Indian Philosophy v2.c25.s3: VIII Implication

Indian Philosophy v2.c25.s3

Language: English

VIII Implication

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Where the perception of a thing (artha) cannot be explained without the assumption of another thing, this assumption is a case of arthāpatti, or implication. It differs from inference, since an element of doubt enters into the facts observed, which can be removed only by the assumption of something else. The facts observed remain inconsistent or doubtful until the assumption is made. In inference there is no room for any element of doubt. While this is the view of Prabhākara, Kumārila believes that arthāpatti helps us to reconcile two apparently inconsistent facts. There is no such inconsistency between well-ascertained facts in inference. Kumārila’s view is sounder, since any doubt about the observed fact will prejudice the validity of the argument by arthāpatti. Unless we are certain that a person is alive and he is not at home, we cannot presume that he is somewhere else.

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NON-APPREHENSION

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Kumārila, after the Vṛttikāra, admits non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) as an independent source of knowledge.¹ Dissimilarity is only want of similarity, and it is accounted for by the principle of non-apprehension. When we say “There is no jar in this place,” we cognise the absence of the jar. Absence (abhāva) cannot be apprehended by perception, which stands in need of sense-contact with a present object, which is not possible in the case,² nor can non-existence be apprehended by the other pramāṇas. Non-apprehension is a means of knowledge (mānam) with reference to the object negated. We perceive the vacant space and the absence of the jar. We may say that the non-existence of the jar is as much perceived as the vacant space, yet, since perception involves contact of an actual object with the senses, we cannot identify the act of non-apprehension with perception. We perceive the vacant space, remember the jar that is absent, and then we have the knowledge of the absence of the jar, which has no reference to the act of perception. Apprehension of non-existence is through anupalabdhi.³ Abhāva is said to be a positive object.⁴ What we call emptiness is the locus unoccupied by any object.⁵

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¹ See Śabara on i. 1. 4.

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² S.V., Abhāvapariccheda.

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³ Śāstradīpikā, pp. 234 ff.

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⁴ S.V., Nirālambanavāda, p. 40.

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⁵ Vastvantaraikasamsṛṣṭaḥ padārthaḥ śūnyatādhiyaḥ (112).

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Prabhākara does not accept non-apprehension as an independent source of knowledge. The cognition of non-existence is inferred from the non-perception of something that would have been perceived if it were present. When we perceive the mere space and no jar in it, we say that there is no jar. The cognition of the substratum by itself (tanmātradhi) is what answers to non-apprehension.⁶ Kumārila disputes this view. We may perceive not merely empty space, but space filled by books and paper, but that will also give us a knowledge of the non-existence of the jar. If we say that we apprehend space as not qualified by the jar, we are admitting negative knowledge. For, the mere perception of the ground cannot give rise to a knowledge of the non-existence of the jar, since even where there is the jar the ground is perceived. So the ground must be perceived as negatively qualified, and this means that we have already the notion of negation.

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⁶ This view of Prabhākara is criticised in Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya, iv. 21.

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PRABHĀKARA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

