, from his *Śūdra*-wife. The date of the astronomer *Varāhamihira*, however, has been fixed by scholars to be somewhere in the fourth century A.D.—*Vidyāpati Thakkura*, in his *Puruṣaparīkṣā*, speaks of *Shabara* as the ‘*Guru*’ of *Vikramāditya*.—The name ‘*Vikramāditya*’ continues to be shrouded in mystery. The only conclusion, therefore, that we can come to is that *Shabara* lived before 400 A.D. This would fit in with his posteriority to ‘*Bhagavān Upavarṣa*’—whose date is believed to be pre-Christian,—and priority to *Prabhākara*, *Kumārila*, *Maṇḍana* and *Śaṅkara*.—Under Sū. 6.1.12, *Shabara* has quoted the well-known text ‘भार्या दासश्च पुत्रश्च’ निर्धनाः सर्व’एव ते which occurs in *Manusmṛti*; this would make *Shabara* posterior to the Great Law-giver.

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*Vidyāpati* has spoken of *Shabara* as the ‘*Guru*’ of *Vikramāditya*; this would make him a resident of Ujjain. But from certain points gleaned from the *Bhāṣya*, he appears to belong to the North—Kashmir, or even *Takṣashilā*.—[Vide Intro. to English Translation of *Shabara-Bhāṣya* by *Gaṅgānātha Jhā*—Gaekwad Series, Baroda.]

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It is this *Shabara-Bhāṣya* that has formed the basis and starting-point for all later *Mīmāṁsā* works; well might *Shabara*, therefore, be regarded as the ‘Father’ of *Mīmāṁsā*-literature; he it was who seems to have systematised and co-ordinated the *Sūtras* into *Adhikaraṇas*; we have to accept this as a settled fact, at least until we have discovered the earlier commentaries on the *Sūtra*, by *Upavarṣa* and others. Indeed *Shabara* had attained this position as early as the time of the Great *Śaṅkara*, who quotes his words as those of the ‘ *Shāstratātparyavidah* (*Shārīraka-Bhāṣya* 1.1.4).

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The earliest commentaries on the *Bhāṣya* so far found are those by *Prabhākara* (also spoken of as *Prabhākara-Mishra*, and called *Guru*), and by *Kumārila* (also spoken of as *Kumārila-Bhaṭṭa*, or simply *Bhaṭṭa*). These two writers became the founders of two schools of *Mīmāṃsā*,—to which a third was later on added in the person of *Murāri Mishra*. In *Mīmāṃsā*-literature, the view of *Prabhākara* is generally referred to as ‘ *Guru-mata*,’ that of *Kumārila* as ‘ *Bhaṭṭa-mata*,’ and that of *Murāri Mishra* as ‘ *Mishra-mata*.’

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There are references to a *Vārtikakāra* in the works of *Shālika-nātha*. This *Vārtikakāra* does not appear to be *Kumārila*; he is evidently an older writer whose ‘ *Vārtika* ’ has been referred to by *Kumārila* himself in the *Tantravārtika* (Text, p. 606); where a ‘ *Vṛtti* ’ also is mentioned.

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There has been some difference of opinion regarding the relative chronological position of *Prabhākara* and *Kumārila*,—*Murāri Mishra* being generally admitted to have lived long after these two. The idea current among Pandits is that *Prabhākara*, along with *Murāri Mishra*, was *Kumārila*’s pupil; and a story is told to the following effect: From his early age, *Prabhākara* had showed signs of keen intelligence and independence of judgment, and in course of study there arose a sharp difference of opinion between the pupil and the teacher on some matter relating to the After-death Rites; having failed to convince the pupil by arguments the Teacher had recourse to a stratagem; once in the morning, it was given out that the Teacher had expired; when the people assembled for the purpose of the Rites, there arose a question regarding the proper manner of this performance; the matter was referred to *Prabhākara*, as the protagonist of one of the two views that had been discussed; and he readily said—‘ Of course the view held by our teacher is the correct one; the other view had been put forward by me only for the purposes of discussion; ’ thereupon *Kumārila* got up and said—‘ So *Prabhākara* has been won over to my view; ’ whereupon *Prabhākara* retorted—‘ Yes, but not while you were alive.’—Another story:—In course of study, the Teacher came by a sentence—‘अत्रतनोक्तं तत्रापिनोक्तम् इति दिरुक्तम्; the apparent meaning of this was—‘ This has not been mentioned here, nor has it been mentioned there, so it has been mentioned *twice*; and this was an absurdity which puzzled the teacher and the pupils alike; after some cogitation, the teacher retired to rest; before he returned *Prabhākara* put a mark between अत्र and तु and another, upon त्रा which altered the whole structure of the sentence 'अत्र तुना' उक्ऊं' तत्र' अपिना' उक्तम्'—इति द्विरुक्तम्, which thereby was found to mean—' Here this idea has been expressed by the particle तु and there the same idea has been expressed by the particle अपि, hence it has been expressed twice;' when the teacher returned, he saw the marks and found the difficulty easily solved; and having found out who had supplied the key to it, he was very highly pleased and bestowed upon *Prabhākara*, the title of '*Guru*.'—Another explanation of this title of *Prabhākara*'s is not complimentary, being attributed to the *complicated* nature of his views, in the following verse current in South India—

