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Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s3: The Scope of the Nyāya

Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s3

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The Scope of the Nyāya

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The term Nyāya means literally that by means of which the mind is led to a conclusion.² "Nyāya" becomes equivalent to an argument, and the system which treats of arguments more thoroughly than others comes to be known as the Nyāya system. Arguments are either valid or invalid. The term "nyāya" means in popular usage right or just, and so the Nyāya becomes the science of right reasoning. "Nyāya" in the narrow sense stands for syllogistic reasoning,³ while in the wider sense it signifies the examination of objects by evidences. It thus becomes a science of demonstration or of correct knowledge, pramāṇaśāstra. All knowledge implies four conditions: (1) The subject or the pramātṛ, the cogniser or the substantive ground of the cognitions; (2) the object, or the prameya to which the process of cognition is directed; (3) the resulting state of cognition, or the pramiti; and (4) the means of knowledge, or the pramāṇa.⁴ Every cognitive act, valid or invalid, has the three factors of a cognising subject, a content or a what of which the subject is aware, and a relation of knowledge between the two, which are distinguishable though not separable. The nature of knowledge, as valid or invalid, depends upon the fourth factor of pramāṇa. It is the operative cause of valid knowledge in normal circumstances.¹

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² Niyate anena iti nyāyaḥ.

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³ N.B., i. 1. 1. Vātsyāyana uses the expression paramanyāya for the conclusion or nigamana which combines in itself the five parts of a syllogism. Dignāga calls the members of a syllogism nyāyāvayava. See also N.V., iv. 1. 14. In Vācaspati's *Nyāyasūci* the section on the syllogism (i. 1. 32-39) is spoken of as the Nyāyaprakaraṇa. Viśvanātha means by Nyāyasvarūpa the essential structure of the syllogism. See his *Nyāyasūtravṛtti*, i. 1 25; i. 1. 31; i. 1. 38; i. 1. 40. Mādhava (S.D.S., xi) uses the word nyāya in the sense of inference for the sake of others.

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⁴ Pramākaranam pramāṇam. See also *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, i.

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¹ N.V., i. 1. 1.

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While Vātsyāyana defines pramāṇa as an instrument of knowledge or "that by which the knowing subject knows the object,"² Uddyotakara calls it the cause of knowledge (upalabdhihetu).³ He admits that this definition is rather wide, since the cogniser and the object cognised are also causes of cognition, but justifies it on the ground that "The cogniser and the cognised have their function fulfilled elsewhere, i.e. the function of the cognising subject and the cognised object lies in, and is only fulfilled by the inciting of the pramāṇa into activity; pramāṇa, on the other hand, does not have its function fulfilled (except by the bringing about of the cognition); so it is the pramāṇa that is to be regarded as the real cause of the cognition." Wherever the pramāṇa is present, cognition arises; wherever it is absent, whatever else may be present, cognition does not arise. Pramāṇa is thus the most efficient cause of cognition and the last to appear before the cognition arises.⁴ Śivāditya brings out the logical implication when he defines pramāṇa as that which produces pramā or knowledge in accord with reality.⁵ Jayanta makes pramāṇa the cause which produces non-erroneous, certain knowledge of objects.⁶

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² N B., i. 1. 1.

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³ See also N.V.T.T., i. 1. 1.

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⁴ N.V., i. 1. 1. Another objection, viz., that if the pramāṇa is brought into existence by the cognising subject and the cognised object, then these two must exist prior to the pramāṇa, though as a matter of fact, until the pramāṇa is there, we cannot recognise subject or object, which have a meaning only in relation to the thought activity called the pramāṇa, is considered. Uddyotakara admits all this, but says: "These words are not dependent on their relation to present action only." A cook is a cook whether he is actually cooking or not. "The reason for such usage lies in the (expressive) potency of the word itself; and this potency is present at all times; in the same manner, there need be no incongruity in the assertion that the pramāṇa is brought into existence by the cognising subject and the cognised object."

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⁵ Saptapadārthī, sec. 144. See also S.D.S., xi.

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⁶ Avyabhicāriṇīm asaṃdigdhām arthopalabdhim. Nyāyamañjarī, p. 12.

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The specific form of knowledge depends on the pramāṇa. The other factors of subject and object may be the same in perception or inference. Similarly, the contact of the manas with the soul is the common mediate cause of all forms of knowledge. This contact takes different forms in the different kinds of knowledge. Though the Nyāya deals with knowledge, it deals more especially with the supreme condition of knowledge called the pramāṇa, and so it is called pramāṇaśāstra.¹ Before we investigate the nature of objects, we must know the capacity of the instruments of knowledge; for "knowledge of the thing to be measured depends on the knowledge of the measure."² Pramāṇaśāstra not only helps us to a right apprehension of objects, but also enables us to test the validity of knowledge.³ It is both formal and material, and is interested in consistency as well as in truth. The Nyāya starts with the assumption that the account of the world which our minds afford us is in the main a trustworthy account. All knowledge is revelatory of reality (arthaprakāśa). We are so constituted as to perceive objects, notice their resemblances and draw inferences. These operations are performed by all thinking men, though with different degrees of care and exactness. Whenever we have mental activity, controlled by the purpose of acquiring a knowledge of reality, we have a topic for logical inquiry. Truth-seeking is already present in human action. Logical theory does not create it. It only tries to interpret this element and express its nature in general principles. Its problem is not much different from that of any positive science. Just as a physiologist investigates the processes by which life is sustained in the individual, the logician states the laws governing the process of knowledge. He is no more responsible for it than the physiologist is for the working of the bodily mechanism.