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Prabhākara is an advocate of tripuṭisaṁvit, according to which the knower, the known and the knowledge are given simultaneously in every act of cognition. Knowledge reveals itself as well as the knower and the known. In the consciousness, " I know this " (aham idaṁ jānāmi), we have the three presentations of the " I " or the subject (ahaṁvitti), this or the object (viṣayavitti), and the conscious awareness (svasaṁvitti).¹ All consciousness is at the same time self-consciousness as well as object-consciousness.² In all cognitions, whether inferential or verbal, the self is known directly through the agency and the contact of the manas. While there is always a direct and immediate knowledge of self in every act of cognition, there is not always a direct and immediate knowledge of the not-self or the object. In recollection and inference the object is not directly presented to consciousness. Though in indirect knowledge the object is not directly presented to consciousness, yet the indirect knowledge itself is directly presented to consciousness. Cognition is also self-cognised by direct apprehension. The cognition which is of the nature of light or illumination does not stand in need of any other thing to manifest it. Therefore, the cognition is said to be self-apprehended. The cognising self and the cognised object are not of the nature of light, and so they require for their manifestation the aid of something different from themselves which is of the nature of light. Cognitions are self-illumined, and not perceived as objects.¹ They are not cognised by other cognitions. They are never objects, and so cannot be cognised, as pleasure and pain are cognised. They are cognised as cognitions, but not as objects.² If cognitions are cognised as objects, then each individual cognition may require another cognition to cognise it, and so on ad infinitum. Prabhākara feels that his theory is not evidently consistent with Śabara’s observation that we perceive objects in apprehension and not cognitions, and so argues that, though cognitions are self-cognised, their presence is known through inference. Inference tells us that there is a cognition from the fact that we have the apprehension of the object. This cognition is a prameya, or the object of right knowledge, but it is not saṃvedya, or apprehended in its fulness. According to Prabhākara, we have a case of saṃvedya only when the form of the object is manifested, and this is possible with the objects perceived by the senses. As cognitions have no form, they cannot be perceived. Their presence is only inferred. Inference does not apprehend the form or content of the object, but only its existence.³ Both Prabhākara and Kumārila admit that cognitions, which are products (pariṇāma) of ātman, are objects of inference.

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¹ Some Western thinkers are also inclined to this view. According to Hamilton, " an act of knowledge may be expressed by the formula ' I know ' ; an act of consciousness by the formula ' I know that I know ' ; but, as it is impossible for us to know without at the same time knowing that we know, so it is impossible to know that we know without our actually knowing." Cp. also Varisco : " That I may know, it is necessary that I should be conscious of my consciousness, that I should know that I know." " It follows that the act of consciousness proves the reality of itself and of the thinking subject " (Know Thyself, p. 5).

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² Since we have no knowledge of objects in deep sleep, we have no knowledge of self, though it exists. If the self did not exist in deep sleep, we could not have the recognition of personal identity on waking from sleep (Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 59).

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¹ Cp. with this Alexander’s distinction of enjoyment and contemplation (*Space, Time and Deity*, vol. i. pp. 12–13).

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² Saṃvittayaiva hi saṃvit saṃvedyā na saṃvedyatayā.

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³ Nāpy anumānāt rūpagrahaṇaṃ sanmātragrāhy anumānam bhavati.

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The validity of knowledge is not determined by anything external to it. There is no question of reproducing external objects. The validity of cognition is signified by the force with which all direct apprehension prompts us to action in the external world. All knowledge generates in us this specific attitude, and does not wait for the mediation of any later experience. A cognition which apprehends an object cannot be invalid. If cognitions were not valid in themselves, we cannot have any confidence in our cognitions. The notion of validity is original and underived. While knowledge is self-evident, this validity is derived from the instruments of knowledge. The conditions of knowledge also produce the consciousness of its validity.¹

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¹ Gaṅgeśa, in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, criticises this view on the ground that, if the validity of knowledge were derived from the general conditions of knowledge, then invalid knowledge would be one with valid knowledge, since both have the same conditions. Again, were knowledge self-evident, it would be difficult to account for doubtful cognition.

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Prabhākara distinguishes knowledge into valid and invalid. Anubhūti or direct apprehension, is valid, while smṛti, or remembrance is invalid. " Valid cognition or apprehension is different from remembrance, since the latter stands in need of a previous cognition."² The dependence on a previous apprehension is the cause of the invalidity of the remembrance. Cognitions that bear indirectly on the object are invalid. Previous non-apprehension of the object is made the test of valid knowledge by both Prabhākara and Kumārila, though the latter insists also on absence of discrepancies. All knowledge is valid and prompts us to activity.

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² Pramāṇam anubhūtiḥ sā smṛter anyā na pramāṇaṃ smṛtiḥ pūrva-pratipattivyapekṣanāt (*Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 42; Jhā: *Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā*, ii).

