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The Doctrine of the Jainas, Described after the Old Sources c8: IV

The Doctrine of the Jainas, Described after the Old Sources c8

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Contents

IV

c8.1

§ 57. The Fundamental Facts. The word "fundamental fact" is but a fairly liberal version of *atthikāya* which literally means "mass of all that is". As such it represents a mass by the totality of the units (*paesa*).¹ The five fundamental facts are known as motion (*dhamma*), stop (*adhamma*), space (*āgāsa*), souls (*jīva*), and matter (*poggala*), each in combination with *atthikāya*. Viy. 775b renders alleged synonyms which, however, do not hit the point. They simply replace the basic words now in a conventional and then, again, in quite a remote way. Thus e.g. *dhamma* stands for complying and *adhamma* for not complying with the monastic duties.²

c8.2

¹ *astayaś ceha pradeśās, teṣāṃ kāyaḥ Sthān. 516a; Prajn. 8b 9a. See also Nemicandra, Davvasamgaha 24. From the Attikāyas KOHL starts in his book, Das physikalische und biologische Weltbild der indischen Sekte der Jainas (Aliganj 1956). Rev. by the AUTHOR, ZDMG 109, p. 226ff.

c8.3

² Thus all five *atthikāya* are dealt with in the way described. This speaks against the opinion held by Jagdish Chandra JAIN (IHQ 9, 792-794) saying there here a non-metaphysical outlook on *dhamma* and *adhamma* is being given.

c8.4

The five fundamental facts constitute the world, or, rather, the world and the non-world (Viy. 608a). Their qualities are laid down in Viy. 147b. They all share in eternity. The space embraces both the world and the non-world, whereas the remaining four are concerned with the expansion of the world. For the dimensions of parts of the world proportional to motion, stop and space see Viy. 151a ff. and, nearly consonant, 775a. All *atthikāya* except the *jīva* are inanimate (*ajīva*), and, with the single exception of matter, all are immaterial (*arūva*). The last two sentences explicitly represent Mv.'s personal conception (Viy. 324b).³ Materiality is defined by saying (324b) that among all inanimate fundamental facts matter alone is palpable (*poggal’ atthikāyamsi cakkiyā kei āsaittae vā saittae vā ciṭṭhittae vā* etc.), whereas this does not apply to motion, stop or space, even though they fill the world completely. They are, in fact, as little palpable as are the flames of a thousand candles lighting a closed room (615b).¹ As *dhamma* and *adhamma* we know them, thanks to JACOBI on T. 5, l. 17 in their meaning² as motion and stop so characteristic of the Jains. It is by their presence only that any motion and any rest become possible at all, so that they themselves are not actually meant³ (and, for that reason, we ought to speak of stop rather than of rest). Within the realm of souls, *dhamma* and *adhamma* produce all possible conditions of movability and its opposite, on the one hand "coming and going, speaking, moving an eyelid, activity of the inner sense, speech and body" and on the other "standing motionless, sitting, lying, confinement to the acitivity of the inner sense" (Viy. 608a). Concerning space we have to distinguish between the space of the world (*log’āgāsa*) and the space of the non-world (*alog’āgāsa*), the former representing but an infinitely small fraction of the total space (Viy. 151a). It is in the nature of space to give room (*avagāhaṇā*, not *ogāh.*) to any amount of atoms (608a)⁴; but this, of course, applies merely to the space of the world, the space of the non-world being absolutely void (Viy. 151a). Notwithstanding this discrimination i should be observed that both space and motion as well as rest are definitely singular, whereas souls and matter are of an infinite variety, and, moreover, they alone are active. For the

c8.5

³ Some of the audience had difficulties in understanding this as we are told in two reports (Viy. 323b, 750b). Dissenters led by Kālodāi ask Goyama and the layman Madduya resp. for an interpretation. While Goyama is at a loss for an answer, Madduya declares himself incompetent in the matter,

c8.6

¹ Note that the flame as a light is of material nature (§ 60).

c8.7

² But the *atthikāya* "*dhamma*" stands next to the *suya-* and the *caritta-dhamma*, Thāṇ. 154 b.

c8.8

³ This might serve as a reply to SCHRADER'S proposal (*Festgabe für JACOBI*, page 274) to derive *dharma* from a root *dhr* "to go".

c8.9

⁴ It therefore does not count among the *atthikāya* which "touch world", Thāṇ. 251b.

c8.10

but when pressed he shows by pointing out to the wind, sweet scent particles, fire made by rubbing two sticks, persons living beyond the seas, and gods, all being existent without being visible, that something, even though nothing can be said about it except by a Kevalin, yet may exist. Mahāvīra commends him for not having taught things he does not understand and for thus having evaded giving offence (*āsāyaṇā*) to the sacred law, the Arhats and the Kevalins.

c8.11

nature of the soul rests in its intellectual function (*uvaoga*), which by means of will and skill is put to use in all possibilities of intellectual cognition. The matters cause the souls to take possession (*gahaṇa*) of the bodies and to enact bodily functions. They own all qualities of colour (black, dark, red, yellow, white), of taste (bitter, sharp, astringent, sour, sweet), of smell (good, bad), and of palpability (heavy, light, soft, rough, cold, warm, sticky, dry, see also Ṭhāṇ. 422a). The five fundamental facts (see also Ṭhāṇ. 332b, Samav. 10 a) are substances (*davva*)¹. But the expression *savva-davva* also includes the time (*addhā*-samaya) according to Viy. 873 a)². With the former it is connected by its eternity and singularity, whereas it is separated from them by being confined in space and by lacking space points. The difference in opinions manifests itself in the conception of T. 5, 38 where time (*kāla*) is being unconditionally acknowledged as matter by the Dig., whereas but conditionally by the Śvet. Just as space consists of units, so does time. One unit of time (*samaya*)⁴ forms the present. It then follows that the future owns as many *samaya* as does the past plus 1, and the latter again as many as the former minus 1; the total time comes to twice the amount of the past with a plus, and twice the amount of the future with a minus, and, consequently, the time that has passed makes up half its total with a plus, and the time to come half its total with a minus (Viy. 889a)⁵. Even the smallest calculable fraction of time, the *āvaliyā*, consists of as many⁶ *samaya* as all the remaining others which are being recorded (see also Thāṇ. 158a), up to the ussappiṇī. When occurring repeatedly their number may increase up to ∞ (Viy. 887 b). For the list of time measures see Viy. 275a, 888a; Jambudd. 89a and also a.o. Thāṇ. 158a. It may suffice to refer to JACOBI on T. 4, 15 and KIRFEL, Kosmographie pp. 337-339, and to note the fundamental difference between those measures that are calculable (gaṇiya) and those expressible by way of comparison only (addho'vamiya). The latter (see Jambudd. 92b) according to Thāṇ. 90b, 430b are paliovama, sāgarovama, osappiṇī, ussappiṇī (§ 12), poggala-pariyatta, tiyaddhā, aṇāgay'addhā, and savv' addhā, but that expression will apply only to the first four or five.

