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Buddhist Logic v2: Volume 2

Buddhist Logic v2

Language
English

Contents

Volume 2

Front matter

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BIBLIOTHECA BUDDHICA • XXVI

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BY

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TH. STCHERBATSKY, Ph. D.,

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MEMBER OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE USSR, PROFESSOR TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LENINGRAD

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IN TWO VOLUMES

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VOL. II

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CONTAINING A TRANSLATION OF THE SHORT TREATISE OF LOGIC BY DHARMAKĪRTI, AND OF ITS COMMENTARY BY DHARMOTTARA, WITH NOTES APPENDICES AND INDICES

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MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED • DELHI

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Also available at: MOTILAL BANARSIDASS 41 U.A., Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007 120 Royapettah High Road, Mylapore, Madras 600 004 16 St. Mark's Road, Bangalore 560 001 Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004 Chowk, Varanasi 221 001

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PRINTED IN INDIA BY JAINENDRA PRAKASH JAIN AT SHRI JAINENDRA PRESS, A-45 NARAINA INDUSTRIAL AREA, PHASE I, NEW DELHI 110 028 AND PUBLISHED BY NARENDRA PRAKASH JAIN FOR MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PVT. LTD., BUNGALOW ROAD, JAWAHAR NAGAR, DELHI 110 007

Preface

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More than twenty years have elapsed since we have first treated the subject of Buddhist logic and epistemology as they were taught in the schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Our nearly unique source at that time was the Nyāya-bindu and ṭīkā, this solitary sanscrit remnant of what has been a vast field of literary production. Since that time our knowledge of the subject has been considerably enlarged. Important sanscrit texts have been discovered and published in India. The interconnection and mutual influences of Indian systems are better known. The Tibetan literature reveals itself as an almost illimited source of information. Prof. H. Jacobi has contributed a series of articles on the early history of Indian systems. Prof. J. Tucci has recently elucidated the problem of Buddhist logic before Dignāga. Prof. de la Vallée Poussin has brought to a successful end his monumental translation of the Abhidharma-Kośa. Prof. Sylvani Lévi has enriched our knowledge by important discoveries in Nepal. Prof. M. Walleser has founded in Heidelberg an active society for the study of Mahāyāna. A great deal of work has been done by Indian and Japanese scholars. The Nyāya-bindu is no more a solitary rock in an unknown sea. Buddhist logic reveals itself as the culminating point of a long course of Indian philosophic history. Its birth, its growth and its decline run parallel with the birth, the growth and the decline of Indian civilisation. The time has come to reconsider the subject of Buddhist logic in its historical connections. This is done in these two volumes of which the second apears before the first. It contains translations which aim at being intelligible, a reservation not unnecessary in Indian matters, since we have witnessed translations by authoritative pens which read like an absolutely unintelligible rigmarole. In the copious notes the literary renderings are given where needed. This will enable the reader fully to appreciate the sometimes enormous distance which lies between the words of the sanscrit phrasing and their philosophic meaning rendered according to our habits of thought. The notes contain also a philosophic comment of the translated texts. The reader who would like to have a *vue d'ensemble* of Buddhist philosophy as it is represented in its logical part will have to go through the labyrinth of these notes and texts and make for himself a statement as well as an estimate of that doctrine. This task is facilitated in the first volume which will contain a historical sketch as well as a synthetical reconstruction of the whole edifice of the final shape of Buddhist philosophy, as far as it can be achieved at present. The second volume thus contains the material as well as the justification for this reconstruction. The first volume is in the press and we hope that it will appear before long.

Nyāya-Bindu

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BY

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DHARMAKIRTI

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WITH

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A COMMENTARY (ṬĪKĀ) BY DHARMOTTARA

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the *Gesta Romanorum*, the *Legenda Aurea* of Jacobus de Voragine, and the *Speculum Historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais. These were the books that fed the imagination of the Middle Ages, and they were the books that the Church, in its wisdom, provided for the instruction and edification of the faithful.

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But the Church did not merely provide books; it also provided the means of their dissemination. The monastic scriptoria, where monks labored in silence to copy the sacred texts, were the precursors of the printing press. And when the press finally arrived, it was the Church that first harnessed its power, using it to spread the word of God to the corners of the earth. The Gutenberg Bible, the first major book printed in Europe, was a testament to the Church's commitment to the written word.