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गाथा ताथागतानां गलति गमनिका कापली कापि लीना
क्षीणा काणादवाणी दुहिनहरगिरः सौरभं नारभन्ते ।
क्षामा कौमारिलोक्तिर्जगति गुरुमतं गौरवाद् दूरवन्तं
का शङ्का शङ्करादेव्र्जित यतिपतौ बद्धवेदीं त्रिवेदीम् ॥

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This tradition relating to the relationship between *Kumārila* and *Prabhākara* is found mentioned in the *सर्वसिद्धान्तरहस्य* of *Śeṣa* commented upon by his son *Govinda* who was a pupil of the Great *Madhusūdana Sarasvati*,—where we read—

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अस्यां सूत्रं जैमिनीयं—शाबरं भाष्यमस्य तु
मीमांसावार्तिकं भाट्ट भट्टाचार्यकृतं 'हि तत् ।
तच्छिष्योऽप्यल्पभेदेन शाबरस्य मतान्तरम्
प्रभाकरगुरुश्चक्रे तद्वि प्राभाकरम्मतम् ॥

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*Prabhākara* is believed by Prof. Keith and other scholars to have lived between 600 and 650 A.D.

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It is interesting to note that while the Buddhist writer *Śāntarakṣita*, who lived in the eighth century, criticises in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* and quotes extensively from *Kumārila* (and also criticises *Uddyotakara*, the author of the *Nyāyavārtika*),—neither he nor his commentator makes any reference to *Prabhākara*.

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Notwithstanding all this, however, the fact appears to be that Prabhākara was senior to Kumārila and the two were perhaps contemporaries, and that for the following reasons:—(a) Internal evidence—Prabhākara's commentary on Shabara-Bhāṣya—known as Bṛhatī—is a comment in the strict sense of the term; he does not criticise the Bhāṣya on any point, he simply puts forward the Bhāṣya-kāra's view as understood by himself. In fact, he does not criticise other views either, except in very few places. Kumārila, on the other hand, very frequently criticises and rejects the interpretation of the Bhāṣya-kāra and puts forth his own views; this he does in several places—in no less than seven places—in the first adhyāya itself; Pāda 2, Adhikaraṇa (1) [Tantra-vārtika, Translation, page 32]; Pāda 3, Adhikaraṇa (1) [Tantra-vārtika, Translation, p. 116]; Pāda 3, Adhikaraṇa (4) [p. 178]; Pāda 3, Adhikaraṇa (5) [p. 207]; Pāda 3, Adhikaraṇa (7) [p. 227]; Pāda 3, Adhikaraṇa (10) [p. 347]; and Pāda 4, Adhikaraṇa (1) [p.373];—also in Adhyāya III, Pāda 7, Adhikaraṇa (19) [p. 1643]. Under Adhyāya III, Pāda 4, after Sūtra 9, Kumārila has six Sūtras embodying four Adhikaraṇas; these do not figure in the Bhāṣya, nor in the Bṛhatī; nor does Rjuvimalā take any notice of these Sūtras. Under Sū. 3.7. 39, 40, the Bhāṣyakāra's interpretation has been criticised by Kumārila; it has been adopted by Prabhākara (vide Bṛhatī), and Rjuvimalā has answered the objection raised against the Bhāṣya by Kumārila.