c8.12

¹ daviyadi, gacchadi, tāim sabbhāva-pajjayāim jam daviyam tam bhaṇṇante Pancatthik. 9.

c8.13

² Most certainly it goes back to adhvan, but the Sanskrit of the comm. gives *addhā*-(fem.) Viy. 532b; in Ṭhāṇ. 201 a we find *addhā-kāla*, the eternal time as the fourth beside the civil time measure (*pamāṇa-k.*), the amount of life-time (*ahāu-nivatti-k.*), and the time of death (*maraṇa-k.*).

c8.14

³ F. K. LALANA, The six Dravyas of the Jaina Philosophy. Bombay 1914.

c8.15

⁴ Viy. 6, 4, 1 speaks of *paesa* as of time; the soul is *kāl’āsesam* *sapaesa*, because it has existed since times eternal.—For the atomism of time with the Jains see MASSON-OURSEL, Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philos. 40, 173-176.

c8.16

⁵ Both past and future being without beginning and without end are equal in duration. The “plus” and the “minus” are the 1 *samaya* of the present.

c8.17

⁶ *asamkhejja* (↓)=incomputable as against *samkhejja* (x)=computable, expressible by a definite figure; *apanta* (∞)=innumerable.

c8.18

§ 58. The Units. Logically the "masses" are preceded by their parts, and these appear as the desa and the paesa. But while the paesa are essential for the structure of the world, the desa represent but calculable quantities. So, *e.g.*, the fundamental facts dhamma, adhamma and ākāsa do not exist in their totalities in the lower, the upper and the higher regions of the world, but only in their parts mentioned (desa), whereas in the total world (loga) they do not exist in parts but wholly with the exception of ākās'atthikāya, which, as we saw, is existent in the world as well as in the non-world (Viy. 522 a). On the other hand (see again Viy. 522a) we may just as well examine a unit of space as to whether it contains the atthikāya either completely or in parts (*egammi*¹ ākāsa-paese). For other considerations containing the desa and the paesa see Viy. 149a, 493a, 714a; Pannav. 8a. Let us make it quite clear that it is the paesa or the "units" which in their totality, and in their totality only, constitute the "masses". No fraction of either, however large, may replace them, and any deduction is as little admissible as with a concrete object (*no khaṇḍe cakke* . . . —*sakale cakke* . . . Viy. 148a). With motion, rest and space this comglomeration which lacks both beginning and originator (visasā) is not a merger, but the units of one and the same mass are strung up like the links of a chain. They do not mix like milk and water (Viy.

c8.19

¹ We ought to expect : *egammi*.

c8.20

394a incl. comm.). The number of the units is ∞ with the total space as well as with souls and matter, and 1 with motion and rest (148a) and with the space of the world (421a, 610a, 873b). Moreover there are 8 centremost units (*majjhā-paesa*), which, each with motion, rest and space are supposed (acc. to comm.) to exist in the centre of the upper regions of the world, called the Ruyaga, in Rayaṇappabhā (§107), with the souls within their resp. bodies. They will occupy 1 to 6 or either 8, but *vastu-svabhāvat* not 7 units of space (Viy. 886a, 395b). In the realm of space we meet the 4 main and the 4 intermediate directions (*disā and vidisā*) in addition to zenith (*uddham*) and nadir (*aho*). Their are given as *indā, jāmā, vāruṇī, somā; aggei, nerai, vāyavod, isāṇī; vimalā, tamā* (see Viy. 492b).¹ Acc. to the comm. they are of two-resp. one-dimensional shape.² The pole from which they start (Viy. 606a, Ṭhāṇ, 477b) is a square cube³ of 8 *paesa*.

c8.21

¹ But we find the tripartition above, below and horizontal directions just as well (Ṭhāṇ. 132b).

c8.22

² *disāḥ śakaṭoddhi-samsthitāḥ, vidiśas tu muktāvaly-ākārāḥ, ūrdhvādho-diśau ca ruak’ ākāre Vy. 493b.*

c8.23

³ LEUMANN, Übersicht p. 43b.

c8.24

If the masses constitute the world, they necessarily have to interpenetrate each other, and the units of the one must be touched (*puṭṭha*) by those of the others. Viy. 609a discusses with how many units this will be the case. In doing so, the units of time (*addhā-samaya*) are included. In other words, they are placed on the same level with the others and considered constant. Maximum and minimum figures (*ukkoseṇam* and *jahanneṇam*) mean that a unit in one corner of the end of the world can be surrounded only by 2 lateral units and 1 either above or below, but not by 4 round about and 2 above and below. Both space and time are conditionally, or resp. unconditionally, limited, so that contact will not occur everywhere. The masses interpenetrate each other insomuch that 1 u. motion will coincide with 1 u. rest 1 u. space (*jattha . . ogāḍhe tattha . . og.*). That is to say that e.g. in the minimum of cases the afore-said unit of motion is being touched not by 2 but by 4 u. rest, and not by 6 but by 7 u. But then it coincides (*taiḥ pratyekam antarvyāptaḥ*) with ∞ units of souls, matter and time, as far as the latter is concerned. By 1 u. of soul, and, equally, 1 u. of matter, coinciding with ∞ u. of soul and ∞ u. of matter, we are given proof of the greater density of these substances.

