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The Doctrine of the Jainas, Described after the Old Sources c11: The Victory

The Doctrine of the Jainas, Described after the Old Sources c11

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Contents

The Victory

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§166. As mentioned in § 5 a great number of catchwords obviously representing the core of the parables delivered by Mahāvīra have been handed down to us. Their similes are concerned with the character of human nature and with human ways and doings. Yet Mahāvīra did not couch his practical experiences in parables only but in forms enumerative and otherwise as well. All these forms may be observed in Thāṇ. 4, and one case of each referred to in Thāṇ. 3 and 5 (Thāṇ. 113a; 341b) has its prototype there already. Hence with these exceptions the subject is considered fourfold. In the simplest type an x which later is equated with man¹ has the attribute a or b or c or d. Thus man (*purisa*) retaliates in different ways, just as the bud (*korava*) of a mango is synchronous with the twig from which it springs, as the bud of a palmtree develops late, that of a liana quickly, while the bud of the *dhavisāṇa* tree ripens into an inedible fruit (185a). Just as trees can—at the same time—have leaves, flowers and fruit, and, partly,² offers shade, so man—and this is probably meant—acts differently on his equal (113).³ A second type says that an x has the attribute a but not b (1st case) or, vice versa, b and not a (2nd case), or that it has both the attributes a and b (3rd case), or, finally, neither a nor b (4th case). Human beings, like bulls, differ in descent, strength and beauty (207b), like elephants they differ in temper (208a), like warring armies in being either successful or not (218a), like song- and pleasure-birds (234b) or flowers (239a) in the preference they are given, they differ in that some are sociable and others are not (197 a), in their faculty of either causing or healing wounds (264 b), in the way a kernel is different from its shell (265 b), etc. A third type is concerned with mutually exclusive opposites like erect and bent (trees; 182a), clean and soiled (clothes; 184a), straight and crooked (ways; 315b), full and empty (pots; 278b), stallion and mare (248 b), friend and foe (284 a), etc. etc. Here the contrasted pairs are linked by nām'ege or nāma-m-ege: cattāri kanthagā (horses) pannattā, tam-jahā: āinne (stallion) nāma-m-ege āinne (1st), ā. n.-m-e. khalunke (mare) (2nd), kh. n.-m-e. ā. (3rd), kh. n.-m-e. kh. (4th), evam cattāri purisa-jāyā (248 b). Such antitheses probably will concern the contrast between pretence and reality, rule and exception, and perhaps even between formerly and now. The subject presumably takes the second place. The same may be supposed to be the case with a fourth type formally associated with the third and giving the opposite (b) to the first attribute a along with the uniform extension of a and b: cattāri sambukkā (shells) p., t.-j.: vāme nāma-m-ege vām'āvatte(a), v. n.-m-e. dāhiṇ'āvatte(b). dāhiṇe n.-m-e. vām'āv.(c), d. n.-m-e. dāhiṇ'āv,(d), evam cattāri purisa-jāyā (216 a). Loc. cit. the same with regard to whirling smoke, fire, and wind¹ and in numerous other cases. Its meaning probably comes up to what was supposed above. It is with regret that we miss the exemplifications which in former times the living speech is certain to have offered to the edification of the audience.

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¹ *purisa* may be translated this way although sometimes the simile applies to women, s.b. Even teachers and monks are subject to treatment in similes.

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² This last one only in Thāṇ. 4 (235 b).

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³ *pattē (pupphē, phalē) vā-rukkha* contracted from *ōvaya* (=*ōpaga*).

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¹ These three are applied to women as well (agga-mahisi, itthi).

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§167. The heterogeneousness of human beings² results from their Karman. Karman penetrates into the soul through the activity of body, soul and inward sense, the joga (Thāṇ. 106b; T. 6, 1), and this process stands for what is understood by "influence" (aṇhaya, more frequently āsava, § 84). For the determination starting which certain spiritual or physical process produces a certain kind of Karman in the soul comp. T. 6, 11ff. Here partly also the conception that the effect equals the cause in kind: contempt for knowledge causes the Karman obscuring knowledge, killing results in the "unpleasant", respectable conduct in the "pleasant" Karman, wheras Viy. 304b teaches that the *asāyā-veyaṇijjā kamma* spring from actions causing pain, grief, depression, etc., while, on the other hand, the *sāyā-v. k.* follow from abstaining from them. Previous to this Viy. loc. cit. quotes the *kakkasa-v. k.*, an expression missing in the traditional sequence. They are caused (by virtue of sensual perception, Viy. 571a) by the different passions (*kasāya*) of anger, pride, fraud, and greed,¹ by love (*pejja*) and hate (*dosa*), by quarrel, calumny, tale-bearing, and slander, by discomfort and comfort (*arai-rai*), by cheating and lying (*māya-mosa*), and, finally by heresy (*micchatta*).² They all are preceded by the five main vices, i.e. damage done to living beings, untruthfulness, appropriation, dissipation, and possession.³ These 18 will be discussed in a different context (§ 170). There is no common name for them, but in Mahānisīha they are called the 18 *parihāra-ṭṭhāṇa*.⁴

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² Their acting as sumana and dummana is documented by Thāṇ. 130 b on the ground of many examples following the normal pattern.

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¹ But acc. to Ṭhāṇ. 195a they all take a share in all 8 kinds of the Karman.

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² This sequence a.o. also Uvav. § 56. 87. 123.

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³ They all refer either to oneself or to somebody else (Ṭhāṇ. 92a).

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⁴ The AUTHOR, Mahānis. p. 66, where the sequence slightly departs from the rule.

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The texts frequently refer to posthumous retaliation for defects of character. In Ṭhāṇ. 274a we seem to be concerned with such of a monk, since *avaddhamsa* "apostasy" presupposes the prescribed good conduct. After the mental disposition (*bhāvanā*, Sthān.) inderlying it or after the reward to be expected in the future existence the *av.* is called either as *āsura*, *abhiog(iy)a*, *sammoha* or a *deva-kibbis(iy)a*, expressions reflecting the names of lower classes of gods (§ 134). The remarks, however, saying what defects—along with occupations and performances like *nimitt’ājivaya*, *bhūi-kamma*, *kouya-karaṇa*—will result in what forms of existence generally refer to the *jīva* and not exclusively to the monk. Acc. to Viy. 49a the reward in the shape of either a higher or lower heavenly existence is listed in a sequence strangely composed of spiritual and temporal conceptions and placing next to those of a more or less disciplined character (samjama, § 177) the asannī, tāvasa, kandappiya, caraga-parivvāya-yaga, kibbisiya, tericchiya, ājīviya, and ābhiogiya.

