The Doctrine of the Jainas, Described after the Old Sources c8.165

c8.165

§82. By concluding this subject we return to its beginning where the spiritual function (*uvaoga*) was designated as the essence and characteristic feature of the soul. The statement of this fact in T. 2, 8 is followed in T. 2, 9 by the division of the *upayoga* into "formally distinct" and "formally indistinct" imagination. This Sūtra goes back to Pannav. 29. Imagination is *sākāra* if the object is grasped separately together with its present qualities (*saparyaya*, Prajn.). This happens in cognition, no matter whether it is of the right of the wrong kind, the latter in this case being called non-cognition. Thus it follows that the *sākāra-uvaoga* is eight-fold and that it comes wherever those two kinds of cognition are recorded, i.e. with all beings. The *anākāra-uvaoga*, however, is given when an object appears without its temporal attributes as an abstract (*sāmānya-rūpatayā*). Prajn. 526 a, b illustrates this by saying that a Kevalin needs for both but 1 *sam.*, whereas any other individual needs for it upto 1 *muh.*, but to become aware of the qualities of the object will take him x times as much as to grasp it as an abstract. The latter is called *damsaṇa* meaning "seeing" in a metaphorical sense, and it is four-fold according as it is done either by means of the visual organ, by one or different other organs of sense or else by the inward sense (*acakkhu-d.*), or either whether it comes to happen metaphysically with and without limitation (*ohi-* and *kevala-d.*). All beings own at least one of these kinds of the *damsaṇa*. In case, however, a *chaumattha*, by force of *jñāna* and *avadhi-darśana*, should grasp (*jāṇai pāsai*)¹ an object (of ∞ space units), a *sākāra-* and an *anākāra-upayoga* will happen simultaneously. But with the Kevalin it is different: in this case any simultaneity, i.e. any coincidence of the *kevala-jñāna* with the *sākāra-* and the *kevala-darśana* with the *anākāra-up.* is out of the question, and it is this consideration that Viy. 755b and Pannav. 531 a f. are based upon. Prajn. categorically contradicts (532b) Siddhasena who had maintained that a Kevalin grasps an object specially and generally at the same time (*kevalī bhagavam yugapat jāṇāti paśyati ca*).