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If Prabhākara had come after Kumārila, he would not have failed to defend the Bhāṣya against these strictures of Kumārila. As a matter of fact, however, he takes no notice of these strictures, or of the new interpretations put forward by Kumārila. On the other hand, Kumārila is found to be taking great pains to demolish certain views, a few of which we find put forward in the Bṛhatī: For instance—(a) under 1.2.31 (Tantravārtika, Trans., p. 54), Kumārila objects to the question of the Adhikaraṇa being put in the form ‘Are Mantras meaningless?’—and this is the form in which it has been put forward in the Bṛhatī (in accordance with the Bhāṣya);—(b) under 1.3.2, according to Prabhākara (MS. 31b) [see note in Shabara-Trans., pp.90-91] the Vedic text in support of the Smṛti is to be inferred; this is objected to by Kumārila (Tantra., Trans., p. 112);—and so on in other places. The only point where we have found Prabhākara combating a view propounded by Kumārila is under Sū. 4.1.2 (Bṛhatī MS., p. 64b). But in this connection also, it is noteworthy that the words in which the criticised view is expressed—which are apparently a quotation,—are very different from those employed by Kumārila (under 4.1.2); the words of Kumārila are—क्रत्वर्थे द्रव्यार्जनं ऋतुविधानं स्यात्; while those found in Prabhākara are क्रत्वर्थत्वे स्वत्वमेव' न' भवतीति' याग एव' न' संवर्तते and this view is combated by Prabhākara in the words—प्रलपितमिदं केनापि अर्जनं स्वत्वं नापादयतीति प्रतिषिद्धम्. This difference in the words shows that the person referred to by Prabhākara's केनापि is someone different from Kumārila. It is interesting to note that these very words of Prabhākara have been quoted in the Mitākṣarā with approval (p. 181 Ed. Setlur).

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In point of style also, Prabhākara's work shows distinct signs of being older than Kumārila's work. The style of Bṛhatī is similar to that of the Bhāṣya—possessing the same natural grace, simplicity and directness, while that of Kumārila becomes rather diffuse and rich, very much like that of Śaṅkarācārya. In Bṛhatī we met with more of those flashy retorts and turns of idiom which characterise the earlier works, like those of Patañjali and Śabara; e.g., अज्ञानकार्यमायुष्मतः प्रदर्शितम् (p. 30b l. 2)—अहो अनवस्थितनयनीतिशो भवान् (32b l. 3)—मूर्धाभिषिक्तं प्रामाण्यम् (32b, line 6)—अग्रन्थशो देवानाम्प्रियः (35b, line 9).

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Under Sū. 3. 4, after Sū. 9, the Tantravārtika has six Sūtras, which are not found in the Bhāṣya; nor in the Bṛhatī; and Kumārila has suggested several reasons for this omission in the Bhāṣya:—(1) the author of the Bhāṣya forgot to comment on these Sūtras; or (2) his comments on these have been lost; or (3) they have been intentionally omitted as they were not of much importance; or (4) he did not accept them as genuine, on the ground that they interrupt the desirable connection between Sūtra 9 and Sūtra 16.

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This last view has been controverted by Kumārila, at the end of Sū. 9 (Tantravārtika, Trs., p. 1275).

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The studied omission of these Sūtras by Prabhākara has been expressly noted by later writers; e.g., by Vidyāraṇya in his Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha (p. 4).

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The Rjuvimalā also does not make any reference to these Sūtras; it does not even seek to traverse the arguments that have been propounded by Kumārila in favour of their genuineness.

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This is an indication of the fact that, though Kumārila knew of the omission of the Sūtras by ‘some commentators,’ Prabhākara and his immediate followers have taken no notice of what Kumārila has said regarding them:—which points to the conclusion that Prabhākara lived before Kumārila.

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This question however of the priority or otherwise of Prabhākara to Kumārila is still far from being definitely settled.

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Some light appears to be thrown upon the question by a passage in the Saṅkṣepaśārīraka (I. 271) which contains the expression प्राभाकरे च समये; this shows that the Prabhākara system was a well-recognised system at the time; the author Sarvajñātma was a pupil of Sureśvarācārya, the well-known disciple of Śaṅkarācārya. Under the circumstances—(a) if the traditional equation of Sureśvara-Maṇḍana is correct (which is doubtful),—and if Maṇḍana was the pupil of Kumārila (which is not unlikely),—Prabhākara should be very much older than Maṇḍana and hence than Kumārila also. All this, however, is still problematical.