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¹ The importance attached by the Hindu thinkers to the investigation of pramāṇas is evident from Viśvanātha's reference that pramāṇa is one of the names of Viṣṇu.

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² Mānādhīnā meyasiddhiḥ.

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³ Cp. W. E. Johnson's definition of logic as ' the analysis and criticism of thought " (Logic, vol. i, p. xiii).

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The Nyāya system does not assume that value and fact are wholly disparate and require altogether different methods of treatment. Values attach to facts and can be studied only in relation to them. We do not start with empty minds; we possess information about the nature of the world through experience and tradition. A complex system of knowledge is handed down through the scriptures. Adopting the inductive method of science, the Nyāya classifies the different ways in which our knowledge is acquired. The four pramāṇas through which correct knowledge is acquired are pratyakṣa or intuition,¹ anumāna or inference,² upamāna or comparison and śabda or verbal testimony.³ Western treatises on logic do not generally treat of perception,⁴ but the Nyāya regards it as one of the important sources of knowledge. Inference is a central topic of the Nyāya system, which is sometimes called Hetuvidyā, or the science of reason on which the validity of an inferential argument depends.⁵ According to this view logic is the theory of inference or anumānavāda. Intuitive or immediate knowledge is beyond the scope of logic as thus understood. The Nyāya does not justify this narrow usage. The inclusion of verbal testimony, which is a problem of Revealed Theology, shows the religious interest of the system. The Nyāya gives us a psychological account of these four sources of knowledge. It affirms that logical inquiry cannot be carried on without regard to the psychological processes by which knowledge as mental content is gained. It treats at length the ways by which the mind is carried forward and impelled to produce fresh results. In doing so, it also points out the pitfalls which are incidental to the employment of these means. The problem of logic is not a purely inductive one. The mere generalisation, that all our knowledge is gained through one or other of the four sources of knowledge, does not explain the problem of knowledge. Generalisation is not explanation.

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¹ Sense-perception is only a variety of intuition or direct apprehension.

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² Anumāna means literally the knowledge of one thing after, or through that, of another.

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³ N.S., i. 1. 3. Caraka gives āptopadeśa or reliable assertion, pratyakṣa, anumāna and yukti or continuous reasoning. See also Sthānāṅga Sūtra.

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⁴ Cp., however, J. S. Mill: "Truth is known to us in two ways, intuition and inference" (System of Logic, Introduction, p. 4).

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⁵ The term "hetuvidyā" occurs in Milinda (S.B.E., vol. xxxv, pp. 6-7), Lalitavistara (xii). Though "hetu" means only reason or ground, the Jaina thinkers use it in a wider sense. See also Manu, ii. 11; M.B., Ādiparva, 1-67; Śāntiparva, 210. 22; Aśvamedhaparva, 85. 27. The earlier grammarians, Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali accept this view. See also N.V., iv 1. 14; I.L.A., p. 11.

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The Nyāya not only inquires into the ways and means by which the human mind assimilates and develops knowledge, it also interprets the logical facts and expresses them in logical formulas which assume the form of standards or norms in all cases of the divergence of thought from its normal course of truth-seeking. Pramāṇas thus become the measures or canons of knowledge by means of which we can check and evaluate the knowledge already existing in us. Logic is thus the science of proof or the estimation of evidence. It discusses the validity of knowledge by showing its dependence on given grounds or compatibility with reality. The problem of truth has important bearings on metaphysical theory. The Nyāya is a metaphysics of reality (tattvaśāstra),¹ as well as a theory of knowledge. Thus it is not merely formal logic but a full epistemology, combining discussions of psychology and logic, metaphysics and theology.

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¹ N.B., i. 1. 1.

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THE NATURE OF DEFINITION

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The several topics discussed in the Nyāya Sūtra are first enunciated, then defined, and lastly examined.² Definition states the essential nature (svarūpa) of a thing so as to differentiate it from others. The function of a definition is to distinguish the thing defined from all things different from itself, with which it is likely to be confused.³ We can distinguish things without stating their respective essences. An asādhāraṇa dharma or a peculiar attribute also helps us to distinguish. The fallacies incident to definition are of three kinds: Ativyāpti, or the extension of the attribute to objects beyond the class defined, occurs in definitions which are too wide, as when we define a cow as a horned animal; Avyāpti, or limitation of the attributes to only a portion of the class defined, which occurs in definitions which are too narrow, as when we define a cow as a tawny animal; Asambhava, or the fallacy committed when the definition does not state the essential attributes of the object defined, as when we define a cow as an animal with uncloven hoofs. Definition states " a characteristic mark which applies to all things denoted by the term defined, neither more nor less." ⁴ To secure this, we may start with the genus and subsequently narrow its denotation by the express exclusion of superfluous objects, by the use of words like other than (itara), different from (bhinna).¹ This is definition by genus and difference.

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² Uddeśa, lakṣaṇa and parīkṣā, N.B., i. 1. 2.

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³ N.B., i. 1. 2.

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⁴ Lakṣyatāvacchedakasamaniyatatvam.

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¹ A sense-organ is defined as śabdetarodbhūtam.

Cites (9)