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Yet, even as the Church championed the spread of knowledge, it also sought to control it. The *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, or List of Prohibited Books, was a tool used by the Church to suppress ideas it deemed dangerous or heretical. This tension between the desire to educate and the need to control would define the Church's relationship with literature for centuries to come.

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It is a complex history, one that is marked by both enlightenment and suppression. But it is a history that cannot be ignored, for it is the history of the very foundation of Western civilization. The Church, in its role as the guardian of knowledge, has shaped the way we think, the way we write, and the way we understand the world around us.

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PERCEPTION.

§ 1. Subject Matter and Purpose of This Work

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1. All successful human action is preceded by right knowledge. Therefore this (knowledge will be here) investigated.

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(1. 6). In this sentence the importance of the subject of the present work is pointed to. The body of a literary work, indeed, has a double aspect, it consists of words and subject matter. The words, in the present case, have no other purpose than to convey their meaning; they will not be analysed. But if the subject matter were of no use, no work could be devoted to an enquiry¹ into it, just as no reasonable man would ever undertake an enquiry about the teeth of the crow, because this would serve no purpose.² Wishing to show that this treatise deserves to be written, the author points to the importance of its subject matter (1. 10). Because (says he) all successful human action is preceded by right knowledge, therefore this (phenomenon) must be investigated, and with this aim the present treatise is undertaken. Such is the meaning of the (prefatory) sentence.³ (2. 2). (By making this statement, viz.) by stating that right knowledge — the subject matter of this treatise — is the cause¹ of all successful human action, the importance (of a theory of cognition is alone) stated (directly). (2. 3) But by making such a statement the subject-matter (of the work), its aim and its fitness² (for that aim) are (indirectly) indicated. Indeed when it is being stated that right knowledge, the source of all (successful) human action,³ will be analysed in the present work, it is also implied that right knowledge is the subject-matter of this literary composition, its aim is an analysis of (the phenomenon) of knowledge, and the work itself represents the means through which the analysis (is achieved). (2. 5). Directly stated is thus only (one) point, the importance of the subject matter, (the other points), its fitness etc., are then implicitly understood.⁴ The (prefatory) sentence alone is not adequate to give a direct statement of the subject matter, the purpose and the connection between them (separately). By naming directly only one point, it indirectly alludes to all three. (2. 7). The word «this» (knowledge) points here to the subject matter. The words «will be investigated» — to the purpose. The purpose here meant (is double). For the author it is the task of composing the work, whilst for the student it is the task of studying it. (2. 9). Indeed, all reasonable men set themselves to work when they have some useful aim in view. To the questions⁵ as to why has the Master written this treatise and why should it be studied by the pupils, it is answered that its purpose is an analysis (of knowledge). It is written by the author in order that he may himself become the teacher for those

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¹ *pratipatti* = *bstan-pa*.

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² We would expect *kāka-danta-parīkṣā-prayojana-abhāvāt*, since the meaning is not that the teeth are useless, but that an investigation about unexisting teeth is useless, cp. Tātp., p. 1. 17, and *infra*, p. 2. 22. (text). This would agree with Vinitadeva's interpretation according to whom the *vyutpatti* (= *parīkṣā*) must have a *prayojana*. Since *vyutpatti* is already the *prayojana* of the treatise itself (*prakaraṇa-śarīra*), its importance will then be *prayojanasya prayojanam*. To this double *prayojana* Dharmottara takes exception, he is thus obliged to give a somewhat awkward turn to his example. But cp. Tātp., p. 28. 12, *niṣprayojane* (-*ām*?) *parīkṣām*.

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³ Vinitadeva, p. 31. 10, has interpreted the first sentence as containing an indication 1) of the subject-matter (*abhidheya* = *samyag-jñāna*), 2) of its aim (*prayojana* = *vyutpatti*), 3) their connection (*sambandha*) and 4) the aim of the aim (*prayojanasya api prayojanam*), the latter referring to the real importance of the study of the theory of cognition, since cognition is involved in every purposive action. Dharmottara objects to the unusual *prayojanasya prayojanam*. He takes the first sentence as a whole, indicating the importance of a study of the theory of

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¹ *uktva* must be inserted before *prayojana*, p. 2. 2, cp. Tib. *rgyu-ñid-du bstan-pas*.

