The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v3.c19.s7.2

v3.c19.s7.2

1. Allen Wright Thrasher, The Advaita of Maṇḍana Miśra's Brahmasiddhi. Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1972, pp. 174-176.
2. Frauwallner, B9032, p. 137.
3. Thrasher, op. cit., p. 199.
4. Thrasher, op. cit., pp. 176-177.
5. Thrasher, op. cit., p. 177.
6. Thrasher, op. cit., pp. 178ff.
7. D. C. Bhattacharya, B1358, cites Canto VII of the Śaṃkaradigvijaya as the source of this identification. See also Balasubramanian, "Identity of Maṇḍana-miśra," Journal of the American Oriental Society 82 (1962), pp. 522-532.
8. See D. C. Bhattacharya, B1358; also B. R. Gupta, B2408.
9. Hiriyanna, "Sureśvara and Maṇḍanamiśra," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1923), pp. 259-263.
10. P. V. Kane, "The chronological position of Maṇḍana, Umbeka, Bhavabhūti, Sureśvara," Journal of the Asiatic Society, Bombay Branch, n.s. 3 (1928), pp. 289-293.
11. D. C. Bhattacharya, B1358.
12. S. Kuppuswami Sastri in Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Congress 3 (1924), pp. 480-481.
13. Balasubramanian, "Identity of Maṇḍanamiśra," op. cit.
14. Thrasher, op. cit.
15. Vy-adhikaraṇa also means "in different grammatical cases," i.e., in "from the smoke, it is fire," "smoke" is in the ablative and "fire" is in the nominative. Both meanings are probably intended.
16. The commentator Śaṅkhāpaṇi says that these are those who teach a real universe of diversity (satya-prapañca-vādin). They would presumably be a sort of Vedāntin, of the Bhedābheda sort, probably.
17. This argument seems to depend on the fact that artha means both "point," or "purpose," and "meaning." Thus statements without a point are also in the opponent's opinion without a meaning, and they have no point unless they are employed to produce action or its avoidance.
18. As there is a pramāṇa, presumably arthāpatti, for the existence of some sort of union with the objects of other words.
19. It is not clear what "viniyoga" means here. The commentators seem to take it as equivalent to anvaya, the connection of the objects of words in a sentence. This whole passage is somewhat obscure.
20. Maṇḍana here seems to be doing two things. First, he is affirming that the injunctions to works have an end in themselves, heaven, etc. Second, he is preparing the way for his own opinion that works may be made accessory to knowledge rather than secular ends.
21. In an exclusive injunction (parisaṃkhyānavidhi), something is enjoined with respect to some things so that everything else previously established (prāpta) is excluded. Thus the injunction "Five five-nailed animals should be eaten" limits the "established" eating of all five-nailed animals to five sorts of animals only. In a restrictive injunction (niyamavidhi) one thing is prescribed, where in the absence of that injunction either one of two "established" options would be possible. Thus the injunction "One pounds the rice" eliminates the possibility that one might use the other possible way of removing the husks from the grain, namely, cracking them with the fingernails. In both these the question of some course of action has already arisen, they are "established." But it is otherwise with prohibitions, according to Maṇḍana.