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Later researches carried on at the Madras University are beginning to point to the conclusion that Prabhākara, Kumārila and Maṇḍana are not far removed in point of time—that all of them lived during the sixth-seventh centuries A.D.

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In this connection it is interesting to note that the Buddhist writer Śāntarakṣita, author of the Tattvasaṅgraha, who is believed to have lived only about a century later, has quoted extensively long series of Kārikās from Kumārila’s Ślokavārtika, and criticises in detail the views embodied therein; while he nowhere mentions Prabhākara either directly by name or by a reference to his distinctive views; he mentions and refers to Śabara frequently. It may be that the Tattvasaṅgraha itself being entirely in the form of Kārikā, the author found it easier to quote from a work in the same form—as the Ślokavārtika is,—than from a prose work, like Prabhākara’s Bṛhatī.

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The only manuscript available of Prabhākara’s work—the Bṛhatī commentary on Śabara-bhāṣya,—extends to the middle of Adhyāya VI only. The Tarkapāda section has been published at Benares, and also at Madras,—along with its extensive commentary, the *Ṛjuvimalā* by *Śālikanātha Mishra*; who is believed to have been a direct pupil of *Prabhākara* himself; but this is doubtful.

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There is another commentary on the *Sūtras* called *नयविवेक* by *Bhavanātha Mishra*, believed to represent the *Prābhākara* School. A manuscript of this work is available at the *Sarasvati-bhavana*, Benares, which is a transcript obtained from the Madras Oriental MSS. Library. One or two later *Prābhākara* works have also been printed at Calcutta—such as *प्रभाकरविजय*. The most important of these is the *प्रकरणपञ्चिका* by *शालिकनाथमिश्र*, the author of *ऋजुविमला* (published at Benares).

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*Prabhākara’s Bṛhatī* appears to have been spoken of as the ‘*Nibandha*’ or ‘*Nibandhana*,’—vide *Śāstradīpikā* 2.1.1, where a passage from the ‘*Nibandhana*’ is quoted, and this is believed to be from the *Bṛhatī*. In the only manuscript of the *Bṛhatī*, however, which has been found, we find that the colophon at the end of *Pāda* 2 of *Adhyāya* 2, speaks of the work as *प्रभाकरमिश्रकृतौ मीमांसाभाष्यविवरणे* while that at the end of *Adhyāya* 3, it speaks of it as *इति बृहत्याम्*.

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It is interesting to note that this manuscript (in the Library of the Bengal Asiatic Society) bears the words—*सर्वविद्यानिधान-कवीन्द्राचार्यसरस्वतीनां ‘प्राभाकरमीमांसायाम्’* after the end of *Adhyāya* 3. So that the manuscript belongs to the collection of MSS. that belonged to *Kavindrācārya* who lived at Benares in the seventeenth century and obtained from the Emperor Shahjahan the remission of a certain tax that used to be levied on pilgrims to Benares. A list of this collection came into our hands in 1918; and it was published in the Gaekwad Oriental Series. This *Kavindrācārya* is believed to have lived on the other side of the Barnā river opposite the site now occupied by the Queen’s College and the *Sarasvatī-bhavana*.

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*Bṛhatī* quotes from *Bhāravi’s Kirātārjunīya-Kāvya*: *अविवेकः परमापदां पदम्* (242).

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*Kumārila’s* system—called the *Bhāṭṭa* System—is represented by the works of *Kumārila* himself; the best known of which is his extensive commentary on the *Shabara-bhāṣya*, which commentary, as it has come down to us, consists of three parts—Part I, called the *Shlokavārtika* dealing with the *Tarkapāda* Section; Part II, called the *Tantravārtika* dealing with Adhyāya I, Pāda 2 to the end of Adhyāya III; and Part III, called the *Tuptikā*, dealing very briefly with the remaining nine *adhyāyas*.—The whole of these three parts has been published at Benares; and Parts I and II have been also translated into English, and the translation has been published by the Bengal Asiatic Society.—Kumārila is believed to have written a still more extensive commentary on the *Bhāṣya*, called the *Bṛhat-ṭīkā*; and also the *Madhyamāṭīkā*; both these have been referred to by Kṛṣṇadeva in his *Tantra-cūḍāmaṇi*,—where he remarks that *Tantravārtika*, otherwise called ‘*Tantraṭīkā*,’ is only a summary of the *Bṛhat-ṭīkā*. This *Bṛhat-ṭīkā* has also been referred to by Someśvara in his *Nyāyasudhā*.

