The Doctrine of the Jainas, Described after the Old Sources c8.4

c8.4

The five fundamental facts constitute the world, or, rather, the world and the non-world (Viy. 608a). Their qualities are laid down in Viy. 147b. They all share in eternity. The space embraces both the world and the non-world, whereas the remaining four are concerned with the expansion of the world. For the dimensions of parts of the world proportional to motion, stop and space see Viy. 151a ff. and, nearly consonant, 775a. All *atthikāya* except the *jīva* are inanimate (*ajīva*), and, with the single exception of matter, all are immaterial (*arūva*). The last two sentences explicitly represent Mv.'s personal conception (Viy. 324b).³ Materiality is defined by saying (324b) that among all inanimate fundamental facts matter alone is palpable (*poggal’ atthikāyamsi cakkiyā kei āsaittae vā saittae vā ciṭṭhittae vā* etc.), whereas this does not apply to motion, stop or space, even though they fill the world completely. They are, in fact, as little palpable as are the flames of a thousand candles lighting a closed room (615b).¹ As *dhamma* and *adhamma* we know them, thanks to JACOBI on T. 5, l. 17 in their meaning² as motion and stop so characteristic of the Jains. It is by their presence only that any motion and any rest become possible at all, so that they themselves are not actually meant³ (and, for that reason, we ought to speak of stop rather than of rest). Within the realm of souls, *dhamma* and *adhamma* produce all possible conditions of movability and its opposite, on the one hand "coming and going, speaking, moving an eyelid, activity of the inner sense, speech and body" and on the other "standing motionless, sitting, lying, confinement to the acitivity of the inner sense" (Viy. 608a). Concerning space we have to distinguish between the space of the world (*log’āgāsa*) and the space of the non-world (*alog’āgāsa*), the former representing but an infinitely small fraction of the total space (Viy. 151a). It is in the nature of space to give room (*avagāhaṇā*, not *ogāh.*) to any amount of atoms (608a)⁴; but this, of course, applies merely to the space of the world, the space of the non-world being absolutely void (Viy. 151a). Notwithstanding this discrimination i should be observed that both space and motion as well as rest are definitely singular, whereas souls and matter are of an infinite variety, and, moreover, they alone are active. For the