c8.25

Viy. 420b; Ṭhāṇ. 251b say that the individual soul has as many *paesa* as has the space of the world. But this does not refer to the limiting case of the Kevalin as the comm. wants us to believe; it simply says that both have units. One individual soul occupies the room of 1/¿ *ang.* (or either more) of such quantities (T. 5, 15) as are presumed by the part of that or that size acquired through Karman. So then (substantially) the soul of an elephant equals that of a louse, as is explained by the simile of the lamp whose light, as the case may be, will illuminate a large or a small hollow room (Rāyap. 140a, referred to by Viy. 313a). T. 5, 16 in giving this simile its literary expression hereto introduces the conception of contraction and expansion. They stand for different densities within the same number of units, i.e., ¿ in different bodies (Siddh. ref. to T. 5, 8).¹ For the historical importance of the theory (Viy. 365a), according to which the soul equals the body in size, see JACOBI GGA 1919, 17.

c8.26

¹ JAINI, Outlines p. 17 speaks of an elasticity of the soul.

c8.27

Also the units of matter differ in number from 0 up to ∞. The lower limit is the smallest unit of matter, the atom. It is true that, acc. to Kundakunda, the atom has 1 unit (Davvas. 26), but acc. to Umāsvāti it has none. It is one (T. 5, 11 and Siddh. ref. to 5, 11, 14), and thus it coincides with 1 u. It follows that also the word *poggal'atthikāya-paesa* is being applied in speaking of the atom, and its combinations have the word *paesa* added (see below).² There is still another difference with regard of the density of these *paesa*: 1 u. space may contain up to ∞ atoms (Viy. 613b). That is to say: 2 units of matter coincide with 1 or 2 u. of space (and as many units of motion and rest), 3 with 1, 2 or 3, and finally ∞ with 1, 2, 3, . . . . x, ∞ or ∞. For an explanation Siddh. gives a number of similes with ref. to 5, 14.

c8.28

² Comp. also *paramāṇu-poggala-mette vi paese* Viy. 579a.

c8.29

§59. The Atom. *poggala*, the word for atom,¹ is applied in its basic meaning as a "concrete body" in Viy. 176b, whereas in 240a it means the part of an individual. The atom is eternal (Viy. 65b) as is the substance of which it is the ultimate particle and among the fundamental facts it is the only one bearing any physical character (T. 5, 4). Owing to the fineness of its structure by which it eludes observation, it is beyond the grasp of tools and indivisible², but it owns the qualities of colour, smell, and taste at either 1 kind or 2 kinds of touch (Viy. 746b. 797a) among the possible 5, 5, 2 and 8 kinds of these four (Viy. 778 a), and such in an endless variety of different grades (*guṇa*). The qualities of touch are cold or warm in combination with smooth or rough.

c8.30

¹ *pūrayati galati ca* Siddh. ref. to T. 5, 10, comp. with 5. 32.—*puggala* is scarcely ever read.

c8.31

² This is what the *paramāṇu* has in common with the *samaya* and the *paesa* (Thāṇ. 134b). It appears to be probable that *apassa* along with *anaddha*, *amajjha*, and *avibhāima* equally means only the lacking of parts (see also 293a and others).

c8.32

It is either spontaneously or by means of an impulse from without (Thāṇ. 63b) that atoms by merging constitute aggregates (*khandha*) which, as the case may be, may own a greater number of qualities of colour, etc. (Viy. 748b). According as such a one consists of 2, 3, etc., atoms, we speak, as already mentioned, of a *du-paesiya, ti-p.*, etc. up to *ananta-p. khandha*. In connexion with aggregates the atom is called *paramāṇu-poggala*. An aggregate consisting of even-numbered atoms is divisible into halves, but it lacks a middle (it is *amajjha*), whereas conditions are reversed with odd numbers, and both cases are valid with indeterminate numbers, (*x*, and *¿*); it goes without saying, however, that all of them are *sa-paesa* (Viy. 233 a). The way how to decompose an aggregate consisting of 2 and more atoms is demonstrated in Viy. 102b and, more closely, in Viy. 561a. That such a decomposition will result in gaining only complete atoms had to be specifically stressed in 103a. Just as the question of divisibility is being discussed so is the contiguity (*puṭṭha*) between atoms and aggregates by taking as a basis 9 possibilities, either whether it occurs in parts (*deseṇam*, *desehim*) or completely (*savveṇam*) (Viy. 233b). It must be noted, therefore, that the number of atoms constituting an aggregate may divide among one and several *paesa*.

c8.33

The mergence of atoms and aggregates with atoms and aggregates is brought about (Viy. 102b. 103b) by a *sineha-kāya*, though nothing concerning its nature is mentioned.¹ T. 5, 32 introduces the contrasted pair of *snigdha* and *rūkṣa*, 'smooth' and 'rough'.

c8.34

¹ Quite another kind of *sukuma* is the *sineha-k.* which acc. to Viy. 8gb moves in all directions (*pavadi*) and thus dissolves rapidly in contrast to the *bāyara āu-kāya*.

c8.35

As is the case with all sensuous qualities, also these two *lukkha* and *niddha* (Viy. 638 b *lukkhā* and *alukkhī*) exist in gradations (*guṇa*), as is presupposed by Viy. 878 a, whereas in Viy. 394 b they are but hinted at by *vemāya-niddhayā* etc. According to T. 5, 33 the lowest grades will not merge because they lack sufficient power to assimilate (*śakti* Siddh.); it takes at least two grades of difference to make this power effective (T. 5, 35), and that is why only equal grades—though only *s+r*, not *s+s* (T. 5, 34)—will assimilate, and, accordingly, only the lower grade to the higher.

