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The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma" c8: VI. Elements of Mind

The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma" c8

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VI. Elements of Mind

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In the *āyatana* classification two items (Nos. 6 and 12) are devoted to the elements of mind (*citta-caitta-dharmāḥ*, *arūpino dharmāḥ*) and, according to the principle of this classification, they represent two correlative groups: a subjective one (*indriya*) and an objective one (*viṣaya*). The principle of externality of one element in regard to another, i.e. the idea of separate elements (*pṛthag-dharma*), is maintained in the field of mind just as in the field of matter. Mind is split into two chief parts. The subjective part, or mind viewed as a receptive faculty, is represented by one element called, indiscriminately, *citta*, *vijñāna*, or *manas*.² It represents pure consciousness, or pure sensation, without any content. Its content is placed in the objective part which contains the definite sensation (*sparśa*), feelings (*vedanā*), ideas (*saṃjñā*), volitions (*cetanā*), and various other mental phenomena up to the number of forty-six separate elements.³ So it is that feelings come to be viewed as objects of the mind, a position which, for other reasons, they likewise possess in the Sāṅkhya system. The category in which they are entered is called the (general) group of elements (*dharma-āyatana*) or simply “the elements” (*dharmāḥ*). As stated above, the first eleven “bases” contain one element (*dharma*) each, but this last one contains the remaining sixty-four elements of the list. Beside the forty-six mental phenomena it contains the fourteen elementary forces (*viprayukta-saṃskāra*), the element of character (*avijñapti*) and the three eternal elements (*asaṃskṛta*): among the latter is Nirvāṇa, the chief *dharma*.

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² Ab. K., ii, 34. The same terms in the Pali Canon, Samyutta, ii, 94.

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³ The Theravāda reckoned fifty-one. Cf. the fifty *bhāvas* of the Sāṅkhyas, some of them exhibiting an analogy with corresponding Buddhist *caitta-dharmas*. A full list of the forty-six *caitta-dharmas* is given below, App. II.

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For this reason the term "elements" (*dharmāḥ*) is a sufficient indication of this group, because the other categories, although also containing elements (*dharmāḥ*), have a special name each.¹ The common feature of all these elements is that they are apprehended by the intellect directly without any intermediate agency of the senses. In the apprehension of sense-objects there is likewise participation by the intellect; but these *dharmāḥ* are non-sensuous objects, they are the exclusive domain of the receptive intellect, just as colour is the exclusive domain of the sense of vision.² The definition of receptive consciousness is pregnant: *vijñānam prativijñaptiḥ*, i.e. "consciousness is an intimation, or awareness, in every single case" (of what is now present to the senses, or to the mind directly).³ If an apprehension contains some, albeit quite indefinite, content, say some indefinite visual sensation, it will then represent the next degree, a real sensation (*sparça*).¹ The definite perception (*paricchitti*) of a colour will be an "idea" (*saṃjñā*), but consciousness as the perceptive faculty is pure sensation. Although quite undifferentiated in itself, this pure sensation is, nevertheless, distinguished from the standpoint of its origin or, more precisely, its environment, i.e. the elements by which its appearance is accompanied. From this point of view, as stated above, there is a set of six different kinds (*dhātu*) of consciousness, corresponding to a set of six receptive faculties and a set of six kinds of objects. We thus have six categories of consciousness (*ṣaḍ-vijñāna-kāyāḥ*), beginning with visual sensation or, more precisely, pure sensation arising in connexion with some colour (*cakṣur-vijñāna-dhātu*) and ending with consciousness accompanying a non-sensuous object (*mano-vijñāna-dhātu*). We have besides the same consciousness as a receptive faculty (*dhātu* No. 6). As a receptive faculty *mano-dhātu* is not different from consciousness arising in connexion with abstract objects (*mano-vijñāna-dhātu*); it is the same reality, the same *dharma*. But for symmetrical arrangement it has been found necessary to have a set of three items for the purely mental elements, just as there is a threefold set of faculty, object, and sensation corresponding to each of the senses.² The difference between consciousness as a receptive faculty and the same consciousness accompanying an abstract object is then said to be a difference of time. Consciousness in the role corresponding to the place occupied in the system by the senses is the consciousness of the preceding moment.³ The Theravādins, evidently for the same purpose of symmetrical arrangement, introduced into the system a "heart-stuff" (hadaya-vatthu) which supports the non-sensuous cognitions, just as the other sense-stuffs "support" sense-cognitions. It occupies in the system the place of the sixth organ (āyatana or dhātu No. 6).¹

