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Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c22.s5: 5. Vedānta and Mahāyāna

Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c22.s5

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5. Vedānta and Mahāyāna

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The appearance of a tendency to recognize an absolute in the Mahāyānaçraddhotpāda has been naturally enough attributed, on the theory that the author of that treatise is Açvaghoṣa, to the Brahmanical training of that accomplished poet. In any case the parallel between Vedāntic absolutism and Mahāyāna tenets is striking and undeniable. In the Vijñānavāda we have definitely the conception of void intellect as the final reality, and, though the Vedāntic absolute is being, thought, and bliss, we are aware that thought here has no object and is therefore, if intelligible in any sense, nothing essentially different from the void intellect of the Vijñānavāda. The bliss of such a void intellect is too mysterious a matter to inquire into, and its existence is clearly on a par with the existence of the void intellect of the Vijñānavāda.

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The similarity of result, however, does not necessarily mean borrowing on either side, for parallel developments of different initial conceptions, one of absolute reality, one of absolute nothingness, might lead to results not dissimilar, and it is, of course, true that there is a vital difference between the two doctrines. The truth of convention or appearance (*vaiyavahārika*) of Śaṅkara is certainly false from the point of view of absolute truth, but it rests on a reality, for illusion (*māyā*) is, and the magician who causes it is a Lord, while Nāgārjuna’s truth of obscurity is utterly unreal, like the horn of a hare or the son of a barren woman.¹

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¹ See Poussin, JRAS, 1910, pp. 129 ff.; Jacobi, JAOS. xxxiii. 51 ff.; Sukhtankar, VOJ. xxii. 136 ff.

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It is, however, of importance that the later supporters of the doctrine of duality, adherents of the Sāṃkhya as well as of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, do not hesitate to pronounce judgement against the monist Vedānta by accusing it of being nothing but Vijñānavāda Buddhism concealed; in this Puranic evidence concurs with Vijñānabhikṣu, and the earlier testimony of Yamunācārya, spiritual grandfather of Rāmānuja, so that the accusation was evidently current shortly after Śaṅkara had established the orthodoxy of the Māyāvāda.² On the other hand, it is obvious that the Buddhists themselves were aware of the approximation of the Vijñānavāda in some of its aspects to the Vedānta; we have in the *Laṅkāvatāra*³ a direct challenge of the similarity of the doctrine of the Tathāgatagarbha and the Vedānta self, though the Buddha repudiates the charge of plagiarism by insisting that his teaching is merely *ad populum*. Again in the *Ṣuklavidarçaṇabhūmi*⁴ it is shown that a famous Buddha’s utterance: ‘This threefold world is only thought’, is equivalent to the doctrine of the Upaniṣads: ‘Verily all this universe is Brahman.’ Similarly, a verse in the Pitāputriyasaṃhitā (elsewhere attributed to Vārṣagaṇya’s Ṣaṣṭitantra):¹ ‘The real nature of things does not fall within sight, and what is visible is absolutely void and illusion,’ is identical in sense with the doctrine of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.

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² *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, i. 22; *Padma Purāṇa*, Bodl. Cat. i. 14; *Siddhitraya*, p. 19; *Çribhāṣya*, ii. 27.

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³ pp. 80 f.

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⁴ JRAS. 1908, p. 889; *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, iii. 14.

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¹ Garbe, Sāṃkhya-Philosophie, p. 76.