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² *sambandha*.

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³ *puruṣa-artha-upayogi* = *puruṣa-artha-siddhi-hetu*.

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⁴ Lit., p. 2. 5. «Therefore by the force of direct statement (*abhidhāna*) of the importance (*prayojana*) of the part (which is) the subject, connection etc. are expressed». Dh. thus insists that the first *sūtra*, as a whole (*samudāyārtha*), refers directly to *abhidheya-prayojana*, i. e. to the importance of a theory of cognition, the three usual preliminaries are then to be understood implicitly. Vinitadeva thinks that *abhidheya* and *prayojana* are expressed directly (read *mñon-du* instead of *śñon-du*, p. 32. 2 of M. de la Vallée-Poussin's edition in B. I.) and *sambandha* indirectly. The importance of a theory of cognition is then conceived by him as a *prayojanasya api prayojanam* (p. 33. 8).

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⁵ *iti saṃśaye*.

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cognition, and then the three usual preliminaries as implicitly contained in it. He thinks that a distinction between *prakaraṇasya śarīra-prayojanam* and *abhidheya-prayojanam* is useless, since *śarīra* is first of all *śabda* which is not investigated.

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who are being instructed in (the theory of) cognition, and it is studied by the pupils desirous of acquiring for themselves the instruction delivered by the Master. An analysis of knowledge is thus the purpose of both the composition and the study of the work. (2. 13). No word (in the prefatory sentence) indicates the connection between the subject matter and the purpose. It must be supplied from the context.¹ Indeed when a reasonable man is working at this treatise for the sake of an analysis of right knowledge, this treatise is just the means of attaining his purpose and there is no other. Thus it is clear that the relation between this treatise and its aim is that of an expedient and the thing to be expedited.

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¹ *sāmarthyāt*.

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(2. 16). However, (the advisability of stating these topics at the beginning can be questioned), since, even if they are stated, no reasonable man will accept them without further evidence, before having looked into the book. This is true! Without a foregoing study of the book these topics, although stated, cannot be appreciated. But when stated, even without being authenticated, they provoke the spirit of inquisitiveness² by which people are incited to work (2. 18). Indeed, when reasonable men presume that a thing may be of some use to them,³ they (immediately) set to work: whereas when they suspect that it is of no use,⁴ they give it up. (2. 19). Therefore the author of a scientific work is especially expected to make at the beginning a statement about the connection between his aim and the subject matter). For it is all very well for writers of romance to make false statements in order to amuse,⁵ but we cannot imagine what would be the aim of a scientific author if he went (the length of) misstating his subject-matter. Neither (do we see that this actually) occurs. Therefore it is natural to expect inquisitiveness concerning such (works). (2. 22). If it were not stated, the student might possibly think that the subject matter served no purpose at all as, e. g., an enquiry about the teeth of a crow; or that (the aim) was irrealizable as, e. g., the instruction to adorn oneself with the demon Takṣaka's crest jewel which releases from fever⁶; or that its aim was undesirable, like the instruction about the ritual to be followed at the (re-)marriage ceremony of one’s own mother¹; or that the aim could possibly be attained in an easier way than through this book; or again that it was altogether useless. If any such presentiment of uselessness arises, reasonable men will not apply themselves to the study of the book. By stating the subject matter etc. some useful purpose is (always) suggested, and this checks the suspicion of uselessness. Reasonable men are thus incited to take action. Thus it is clear that the connection (between the subject matter and the purpose) is stated in order that the book may be credited with efficiency, since such consideration incites human activity.

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² *saṃśaya*.

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³ *artha-saṃśaya*.

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⁴ *anartha-saṃśaya*.

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⁵ Lit., 2. 20. «Indeed the words of story-tellers may be imagined in a different way for the sake of sport etc. (Tib. = *krīḍādi* )».

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⁶ Cp. the same simile Tātp., p. 3. 6.

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¹ This is an indication that Buddhists had in India the same aversion to the remarriage of widows as the brahminical Hindus.

