Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s3.9

v2.c24.s3.9

⁴ N.V., i. 1. 1. Another objection, viz., that if the pramāṇa is brought into existence by the cognising subject and the cognised object, then these two must exist prior to the pramāṇa, though as a matter of fact, until the pramāṇa is there, we cannot recognise subject or object, which have a meaning only in relation to the thought activity called the pramāṇa, is considered. Uddyotakara admits all this, but says: "These words are not dependent on their relation to present action only." A cook is a cook whether he is actually cooking or not. "The reason for such usage lies in the (expressive) potency of the word itself; and this potency is present at all times; in the same manner, there need be no incongruity in the assertion that the pramāṇa is brought into existence by the cognising subject and the cognised object."