The Doctrine of the Jainas, Described after the Old Sources c8.144

c8.144

also in the Ṭhāṇ.; Jīv. 734a; Dasā 6), the subject is characterised by the words . . . tti vattavvam siyā: "from a standpoint it is predicable that . . .".¹ The word siyā standing for itself and occurring in pairs and repeatedly in the from of siya (e.g. neraiyā siya sāsayā siya asāsayā, Viy. 302a) has become the motto for the theory of the relative validity of any statement. But now, apart from the word syāt, the negation avattavya is significant of the seven formulae of the syād-vāda which will be mentioned presently. But just as the formula vattavvam siyā belongs to the sphere of the Syādvāda already so does avattavya in the discussions rendered by Pannav. 323b ff.; Aṇuog. 54 ff. From the latter we may take as an example that a mere dual of equivalent elements (e.g. an aggregate consisting of two atoms) eludes observation from the view of the "sequence" (aṇupuvvī), i. e. that it lies "beyond what is predicable" (du-paesie avattavvae), since this dual is neither a sequence as is the case with three atoms and more nor none as with one atom. While thus the building stones of the Syādvāda are existent in the Canon already, yet the latter is still unaware of the completed building bearing this name or that of the Anekāntavāda. Most certainly the invention of this theory of relativities (as it is frequently called in a somewhat playful manner) goes back to an early time, probably to Mahāvīra personally, but in its fully developed shape as the so-called sapta-bhaṅgī it appears only later as an anonymous creation. As to its origin SCHRADER, who noticed the relation with the vikalpa of the Ājñānika, pointed to the logics of the southern Indian Digambaras developed in shrewd dialectic argumentations.² The sapta-bhaṅgī says that an object (a ghaṭa, of course) seen from a chosen standpoint (syāt) can be signified (1) as existent, (2) as non-existent (i.e. regarded under the aspect of another object) and (3) as both existent and non-existent (the former seen under its own aspect and the latter under alien ones). The three corresponding formulae are : syād asty eva, syān nāsty eva, syād asti nāsti ca. The two statements of (3), however, can be made by letting the one follow the other, whereas they cannot possibly be made simultaneously. Under this aspect the object (ghaṭa) (4) defies description: *syād avaktavya eva*. The remaining three sentences are identical with the first three by adding *avaktavya*. This means to say in sentence (5) that a thing exists but that, apart from this positive quality with reference to another thing, it has a negative quality as well, and that it is impossible to express both qualities simultaneously: *syād asti cāvaktavyaś ca*. Sentence (6): *syān nāsti cāvaktavyaś ca* is just the reverse on the basis of non-existence. Sentence (7), finally, expresses that an object as in (3) can be taken either as positive or negative, though not simultaneously but only successively: *syād asti nāsti cāvaktavyaś ca*. The wording rendered follows Vimaladāsa’s Saptabhaṅgītaraṅgiṇī (p. 2); except for some slight difference it represents the backbone of the Syādvāda literature.¹