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There is, however, clear evidence of a direct influence of Buddhist conceptions on Gauḍapāda whose Kārikās certainly are of importance in the development of the Vedānta, and who passes for the spiritual grandfather of Caṅkara.² The origin of plurality is explained by the simile of the firebrand, whose point waved in a circle produces the appearance of fiery lines without the addition of anything to the brand itself; so, too, the conclusion is, the many phenomena of the world are merely vibrations of the one consciousness, and this consciousness, we find, is without distinction of subject, object or knowledge, and thus is hardly other than the Vijñānavāda absolute. The simile is Buddhist; the Laṅkāvatāra³ and the Abhidharmakoçavyākhyā, Vijñānavāda and Sautrāntika sources, apply it to show the nothingness of things; cloth is not real because the grasping of it depends on the grasping of its parts as in the case of the firebrand circle. The whole content is also Buddhist in tone; birth and destruction are hotly denied; the cause cannot be identical with or different from the effect since neither being nor not-being nor being and not-being can exist, and so causation is impossible. In absolute truth there is no destruction or birth, no bound, no accomplishing release, no seeking release, and no release. From a magic seed is born a magic sprout and there is no permanence, just as from void things void things ever arise without abiding substance. Things come into being neither by themselves, nor by another, nor by both, nor by neither.⁴ These and numerous other phrases are conclusive of close relationship, and if Gauḍapāda¹ and his commentator—whose identity with Śaṅkara need not be assumed²—deny that the Buddha taught as finally real that knowledge without duality which has no distinction of knower, known and knowledge, the fact goes flatly in the face of all Buddhist evidence. Gauḍapāda in fact borrows without wishing to admit his debt in full. But in a sense he had, of course, the right as an Aupaniṣada in his Kārikās, whatever his earlier faith, to borrow; the Mahāyāna in its turn had doubtless drawn from the stream of Aupaniṣada tradition in its conception of the final reality of the world.

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² Walleser, Der ältere Vedānta (Heidelberg, 1910), pp. 24 ff.; cf. JRAS. 1910, pp. 1361 ff. Walleser (pp. 16 ff.) gives substantial grounds for placing Gauḍapāda before Bhāvaviveka (before A. D. 600) and Ṣāntirakṣita (c. A. D. 730), and renders the alleged relationship implausible. He knows the Vijñānavāda; JAOS xxxiii. 53 f.

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³ p. 95; AKV. (Paris MS.) f. 267a. Cf. Maitr. Up. vi. 24; Wassilieff, (Bouddhisme, p. 284) gives it as illustrating the illusion of simultaneity of consciousness from swiftness of motion.

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⁴ ii. 32; iv. 59; 7; 22.

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¹ iv. 99.

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² Cf. Deussen, Sechzig Upanishads, p. 478, n. 1.

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The attitude of Śaṅkara is interesting, as he expounds with much clearness the Vijñānavāda position, in opposition to the realistic doctrines of the Sarvāstivādins, whether Vaibhāṣikas or Sautrāntikas, and explains fully his own objections to the Vijñānavāda.³ The Vijñānavāda maintains the sole existence of the threefold process of knowledge, which may be analysed as apparent subject, object, and consciousness or knowledge. The existence of external things is denied on the score of impossibility; they must either be atoms or aggregates of atoms; if the former they are incomprehensible on the score of minuteness; if aggregates, they must either be different from the atoms, which is a contradiction in terms, or they must be non-different, in which case they cannot produce impressions of gross non-atomic bodies. Moreover, our cognitions constantly differ in content; this is impossible unless they take the form of the objects, and, if this is so, it is needless to assume external things. Further, we are always conscious simultaneously of the act and the object of knowledge which proves identity, since else we could at one time know the object, at another know consciousness. Again, we have the fact of dream consciousness without external things, whence we deduce that all consciousness exists without such things; the variety of our experience is explained by the presence in our consciousness of the impressions of ideas, the stream of ideas and impressions continuing unbroken for ever, and excluding any need of external reality.

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³ On BS. ii. 2, 28 ff. For Nyāya criticism cf. Jacobi, JAOS. xxxi. 9 ff. ; Keith, JRAS. 1914, p. 1090 ; ILA., pp. 22 f., 99 f., 208 ff. ; NM., pp. 536 f., 548 f. ; for Mīmāṃsā, Keith, KM. pp. 46 ff. For a formal examination from a Kantian standpoint see Walleser, Der ältere Vedānta, pp. 40 ff. For Rāmānuja’s critique, see Śrībhāṣya, ii. 2. 27. Of the original sense of the Sūtra it is difficult to be certain ; cf. JAOS. xxxi. 13 ff. ; V. S. Ghate, Le Vedānta, pp. 44 f. For Sāṃkhya criticism see Aniruddha on SS. i. 42 f. ; in v. 77-9 it is shown that on either Madhyamaka or Vijñānavāda principles liberation is inconceivable ; in v. 91-3 the existence of genus is defended.

