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Indian Philosophy v2.c25.s3.25

Indian Philosophy v2.c25.s3.25

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v2.c25.s3.25

This theory is criticised by the other schools. "Do the two apprehensions, the perceived and the remembered ones, appear in consciousness or not? If they do not, they do not exist. . . If they do, then non-perception of the difference between them is impossible."² The theory fails to account for the fact that, as long as the error lasts, there is the actual presentation to consciousness and not a mere memory image. It is difficult to account for the obscuration of memory (smṛtipramoṣa), which breeds the illusion of a direct presentation.³ Gangeśa argues that unconsciousness of the distinction cannot account for the activity to which the person is prompted. The knowledge of the given element, the shell, for which the person has no desire, will lead to counter-activity, the knowledge of the remembered silver to activity, and the unconsciousness of the distinction between the two should result in non-activity. It is difficult to understand how unconsciousness can prompt one to activity.⁴