Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c26.s2.16.3

c26.s2.16.3

This is done by the action of the intellect in clothing the momentary impression with the result of past and the presage of future experience; it is the intellect which concerts the sensation into a knowable object, a moment series. Take away the work of the imagination (niścaya,² kalpanā, adhyavasāya), and you have nothing knowable left; you have merely the bare fact of sensation. The parallelism with the Kantian conception of the synthesis of apprehension is quite clear, however less effectively brought out. There is, however, the vital difference that in the view of Dharmakīrti, as of Dignāga, the addition of the intellectual element deprives perception of the truth of sensation (abhrānta); that is, he fails to realize the inconsistency of introducing the idea of error; truth being obviously an ideal conception, it is absurd to attribute error to it because it is not something different from itself. The expression of the idea of mere sensation by Dharmakīrti is doubtless faulty,³ but it is not necessary to deny him credit for following Dignāga in recognizing it. The particular sensation is unique, and it is developed by the imagination (vikalpa)⁴ into the knowledge of the object; when we are told that the sensation of blue is thus transformed into the perception ‘This is blue’, we must understand the doctrine in the light of common sense.¹ It is clear that the sensation as such cannot be described as blue;