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§168. The different passions¹ have been dealt with before in § 21 and 87. They are recorded in Thāṇ. 193a; Samav. 9a where their motives (uppatti) are said to be space, object, body and some piece of the outfit. Their effects are demonstrated in detail by Dasav. 8, 37-39. They depend on impressions made by all colours, different kinds of taste or smell, and the four sensations warm, cold, soft and rough (the latter acc. to Vy.), and this they have in common with the central offences and all other sins (Viy. 571). However, we are not told why the 8 sensations possible (§ 57) are confined to these 4. In a somewhat far-fetched way they are compared with a whirl (āvatta, Thāṇ. 288a) which according to the passions listed in the traditional sequence is either violent (khara), high, concealed, or fleshy (āmisa).² In any case they result in an existence in hell (also Thāṇ. 284b). With anger their violence resembles the line drawn with stone, earth, sand or water (Thāṇ. 234b), with pride a pole of stone, bone, wood or a Dalbergia tendril, with fraud a curved handle³ made of bamboo, horn, gomuttiya or a chip, with greed the scarlet spot (kimi-rāga)⁴ wet and the dry dirt, and the spot caused by curcuma (Thāṇ. 218b). The similes try to come near to the character of what is being compared: strength, height, crookedness and spreading are pictures suggesting themselves with anger, pride, fraud, and greed just as does the vision of "white" with glory and laughter. The latter two represent a delusion of a friendly, the former of a hostile nature: a distinction is made between a pejjavattiya and a *dosa-v. mucchā* (Thāṇ. 98a) thus causing *pejja* and *dosa* to be placed over the *kasāya*. All details offered with regard to the passions (except *greed*) derive from the sphere of the monk, *Anger* arises with the experienced or anticipated confiscation of pleasant things or with the act of supplying someone with unpleasant ones, and it is aroused by one's self-satisfaction wounded by the teachers (Thāṇ. 472b). *Presumption* (*maya*, acc. to Viy. 571a a synonym for *māṇa* “pride”) is entertained (*aham anti ti thambhejjā*) towards one's ancestry and family, physical strength and handsomeness, erudition and asceticism, gifts, and prestige, visits by gods and goddesses, and finally, towards one's standing above the average of the masses by one's knowledge and faith (Thāṇ. 424a; Samav. 13b; Thāṇ. 473a).¹ *Fraud* means all that contradicts truth. Since the concrete prescriptions offered by Mahāvīra's teaching serve the truth their violation comes up to *māyā*, the offender is *māī*, and the single case *māi-ṭṭhāṇa* (Āyār. II 1, 5, 1 and at frequent other places). Thus we come to understand the connexion between the consumption of forbidden food and the incapability of transforming oneself or of perceiving the proper thing in magic television. Only an *amāī* is capable of either (Viy. 189a—already § 62—191b; 627b; 747a—here a god). That sinfulness goes hand in hand with *heresy* is shown by the combination of *māī* with *micchā-diṭṭhi* (Viy. 636b; 746b). According to the points of view of either approving of what is wrong or failing to recognize what is right the *micchatta* can be divided tenfold (*adhamme dhamma-saddā, dhamme adhamma-s.*, etc. Thāṇ. 487a), less distinctly (Thāṇ. 153a) into *akiriyā* (probably *duṣkriyā*), *avinaya* and *annāṇa*, each of which being divided still further. Apart from the large sequence of the 18 sins (§ 167) *māyā* and *niyāṇa*, the desire for reward (§ 180), along with the *micchatta* belong to the smaller sequence of the 3 “pricks” or “thorns” (*salla*, Thāṇ. 147b; Samav. 8a) sticking in the heart.

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¹ For synonyms of koha, māna, māyā and lobha see Viy. 571a; Sūy. 1, 1, 4, 11f.; 1, 2, 2, 29; 1, 9, 11.

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² Examples provided by Abhay. are a.o. waterwhirl (horizontal), windwhirl (vertical), ball of thread, and the circling of birds of prey above the flesh (?).

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³ Thus Abhay. exactly defines the crooked object which he compares with fraud which in poetry is said to form a zigzag line on the ground. gomuttiya in this connexion cannot be the urine of a cow itself, but it must rather be a textile named after it and cut in that way.

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⁴ The comm. (219a) has two opinions of how this dye-stuff came into being.

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¹ Seven of these ten showed up as early as with the *goya-kamma* § 87. Acc. to the comm. on Thāṇ. 538b objects of pride also include the 6 things that will do harm to an *anattavam* (*anātmavat*), but will add to the benefit of an *attavam*: monk's ranks followers, knowledge, asceticism, reception of alms, and respect.

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By its pertaining to the causes of the *kakkasa kamma* (s. a.) the *micchatta* is a form of the *aṇhaya* or "influence". But it is equally and expressly called one of the 5 gates¹ of the same (*āsava-dāra*) (comp. *Thāṇ.* 316a: *Samav.* 10a). The remaining are: disregarding the commandments (*avirai*), negligence (*pamāya*), the passions and the performance (*joga*). Acc. to Umāsvāti T. 8, 1 the same represent the causes of the binding. He continues the teaching of the *asrāva* in 8, 6.

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¹ *dāra* "gate" fits in with *aṇhaya* only. Combined with *saṃvara* it means the "case".—In commencing to render our positive representation of Jain ethics we refer to the lectures delivered by Charlotte KRAUSE: An Interpretation of Jain Ethics, Bh. 1929 and The Heritage of the Last Arhat, Bh. 1930.