c8.36

§60. Thus it follows that the atom, though as a substance it is eternal, is changeable in its conditions. As to Viy. 640 a, colour, smell, taste, and touch are qualified as conditions, (*pajjava*). They are inherent in the substance (*paryāya* T. 5,37). But according to Pannav. 5. (196b) *pajjava* also means the secondary differences of atoms and aggregates within each of the above mentioned four spheres and, moreover, within their size (*ogāhaṇā*). Their number is ∞, and thus it happens that they coincide with the *pariṇāma*, the "accidental" changes and their results, which constitute the momentary being of an object (T. 5, 41). As such the above mentioned four are referred to by Viy. 420 b along with the shape (*saṃṭhāṇa*, see below). The latter is omitted by Ṭhāṇ. 201a. These five species as existing spontaneously (*visasā*) are contrasted with those caused by an impulse from without (*paogasā*) or either by the mixture of both (misa) according to Viy. 328 a¹. *pariṇāma*, however, within the realm of the inanimate does not refer to those five only (Pannav. 13, 287b), but also to combination (of smooth and rough), cleavage (s.b.) and sound (s.b.), as well as to motion and the absence of weight and non-weight. Motion may manifest itself by extending either in long or short distances or by either leading to contacts or not.² From Viy. 95 b, we learn that neither heavy nor light is a quality of the Karman body (§ 262), of the tinge of souls (§ 97), the inward sense (§ 71), or of speech (§ 68) which all pertain to the realm of matter.

c8.37

¹ The *paogasā* and *visasā pariṇaya poggala* are mentioned by Subuddhi to his prince Jiyasattu (Nāya 12, 174a.)

c8.38

² For the *phusamāṇa-gai* Prajn. refers to the act of making a flat stone skip along the surface of water (*bāla-jana-prasiddha*).

c8.39

The transition from one *pariṇāma*³ to the next is described by synonyms as a process of motion; *paramāṇu-poggale (and khandhe) eyai veyai calai phandai ghaṭṭai khubbhai udīrai tam tam bhāvam pariṇamai* Viy. 232 b (after 182b). Aggregates will experience it either totally or partially. T. 5, 26 teaches a.o. that aggregates come about by an amalgamation of atoms as well as by the secreting of atoms (*sāhaṇā* and *bheya*, Viy. 567a), i.e. by giving away atoms. This theory may well go back to Viy. 743b, where it is said that of all *poggala* seized for the purpose of taking in matter (*geṇhai*) a being will retain (*āhārei*) 1/¿ and give away 1/∞ (*nijjarei*), that is to say *seya-kale*, during the vibration as which the transition manifests itself (*grahaṇantaram* Vy.), for with reference to *eya* all atoms and aggregates are called *seya* and *nireya* (*saija and nireja*).⁴ The act of motion passes in an incalculably small time, i.e. in 1/¿ *āvaliyā* at the very utmost, which is called *antara* (Viy. 234b, 883b).

c8.40

³ Acc. to Viy. 638b the new *pariṇāma* comes on when the former is *nijjiṇṇa*. In this connexion *samayam* means "for some time."

c8.41

⁴ Vy. is wrong in saying *eyati kāle*.

c8.42

In connexion with the theory of motion the *sadda-pariṇaya poggala* are quoted and equated with the atoms and aggregates in motion, whereas the *asadda-p.p.* are equated with those in rest during motion and rest. So that, then, the sound, either *subbhi* or *dubbhi*,⁵ is a quality of the matter in its form as an aggregate. According to T. 5, 24 the same is true with association, fineness and coarseness¹, form and decay, darkness, shadow, warmth and light. Of these ten phenomena the first seven are such inherent in the aggregate, whereas the last three are irradiations. The modes of the association, i.e. of the units within the animate and inanimate world, are grouped by Viy. 394b according to spontaneousness (*visasā*), impulse (*paogasā*), and finality (*sāiya, aṇāiya sapajjavasiya* and *ap.*). Between the fineness and its opposite there runs the dividing-line which separates this concrete world from the one beyond sensual conceivability, the first being *bāyara*, the latter *suhuma*. Their difference is in the number of atoms: an aggregate consisting of 8 atoms is equally unsplittable as the single atom, whereas if consisting of ∞ atoms it can be split, and then it is even combustible as well as it may get wet and be able to float (Viy. 232 b). T. 5, 28 points out that its spectacular appearance results from decay and association, and in order to prove this Devanandin offers a theory², though it may simply mean that the object radiates atoms which associate with the organs of sense known to be of material quality. As to the shape of aggregates we distinguish between geometrical and non-geometrical formations, the latter being called *aniṭṭhamtha* "not thus behaving". In circular (*parimaṇḍala*), orbicular (*vaṭṭa*), triangular, square, and linear formations the atoms, or the units resp., are arranged in an either two-or three-dimensional order (*payara, ghana*), in linear formations (*āyaya*) also one-dimensionally (*seḍhi-āyaya*), and, with the only exception of circular formations, they contain atoms in either odd or even numbers (*oya-paesa, jumma-p.*). Their highest and lowest numbers are laid down in Viy. 860a. Decay may manifest itself in the shape of smaller units, lumps, potsherds, leaves, and brookes (Pannav. 266a, 288a). The material quality of darkness becomes evident in the *tamu-kkāya* and the *kaṇha-rāī* of the world (§ 134). Darkness and lightness of night and day are attributed according to Viy. 246b to *asubha* and subha poggala, and to the former also the darkness in the different regions of hell (see Ṭhāṇ. 263a). In the legendary story of Jambudd. III the lightness is like scattered matter that lasts. For Bharata (§ 13) at the head of his army succeeds in passing through the long tunnels of both the Timisa-and Khaṇḍappavāya-guhā in the rays of his jewel by forming circles which alternatingly appear on the right and the left walls (Jambudd. 225a). This can but mean that he is anxious not to leave any spot dark, and, actually, no spot remains dark, after he has passed. Each circle lies in the radiant sphere of the other.

c8.43

⁵ Nāyādh. 174a; Pannav. 288a.

c8.44

¹ Thus instead of "smallness" and "largeness" (JACOBI for *saukṣmya* and *sthūlya*).

c8.45

² JACOBI with ref. to T. 5, 28.