§ 2. Right Knowledge Defined

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(3. 5). Right knowledge is knowledge not contradicted (by experience)² In common life we likewise say that (a man) has spoken truth when he makes us reach the object he has first pointed out. Similarly (we can also say) that knowledge is right when it makes us reach an object it did point to. But by «making us reach an object» nothing else is meant than the fact of turning (our attention) straight to the object. Indeed knowledge does not create an object and does not offer it to us, but in turning (our attention) straight to the object it (eo ipso) makes us reach it. Again «to turn a man straight to the object» is nothing else than to point it out as an aim of a (possible) purposive action. Indeed, (one should not imagine) that knowledge has the power forcibly to incite a man (against his will).³ (3. 9). For this very reason (as will be stated later on)¹ the only ultimate result of an act of cognizing is (simply) a distinct cognition. When an object has been cognized, man has been (*eo ipso*) turned towards it and the object reached.² The (proper) function of cognition is thus at an end just after the object has been cognized. (3. 10). For this very reason cognition is concerned with an object not yet cognized. But when it has been first cognized, the same act of cognition has also drawn (the attention) of man and has made him reach the object, (i. e., reach it by his cognition). Any further act concerning that very object cannot be regarded as its cognition.³ Consequently (a purposive action directed towards) an object already cognized will not be an act of cognizing it.⁴

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² This is the Buddhist definition of empirical knowledge (samyag-jñāna = pramāṇa). It is opposed to the definitions of the Mīmāṃsakas (artha-avabodha), of the Cārvākas (artha-darśana), the Naiyāyikas (pramā-karaṇa). Mādhyamikas and Yogācāras held that this knowledge is a transcendental illusion (ālambane bhrāntam). With this reservation the first accepted the realistic Logic of the Naiyāyikas, the second adhered to the reform of Dignāga, cp. my Nirvāṇa, p. 156 n. For Vinitadeva, p. 34. 1, 40. 13, and Kamalaśīla, Tattvasg., p. 392 .6, the definition refers to the field of experience only (prāpaka-viṣaye) and thus agrees both with the Yogācāra and Sautrāntika views (ubhaya-naya-samāśrayeṇa). But the Tipp., p. 18—19, thinks that the Yogācāra idealism is here forsaken and the Sautrāntika realism adhered to. As to Jinendrabuddhi’s view cp. Appendix.

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³ Thus jñānam is a jñāpaka-hetu, not a kāraka-hetu. These remarks are probably directed against Vinitadeva who explains puruṣārtha = prayojana, siddhi = sādhaka (grub-par-byed-pa) and pūrvaka as hetu. He thus converts jñāna into a kāraka-hetu. Kamalaśīla, just as Dh., defines avisamvāditva as

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¹ About *pramāṇa-phala* cp. *infra*, text, p. 14. 16 and 18.8 cp. transl. and notes.

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² The Mīmāṃsaka assumes three stages in the development of every cognitive act, the first apprehension (*darśana*), man's purposive action (*pravartana*) and the successful reaching of the object (*prāpaṇa* or *hāna-upādāna*), every following stage being the result (*phala*) of the preceding one. According to Dh., the first stage alone belongs to the domain of cognition proper, the subsequent idea of a purposive action is not an act of cognizing the same thing. cp. Tipp., p. 8. 5, and Ślokav., pratyakṣa 60—70.

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³ Lit., p. 3. 12. « Regarding that very object what can another cognition make additionally? »

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⁴ « Reaching » (*prāpaṇa*) as understood by the Mīmāṃsaka and Naiyāyika means actual successful action; as understood by Dh., it here means possible purposive action,*prāpaṇa-yogyī-karaṇa*, cp. Tipp., p. 8 6. Cp. Tātparyaṭ., p. 15. 5.

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(3. 12). (Turning now to the different modes of cognition we see that) when an object has been apprehended by direct experience,⁵ it has been converted into an object of (possible) purposive action through sense-perception. Because (we say) that sense-perception has pointed out an object, when the function of that knowledge which consists in making us feel its presence in our ken is followed by a construction (of its image).⁶ Therefore (we say) that an object has been pointed out by sense-perception, when it is cognized as something directly perceived. (3. 15). Inference (or indirect cognition, differs) in that it points out the mark of the object, and by thus (indirectly) making sure (its existence) submits it as an object of possible purposive referring to a possible, not to an actual successful action (= *abhimata-artha-kriyā-samartha- artha-prāpaṇa-śaktimattvam, na tu prāpanam eva.*, op. cit p. 392. 7).