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§ 169. The *Paṇhāv.* since they call the devotion to the cardinal vices by the name of *aṇhaya-dāra* contrast them with the *saṃvara-d.* *saṃvara* stands for the "stoppage" against the influence of Karman. It is man's task towards each of the five outward senses and the inward sense, to speech and to the body (*Thāṇ.* 322b; 355b; 422a; also 472a). As to the technique of salvation it is practised by a number of means referred to further below (§ 173). These means include the observance of the cardinal commandments, and that is why they constitute the 2nd part of the *Paṇhāv.* Acc. to *Thāṇ.* 316a; *Samav.* 1a the *saṃvara-dāra* are, furthermore, the counterparts to the actions referred to above and quoted by the same texts; in this case the *sammatta* corresponds with the *micchatta*. In the Karman teaching *sammatta* stands for the condition of one who has deprived his *mohanijja kamma* of its effect (§ 183). "Righteousness"—this is the common meaning (JACOBI on T. 2, 3)—included the true faith called *sammad-diṭṭhi* or *-damsaṇa*. The *Sammatta-paya* of the *Paṇṇavaṇā* (19) teaches that *sammad-d.*, *micchā-d.*, and *samma-micchā-d.* occur differently with all beings from which we here but conclude that with rational beings all three possibilities occur. In the field of practised religion we meet the *sammad-d.* less often than the *rui* (*Thāṇ.* 151 a) and the *saddahaṇā* (*saddahaṇayā* *Thāṇ.* 355 b), and in the formula applied for confessing one's conversion this corresponds with *saddahāmi pattiyāmi roemi* (Viy. 99b). The objects of the creed, however, are the 9 "ethical fundamentals" (*sab-bhāva-payattha*, Thāṇ. 445b), i.e. souls and all that is unanimate, merits and guilt, influence and stoppage, annihilation, binding, and salvation. Umāsvāti, T. 1, 4 did not add *puṇṇa* and *pāva* to these "truths" (*tattva*) by which name they continued to be represented in the course of the centuries.

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§170. We started our description by dealing with man in general as appearing in Mahāvīra's similes, and we now proceed to him in whom the teaching has taken root even if without leading him to monkhood. It is the layman. He charges himself with a number of restrictions, and paradoxically enough, they exceed in number those accepted by the monk. This is due to the larger diversity of the civil life in which the layman still stands, and this also accounts for the texts specifically, naming several exceptional cases which, according to the subject, are contained in the fundamental commandments. The duties a layman is bound to observe must be derived from those observed by the monk. They divide into three groups of lay restrictions: (a) the small vows (*aṇu-vaya*), (b) the additional vows¹ (*guṇa-vaya*), and (c) the strengthening vows (*sikkhā-vaya*).² Their number is twelve in all, and hence the texts speak of the *duvālasaviha agāra-dhamma*. We gain this tripartition from Uvav. 57, the wording, at least as far as it concerns the first, is shown by Uvās. § 13ff., and offences are quoted by Uvās. 45ff.³ The Small (*aṇu*) Vows Thāṇ. 290a; Samav. 10a) are called thus as compared with the Great Vows taken by the monk (§ 171),⁴ and they remain in force lifelong as do the latter. While the Great Vows are unconditional, they are reduced for laymen to their abstaining 1. from gross (thūlaga) offences against live matter leading to death (pāṇāivāya), 2.

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from gross untruthfulness (musā-vāya), from gross appropriation (adinn'ādāna), 4. from adultery by contenting oneself with one's wife (sa-dāra-saṃtosa), and 5. from greed by restricting one's striving after possession (icchā-parimāṇa). thūlaga¹ in the first line concerns the action expressed by the prohibition, but (Uvās. 45ff.) different others, i.e. five in each case, are equated with it.² That it concerns merely a selection—taken especially from agriculture and commercial activities—is indicated in Uvās. 45 by the word peyāla "typical" which, however, is missing in later texts. Gross offence against live matter is understood by fettering, beating, wounding, overloading and disregarding the urge of appeasing one's hunger and quenching one's thirst, all this most probably with a view to domestic animals. Gross untruthfulness is understood by falsely accusing³ a person either directly or indirectly, by compromising one's wife by indiscretion,⁴ by passing on wrong informations and by forgery. Gross appropriation consists in receiving of, or dealing in, stolen goods, in the instigation to theft, in illegally entering a country, in using false weights and measures, and in the adulteration of goods. The offences against matrimonial faith need not be mentioned (Uvās. 48). As to self-restriction we are referred to gold, cattle, real estate, carts and carriages as well as a long list of possessions, jewelry and luxuries.

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The five Small Vows are followed by the three "Additional" Vows: 1. refraining from useless actions which may cause damage (apaṭṭhā-daṇḍa), i.e. from worries and desires, from doing foolish and dangerous things, and from instigating others to do them,⁵ 2. the commandment directing the layman to confine himself to an area of a certain extension in either direction which he may not leave in his undertakings (disi-vvaya), and 3. the commandment of observing moderation in eating and drinking as well as in all furnishings along with the prohibition of practising certain trades (uvabhoga-paribhoga-parimāṇa). In a concrete sense the latter was already listed among the fifth anu-vvaya. That is why here, first of all, fundamentals are referred to, i.e. the consumption of things containing life. They are followed by the trades or by activities affecting live matter of which fifteen different kinds are listed, e.g. charcoal burning, ivory- and lacquer-trade, pressing of fruit kernels, drainage of swamps, etc. This prohibition accounts for the fact that up to this day the Jains are found but in a restricted number of occupations. According to this view also b 3 along with b 1 represents but a special formulation of the commandment asking for the preservation of life a 1, though in Uvās. the demand to restrict one’s striving after possession 5a is immediately followed by b3 and b 1.

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In any case, however, the guṇa-vvaya prove to be special forms of the anu-vvaya in which b 2 equally follows a 5. As compared with those mentioned up to now the Strengthening Vows are of a positive nature. By them the layman temporarily comes near to the monk and his conduct of life. 1. By sāmāiya the comm. understands the state of an inward balance without adding that it concerns an act of devotion to be repeated several times every day (§ 151).¹ 2. desavagāsiya stands for the self-limitation of one’s dwelling- and occupation- area which may not be transgressed by messengers, calls, signs, nor by the way of throwing objects across. 3. By the posahōvavāsa certain fasting days combined with night watches (posaham paḍijāgarette) are observed at least every fortnight in a special room called the posaha-sālā (comp. Viy. 553a; Jambudd. 3). 4. ahā- or atihi-saṃvibhāga means the distribution of gifts in which a.o. tricks of any kind excluding their acceptance are forbidden. To these twelve duties of a layman the texts (also Samav. 119b), and in conformity with them Umāsvāti in T. 7, 17, add the fasting leading to death which by its name of *apacchimā māraṇantiyā samlehaṇā jhūsaṇ’ārāhaṇā* indicates the high esteem it enjoys. This addition explains itself by the fact that in the *samlehaṇā* (or *sallehaṇā*), too, the layman puts himself on a par with the monk. It could not be admitted among the formal duties since, by its nature, it is voluntary (§ 165).

