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The Doctrine of the Jainas, Described after the Old Sources c8.248

The Doctrine of the Jainas, Described after the Old Sources c8.248

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c8.248

Just as these questions occupied the minds (to which degree, it is shown by the various antitheses Ṭhāṇ. 39b ff.), so the classification of the actions was a problem. Sūy. II 2 gives and supports by examples 13 cases of activities (comp. also Sthān. 316b; Samav. 25a): 1 to 5 are called *daṇḍa-samayāṇa* thus being characterised as acts of violence, while 6 to 13 stand for activities of an otherwise blamable kind, though, to be true, the list ends up by kind to be observed by the monk (*samparāiya*). They all are based on offences against the fundamental commandments as far as they are involved, i.e. the first, second and third underlie the cases 1 to 7, and the four passions of anger (10), pride (9), fraud (11), and greed (12), though it has to be observed that anger appears in the shape of an offence against friends (mitta-dosa). 8 is the (evil) state of mind (ajjhattha). Ṭhāṇ. 316a leads the discussion over into the field of theory and sets up actions in groups of five the first three of which appear here only and, partly, also in Ṭhāṇ. 39b f. The first of these groups—provided the interpretations prove true—concern an activity for the purpose of seeing (diṭṭhiyā kiriyā), touching (puṭṭhiyā k.), on the ground of certain outlooks (paḍucciyā k.), of the conform judgment of persons closely concerned (sāmanta-vaṇivāiyā k.) and performed by one’s own hands (sāhatthiyā k.). The second group calls the kiriyā a nesatthiyā, āṇavaṇiyā, veyaraṇi, aṇābhoga-vattiyā and aṇavakankha-v., by which an action may be understood resting on an order,¹ on communication, on permission, and brought about without thinking and willing participating in it. The third group refers to an action strictly confined to humans which may go back (-vattiyā-k.)- to affection (pejja), antipathy (dosa), plan (paoga), going for alms (samudāṇa) or wandering (iriyā). Nearly everywhere the commentary (Sthāṇ. 42a ff., 317a) is uncertain, and, partly, no doubt goes wrong. The sub-division can be omitted here.

Cites (2)