Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c26.s2.16.2

c26.s2.16.2

it is not enough to make a man a realist in metaphysics, because in a logical treatise he speaks of an element as fact (*artha*), external (*bāhya*), or having a distinct character (*svalakṣaṇa*). His metaphysical views, he is entitled to ask, shall be gathered from treatises in which he has set them out, not inferred from logical doctrines which do not formally discuss the metaphysical nature of the given element in presentation. As regards, however, the question of knowledge, there is no point in urging the question; it is perfectly clear that the Sautrāntikas accepted the existence of ideas only as known to us, whence we infer an external reality; if, then, we accept the suggestion that Dharmakīrti was an adherent of that school in the ordinary sense of the term, we cannot suppose that he held the doctrine that ideas copy reality. In fact, whether Dharmakīrti was a Sautrāntika or a Vijñānavādin, his position might be expressed in the same terms; equally in either case all knowledge is of ideas; logical analysis must accept this fact; whether the source of the sensation is external or results from the action of consciousness, the sensation as such is unknowable and momentary. This is the essence of the doctrine of Dharmakīrti; the sensation (kṣaṇa) cannot be grasped (kṣaṇasya jñānena prāpayitum aśakyatvāt);¹ it becomes an object of knowledge only in so far as imagination gives it the necessary characteristics for knowledge.