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A man carrying loads stops in his way by placing his burden from one shoulder on to the other, by relieving nature, by resting at a shrine (*nāga-* or *suvaṇṇakumāra-vāsa*), or by retiring from active life for good. *Thāṇ.* 235b compares these ever increasing breathing-spaces (*ussāsa*) with the interruptions in the increase of Karman which occur when the layman undertakes responsibilities, in which case *sāmāiya* and *des’avagāsiya* are considered more effective than the remaining¹ except for the fasting vow which, again, is more effective than those two, while the *samlehaṇā* effects the ultimate goal of ending.

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¹ Called "meritorious v." by the AUTHOR RL 7, 22. But the expression above is, perhaps, more to the point since it concerns exceptional cases of the *aṇu-vaya*.

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² This is *śikṣā-vrata*, not *-pada* as LEUMANN Aup. writes.

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³ This is followed by Haribhadra, Samarāicc. p. 49f.

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⁴ Both together are the *mūla-guṇa* as compared with the *uttarag.* by which the texts (e.g. Viy. 295b) understand first of all the additional and the strengthening vows.

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¹ Umāsvāti T. 7, 2. 15 does not use the word.

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² They partially somewhat differently in T. 7, 19ff.

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³ He who does so (abhakkhhāṇa) will be done so himself, no matter where it be (Viy. 231 b).

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⁴ Even a truthful statement is not allowed if by it somebody else is hurt (§ 171).

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⁵ In civil life aṭṭhā-d. is distinguished from apaṭṭhā-d. Thāṇ. 47b.; Samav. 7b.

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¹ Umāsvāti in commenting on T. 7, 16 explains sāmāiya to be a regulation stating how long the layman is willing to keep the Great Vows.—It strikes the eye that in Dasā 6 II sāmāiya and desavagāsiya are treated as one subject; se ṇaṃ sāmāiyaṃ desavagāsiyaṃ ṇa sammaṃ aṇupālittā bhavai.

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¹ *silavvaya-guṇavvaya-veramaṇa-paccakkhāṇa-posahovavāsāiṃ*. *guṇa-vv.* are the above b 6-8. *sila-vv.* possibly stands for the *sikkhāvaya*, above c 9-12 *veramaṇa* (-*paccakkhāṇa* ?) a 1-5. Inaccurate as is this mode of expression so is the inclusion of the *posahovavāsa*, and the more so since the (*paḍipunṇa*) *posaha* follows immediately.

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§171. The formula of the layman has: *jāvajjīvāe duvihaṃ tiviheṇaṃ: na karemi na kāravemi maṇasā vayasā kāyasā* (Uvās. 13ff.). In other words, the layman renounces not only all directly but also all indirectly forbidden activity so far as it consists in one’s actively causing it. Nor is it possible in the frame of civil life to adjure the approval (*aṇujāṇai* or *samaṇujāṇi*) of what others are forbidden to do, though in monkhood this is obligatory. Hence the monastic vows (*maha-vvaya*, *Thāṇ.* 290a; *Samav.* 10a) have the phrase of *tivihaṃ tiviheṇaṃ*, and moreover, they equally pertain to what is done by “heart, mouth, and hands.” With regard to their subject they are no less unconditional and comprehensive. They are quoted by *Āyār.* II 15 end and are repeated by *Dasav.* 4 beginning.² For a brief treatment of the same see *Dasav.* 6, 9-26. The 10th Anga (*Paṇhāvāgaraṇāiṃ*) is a monography not only on these five self-restrictions but precedingly also on their five counterparts (*pāṇi-vaha, aliya-vayapa, adinn’ādāṇa, abambha, and pariggaha*). With the latter we confront the ethical fundamentals of monkhood. The vow asking for the preservation of life (*pāṇivāyāo veramaṇaṃ* Dasav.) comprises life manifesting itself in any form or shape, either immaterial or material, either of a superior or inferior kind. The sermon by which Āyār.

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17, 16 starts is a counterpart to the explanations commenting on the acts of consecrating laymen, since here the performance of power suggested to be exercised by the Kevalin is described fivefold. Practically parallel to them, however, are the *bhāvaṇā* (Samav. 44a), instructions for right understanding, which in Āyār. II 15 follow every vow.¹ We find the same in Paṇhāv., though here some Bhāvanās have changed places, and several ones have a different, if cognate, content. Apart from demanding the highest possible care to be taken in all monastic affairs they ask for abstention from malevolent thinking and speaking. The "reverence towards life" (as Albert SCHWEITZER has put it) by which the realm of life was so immeasurably extended, permeates the discipline of Mahāvīra's Order in a way no other ethical prescription does. We can observe its entering into the field of sexual abstention which alone equals it in importance.² 2. The vow of truthful speech (*musāvāyāo ver.*) discovers sources of untruthfulness in the main passions represented by anger, pride, fraud, and greed along with fear and joy and asks for a considerate mode of expression. Truthful speech causing pain must be equally avoided. It is treated in detail along with the allowed modes of expressing oneself by Āyār. II 4 and hereafter by Dasav. 7. For what is being understood by "true" and "wrong" comp. § 74. 3.

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The vow of non-appropriation (*adinn’ādāṇāo ver.*) comprises all that is not expressly given as a present (*adinna*) regardless of its kind and size and wherever it be. Since a monk is not allowed possessions of any kind (s. 5) this merely refers to his outfit and to alms. The exemplifications concern the monk's quarters (§ 147). 4. The vow of chastity (*mehuṇāo ver.*) has, as was mentioned above, an extremely vast effective range. The prescriptions cohering with it do not refer to normal sexuality only, but they frequently also indicate events of sexual pathology. Among the cases resulting from frustrated desires we find the apparitions of godly persons of opposite sex to which either monks, or nuns surrender (K. 5, 1-4). 5. The vow of being void of property (*pariggahāo ver.*) concerns the abandonment of all one’s belongings down to the smallest item including even the preservation of food for later use. The outfit necessary for monks and nuns is not considered as property (Dasav. 6, 20 ff.). The desire for possessing something is roused by pleasant impressions forcing themselves on the five senses. That is why the five interpretations of this vow demand indifference towards them as well as towards their negations which on their part naturally rouse desires, if only in the direction of warding off temptations.¹

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² Comp. also *Uvav.* § 87.

