The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v3.c19.s7: Maṇḍana Miśra

The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v3.c19.s7

Language: English

Maṇḍana Miśra

1. Allen Wright Thrasher, The Advaita of Maṇḍana Miśra's Brahmasiddhi. Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1972, pp. 174-176.
2. Frauwallner, B9032, p. 137.
3. Thrasher, op. cit., p. 199.
4. Thrasher, op. cit., pp. 176-177.
5. Thrasher, op. cit., p. 177.
6. Thrasher, op. cit., pp. 178ff.
7. D. C. Bhattacharya, B1358, cites Canto VII of the Śaṃkaradigvijaya as the source of this identification. See also Balasubramanian, "Identity of Maṇḍana-miśra," Journal of the American Oriental Society 82 (1962), pp. 522-532.
8. See D. C. Bhattacharya, B1358; also B. R. Gupta, B2408.
9. Hiriyanna, "Sureśvara and Maṇḍanamiśra," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1923), pp. 259-263.
10. P. V. Kane, "The chronological position of Maṇḍana, Umbeka, Bhavabhūti, Sureśvara," Journal of the Asiatic Society, Bombay Branch, n.s. 3 (1928), pp. 289-293.
11. D. C. Bhattacharya, B1358.
12. S. Kuppuswami Sastri in Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Congress 3 (1924), pp. 480-481.
13. Balasubramanian, "Identity of Maṇḍanamiśra," op. cit.
14. Thrasher, op. cit.
15. Vy-adhikaraṇa also means "in different grammatical cases," i.e., in "from the smoke, it is fire," "smoke" is in the ablative and "fire" is in the nominative. Both meanings are probably intended.
16. The commentator Śaṅkhāpaṇi says that these are those who teach a real universe of diversity (satya-prapañca-vādin). They would presumably be a sort of Vedāntin, of the Bhedābheda sort, probably.
17. This argument seems to depend on the fact that artha means both "point," or "purpose," and "meaning." Thus statements without a point are also in the opponent's opinion without a meaning, and they have no point unless they are employed to produce action or its avoidance.
18. As there is a pramāṇa, presumably arthāpatti, for the existence of some sort of union with the objects of other words.
19. It is not clear what "viniyoga" means here. The commentators seem to take it as equivalent to anvaya, the connection of the objects of words in a sentence. This whole passage is somewhat obscure.
20. Maṇḍana here seems to be doing two things. First, he is affirming that the injunctions to works have an end in themselves, heaven, etc. Second, he is preparing the way for his own opinion that works may be made accessory to knowledge rather than secular ends.
21. In an exclusive injunction (parisaṃkhyānavidhi), something is enjoined with respect to some things so that everything else previously established (prāpta) is excluded. Thus the injunction "Five five-nailed animals should be eaten" limits the "established" eating of all five-nailed animals to five sorts of animals only. In a restrictive injunction (niyamavidhi) one thing is prescribed, where in the absence of that injunction either one of two "established" options would be possible. Thus the injunction "One pounds the rice" eliminates the possibility that one might use the other possible way of removing the husks from the grain, namely, cracking them with the fingernails. In both these the question of some course of action has already arisen, they are "established." But it is otherwise with prohibitions, according to Maṇḍana.

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22. This is directed not only toward the present point at issue, but against the Prābhākara idea of *niyoga* as the object of Vedic injunctions.

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23. Cf. Maṇḍana's insistence elsewhere that *avidyā* belongs only to the *jīvas*.

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24. From here to the end of I.34 there is a long discussion between an opponent (*pūrvapakṣin*) and an objector to him who represents Maṇḍana's views in part (see the statement of his viewpoint in I.35 and later at III.48-54), but with whom he does not entirely agree (*ekadeśa-siddhāntin*, "one who states a partial conclusion"). The opponent apparently bases himself on Śaṃkara's views, but holds a stricter disjunction between knowledge and works than Śaṃkara. Perhaps he is Sureśvara. See also Vetter's discussion at n. 212, p. 113 of his edition and translation of the *Brahmasiddhi* (Wien, 1969). I introduce the *pūrvapakṣin's* arguments by the word "Opponent," and the *ekadeśasiddhāntin's* by "Objector," to call attention to the isolation of the argument, replacing the customary "Objection" before the *pūrvapakṣa* and "Response" before the *siddhānta*.

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25. Cf. the distinction of two kinds of *avidyā* at I.9, I.20, I.21, III.61, and III.63.

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26. The point is that one may either hold that sacrifices and the like produce a counter-*saṃskāra* in some way that is not obvious ("visible") and must be learned or inferred from scripture, as the injunction to sprinkle the rice grains before they are pounded has no visible purpose and so we must infer that sprinkling produces a *saṃskāra*, or else that sacrifices have an obvious purpose and *saṃskāra* in producing the destruction of sins previously committed, like the pounding of rice grains that they may be made into cakes. Thus Citsukha's commentary.

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27. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* IV.4.24, where, however, the words "defined as Being" are absent. They are found in the *Vṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya* I.145.

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28. Unknown quote. But cf. *Vākyapadīya* III, Dravya (1), 15.

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29. *Viśeṣa*, "particular" is not being used here solely in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika sense of "ultimate particularity."

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30. Note that Maṇḍana does not use the term *savikalpa pratyakṣa*. It is possible that he thought that *pratyakṣa* was *nirvikalpa*.

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31. *Vastu-mātra*, which, N. B., on Maṇḍana's view equals the universal!

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32. I translate "akṣa" by "organ" because it often means, not specifically the eye, but any sense organ, and "organ" has the advantage of being an equivocal term in English.

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33. According to the Mīmāṃsā, what a Vedic passage "assumes" or "repeats" (*anuvāda*) cannot be the point it wishes to teach.

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34. The commentator Śaṅkhāpani says this is directed against Śaṃkara, with special reference to *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* IV.1.15 and 19.

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35. This sentence is a literal translation of Maṇḍana's sentence concluding the commentary on these verses. It is not clear what point it makes, whether no injunction, including that to know the Ātman as without duality, can deal with the highest truth, or whether the injunction to know the Ātman as without duality somehow misrepresents It, even though the Ātman is in fact without duality.

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36. It should be kept in mind here that the Sanskrit root "jñā" has the usual root meaning "to know" in ordinary language, and covers any sort of cognition "Knowledge" as valid cognition is pramāṇa. An injunction to know and to "cognize" the Ātman is the same (jñānavidhi). I have chosen cognize as the broader word in English.

Linked texts (2)

Vākyapadīya — Bhartṛhari (grammarian), Sanskrit
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad — Sanskrit