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Kumārila quotes (in *Tantravārtika*, Text, p. 347) the grammatical dictum ‘करोतिरर्थेष्बिव सर्वधातन्’ which is also found in the *Bhaṭṭikāvya*,—and also the well-known words सतां हि सन्देहपदेषु वस्तुषु प्रमाणमन्तःकरणप्रवृत्तयः which are found in *Kalidāsa’s Shākuntala*;—this latter in *Tantravārtika*, Text, p. 133. He also wrote a commentary on the *Mānava-Kalpa-Sūtra*; a facsimile of the manuscript of this work (India Office Library No. 17) was published in 1867 by Th. Goldstucker.

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Kumārila is believed, on good grounds, to have lived between 600 and 660 A.D. Prabhākara, according to Prof. Keith, who is convinced that he was senior to Kumārila, lived between 610 and 690 A.D.

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The earliest expositor of the *Bhaṭṭa* System hitherto known is Maṇḍana Mishra (615—695), who wrote a commentary on Kumārila’s *Tantravārtika*, which is mentioned in *Shāstradīpikā* on 2.1.1; as also other important works—such as *Vidhivivēka* and *Bhāvanāvivēka* (both published at Benares), and a résumé of the entire *Sūtra-Bhāṣya*, named *Mīmāmsānukramaṇī* (printed with a modern commentary in the Chaukhambha Series, Benares.) He also wrote the Vedānta text-book (pre-*Shāṅkara*, apparently) *Brahmasiddhi*, on which Vāchaspati Mishra wrote the commentary known as *Brahmatattvasamīkṣā*. The *Vidhivivēka* of Maṇḍana, has been regarded as an important work, so much so that it has been honoured by an extensive commentary by the great Vāchaspati Mishra; this commentary is called *Nyāya-Kaṇikā*, which also has been printed along with the text at Benares.—Later on came *Sucharita Mishra* who wrote the *Kāshikā*, a voluminous commentary on Kumārila’s *Shlokavārtika*; it is being published in the *Trivandrum Sanskrit Series*.—Somewhat later came *Pārthasārathi Mishra*; he wrote—(1) the *Nyāyaratnākara*, a commentary on Kumārila’s *Shlokavārtika*, (2) the *Shāstradīpikā*, an independent complete commentary on the Sūtras, (3) *Tantraratna*, a commentary on Kumārila’s *Ṭupṭikā*, and (4) the *Nyāyaratnamālā*, an independent treatise, a *Prakaraṇa-grantha*, dealing with some selected topics. Long after him came *Someshvara Bhaṭṭa* who wrote the *Nyāyasudhā*, also called *Trikaṇḍimīmāṁsāmaṇḍana*, better known as *Rāṇaka*, which is an extensive commentary on Kumārila’s *Tantravārtika*. Earlier than all these appears to be *Paritoṣa Mishra*, whose work, the *Ajitā*, appears to be a commentary on the *Tantravārtika*; the Colophon speaks of it as ‘*Nyāyanibandhatikā*.’ A manuscript of this work is contained in the Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. Many other works, too numerous to be named here, have been written and still continue to be written, on the *Bhaṭṭa* system. In addition to the *Rāṇaka* and the *Ajitā*, we know of some other commentaries on the *Tantravārtika*—for instance, (1) *Tautātimatatilaka* by *Bhaṭṭa-Bhavdeva*, alias *Bālabalabhī-bhujaṅga* (India Office Cat., p. 690), (2) *Nyāya-parāyaṇa* by *Gaṅgādhara Mishra* (Govt. Sans. Liby., Benares); (3) *Subodhinī*, by *Annambhaṭṭa*, son of *Tirūmātārya* of *Rāghava-Somayājī* family (Govt. Sans. Liby., Benares); (4) *Mitākṣarā* by *Gopāla Bhaṭṭa*.