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¹ They are presupposed by K. 3, 24.

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² The AUTHOR, Mahānis. p. 73.

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To these five vows Dasav. 4 adds a sixth which, however, instead of *maha-vraya* is called *vaya* only. It is the *rāi-bhoyaṇāo veramaṇam*, the abstention from taking food and drink after darkness has set in, resulting from the consideration that an insect or either any vegetable or other living substance might drop into the food to perish there. Dasav. 6, 22-26 in treating the subject of taking food at night rather concerns itself with the subject of going out at night, and especially so for the purpose of asking for alms (*esaṇīya*), which certainly is quite out of the question, whereas to be out at night is indeed strictly forbidden (K. 1, 4 ff.). The reason for this is, of course, that in the darkness something living may escape one’s notice and be injured. The *rāi-bhoyaṇa* is actually a special case of the *pāṇāivāya* accentuated by several teachers, so that along with Dasav. 4 we see Uvav. § 57; Utt. 19, 30 refer to it. Acc. to Dasav. 2, 2, however, it is not differentiated (as *rāi-bhatta*) within the great number of individual prohibitions. Principally this conception is the

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a. For the development of five vows from four thanks to Mahāvīra comp. §16.

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older one, nor are the old collections of disciplinary texts at variance with it.¹

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¹ Comp. K. 4, 1; Nis. 11, 72ff.

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§172. Details have been considered here only so far as they were necessary to describe the fundamental commandments according to their essential contents. The way they work in praxi is represented in a special paragraph (§§ 136 ff.). As was shown by JACOBI² the monastic vows originate from Brahman asceticism and, as there and with the Buddhists, their selection rests on the ethical feeling. Umāsvāti’s Sūtras T. 7, 4-7 produced by him with regard to the five principal commandments and weak as they are in this respect are not supported by the Canon. Hence, acc. to JACOBI’s conjecture³ 7, 5, and 6 are borrowings from Patanjali’s Yoga-Sūtra i.e. the consideration that killing, lying, etc. are, in the main, nothing but sorrow (duḥkha), and the demand “for benevolence (maitri) towards all beings, joyful reverence (pramoda) towards those who are better, compassion (kāruṇya) for sufferers and indifference (mādhyasthya) towards all that are incorrigible”. Sutra 7, 4 renders the standpoint of utility and 7, 7 the frame of mind as means for avoiding what is forbidden.

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² SBE 22, XXII ff.

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³ For Sūtra 7, 6 see also SPAW 1929, 607.

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In § 168 we briefly dealt with the avirai, i.e. the contempt for the commandments, and it is this offence that causes the souls to suffer and to act (ahigaraṇī and ahigaraṇa, Viy. 698a). In it the poor and the rich, the largest animal as well as the smallest (hatthi and kunthu) are equal (Viy. 101a; 314b). But it rests on the apaccakkhāṇa. It is not virai and avirai, but paccakkhāṇa “renunciation” (Ṭhāṇ. 44a, 112b) and apaccakkhāṇa, and acc. to Viy. 266b even the mixture of either, that was given a systematical description. So far as the pacc. is represented by the monastic vows and by the aṇu-vvaya it is called mūlaguṇa-pacc. (Viy. 295b) and uttaraguṇa-pacc. when represented by the guṇa- and sikkhā-vaya. Here, however, not indicating the content but the mode of performance, there follows a sequence of 10 forms (also Ṭhāṇ. 498a) showing the pacc. to happen on account of something in the future or either in the past, to be enforced despite indisposition, etc. Its purity, acc. to Thāṇ. 349a, demonstrates itself by faith, discipline, learning, conserving, and a harmonious character. In this connexion we may refer to the failure of a monk described by Thāṇ. 246 a as the four duha-sejjā concerning heresy, insatiability, dissipation, and fastidiousness. Their opposites are the so-called suha-sejjā.

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§173. We continue to deal with the "stoppage" (samvara) by considering its media in the sequence of groups established by Umāsvāti T. 9 in starting from the number of the sub-members. Many of these sub-members will be found in more than one group. Since the Canon knows but some of them, it is ignorant of their common aim as such. First we have the control (gutti) of the mind, the speech, and the body (Thāṇ. 111 b; Samav. 8a). In each of these cases, acc. to Utt. 24, 19ff., it represents itself by refraining from samrambha, samārambha, and ārambha, by which the comm. (comp. also Sthān. on Thāṇ. 403b) understand two stages of preparation and the performance of forbidden thinking, speaking and acting. The same relate the 1st and 2nd gutti to the four possibilities of "true, wrong, either and neither of the two" (and hence in each of them attentiveness is asked for), and the physical gutti to the omission of an action doing harm to other beings. Though all this was comprised by the ārambha, etc. already, Umāsvāti in commenting on T. 9, 4 is, on the whole, more concrete in interpreting the three gupti.