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¹ Every *āyatana* is thus a *dharmāyatana*, but No. 12 is *dharmāyatana* par excellence. Just so is it that the ten material *āyatanas* all include matter. They are, consequently, all of them, *rūpāyatanas*. But only one of them—the visible element, *āyatana* No. 7—retains the name of *rūpāyatana* as its special designation, because it represents the most characteristic and important among the elements of matter. Cf. Ab. K., i, 24, Tibetan text, p. 42, 17 ff.

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² Prof. and Mrs. Geiger, op. cit., p. 80, have established for the *dharmāḥ* in the technical sense the signification "the empirical things". This is an example of the impotence of the "philological method"! It has not escaped their attention that *dharmāḥ* is synonymous with *dharmāyatana* and *dharmadhātu*, in which *Nirvāṇa* is included (p. 83), which is anything but empirical. The *dharmāḥ* are apprehended by *manaḥ* (p. 81), but the emphasis is put on the fact that they are apprehended *without the co-operation of the senses*. Everything is apprehended by *manaḥ*, but the *dharmāḥ* are external with regard to *manaḥ*; their place in the system is among the six *viṣayaḥ*, as opposed to the six *indriya*, one of which, the sixth, is *manaḥ*. Concerning the meaning of the terms "external" and "internal" some remarks will be made later on, pp. 58-9, when discussing the theory of cognition.

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³ Ab. K., i, 16. *Cittam vijānāti*, Asl., p. 42 = "is aware variously" (M. Ting), must have the same import, if any. Cf. the Sānkhya definition of *pratyakṣa* in *Sānkhya-kārikā*, 5: *prativiṣay-ādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam*, where we have likewise the distributive *prati-*, but *vijñāna = vijñaptiḥ*, since it is in the Sānkhya system represented by *puruṣa* (cf. below, Theory of Cognition, p. 63), is replaced by *adhyavasāya*—the function of the internal organ (synthesis).

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¹ Three *dharmas* are engaged when this kind of sensation, sometimes translated as "contact", is produced: *trayāṇāṃ sannipātaḥ sparçaḥ* (*tiṇṇaṃ saṃgati phasso*): the consciousness (*citta*), the sense-organ, and the sense-object. Cf. below under theory of cognition.

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² *Ab. K.*, i, 16, Tibetan text, p. 29, l. 17.

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³ The mental phenomena (*caitta-dharma*) also have their objects; they are according to the current terminology *sālambana*, but they are themselves *viṣaya* and not *indriya* (*Ab. K.*, i, 34, cf. Tibetan text, p. 49, l. 19).

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¹ Cf. Mrs. C. Rhys Davids, B. Psych., pp. 32, 70. This heart-stuff had, presumably, as little to do with the actual heart as the cakṣur-indriya-stuff with the actual eye. Indian medical science assumed the existence of a subtle ākāśa-food-stuff as a vehicle of mental processes. It is here called heart-stuff.