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Besides the above there is believed to have been another commentary on the *Tantravārtika* by *Bhaṭṭa Umbeka* (who has been identified by some people with *Maṇḍana* and also with the poet *Bhavabhūti*), as observed by *Kṛṣṇadeva* in the *Tantra-Chūḍāmaṇi*. *Shāstradīpikā* also refers (page 199, 2.1.1.) to *Maṇḍana* as a commentator on the *Tantravārtika*. The said *Umbeka* is known to have written a commentary on the *Shlokavārtika* also. The reference in the *Shāstradīpikā* (2.1.1) may however be only to an explanation of the *kārikā* (of the *Tantravārtika* धात्वर्थव्यतिरेकेण यद्यप्येषा न लक्ष्यते — तथापि सर्वसामान्यरूपेणान्याऽवगम्यते ।) provided in course of a discussion in either *Vidhiviveka* or *Bhāvanāviveka*.

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Of the third school—that of *Murāri Mishra*, called the *Mishra-mata*, much is not known except through references in other works. He appears to have struck out a fresh path in relation to certain important topics; which has led to the saying— *मुरारेस्तृतीयः पन्थाः*; the *प्रथम* and *द्वितीय* apparently being *प्रभाकर* and *कुमारिल*।

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Dr. Umesha Mishra, in his paper entitled ‘*Murārestṛtīyaḥ-panthā*’, makes out that there have been five ‘*Murāri Mishras*’ in Sanskrit Literature; one of them is the well-known *Mīmāmsaka*, who lived some time between the eleventh and twelfth centuries of the Christian era; no complete work of his is available; Dr. Umesha has come by two fragments of his gloss on the *Mīmāmsā-Sūtras*—(1) the *Tripādī-nītinayana*, dealing with *Pādas* 2, 3 and 4 of *Adhyāya* I, and (2) the *Ekādaśādyadhikaraṇa* dealing with the question of *Tantra-Avāpa* dealt with under *Adhyāya* XI of the *Sūtras*. From these fragments, it is not easy to find out on what points *Murāri Mishra* struck out his ‘third path’ as distinguished from the *Prābhākara* and the *Bhaṭṭa*. But from references to him found in several important works, it is found that the following are a few of the three points. (1) *Murāri*, like *Śankarāchārya*, regards *Brahma* as the only one Absolute Reality; but for practical purposes, he admits of diverse *Objects, Qualities, Time-substrata* and *Space-substrata*;—(2) in the maker of the variety of cognitions, the opinion expressed by *Murāri* is that Cognition is *svataḥ-pramāṇa*, its validity not being dependent upon anything extraneous to itself; and the very circumstances that bring about the Cognition also serve to establish its validity; (as pointed out in the *Aloka* of *Pakṣadhara*); his view on the point differs from the other two views. According to him the validity of the Cognition is apprehended by the *Anuvyavasāya*, Representative Cognition, that follows in the wake of every Cognition;—‘like the Cognition, its validity is apprehended by the Mind itself,—according to *Murāri-Mishra*’ says *Vardhamāna* on *Kusmāñjali* (p. 219);—(3) in the matter of Error, *Bhrānti*, his view appears to be the same as that of *Kumārila*;—(4) in regard to Causality, the Cause brings about the Effect by virtue of the *Shakti*, Potency, inherent in itself,—according to *Prabhākara* and the other *Mīmāmsakas*; and according to the *Naiyāyika*, the Cause must be something that is free from obstacles in the way of the appearance of the Effect. According to *Murāri*, however, neither Potency nor Absence of *Obstacles* can bring about the Effect; the Effect at a certain point of time is brought about by something which is free from obstacles at that time; and the *absence of obstacles* is only a qualifying condition or adjunct of the Cause, it is not the Cause itself;—says *Vardhamāna* in his Gloss on *Nyāyalīlāvatī* (pp. 62—64); (5) as regards the term ‘*Vaiśvadeva*,’ according to *Śabara*, *Prabhākara* and *Kumārila*, this is the name of a particular sacrifice (Mī. Sūtra 1. 4. 13—16); but according to *Murāri* it is only indicative of the Deity ‘*Viśvedeva*.’ This view is found attributed to ‘*Miśra*’ by *Vardhamāna* on *Tattvacintāmaṇi-Śabdaṇḍa*, (pp. 702—704).

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