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⁵ *dṛṣṭa* refers to all sense-faculties, not vision alone.

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⁶ This is the real definition of sense perception, it is conceived as a moment of indefinite sensation (*vijñāna*) which is followed by a construction (*kalpanā* = *vikalpa*) of a definite image. The definition as given on p. 6. 15 is made *vipratipatti-nirākaraṇārtham*, cp. the same definition *infra*, text, p. 11. 12

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sive action. Thus it is that sense-perception points out a definite ¹ object, (i. e., an object localized in time and space) which appears before us directly,² and inference likewise points out a definite object by way of the mark it is connected with. These two (methods of cognizing) point out definite objects, therefore they are right knowledge. (3. 17). What differs from them is not (right) knowledge. Knowledge is right when it makes us reach the object, and it makes us reach it when it has pointed to an attainable object.³ But an object pointed out in some different way, not according to the above mentioned two (methods of right knowledge), is either absolutely unreal as, e. g., water seen as a vision in a desert — it does not exist, it cannot be reached — or it is uncertain as to whether it exists or not as, e. g., every problematic object. Since there is no such object in the world, which at the same time would be existent and non-existent, therefore such (a problematic object) can never be attained. (3. 21). And all imagination ⁴ which is not produced by the (real) mark of the object, which operates (freely) without taking notice of limitation (by reality) can but refer to a problematic fact (about which we neither know) that it exists nor that it does not exist. Such an object can never be reached. Therefore every cognition other (than perception or inference) is not a source of right knowledge, since it presents an object which cannot be reached, an object which is (either) absolutely unreal (or) uncertain as to whether it exists or not.¹

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¹ niyata is here contrasted with saṃśaya and viparyaya, it is the same as niścita. Cp. niyata-pratibhāsa on p. 8. 10, and niyata-ākāra on p. 70. 11, where the meaning of niyata varies.

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² pratibhāsu = nirbhāsa = ābhāsa = pratibimbana, cp. Tipp., p. 12. 12.

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³ Lit., p. 3. 17. «There is no other vijñāna. What points to an object, which it is possible to attain, fetches, and by fetching it is right knowledge». We would have a better meaning if this first sentence were united with the following two. «No other sensation (vijñāna) indicating (ādarśayat = upadarśayat) an object capable of being reached is such as «makes reach» (prāpaka) and through making us reach (the object) is right knowledge». But the Tibetan translation does not support this interpretation. Vijñāna in logic loses its meaning of an indefinite pure sensation (= nirvikalpaka-jñāna) which it had in Abhidharma where it was contrasted with saṃjñā as a definite idea. With the Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas it is often contrasted with jñāna which has then the sense of transcendental knowledge (= Tib. ye-śes). Here it has the general sense of knowledge, idea, or representation, just as in the term vijñāna-rādin; jñāna and vijñāna are here used indiscriminately, as the next following jñānena proves, anyaj jñānam is then = mithyā jñānam as p. 3. 23, cp. my Nirvāṇa, Index. However there are some contexts where, as will be seen below, we must take into account the original meaning of vijñāna or vijñāna-skandha as pure sensation. Cp. Vācaspati's remark that when jñāna stands instead of vijñāna = viśiṣṭa-jñāna it excludes every element of smṛti or saṃskāra, cp. N. vārt. p. 48. 5–6 and Tātp., p. 114. 1. But the relation may be reversed, cp. Jinendrabuddhi, f. 40. a. 7.

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⁴ kalpanā meaning primarily «arrangement» (yojanā) and vikalpa meaning choice, dichotomy (draidhī-karaṇa), are both used in the sense of imagination, but pure imagination (utprekṣaṇa-vyāpāra) is distinguished from constructive imagination (liṅgaja-vikalpa). A doubt appertains always to the imaginative part of knowledge, not to sensation, yas tu saṃśayaḥ, (sa) vikalpakasya jñānasya, Tipp., p. 10. 11.