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Although external in regard to one another, consciousness and mental phenomena (citta-caitta) were conceived as being in a closer, more intimate, connexion than other combining elements. Pure sensation (citta) could never appear in life in its true separate condition; it was always accompanied by some secondary mental phenomena (caitta).² Among these mental phenomena (caitta-dharma) or faculties (saṃskāra) three are especially conspicuous, namely, feelings (vedanā), ideas (sañjñā), and volitions (cetanā). In the classification into groups (skandha) they occupy three separate items, all the remaining ones being included together with the volitions in the saṃskāra-skandha. Feelings (vedanā) are defined as emotions pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral.³ Ideas (sañjñā) are defined as operations of abstract thought, as that which "abstracts" (udgrahaṇa) a common characteristic sign (nimitta) from the individual objects.⁴ Even the definite representation (parichitti) of a colour is brought under this head.⁴ It is exactly what in later Indian philosophy, Buddhist as well as Brahmanical, was understood by "definite" (sa-vikalpaka) cognition. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti introduced into Indian logic the distinction between pure sense knowledge, free from any operation of abstract thought (kalpanāpoḍha), and definite cognition (sa-vikalpaka).⁵ It was then adopted by Uddyotakara and the whole of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.¹ It now appears that Dignāga was not the originator of this doctrine, he only adapted it to his system. From the very beginning Buddhism had established this difference: vijñāna and its synonyms citta, manaḥ represent pure sensation, the same as the kalpanāpoḍha pratyakṣa of Dignāga, and sañjñā corresponds to definite ideas. Every construction (kalpanā), every abstraction (udgrahaṇa),² every definite (parichinna) representation, such as blue and yellow, long and short, male and female, friend and enemy, happy and miserable—this is all brought under the head of ideas (sañjñā) as distinguished from vijñāna = pure sensation.

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² Ab. K., ii, 23.

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³ Ab. K., i, 14.

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⁴ Ibid.

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⁵ Cf. the definition of pratyakṣa in Nyāya-bindu 1.

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¹ Cf. Nyāya-vārttika, pratyakṣa-sūtra.

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² Udgrahaṇa is literally “abstraction”, kalpanā “imagination”, “construction”. It corresponds to the part taken in Kant’s system by “productive imagination”, whereas vijñāna, or the pratyakṣa of Dignāga, corresponds to “reine Sinnlichkeit”. Cf. my Logic of later Buddhists (chapter on kalpanā).

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Volition (cetanā) is defined as the mental effort that precedes action. It is an element or a force which enters in the composition of a personal life (santāna). It must not be forgotten that, since there is no personality in the Buddhist outlook of the universe, there certainly is no will in our sense, i.e. no personal will. There is a certain arrangement of elements, there is an element, or a force, or, still more precisely, the simple fact (dharma) that the elements are arranged in a certain way, according to certain laws. This fact is pointed to by the term cetanā. It “arranges” (sañcetayati)³ the elements in “streams”, which simple folk deem to be personalities. It is synonymous with the law of moral causation (karma)⁴ and likewise with the force of vitality, the “élan vital” (bhāvanā, vāsanā), which in the Buddhist system replaces any conscious agent, whether soul or God or even a conscious human being.¹ A moment of this kind of will accompanies every conscious moment (*citta*).

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³ To be derived from the root ci from which the Buddhists derive citta as well (Asb., p. 63); sañcetayati is exactly, in form and meaning, the Russian sochetayeti; the Pāli abhisandahati has the same import, cf. S. Z. Aung, Compendium, p. 235.

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⁴ The definition of karma is cetanā cetayitvā ca karaṇam, Ab. K., iv, 1 ff., the same as in Anguttara, iii, 415; cf. Mrs. C. Rhys Davids, B. Psych., p. 93.

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¹ *Ab. K.*, ix, *Soul Theory*, p. 942.

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There are, on the whole, ten mental elements which accompany every conscious moment; they are called the "general" mental elements.² There are ten others which are particularly "favourable" for progress towards the final appeasement of life: they are faith, courage, equanimity, etc. Ten others have the contrary unfavourable or oppressive (*kliṣṭa*) character. There are some others which have no definite moral character. All these mental elements are not general; they accompany only some of the moments of consciousness, not all of them.³

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² *Citta-mahābhūmika*.

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³ A full list of them will be found in O. Rosenberg's *Problems*, p. 374, and at the end of this book.

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