Indian Philosophy v2.c25.s3.4

v2.c25.s3.4

Kumārila, after the Vṛttikāra, admits non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) as an independent source of knowledge.¹ Dissimilarity is only want of similarity, and it is accounted for by the principle of non-apprehension. When we say “There is no jar in this place,” we cognise the absence of the jar. Absence (abhāva) cannot be apprehended by perception, which stands in need of sense-contact with a present object, which is not possible in the case,² nor can non-existence be apprehended by the other pramāṇas. Non-apprehension is a means of knowledge (mānam) with reference to the object negated. We perceive the vacant space and the absence of the jar. We may say that the non-existence of the jar is as much perceived as the vacant space, yet, since perception involves contact of an actual object with the senses, we cannot identify the act of non-apprehension with perception. We perceive the vacant space, remember the jar that is absent, and then we have the knowledge of the absence of the jar, which has no reference to the act of perception. Apprehension of non-existence is through anupalabdhi.³ Abhāva is said to be a positive object.⁴ What we call emptiness is the locus unoccupied by any object.⁵