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The Vedānta reply is that the analysis given is artificial; in our perception of external reality we have the consciousness and the object as two distinct and irreducible psychological elements. This is in effect admitted by the Vijñānavāda which admits that objects appear as if external (*bāhyavat*), an expression which is explicable only because those who use it at the bottom of their hearts recognize the existence of that which is external. It is useless to urge that the expression is justified, because external things are impossible: possibility must be judged on the basis of the operation of the means of correct knowledge, and not made to depend on *a priori* ratiocination. Possible is whatever is apprehended by perception or other means of cognition, and external things are essentially so apprehended, a fact which outweighs the sophistical dilemma of difference or non-difference from atoms. Examination of perception reveals that the idea is the means of knowing the external object which dictates its shape; the distinction of consciousness and external reality can be made clear, if we consider the perception and recollection of a jar, where there is change in consciousness with permanence of object, or the successive consciousness of two different objects, when consciousness remains in principle the same, but its distinctive attributes differ.

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More fundamental still is the onslaught on the momentary character of ideas; this doctrine, if logically followed out, is fatal to the distinction of ideas, to the differentiation of classes and individuals, to the conception of the leaving of impressions on the mind, to the doctrine of the confusion owing to nescience of existence and non-existence, and consequently to the doctrine of bondage and release, for all these matters depend on the possibility of comparison of ideas, which is inconceivable unless there is a permanent knowing subject and not merely momentary ideas. It is idle to seek to evade this result by holding that the idea knows itself, as a lamp illuminates itself. But this is false;

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nothing can act on itself, the lamp cannot manifest itself save with the concurrence of the eye; the idea must be known by the self. Nor is there any regress ad infinitum here; the self is self revealed, not the object of an idea, and is not an idea.

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The argument from the nature of dreams or illusions is effectively refuted by insisting, first, that dreams and illusions are shown to be different from waking consciousness because their objects are negated by that consciousness, while waking consciousness has objects which are not negated by any other state. Secondly, dream consciousness is founded on remembrance as opposed to immediate consciousness and the distinction between the two is felt by all to be based on the absence and presence of the object respectively. To argue that waking consciousness is false, because it resembles dream consciousness, is as absurd as to argue that water is hot, because it shares attributes with fire or vice versa.¹

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¹ On BS. ii. 2. 29.

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The attempt to deduce the external world from mental impressions is also refuted. It involves an idle regressus ad infinitum in order to avoid the normal admission that impressions are derived from external things. Moreover, it is impossible for any impression to be left when there is no permanent substratum like a self on which the impression is to be recorded. If the receptacle intellect (ālayavijñāna) is put forward as the substratum, then the Buddhist either contradicts the doctrine of momentariness and supplies a quasi-self, or, if he maintains momentariness of this intellect also, his position is impossible; remembrance, recognition, and so on require some permanent reality. Recognition of ‘this’ as similar to ‘that’ cannot be made without the presence of a self which can remember and compare; recognition of a thing as the same attests also the permanence of the object, and is illustrated completely by the recognition of the permanence of the self on which no one is mistaken.² The Vijñānavāda, therefore, is no more tenable than the view of the realists which fails utterly to account for the existence of the aggregates making up the self, which advances a theory of causation absurd on account of the parallel theory of momentariness, and which asserts the origin of existence from non-existence, while at the same time it holds that all mental complexes are derived from the four psychical aggregates and material complexes from the atoms. The Madhyamaka doctrine fares even worse, being dismissed contemptuously on the ground that its tenet of vacuity is contradicted by every means of knowledge.¹

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² On BS. ii. 2. 30, 31.

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¹ On BS. ii. 2. 32. Rāmānuja (ii. 2. 30) points out that nothingness is merely a form of existence, and that its proof involves the existence of the proof, and contradicts the result.

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