c8.46

§61. The Substances. The formations of aggregates, as mentioned just before, result in the substances of, so to say, a second order, i.e., in material masses called davva like those of the first order (§ 57). In Viy. 420b we read that one atom and its multiples form whole davva or either parts of such (desa): from four atoms upwards all eight combinations possible in this connexion will occur. suhuma (§60) are the accumulations of colours, smells, and different kinds of taste and palpability which, acc. to Viy. 757 a, are to be found in closely packed density below each region of the lower and the upper world. Material masses of this kind, together with their shapes, come into being spontaneously, whereas all accumulations furnishing the souls in the world with bodies and opportunitics of activity—for the inanimate substance is destined to serve the animate (Viy.856a)—result from impulse, i.e., through the working of the Karman. But as those accumulations have concrete qualities, it follows that they represent a mixture of both cases (Viy. 332 a). Now, owing to Karman, matter forms in four bodies, the inward sense, speech and breath (Viy. 567a; Ṭhāṇ. 158a). The infinite variety of matter thus grouped is called poggala-pariyatta¹. At least in the case of the inward sense matter is divided into vaggaṇā (Viy. 222a, 646b), for we hear of the ∞ maṇo-davva-vaggaṇā of certain gods. Further proofs for this are missing, but s.b. Of the five bodies existent the body of transmission is equally missing in this connexion, since (comp. Sthān. 158a) it cannot occur along with the body of transformation in the same individual (§ 62). From Viy. 621 a ff. we learn, to begin with, that the inner-sense and speech are of a bodily quality (*rūpim*). Concerning the inner sense we may refer to the *vaggaṇā* mentioned above. Speech, however, counts as being shaped like a thunderbolt (*vajja-saṃthiya*, Pannav. 255b, comp. § 68), and its atoms are "beyond heavy and light" (*agurulahu*) and thus of a quality (*pariṇāma*) which (comp. Prajn. 389a) is shared by all non-bodily substances including also the inner sense and the Karman. That both speech and the inner sense must be distinguished from the I (*ego*) (*āyā*) (§ 70), that they are unconscious (*acitta*) and inanimate (*ajīva*), but yet are inherent in souls, adds to establish their bodily nature.

c8.47

¹ Homonymous is the maximum measure of time (Viy. 87b).

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§62. *The Bodies.* During the time of its specific bodily existence the individual possesses more than one body (*sarīra*). Their number is five in all (Pannav. 12. 21; Samav. 216a; Thāṇ. 169b), but their distribution among the different beings differs (§ 67. 104).¹ They all have the Karman body (*kammaga s.*) and the fiery body (*teyaga s.*) life long. All beings pertaining to the upper world, i.e. animal and human beings with one to five senses, permanently own the earthly body (*urāliya* or *orāl. s.*). Both the gods and the inhabitants of hell always live in bodies of transformation (*veuvviya s.*),² but other beings do so only temporarily, while the body of transposition (*āhāraga s.*) merely applies to human beings and in special cases only. The functions of some of these bodies is as well as their purpose are told in the commentaries which however do not always agree. The established list leading from *orāl.* over *veuvv.*, *āhār.*, *tey.* to *kamm. sarīra* suggests the gradual increase in fineness and, simultaneously, in density of material units (T. 2, 38-40).³ Apart from the beings already mentioned all higher animal and human beings, generated by breeding (§63)—the latter when living in a *kamma-bhūmi* (§117)—own bodies of transformation, that is to say, that a human being may change its appearance (*vikuvvittae*) magically, provided that it be free from sin (*amāi*, § 181). For, so we learn from Viy. 189 a, the prepared food taken by a monk in a sinful way (*māi*) will strengthen his bones and the marrow within, but it will weaken flesh and blood, whereas the accidental food of the sinless will result in the opposite. While the one aids to the development of the bodily organs, the other will transubstantiate into excretions. The capability of transformation therefore depends on bodily preconditions. We are not told when and at what point higher animals enter into transformation. Apart from the beings mentioned above the coarse wind-beings equally have bodies of transformation, which appear in the shape of a flag (*paḍāgā*), manifesting themselves either as storms or clouds, yet without changing their minute smallness (1/8 *angula*) (Pannav. 416a, 417a).¹ Animal and human beings, however, may become either quite small or immensely large (1/8 *ang.* upto 100, resp. 100,000 *joy.*). The inhabitants of hell and the gods, with the exception of the Gevijja and Aṇuttara (§ 129), are equally able to change their appearance, even though they already live in bodies of transformation. This body of transformation so characteristic of their form of existence and built up without attracting foreign particles of matter (§ 181) is called *bhava-dharaṇijja*, whereas *uttara-veuvviya* is the body deliberately taken.

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¹ Acc. to Viy. 622b. Pannav. 268a we have different kinds due to stages of transition supervening in case the seizure of a new body has not yet been completed.

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² (*a*) *veuvviya-sarīra* ref. to gods= (un)adorned Viy. 746a.

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³ In this connexion Prajn. 269b speaks of *vaggaṇāu pradeśa-bāhulyam*.

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¹ *sāvat-pramāṇa-vikurvaṇyām eva tasya śakti-sambhavāt* Prajn. 418a.

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Pannav. 423a points out that the body of transposition is exclusively destined to serve pious persons in the Karman places (§ 117) who own magic powers (*iddhi-patta*), but who have not yet succeeded in accomplishing self-discipline (*pamatta-samjaya*), whereas acc. to Devanandin on T. 2, 37, 49 it is meant to prove those powers, to solve subtile dogmatic questions, and to escape any violation of self-discipline.² It is defined by T. 2, 49, and its possession is confined to those who are in command of the 14 Puvva, i.e. its occurrence is antedated by Umāsvāti and located in the historical past. We may be allowed to assume that rather than āhāraka "attracting"¹ its name should be ādhāraka in that the body represents a "vessel" either for him who, for the time of 1 muhutta at the longest (T. p. 60, 9), slips into it which is no higher than a rayaṇa, or else for the instruction brought home by its bearer from a consultative magic change of place. But it was not before Umāsvāti that the latter purpose was introduced. The body of transposition does not exist simultaneously with that of transformation, as this is neither the case with magic powers by which they are generated. The Karman body is the individual formation given its shape by deeds previously wrought. The fiery body has to be understood as a bearer of potential energies, and by being allotted to all beings the latter are attributed a latent energy which may manifest itself with individual persons on the ground of magic power (labdhi). This power will appear a. o. as an radiation of either heat or coolness as an effect of either curse or blessing (comp. the teya-nisagga which provides the name for Viy. 15). The teachers referred to by Umāsvāti on T. 2, 43 are wrong in considering only those exceptional persons, as is Devanandin in adding his Sūtra to T. 2, 48. Not enough with the functions mentioned, Siddhasena (T. S. 59) and Haribhadra (T.S. 56), understand the fiery body to cause digestion, but we think it improbable that of all five bodies the finest but one should serve that purpose. All bodies except the earthly one are closely linked with the soul (jīva-phuḍa, Ṭhāṇ. 251b).