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¹ The realistic systems as well as, in a limited sense, the Mādhyamikas and Vedāntins admit additional sources of knowledge, besides perception and inference, e. g., testimony, analogy, negation, similarity. Buddhist logic includes them all in inference, or indirect knowledge. Therefore whatsoever is neither perception nor inference is wrong knowledge. In realistic systems there is also a difference between pramāṇa (= pramā-karaṇa) and pramā (= pramāṇa-phala). In Buddhist logic this difference is denied and pramāṇa = samyag-jñāna; the «reaching of the object (prāpaṇa)» which was interpreted above, p. 4, as «reaching by definite cognition» is here taken in the sense of an actual successive action.

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(3. 23). (Sentient beings) strive for desired ends. They want that knowledge which leads them to the attainment of objects fitted for successful action. The knowledge that is investigated by the theory (of cognition) is just the knowledge they want. Therefore right knowledge is knowledge which points to reality, (a reality which) is capable of experiencing purposive action.² (4. 1). And that object alone which has been pointed out by such right knowledge can be «reached», (i. e., clearly and distinctly cognized), because, as we have stated above (p. 4), we understand by «reaching» an object its definite cognition. (4. 2). Now, if there is a divergence between what is pointed out (by our cognition) and the real object, the latter has either a different quality or a different place or a different time.¹ Indeed every variation in its characteristics (makes the characterized object) «another» object. (When we say that) the real object is «other», (we mean) that it either has another quality or another place or another time (than what is contained in our cognition).² Thus cognition representing one form of the object, is not to be considered as a right cognition when the real object has a different form, e. g., the yellow conch-shell seen (by the daltonist) is not a right cognition of this conch-shell, since it is really white. Neither is cognition right when it wrongly represents the place of the object, e. g., the radiance of a jewel seen through the chink in a door, when mistaken for the jewel itself which is in the room (behind the door), is not a right cognition of this jewel.⁴ (4. 6.). Nor is our cognition right when it represents the object as existing at a time when we really do not perceive it. E.g., seeing in a dream at midnight an object which we really have seen at noon cannot be considered as a right cognition of an object really present at midnight.¹

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² Although the school of Dignāga (they are called the later Yogācāras, or the Vijñānavādi logicians, or the Sautrāntika-Yogācāras) deny the reality of an external world corresponding to our ideas, they in their logic and epistemology investigate cognition from the empirical point of view, cp. Candrakīrti, Mādhy. vṛtti, p. 58. 14, transl. in my Nirvāṇa, p. 140 ff. Therefore their definition of reality as efficiency (artha-kriyā-kāritva) and of knowledge as artha-kriyā-samartha-artha-pradarśana are purely empirical. But they contend that their analysis of empirical cognition leads to the establishment of an uncognizable transcendental substratum, the sva-lakṣaṇa-paramārtha-sat, the «thing in itself». The validity (prāmāṇyam) of empirical knowledge is thus established by a subsequent step (parataḥ). The question whether the act of cognizing carries in itself (svataḥ) the feeling of its validity, or whether this is due to a further cognition (parataḥ) is very much debated in Indian philosophy. The school of Dignāga has thus established the validity of cognition in opposition to the condemnation of all logic by the Mādhyamikas. This pramāṇa-viniścaya-vāda is represented by Vācaspati, Tātparyaṭ., p. 7. 28.

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¹ The proper place for these remarks would have been, as stated by the Ṭipp., p. 11. 8, later on, p. 16, when discussing the non-illusiveness of sense-perception. They are directed against Vinitadeva's theory that the image may be wrong while sensation is right, since the real object is nevertheless reached by subsequent purposive action (artha-mātrasya prāpteḥ, Ṭipp., p. 11. 4).