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In Utt. 24 the gutti are treated along with the 5 samii (accordingly Samav. 13 b).¹ We might call them their sisters if the comments were right which by these 8 pavayaṇa-māyāo (so called in 24, 1) understand the "mothers of the sacred teaching."² This ought to read p.-māo, -māūo or -māyaro. But actually it means "vessels (mātrā) of the teaching", since he only who is solicitous of discipline and circumspection (samii) will take in its spiritual content. Pre-stages of the 5 samii—along with such, if not expressly mentioned, of the two first gutti—will be found in the interpretation of the 1st principal vow (Āyār. II 15 I), i.e. the circumspection (1) observed in walking (iriyā) and (4) the way of taking utensils in one's hand and of either setting or laying them down (āya-bhaṇḍa-nikkhevaṇa). Along with these two, the latter now going by the name extended to āy.-bh.-matta-ṇ.¹ we have (Thāṇ. 323a; Samav. 10a) the circumspection (2) observed in speaking (bhāsā), (3) in looking for alms (esaṇā), and (5) in relieving nature (uccāra-pāsavaṇa-khela-siṅghāṇa-jalla-pāriṭṭhāvaṇiyā). We are also referred to 8 samii to which the maṇa-, vai- and- kāya-s., not -gutti, are added (Thāṇ. 422b). In all cases we are concerned with the preservation of life. When walking in a street a monk must not look farther than one juga in order not to overlook something near him; his speech must be free from passions, from laughter, fear, loquacity, and slander; the alms must be given and received in the way allowed, and they must be in the condition they have to be (§ 154); all objects handled must be carefully inspected and wiped off; when relieving nature and throwing away something the monk is expected first to scrutinize the place chosen for that purpose for its remoteness (§ 148). All items concerning locomotion on land and on water are treated in detail, though not with regard to the samii, by Āyār. II 3, while Dasav. 7 refers to the mode of speech.

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¹ On the other hand the 5 samii together with the 5 vows add up to the samdhi (Thāṇ. 473a) frequently quoted in monastic poetry, comp. Āyār., Sūy., Utt.

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² CHARPENTIER, Utt. p. 365 even has "mothers of the faith".

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¹ We should expect bhaṇḍa-matta-ṇ-āya-nikkhevaṇa.

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§174. From the domain predominantly devoted to questions of discipline Umāsvāti in dealing with what he calls dharma (T. 9, 6) again turns to that devoted to ethics. The dharma, i.e. the monastic morality, consists in forbearance (kṣamā), humility (mārdava), candour (ārjava), indifference towards the sweets of life (sauca), truthfulness, self-discipline, asceticism, abstention, voluntary poverty, and spiritual obedience. For the model to this sequence see Thāṇ. 296b, (in two halves) and 473b. While *sauca* and *akiṃcaṇya* are missing they give *mutti* ("abandonment") and *lāghava* ("contentedness") instead of them, but Samav. 120b has *soya*, and along with Thāṇ. 233b it refers to *akiṃcaṇiyā*, resp. *akiṃcaṇayā* in related connexions. *uvasama*¹ (the representative of *khanti* or *khamā*), *maddava*, *ajjava*, and *saṃtosa* are, acc. to Dasav. 8, 37f., the counterparts to *koha*, *māṇa*, *māyā*, and *lobha*. In the *uttama bambha*, as Samav. calls it,² the sequence rendered by Umāsvāti culminates.³ For asceticism (*tava*) comp. § 178, for *saṃjama*, § 177, and as to the whole see JACOBI'S comments on the Sūtra. In the texts referred to abstention (*ciyāga*, also *cāya*) means the abandonment of sinful thoughts, acc. to others it stands for the communication of knowledge (i.e. the *dāṇa* of the propertyless), whereas acc. to passages as Dasav. 2, 2f. (*cāi* it is the abstention from concrete pleasures. Samav. 35a describes the *bambha* as being 18fold by abstaining from an offence in thinking, speaking, and acting (3) with regard to worldly and heavenly pleasures (*orāliya* and *divva kāma-bhoga*) (2) in one's own doings, in those caused, and in those approved of (3). The theory of both the *kāma* and the *bhoga*⁴ is reported by Viy. (309b), acc. to which the former along with others refer to sounds and forms, the latter to smells, tastes, and connexions by touching. Acc. to their different tendencies the souls behave partly as *kāmī*, partly as *bhogī*, and partly as *kāma-bhogī*, and the same applies to the beings according to the sensual organs they have. From these arrangements it follows that the idea of the *bambha* comprises far more than merely the abstention from sexual feeling,. This is shown by Thāṇ. 444a referring to the 9 *bambhacera-gutti*, and the comment made on the word *brahmacarya* of the Sūtras answers to it.

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¹ K. 1, 35: *uvasama-sāraṃ sāmaṇṇaṃ* "the nature of monkhood is forbearance".

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² This accounts for *attama* in T. 9, 6 with Umāsvāti and in the Dig. version.

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³ This merely bears analogy to the *dasa-lakkhaṇa dharma* Manu 6, 92 of which JACOBI reminds us. There is no interdependence.

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⁴ In Thāṇ. 263b *bhoga* appears along with *sokkha*. He who is unable to abstain form either kind of pleasure and looks for others of their sort is called a *pasappaya*. *kāma* and *bhoga*, on the other hand, are not included in the 10 *sokkha* Thāṇ. 87a.

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§175. To the tenfold *dharma* Umāsvāti in T. 9, 7 adds the twelve pessimistic reflections (*anuprekṣā*). They include the reflections on the transitoriness of things, the helplessness of man, the painful roaming about in the Saṃsāra, the loneliness of man, (5) on the difference in essence between the soul and both the body and all earthly things, on the inward impurity of the body, on the influence, the stoppage, and the annihilation (10), on the world, on the scarcity of enlightenment (*bodhi-durlabhatva*),¹ and on truth (*dharma-svākhyāta-tattva*). This sequence again, since we do not find it in the Canon, is only the work of the Sūtra author whose authorship, moreover, seems to betray itself by the insertion of the abstract expressions *āsrava*, *saṃvara*, and *nirjarā*. The four first *anuprekṣā* derive from Uvav. § 30 V’, and according to the *dharmya* meditation (§ 180) they are the *anicca-*, *asaraṇa-*, *egatta-*, and *saṃsārānup-pehā*. If only for this reason it seems improbable that the relative statements made in the Mahānis.² should have exercised any influence on Umāsvāti, since here the Saṃsāra takes the fifth place behind *ann'anna*, the difference in essence (*anyatva*). But, after all, the Mahānis. generally speaks of *bhāvaṇā* instead of *anuppeha*; the "impurity" (*aśucitva*) is missing, and new is the *titthagarehim tatta-cintā-bhāvaṇā*.

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¹ Thus with p. 195 of the Bhāṣya instead of *bodhi-durlabha* of the Sūtra.

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² The AUTHOR, Mahānis. p., 66.