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² *sūkṣma-padārtha-nirjñānārtham asamyama-parijihīrṣayā ca.*

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¹ dhriyate ity ādhārakaḥ Devanandin 18a.

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§ 63. Physiology. A being comes into existence physically by three ways; by manifestation, by coagulation, or by generation. Manifestation (uvavāya) means creation brought about with lightning-like suddenness without any material basis;² thus the gods and the inhabitants of hell spring into life. Caogulation (sammuccheṇa) takes place spontaneously out of existing matter; it pertains to all beings furnished with one to four senses. All beings with five senses, i.e. all higher animals and human beings, come into existence partly in the same way (s.b.) and partly by generation (gabbha-vakkanti, garbha-vyutkrānti). The place where a being comes into existence, is its place of origin (joni).¹ It is either cold, animated, concealed (samvuḍa),² or the opposite hereof or both. A fourth trinity (Pannav. 227b) is purely anatomical (§ 64). The distribution of these 9 qualities among the beings, as given in Pannav. 9 (comp. Ṭhāṇ. 121a), can be easily understood. The inhabitants of hell, for instance, come into existence in cold and hot places, the gods in temperate ones (sīsiṇa). In such as the latter ones generation takes place, and, moreover, they are both covered and open to view (samvuḍa-viyaḍa). For according to its position the uterus (garbha) is concealed, though yet it is visible in advanced pregnancy. Manifestation takes place in inanimate places: the gods come into being on the throne of gods and in the garb of gods, that is in a covered concealed place, and the same applies to the inhabitants of hell (nārakōtpatti-sthānānāṃ samvṛta-gavākṣa-kalpatvāt Prajn. 227a. b.). Coagulation takes place in an open place. Of the higher animals the miraculous species of snakes called āsaliya exclusively comes into being in this way (Pannav. 46 a), but there are still other beings which may be brought into existence by coagulation, e.g., the sumsumāra, mahoraga, quadrupeds equipped with claws (saṇapphaga) and the viyaya-pakkhi, birds that never fold their wings (Pannav. 44a, 45a, 46b, 49a), and, finally, the human beings. These all may spring into life from moist human excretions and from uncleanly matter spontaneously³ (50a), though than they will remain undeveloped (apajjatta) and diminutively small (1/¿ ang.), and they will stay alive for 1 muhutta at the longest. Apart from the āsaliya all these beings generated by coagulation are sexless. By development (pajjatti) Umāsvāti on T. 8, 12, p. 177, 4ff. asks us to understand the faculty of assimilating matter to the body and to complete the same along with the sensuous and breathing organs, and, as the case may be, also the speech and the inward sense. In elemental beings, as well as in plants, animal and human beings this development may even be found missing, and then they are *apajjatta*.¹

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² jahe mahāsani-tiyas'indacāva-vijjūṇa sambhave hei gayaṇammi khapena, ahā devāṇa vi hoi uppatti, Haribhadra, Samaraiccakahā ed. JACOBI, p. 57, 8.

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¹ With plants we speak of joni-voccheya when their germinative faculty extinguishes (Viy. 671, 274a; Ṭhāṇ. 123b, 343b, 405a).

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² For samvṛta JACOBI T. 2, 33 writes samvṛta=minimal. Siddhasena p. 191, 19 suggests this version by samvṛtā pracchannā saṃkaṭā vā (yoniḥ).

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³ Āyār. 5, 2 distinguishes between the sammucchima and the rase and saṃsayas. For the same list as here ref. to Ṭhāṇ. 985b, 416a.

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¹ Acc. to Viy. 852b; Samav. 26b this sums up to 14 kinds of beings.

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§64. The description in the text of embryo-life nearly always concerns the human germ. An animal embryo (*tirikkha-joṇiya gabbha*) exists between 1 *muh.* and 8 years, a human one (*maṇussi-g.*) between 1 *muh.* and 12 years, and a fully developed fruit (? *kāya-bhavattha*) between 1 *muh.* and 24 years. This conception is obviously related to the informations rendered by Viy. 88b saying what evil and good is being practised by a *jīva gabbha-gaya samāṇa*, and of what kind his reward will be when he dies as such a one. Human and animal sperm lives in the womb from 1 to 12 hours (*Viy.* 433a; *Tand.* 4b²). Cases of getting with child and of its counterpart, negative sexual intercourse, are dealt with by *Thāṇ.* 312b along with their causes. The first food an embryo (*jīva*) takes after having entered the womb consists in the menstrual blood of the mother (*māu-oya*) together with the sperm of the father (*Sūy.* II 3, 21); 353b), but later it varies. It is not taken by bits, but by the entire body (§ 96), and while nothing is being excreted, all serves to build up the sensuous organs and the body. Mother and fruit are interconnected by two strings: the one (*māu-jīva-rasa-hāriṇī* scil. *nāli* ?) starts from the mother and serves the fruit to breathe and to transubstantiate the different substances, whereas the other (*putta-j.-r.-h.*) starts from the fruit and serves it in building up the body (*ciṇai, uvaciṇai*). While flesh, blood and brain come from the mother (*māiy’aṅga, Thāṇ.* 170b *māuy’a.*), bones, marrow, hair and nails come from the father (*piy’a.*). These parental gifts (*ammā-piiya sarīraya*) will endure as long as the body of the descendant remains unweakened (*avavaṇṇa*). The main source for the afore-said is *Viy.* 87a, partly also *Tand.* 7a, 8a.

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² Ed. DLJP 59.

