Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s3.6

v2.c24.s3.6

While Vātsyāyana defines pramāṇa as an instrument of knowledge or "that by which the knowing subject knows the object,"² Uddyotakara calls it the cause of knowledge (upalabdhihetu).³ He admits that this definition is rather wide, since the cogniser and the object cognised are also causes of cognition, but justifies it on the ground that "The cogniser and the cognised have their function fulfilled elsewhere, i.e. the function of the cognising subject and the cognised object lies in, and is only fulfilled by the inciting of the pramāṇa into activity; pramāṇa, on the other hand, does not have its function fulfilled (except by the bringing about of the cognition); so it is the pramāṇa that is to be regarded as the real cause of the cognition." Wherever the pramāṇa is present, cognition arises; wherever it is absent, whatever else may be present, cognition does not arise. Pramāṇa is thus the most efficient cause of cognition and the last to appear before the cognition arises.⁴ Śivāditya brings out the logical implication when he defines pramāṇa as that which produces pramā or knowledge in accord with reality.⁵ Jayanta makes pramāṇa the cause which produces non-erroneous, certain knowledge of objects.⁶