The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma" c8.4

c8.4

For this reason the term "elements" (*dharmāḥ*) is a sufficient indication of this group, because the other categories, although also containing elements (*dharmāḥ*), have a special name each.¹ The common feature of all these elements is that they are apprehended by the intellect directly without any intermediate agency of the senses. In the apprehension of sense-objects there is likewise participation by the intellect; but these *dharmāḥ* are non-sensuous objects, they are the exclusive domain of the receptive intellect, just as colour is the exclusive domain of the sense of vision.² The definition of receptive consciousness is pregnant: *vijñānam prativijñaptiḥ*, i.e. "consciousness is an intimation, or awareness, in every single case" (of what is now present to the senses, or to the mind directly).³ If an apprehension contains some, albeit quite indefinite, content, say some indefinite visual sensation, it will then represent the next degree, a real sensation (*sparça*).¹ The definite perception (*paricchitti*) of a colour will be an "idea" (*saṃjñā*), but consciousness as the perceptive faculty is pure sensation. Although quite undifferentiated in itself, this pure sensation is, nevertheless, distinguished from the standpoint of its origin or, more precisely, its environment, i.e. the elements by which its appearance is accompanied. From this point of view, as stated above, there is a set of six different kinds (*dhātu*) of consciousness, corresponding to a set of six receptive faculties and a set of six kinds of objects. We thus have six categories of consciousness (*ṣaḍ-vijñāna-kāyāḥ*), beginning with visual sensation or, more precisely, pure sensation arising in connexion with some colour (*cakṣur-vijñāna-dhātu*) and ending with consciousness accompanying a non-sensuous object (*mano-vijñāna-dhātu*). We have besides the same consciousness as a receptive faculty (*dhātu* No. 6). As a receptive faculty *mano-dhātu* is not different from consciousness arising in connexion with abstract objects (*mano-vijñāna-dhātu*); it is the same reality, the same *dharma*. But for symmetrical arrangement it has been found necessary to have a set of three items for the purely mental elements, just as there is a threefold set of faculty, object, and sensation corresponding to each of the senses.² The difference between consciousness as a receptive faculty and the same consciousness accompanying an abstract object is then said to be a difference of time. Consciousness in the role corresponding to the place occupied in the system by the senses is the consciousness of the preceding moment.³ The Theravādins, evidently for the same purpose of symmetrical arrangement, introduced into the system a "heart-stuff" (hadaya-vatthu) which supports the non-sensuous cognitions, just as the other sense-stuffs "support" sense-cognitions. It occupies in the system the place of the sixth organ (āyatana or dhātu No. 6).¹