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The embryology of the human being is discussed in the first part of the Tandulavēyāliya. In referring to the introductory Gāhās we here but state that the margin of fertility is 55 years with the woman and 75 years with the man (v. 13, comp. Sthān. 313b), and that the fruit remains in the womb for 277½ days on an average (v. 4f). Its stages are listed as kalala (7 days), abbuya (the same), pesi, and ghaṇa. Its weight amounts to 3 karisa=½ pala in the first month, in the second it gets solid, in the third it rouses lusts within the mother, in the fourth it makes her limbs swell, in the fifth it its extremities and its head develop (panca piṇḍiyāo), in the sixth its gall and its blood, in the seventh its veins, muscles, vessels, nerves, pores, hairs, and nails, and in the eighth the child is complete. The sex depends on the preponderance of either sperm or blood, in case neither prevails sexlessness will result. A sexless fruit lies (v. 18) in the centre of the mother, but a male on the right, and a female on the left side. Its position and its condition are in accordance with the mother. The word bimba (Tand. 14a; Ṭhāṇ. 287a) appears to qualify the result of a miscarriage. Acc. to Viy. 89a. a cross-position will lead to a still birth. A description of the female genitals is rendered by Tand. 4a. From Pannav. 9 (277b); Ṭhāṇ. 121b we learn that the uterus may be either convex, concave, or flat (vaṃsi-paṭṭa). In Viy. 218 a the role attributed to Hari Negamesi of dislocating the embryo is apparently due to generalising the well-known individual case.

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The generated beings are born either in the egg or with the amnion (the chorion), or as living young. Apart from birds, all snakes, fish, lizards, turtles and crocodiles are egg-born (aṇḍaya). Most higher quadrupeds and all human beings are born with the chorion (jarāuya). Whereas some quadruped like elephants and mammals with digits extended to support a wing-membrane (bats etc.) are born complete (poyaya).¹

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¹ poyaya, Skt. poṭaja, is explained by KOHL (ZDMG 103, p. 159) by "born in a boat", the boat, in his view, being represented by the burst covers developing the fruit when leaving the womb. Though this may well apply to

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§65. As coarse as all these conceptions are, so is the human anatomy (Tand. 35b). Apart from the quantities of liquids and other bodily items which can be omitted here, the human being has 700 veins. Starting from the navel 160 each extend upwards, downwards into the legs, downwards into the abdomen, and horizontally; 25 each contain mucus and gall, 10 contain sperm. Furthermore there are 900 sinews, 500 muscles, 900 vessels, 9.9 million hairpores, not counting the hair of the skull and the beard, and 33 million including the latter. Some figures concerning women and hermaphrodites slightly differ in giving them 670 and 680 veins, resp., and 470 and 480 muscles, resp. Moreover, we learn that the male is furnished with 5 and the female with 6 inner organs (koḍha), and that with the former we find 9 and with the latter 11 apertures (soya).¹ It is but due to a tendency of discrimination that in contrast to the general Indian view, that the left side is qualified as good (suha-pariṇama) and the right side is being unpropitious (Tand. 35b).

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¹ Umāsvāti on T. 2, 34; Śilāṅka on Āyār. 5, 2.

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With the only exception of the Tand. as concerns the structure of the human body, we meet next to nothing but generalities.² Thāṇ. 357 a; Tand. 27b know of 6 different ways of joining the bones (saṃghayaṇa, saṃhanana) by means of hooking and pinning: vajja-risabha (or vairōsabha) nārāya, risabha-n., n. addha-n., kiliya and chevaṭṭha (Umāsv. on T. 8, 12 gives spāṭika instead). For an explanation see a. o. V. GLASENAPP, Karman p. 29, for an illustration see BASTIAN, Ideale Welten I, plate IV (the corresponding sentence on p. 283 is incorrect). From coagulation there results the sixth (and worst) kind, from manifestation none at all, since inhabitants of hell and gods have neither bones, nor sinews, nor veins; with generation all kinds are possible. Acc. to Tand. 27b the chevaṭṭha-joint is the only one, however, which now still pertains to human beings.

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² Here we have to add the nipples. They are not mentioned by Thāṇ. 450b.

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bats, yet it remains to be asked whether it is equally true of elephants and many more quadrupeds listed in the comm. on T. 2, 34.

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³ But Vivāgas. 42b states the 48 nāli and their functions.

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The first is the ideal, and as such it is characteristic of the Arhats etc.

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The shape of the body (*saṃṭhāṇa*), too may appear in 6 different kinds (Ṭhāṇ. 357a; Tand. 27b). A being is proportioned either all over (*sama-cauramsa*), or only above (*niggoha*, *n.-parimaṇḍala*), or only below (*sāiya*, Comm. *sādi*, Um. *sāci*). It is either hunchbacked (*khujja*), or crippled (*vāmaṇa*), or deformed (*huṇḍa*). The latter refers to the inhabitants of hell (comp. § 109) as well as to all coagulated beings except those furnished with one sense only, as is described in § 105. While all kinds apply to the generated higher animals and human beings, the first kind only will apply to the gods.

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Next to the shape of the body we have to mention its size (*sarīr'ogāhaṇā*). The bodies of elemental beings will not go beyond their diminutive smallness which, as a minimum, pertains to all earthly beings. But everywhere else the maximum size is enormous: plants and aquatic animals upto 1000 *joy.*, animals living on dry land up to 6 *gāuya*, and human beings up to 3 *g.* etc. (Pannav. 412b). Beyond the range of the horizontal world the size of the body will increase the more the deeper we go, as it will decrease the more the higher we go : the beings inhabiting the deepest regions of hell measure 500 *dhaṇu*, the Aṇuttarovavāiya 1 *rayaṇi* (Pannav. 417a). For the siddha see §187.

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§66. We now come to speak of the bodily functions. Breathing is called *āṇamai pāṇamai*¹ *ūsāsai nīsāsai*. While the first two words express the inward activity, the last two refer to the outward one (Prajn. 220 b). Unexceptionally all beings breathe (Pannav. 7), but the intervals will be the longer the higher they stand. Thus the inhabitants of hell breathe incessantly,² whereas the highest Vemāṇiya breathes every 33 fortnights only; but animals furnished with one to five senses and human beings follow different ways of breathing (*vemāyāe*). As we learn from Viy. 274b in contrast to Tand. 3b, the frequency of breathing is the same with the embryo as it is with the fully developed man, and he will retain this frequency for the whole time of his life, i.e. 3773 in 1 *muhutta*. So, then, respiration (*ussāsa-nissāsa* or *pāṇa*) comes to be a time-measure. While the breathing of beings having two to five senses was accepted as an established fact (*jānāmo pāsāmo*), it seemed problematic with regard to elemental beings and plants, but it is explicitly stated to apply to them as well (Viy. 109a), and, moreover, Viy. 109b continues in saying that "breathing" embraces all possible matter (*davvāim*). This statement is as surprising as the adjoining and incorrect reference to Pannav. 28 (the Āhāra-paya). A windbody (*vāuyāya*) breathes his own kind, and even though by inhaling its own the same has perished (*uddaittā*) in it a many hundred thousand times, it will yet reappear on and again (*paccāyāi*, Viy. 110a).¹ In some other connexion we are told that the elemental as well as the vegetable beings inhale and exhale each other (Viy. 419b).²

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¹ *aṇiti, prāṇiti.*

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² For all tormented beings breathe rapidly, Prajn. 220b.

