The Doctrine of the Jainas, Described after the Old Sources c8.124

c8.124

§ 74. As to the "articulated" evidences (*akkhara-suya*) mentioned above they are formed by written (*sann'akkhara-s.*) and oral (*vanjan'akkh.-s.*) ones as well as by such consisting in an object conceived by the senses releasing its denomination (*laddhi-akkh.-s.*).¹ We refer to this simply in order to attach the consideration frequently mentioned in the Canon about the expressive content of language. The earliest comments on this subject appear in Āyār. 11, 4; they are closely related to Dasav. 7.² Resting on the monastic discipline they are, to a great extent, based on the primitive distinction between the True (*sacca*) and the Wrong (*mosa*); in between we find what is made up of both the True and the Wrong (*saccā-mosa*), and beyond all three there is what is neither true nor wrong (*asaccā-mosa*) (Āyār. II, 91; Ṭhāṇ. 183 b). They are the four *bhāsājayā*.³ Pannav. 11 deals with them, as with speech altogether, more systematically, though, on the whole in a strikingly ill-assorted way on the whole. Of those four contents the first pair is attributed to "distinct" (*pajjattiya*) and the second to "indistinct" (*apajj.*) speech (Pannav. 255b). From their numerous sub-varieties⁴ it follows (a.o.) that a mode of speech springing from emotion is by itself understood as *mosā*. Next to true speech a Kevalin (§ 81) avails himself of the *asaccāmosa* only (Viy. 749a). All animals with two to four senses and beings with five senses express themselves in the "neither true nor wrong" way, but the latter will employ the first three modes just as well (Pannav. 260a) provided they have learnt to do so or carry along with them a higher ability. The aforesaid fourth mode has twelve cases as address, order, request, question etc. Communication (*pannavaṇī*), too, belongs to the *asaccāmosa*. But the problem was whether such communications were not rather *mosā bhāsā* in case the natural gender of the object was not expressed as in the plural forms *gāo, miyā, pasū, pakkhī*. Pannav. 248b f. denies this and probably dispels even other doubts as to the congruity of grammatical and natural gender and number. Viy. 499b equally affirms that the expression of an intention, e.g. "we want to lie down" (*āsaissāmo*) is a *pannavaṇī bhāsā* and not "wrong". Apart from this kind Pannav. 246b speaks of the *ohāriṇī bh.*, i.e. the statement giving as examples "I mean", "I think" and the like. Such a statement may express any of the four contents (modes) : a true statement will serve (*ārāhiṇī*) the teaching, a wrong one will oppose (*virāhiṇī*) it, etc. It goes with the sphere of ethics that all four modes of speech, and consequently the mode of wrong speech as well, are admitted, provided they are employed in a pious way of mind (*āuttam=samyak*), while even true speech coming from a sinner's mouth will count for nothing (Pannav. 268a). It goes with discipline that a monk charging himself with abstinence for one month (*māsiyā bhikkhu-paḍimā*, § 157) may express himself by four ways only: by begging for alms, by putting a question, by making a request for lodging and by giving an answer (*jāyaṇā, pucchaṇī, anuṇṇavaṇī, puṭṭhassa vāgaraṇī*, Dasā 7 I=Thāṇ. 183b).