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As early as in the Uvav. we equally come across abstractions drawn from the ideas conveyed to us by the monastic poetry with its pessimistic character. Some example by means of catchwords may serve to illustrate the *anuprekṣā*: *kus'agge jaha osa-bindue... evam maṇuyāṇa jīvie* Utt. 10, 2; *kus'agga-jala-bindu-caṇcalam jīviyam* Uvav. § 23 (accordingly Dasav. 11, XXI); *nūlam te tava tāṇāe vā saraṇāe vā* Āyār. 6, 24f., comp. Sūy. II 1, 38, 41; *aṇavadagga dīha-m-addha cāuraṇta-saṃsāra-kaṃtāra* Utt. 29, 22 and elsewhere; for other comparisons see Bhattap. 86, 141;³ *ego aham amsi, na me atthi koi na yāham avi kassai* Āyār. 37, 7, in Mahāpacc. 13 metrically shaped and related to; *ekko uppajjae jivo, ekko c'eva vivajjai, ekkassa hoi maraṇam, ekko sijjai nirao*, etc. loc. cit. 14ff. The impurity of the body is drastically represented in Nāya 8.

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³ Comp. v. KAMPTZ, Sterbefasten p. 23 f.

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The three last *anuprekṣā* are intimately connected with one another and range in a logical sequence once again blurred in the Mahānis., though here the real meaning of *loka* is elucidated by *loga-vitthara* representing the feeling of the immensity of the world full of wandering souls.¹ In addition to this sense of space we have the sense of time which, in the course of innumerable forms of existence, feels the possibility of hearing the teaching and of acquiring salvation through it to be extremely small. Utt. 3 is the first to deal with this idea; comp. also Dasāv. 11, VIII; *dullabhe khalu bho gihiṇam dhamme gihi-majjhe vasantāṇam*. The 12th *anuprekṣā*, finally, refers to the contents of the teaching as it was preached. That it results from the thinking of the Titthagaras is, acc. to the Mahānis., equally an object of consideration.

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¹ Acc. to Umāsvāti it concerns the complexity of the world.

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§176. He who gives himself up to the reflections mentioned above arrests the influence of Karman. By this determination our *anuprekṣā* is distinguished from the one referred to in Utt. 29, 22 where its objects are differently demonstrated. Considering the context the latter inheres in the department of instruction or, more precisely, in that of studying (§ 150).² As another medium of the *samvara* the *anuprekṣā* are followed in T. 9, 2 by the resistance to the 22 troubles (*parisaha*). The classical passage recording them is Utt. 2 acc. to which also Samav. 40b lists them. The temptations are: hunger and thirst, heat and cold, stinging insects (*damsa-masaga*)³ and nakedness (*acela*);⁴ resentment (*arai*) at the monastic duties, women; (compulsory) migratory life (*cariyā*), (compulsory) studying (*nisihyā*) and (compulsory poor) quarters for the night (*sejjā*); abusive language (*akkosa*) and ill-treatment (*vaha*); (compulsory) requests and rejection; illness, injuries caused by blades of grass (*taṇa-phāsa*) and dirt; (flattery by) manifestations of reverence. Differences exist among the three last *parisaha*. Acc. to the comm. (20) *pannā* indicated the presumption of knowledge, but¹ the pertinent passages Utt. 2, 40f. console for the lack of knowledge (*annāṇa*) as being the inevitable result of corresponding former actions. This agrees with the following passages 42f. correctly relating to (21) *annāṇa*, (the resentment at) not understanding. (22) *damsana* (thus also Samav.) most probably indicates the (pride in) faith, though the passages 44f. describe the opposite, i.e. heresy. This corresponds with *adarśana* in Umāsvāti. JACOBI's manuscripts have also *sammatta* along with *damsana*.² In the Samav.-Ṭīkā even the subjects are exchanged one for the other: we have as (20) *jñānam*; *kvacid ajñānam iti śrūyate*,³ (21) *darśana* = *samyag-darśana* and (22) *prajñā* "consideration". At any rate the naming of the three objects is conspicuously inaccurate and, hence, not in harmony with the preceding. The *par.* are equally dealt with by Sūy. I 3, 1 though unsystematically. Among the concrete temptations we have (loc. cit. 3, 1, 13) as a new item the *kesa-loya*, i.e. pulling out one's hair (§ 137). It also counts among the 22 *parisahovasagga* Uvav. § 116 and nearly consonant Viy. 99 b⁴ which in their names and their sequence bear resemblance to ours. *uvasagga* are obstacles either put in a monk's way by godly persons, humans and animals or developing within and on himself (*āya-samceyaṇijja*, Ṭhāṇ. 280a, where detailed statements concerning the different kinds will be found).⁵ Though not counted the words are associated also in other respects, e.g. Āyār. I 38, 3=22=Sūy. I 16, 4. The sequence rendered by the Uvav. probably is secondary, though it is hard to see why the orderly sequence was abandoned.—Viy. 388f. and, accordingly, T. 9, 12-17 teach on what kinds of Karman the different 22 feelings of uneasiness depend and how many of them may occur with one individual simultaneously. By the way they think about ill-treatment they have to suffer the chaumattha and the Kevalin differ from each other (Thāṇ. 306a). They both comprehend the necessity of their sufferings, but while in doing so the former wants and has to promote his own salvation, the latter wants to put an example.

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² UPADHYE Journal Or. Inst. Univ. Baroda 8, p. 6-9.

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³ From Uvav. 87 it follows that two kinds of insects are meant.

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⁴ This pair certainly goes back to an association of ideas, though Utt. 2, 12f. fails to express it.

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¹ With good will *stana* 40 may be interpreted as being a lamentation and 41 (or 41b) as the answer to it given by a conceited monk.

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² Thus Utt. ed. JAYANTAVIJAYA in the text, but *darśana* in the comm. of Kamalasamyama.

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³ Of the same content in Viy. 390b (ibd. a brief characterization of all 22).

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⁴ They start with *nagga-bhāva*.—The author of the Mahānisīha cannot be blamed for having incorporated the same phrase into his text as was done by the AUTHOR, Mahānis. p. 66.

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⁵ In this connexion the actions and their motives seem to be confused. Obstacles, for instance, derive from scorn, hostility, fear, greediness, defence, they consist in bad company, dropping down, falling asleep or in the atrophic shrinkage of the members etc.