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What is called viparyaya is not false knowledge. If all cognition is self-luminous (svaprakāśa) and therefore true (yathārtha), the consciousness expressed in the judgment " This is silver " cannot be erroneous. When we mistake a piece of shell for silver, the error is due to the failure to distinguish the two different elements in it, the idea of silver and the impression of " this." We mix up the perceived and the remembered elements in one single psychosis. The object of a cognition is the thing which is presented to consciousness. In the " This is silver," what is presented to consciousness is " silver," and not " shell." We do not cognise the shell as silver, for the shell never enters into consciousness. The idea which is remembered does not agree with the fact, since the judgment " This is silver " is superseded by the judgment " This is only a piece of shell " when the knower picks up the piece. The error is due to akhyāti, or non-apprehension, of the difference between the given and the remembered elements. The perceived element, "this," and the remembered element, "silver," are true; only there is non-discrimination (akhyāti) of the two factors as distinct. This non-discrimination is due to certain defects of the sense-organs and to the suggestion of the similarity between shell and silver, which rouses the mental residuum (saṃskāra) of the silver previously cognised. This unconsciousness of the distinction between the given and the remembered elements leads to action. In actual experience there is no difference between the valid and the invalid cognitions of silver, since both give rise to the same kind of activity on the part of the agent.¹

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¹ When we judge "the shell is yellow," there is no element of remembrance involved in it. If we perceive the yellowness in the shell, even if it be due to the defect of the eye, the judgment is valid until it is sublated by a further cognition.

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This theory is criticised by the other schools. "Do the two apprehensions, the perceived and the remembered ones, appear in consciousness or not? If they do not, they do not exist. . . If they do, then non-perception of the difference between them is impossible."² The theory fails to account for the fact that, as long as the error lasts, there is the actual presentation to consciousness and not a mere memory image. It is difficult to account for the obscuration of memory (smṛtipramoṣa), which breeds the illusion of a direct presentation.³ Gangeśa argues that unconsciousness of the distinction cannot account for the activity to which the person is prompted. The knowledge of the given element, the shell, for which the person has no desire, will lead to counter-activity, the knowledge of the remembered silver to activity, and the unconsciousness of the distinction between the two should result in non-activity. It is difficult to understand how unconsciousness can prompt one to activity.⁴

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² See Paṇḍit, N.S., vol. xii, p. 109.

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³ Vivaraṇaprameyasaṃgraha, i. 1.

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⁴ Tattvacintāmaṇi.

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Prabhākara’s view that, in every act of knowledge, the object, the subject, and the knowledge of the object are manifested, is not in conformity with the evidence of psychology. When we know an object, there is no need whatever that the content of knowledge should at the same time include a reference to myself. Unless the individual is in a sophisticated mood, the probability is that it will not include the reference to self. Prabhākara mistakes the evidence of later reflection for that of perception. When one thinks of his knowledge of an object, subject and object are present in this thought. We cannot think of a thing as known without reference to the correlative knower. But there is no reason why one should not think of things without thinking of them as known. The act of reflection, which represents a higher stage in thought than the mere observation of objects, tells us about the implications of knowledge. Prabhākara believes that we cannot know without knowing that we know.¹ He does not seem to admit the distinction between "I know" and "I know that I know." Again, if cognition be self-luminous, the objects will appear as manifestations of cognition and not as real objects, and so we are landed in subjectivism.² To escape from subjectivism, Prabhākara holds that self-illumined cognitions are also inferred. Commenting on Śabara's remark that objects are perceived and not cognitions, he says that it follows that cognitions are only inferred.³ But this contradicts the self-illumined character of cognitions. Śālikanātha suggests that the cognition inferred is the contact of the manas with the ātman, which produces the consciousness.⁴ If this is all that is inferred, then it is wrong to say that cognitions are inferred; so long as cognitions are said to be self-illumined the danger of subjectivism remains. Prabhākara does not tell us what the nature of knowledge is, apart from its self-revealing character. He emphasises the ultimateness of knowledge, and incidentally brings out how the meaning of subject and object lies within knowledge itself. If he had developed the implications of this theory, he would have been led to abandon his dualistic presuppositions.

Cites (5)

Tattvacintāmaṇi — Sanskrit
Prakaraṇapañcikā — Śālikanātha Miśra, Sanskrit
Ślokavārttika — Abhinavagupta, Sanskrit
Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya — Śrīharṣa, Sanskrit
Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha — Mādhava, Sanskrit