The Doctrine of the Jainas, Described after the Old Sources c11.1

c11.1

§166. As mentioned in § 5 a great number of catchwords obviously representing the core of the parables delivered by Mahāvīra have been handed down to us. Their similes are concerned with the character of human nature and with human ways and doings. Yet Mahāvīra did not couch his practical experiences in parables only but in forms enumerative and otherwise as well. All these forms may be observed in Thāṇ. 4, and one case of each referred to in Thāṇ. 3 and 5 (Thāṇ. 113a; 341b) has its prototype there already. Hence with these exceptions the subject is considered fourfold. In the simplest type an x which later is equated with man¹ has the attribute a or b or c or d. Thus man (*purisa*) retaliates in different ways, just as the bud (*korava*) of a mango is synchronous with the twig from which it springs, as the bud of a palmtree develops late, that of a liana quickly, while the bud of the *dhavisāṇa* tree ripens into an inedible fruit (185a). Just as trees can—at the same time—have leaves, flowers and fruit, and, partly,² offers shade, so man—and this is probably meant—acts differently on his equal (113).³ A second type says that an x has the attribute a but not b (1st case) or, vice versa, b and not a (2nd case), or that it has both the attributes a and b (3rd case), or, finally, neither a nor b (4th case). Human beings, like bulls, differ in descent, strength and beauty (207b), like elephants they differ in temper (208a), like warring armies in being either successful or not (218a), like song- and pleasure-birds (234b) or flowers (239a) in the preference they are given, they differ in that some are sociable and others are not (197 a), in their faculty of either causing or healing wounds (264 b), in the way a kernel is different from its shell (265 b), etc. A third type is concerned with mutually exclusive opposites like erect and bent (trees; 182a), clean and soiled (clothes; 184a), straight and crooked (ways; 315b), full and empty (pots; 278b), stallion and mare (248 b), friend and foe (284 a), etc. etc. Here the contrasted pairs are linked by nām'ege or nāma-m-ege: cattāri kanthagā (horses) pannattā, tam-jahā: āinne (stallion) nāma-m-ege āinne (1st), ā. n.-m-e. khalunke (mare) (2nd), kh. n.-m-e. ā. (3rd), kh. n.-m-e. kh. (4th), evam cattāri purisa-jāyā (248 b). Such antitheses probably will concern the contrast between pretence and reality, rule and exception, and perhaps even between formerly and now. The subject presumably takes the second place. The same may be supposed to be the case with a fourth type formally associated with the third and giving the opposite (b) to the first attribute a along with the uniform extension of a and b: cattāri sambukkā (shells) p., t.-j.: vāme nāma-m-ege vām'āvatte(a), v. n.-m-e. dāhiṇ'āvatte(b). dāhiṇe n.-m-e. vām'āv.(c), d. n.-m-e. dāhiṇ'āv,(d), evam cattāri purisa-jāyā (216 a). Loc. cit. the same with regard to whirling smoke, fire, and wind¹ and in numerous other cases. Its meaning probably comes up to what was supposed above. It is with regret that we miss the exemplifications which in former times the living speech is certain to have offered to the edification of the audience.