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§177. Umāsvāti has brought the media of saṃvara in the number of their members up to 22 and now opens a brief new sequence with the (right) conduct (caritra, T. 9, 18) taking the first place. He knows of five different kinds: 1. sāmāiya or either the temporary (ittariya) or lifelong (āvakahiya) pious conduct in general as before the ordination (comp. § 138); 2. cheovaṭṭhāvaṇiya, the conduct after the first or the repeated ordination (comp. § 161) (uvaṭṭhavaṇā); 3. parihāra-visuddhiya, the conduct under the "exceptional position" dictated by atonement as nivvisamāṇaga and as nivviṭṭhakāiya) (§ 136); 4. suhuma-samparāya representing a conduct showing but very slight lapses¹ of either one morally changing for the worse (saṃkilissamāṇa) or one morally improving; 5. ahakkhāya representing the conduct which (both with the chaumattha and the Kevalin) comes up to the enunciated ideal. These Prakrit words originate from Viy. 909a; Thāṇ. 322b; Uvav. § 30 II. though the two first passages do not relate them to caritta but to saṃjama (or saṃjaya) thus equating conduct with self-discipline.² By 4. the theory of the saṃjama is associated with the teaching of the guṇa-sthāna (§ 183). saṃjama and its opposite frequently mean the protection of or, resp., the damage done to life. Comp. *chasu samjaya* Dasav. 3, 11; 7, 56 (3) *asamijama* means hurting a being's feelings appertaining to it by virtue of its organs of sense (e.g. *beindiyā ṇaṃ bhante jīvā* (acc. pl. 1) *samārabha(māṇe) ... jibbhamayaṃ sokkhāo vavarovittā bhavai, jibbhāmaṇaṃ dukkheṇaṃ saṃjogittā bhavai* Ṭhāṇ. 284a; also 368b). In the same relation the *samjama* is five-, seven- and tenfold (Ṭhāṇ. 322b; 403b; 472b) in which case, however, also lifeless objects are being considered. Following the tenfold *samjama* we see that in the 17fold Samav. 32b caution in praxis comes into its own by *pehā, uvehā, avahaṭṭu* and *pamajjaṇā* (careful watching, examining, removing and wiping off).

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¹ This probably is the actual meaning of the word rendered by kaṣāya by the commentators.

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² Comp. a.o. saṃjama tti cāritram Sthān. 440b. This s. presents itself in the discipline regarding the inward sense, the speech of the body, and the belongings of a monk Thāṇ. 233b. For another, schematic division of the s. comp. Thāṇ. 322b.

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§178. In dealing with asceticism which, acc. to T. 9, 19ff., follows the *saṃvara* we are no longer in the exclusive province of the *saṃvara*. For Umāsvāti teaches T. 9, 3 that asceticism does not only serve for "stoppage" but also for "annihilation" which, by the way, according to him, though with a certain inconsistency between 9, 2 and 9, 8, makes itself equally felt in the resistance to temptations. In conformity with this importance it has for the ultimate aim asceticism, (*tava*) within its division into external and internal forms presents itself in various shapes. The most detailed information is supplied by Viy. 921a=Uvav. § 30 which we follow on the condition that in the face of the characteristic mixture of ethical and concrete demands we shall state but the principal divisions of the latter, while for details we refer to our representation of the monastic life (§ 156). So then *external asceticism* first of all consists in dropping one's meals, in restricting oneself to but few objects and little food, in doing the round for alms which may be subjected to many different special regulations, and in abandoning spiced food. Frequently *tava* means merely fasting in this wider sense. Physical asceticism exercised by forced positions (§ 157) and by doing without fineries stands fifth. All these points are plainly material, whereas only the second, the restriction of quantity (*omoyariyā*, also Ṭhāṇ. 147a), equally means an ethical dictate to the monk to reduce anger, pride, fraud, greed, noise (*sadda*) and quarrel (*jhaṇjhā*), to be *appa-keha* etc. Thus moderation (*bhāvaṃ*.)

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stands side by side with temperance (*dam'om.*),¹ in connexion with which we observe that in the first case *udara* (belly) as a component part of the word has lost its significance. External asceticism ends up in the monk's withdrawing from his surroundings (*paḍisamliṇayā*, comp. *Thāṇ.* 322b): by reaching the state of indifference (*rāga-dosa-niggaha*) towards all that the five senses offer, by the suppression and taming of the four passions, by the avoidance of displeasing and the promotion of pleasing activities (*joga*) of the inner sense, of speech and body, and, finally, once more plainly concrete by confining himself to the resting-place secluded from all worldly dealings and temptations. This last point is all that Umāsvāti in T. 9, 19 took over from Uvav. § 30 VI, from which we may conclude that he did not fully agree with coordinating the other *paḍisamliṇayā* to external asceticism, and for that reason he suggested it in T. 9, 26 when dealing with internal asceticism. But the old classification rested on the material nature of body, speech, and all senses, while the reflection which conquers the passions depends on the inner sense acc. to T. 2, 25.

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¹ LEUMANN, Aup. s.v. *amayaviyā*.

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§179. *Internal asceticism* also knows of six media as does the external one (*Thāṇ.* 364b). Here we have the subjection to confessions and atonement (§ 158; 161). Second follows good behaviour (*viṇaya*) towards knowledge, faith and conduct, furthermore in thinking, speaking and acting in which it makes no difference whether the object is of a spiritual kind or not, and in the way of proving oneself helpful, tactful (*desakāla-mṇ*) and friendly.² Third ranges the readiness to spiritual service (§ 149) and fourth the study (§ 150). In T. 9, 20 follows fifth the abandonment (*vyutsarga*) of all outer and inner groundworks of existence in which the latter are represented by the body and the passions and the former by the twelvefold *upadhi*.³ Umāsvāti does not go into details. In the Uvav. the corresponding follows only sixth behind the *jhāna* which for its being the larger subject will be treated later. The *viosagga* there referred to (though generally written *viussagga*)¹ disengages from all both material and immaterial (*davva-v.* and *bhāva-v.*), i.e. from the body, the surroundings (*gaṇa*), the belongings (*uvahi*) and food on the one hand and from the passions, the Saṃsāra and the Karman on the other.

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² In this connexion we must not overlook the statement made by Viy. 637 a acc. to which respectful treatment is not found in the hells, not among elemental beings and lower animals, whereas higher animals know of it, only that they are ignorant of offering a seat (1).

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