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¹ Abhay. maintains that the particles of matter constituting inhalation and exhalation are of finer quality than those composing the "earthly" and the transformation body of the wind-being (110 a).

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² Abhay. without having an opinion of his own follows the "paiya-vyākhyā" and builds up a theory according to which closely connected earthly and other beings mutually assimilate in breathing.

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The earth- and water-beings are not capable of moving voluntarily, nor are plants. Hence they are called *thāvara*, i.e. stationary, in contrast to all other beings, called *tasā pāṇā*, i.e. movable (comp. e.g. Āyār. 5, 1). The text of Dasav. 4 beg. formed hereafter shows the altogether unobjectionable meaning. But Siddhasena on T. 2, 12 (p. 158, 3) distinguishes between the two groups as such in which both the conditions and the mood of the corresponding being show up externally and such where they do not; for *trasa*, so it is said, originally (*ādau*) means *sukha-grahaṇa*. Acc. to Devanandin *trasa* expresses the possibility of transition into a different class of being which, as was mentioned just before, certain beings are lacking, so that for him all beings having one sense only belong to the *thāvara*.

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All beings brought into existence by coagulation are, without exception, sexless (Jiv. II), and the same applies to the inhabitants of hell, whereas sexless gods do not occur. In correspondence with the sensuality decreasing in direct proportion to the height of the heavenly region, the Gevejja and Aṇuttara gods are short of female deities (see Pannav. 547b ff. and comp. Ṭhāṇ. 105b and T. 4, 8-10). In the dry account rendered by Jīv. 105b, 177a and 198a, we come across three queer similes which originally belong to a more highly styled text: the female sex is compared with a fire for cooking (*phumphuy*-aggi), the male with a forest-fire (*vaṇa-dav*’aggi), and the third kind with a city-fire (*mahānagara-dāha*).

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§67. The number of different senses (*indiya*; Viy. 223b : *āyāṇa*) amounts to five in all (Pannav. 15).¹ They are unequally distributed among the beings, and that is why the latter are divided into such furnished with one to five senses, as frequently mentioned above, thus forming the fundamentals for approaching the animate world. Beings with one sense own nothing but sensation, those with two have taste added, those with three smell, those with four vision, and those with five the power of hearing.² The first four are comprised as beings with incomplete senses (*vigal’indiya*). The immeasurably small particles of earth, water, fire and wind, and, moreover, all plants are counted among the beings having one sense only. The various manifestations of the elements, all plants and such beings furnished with more senses than one are listed by Pannav. 24a ff. without the intention of completeness, and equally by Utt. 36, while Paṇhāv. 1 mentions many of them short of a system. As to the organs of the senses the above mentioned sequence is the reverse, and then, accordingly, the first three senses have 2 organs each,³ and the latter two one each. For this Pannav.

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¹ For details ref. to the inner sense see § 15.

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² The Dig. follow Brahman conception by interpolating the teachings of the 10 *prāṇa*, 5 of which are the *indiya-pāṇa*, 3 the *bala-p.* comprising the inner sense (§ 71), speech and body, while the remaining 2 stand for the breath (*āṇā-pāṇa* or *ucchvāsa-niḥśvāsa-prāṇa*) and the vital force (*āuga-p.*). Comp. Gommaṭas. Jīv. 129; Devanandin on T. 2, 14; comm. on Prāyaścittacūlikā 4. The latter two state the way in which these *p.* are distributed among the beings furnished with one to five senses. See JACOBI Tattv. for this passage.

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³ The one- to three- eyed beings, referred to by Ṭhāṇ. 171b, are so in a metaphorical sense.

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312a gives *davv'indiya*, which corresponds to *upakarana* given by Umāsvāti T. 2, 17.

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The materiality of the sense causes Viy. 423b to call their bearers, i.e. the *jīva* in itself and all beings in the *Saṃsāra*, *poggali*. We have to distinguish between the *uvacaya*, i.e. the accumulation of atoms suited for the purpose, and the *nivvattaṇā*, i.e. the disposition or shaping, which occurs in *¿ samaya* of a *muhuita*. The *uvacaya* (not mentioned by Umāsvāti) is called *pracaya* by Devanandin (on T. 2, 17). This author distinguishes (see p. 165) between an inner and an outer disposition (*nirvṛtti*), the latter representing the very *pudgala-pracaya*, while the former means the units of the soul with regard of both the extension and shape of the corresponding organ of sense, e. g. the pupil of the eye (comp. JACOBI on the quoted passage). Acc. to Prajn. 294a all that is said about special shapes (*saṃsthāna*) refers to the inner disposition shared by all beings furnished with that sense, and, accordingly, the senses of hearing and smell are shaped like certain flowers (*kalambuya-puppha* and *aimuttaga-canda*), the sense of vision like a lense (*masūra*), the tongue like a knife (*khurappa*), whereas the sense of feeling as not being distinguished into an outer and an inner disposition (Prajn.) appears in different shapes (Pannav. 293b and somewhat divergent Siddhasena on T. 2, 17). Moreover, there are *bāhalla*¹ and *pohatta*² the one standing for the thickness and the other for the width of accumulated matter. Both are diminutively small, and only the *pohatta* of the sense of feeling equals the measure of the body. The range (*visaya*) is largest with vision where it goes beyond 100,000 *joy.*; with hearing it goes up to 12, and with all other senses up to 9 *joy*. This certainly must be taken literally, and just as with the size of the body (s.a.) and the allegedly longest duration of life, this conception refers to legendary individuals. With the objects the organs of sense come into direct contact (*puṭṭhāim*—and *paviṭṭhāim*—

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