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Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s3.12

Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s3.12

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v2.c24.s3.12

The specific form of knowledge depends on the pramāṇa. The other factors of subject and object may be the same in perception or inference. Similarly, the contact of the manas with the soul is the common mediate cause of all forms of knowledge. This contact takes different forms in the different kinds of knowledge. Though the Nyāya deals with knowledge, it deals more especially with the supreme condition of knowledge called the pramāṇa, and so it is called pramāṇaśāstra.¹ Before we investigate the nature of objects, we must know the capacity of the instruments of knowledge; for "knowledge of the thing to be measured depends on the knowledge of the measure."² Pramāṇaśāstra not only helps us to a right apprehension of objects, but also enables us to test the validity of knowledge.³ It is both formal and material, and is interested in consistency as well as in truth. The Nyāya starts with the assumption that the account of the world which our minds afford us is in the main a trustworthy account. All knowledge is revelatory of reality (arthaprakāśa). We are so constituted as to perceive objects, notice their resemblances and draw inferences. These operations are performed by all thinking men, though with different degrees of care and exactness. Whenever we have mental activity, controlled by the purpose of acquiring a knowledge of reality, we have a topic for logical inquiry. Truth-seeking is already present in human action. Logical theory does not create it. It only tries to interpret this element and express its nature in general principles. Its problem is not much different from that of any positive science. Just as a physiologist investigates the processes by which life is sustained in the individual, the logician states the laws governing the process of knowledge. He is no more responsible for it than the physiologist is for the working of the bodily mechanism.