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² The law of «otherness», as understood by the Buddhists, is here alluded to. Concepts, ideas, objects are artificial cuts in an uninterrupted flow of moments. Every variation in time, space and quality (svabhāva) is an indication of something «other» (yad viruddha-dharma-saṃsṛṣṭam tan nānā). The identity of an idea or an object thus reduces to a single moment which has neither duration in time (kāla-ananugata), nor extension in space (deśa-ananugata), nor any quality, kṣaṇabhedena vastuno bhedaḥ, deśa-kāla-vyatirikta-avayavy-abhāvāt (read thus Ṭipp., p. 11. 7). From this point of view every definite cognition, since it corresponds to a subsequent moment, when the sensation is over, will be a cognition of an «other» object, strictly speaking it will be wrong. But empirical cognition refers to series of moments (santāna), infinitesimal time (sūkṣma-kāla-bheda) is not taken into account. The definition of knowledge is framed so as to agree with realities having some stability, santāna-apekṣayā prāmāṇya-lakṣaṇam ucyate, Ṭipp., p. 11. 16 About «otherness» cp. W. E. Johnson, Logic I, p. XXXI.

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³ Cp. Tātparyaṭ., p. 56. Some logicians have maintained that since the object reached in a subsequent action is the real white conch-shell, the cognition will be a right one. But Dharmottara thinks that the image of the yellow conch-shell is nevertheless a wrong cognition, the white conch-shell is «reached» on the basis of another cognitiou. He has enlarged upon this point in his ṭīkā upon Pramāṇa-viniścaya of Dharmakirti.

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⁴ The shining of a jewel, as well as of light in general, is moving matter (gati-dharman) and spreads in light-waves (taraṅga-nyāyena). But this is only the empirical view. The transcendental reality of what appears as a motion is but a series of point-instants in contiguous places following one-another, each representing an «other» thing, cp. Tātparyaṭ., p. 394. 10. But this theory is here overlooked and empirical illusion alone referred to. cp. also N. b. ṭ., p. 69. 2—na kṣanayor virodhaḥ.

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¹ Lit., p. 4. 2—4. 7. «Here the real object which is different from what is pointed out has another form, another place and another time. Indeed by combining with incompatible qualities, the real object is other, and a difference of place, time and form is a combination with incompatible qualities. Therefore when apprehending a real object in another form cognition is not right in regard of the object having a different form, as apprehending a yellow conch-shell (is wrong) in regard of a white one. And apprehending what is situated in one place cognition is not right for what is situated in a different place, as cognition apprehending a jewel in the radiance in the chink of a door (is wrong) for the jewel in the room. And apprehending what is related to another time is not right cognition regarding a real object at a different time, as a dream at midnight about an object (seen) at noon is not a right cognition of a real object (existing) at midnight». About the Buddhist theory of dream and the celebrated identification of reality with a dream by the Vijñānavādins interesting remarks are to be found in Dharmakīrti's Santānāntara-siddhi. But here again this theory is overlooked and dream is taken as an illusion in the usual empirical sense.

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(4. 8.). (It can be objected) that a cognition of the object's own form or its own place can be admitted, but to cognize its own time, (the unique moment to which its real existence) is confined, is impossible. However we do not maintain that it should be reached by distinct cognition at that very moment to which its existence is confined. We have the moment of sensation and the different moment of distinct perception. We maintain that we can distinctly cognize that very object whose existence was confined to (a previous) moment. (The unity which thus appears to exist between different moments) is a unity produced by the synthesis of distinct apprehension, and represents (in reality) a chain of momentary existences.

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(4. 12). (The prefatory sentence) mentions right knowledge which «precedes» successful human action, i. e., which is the cause of it. The cause exists previously to the result, therefore it is said that knowledge precedes (action). If the word «cause» had been used (instead of «precedes») we might have understood that right knowledge is the immediate cause producing successful human action. But by using the word «precedes» its mere antecedence (is elicited). (1. 13). Right knowledge is twofold, it either is (intuitive), directly presenting to the mind the right way of action,² or (discursive), directing our attention towards a possible object of successful action.¹ Of these two only (the last variety), that knowledge which stimulates purposive action, will be here examined. It merely precedes, but does not directly produce successful action. (4. 15). When we acquire right knowledge we must remember what we have seen before. Remembrance stimulates will,² will produces action and action reaches the object. Therefore such knowledge is not a direct cause. (4. 17). In cases when purposive action presents itself directly (the aim) is reached straight off and (the process) cannot be analysed. But in cases when reasonable men strive and doubt, it may be analysed. By intuitive knowledge³ the aims of man are attained (directly), in such cases men have no doubt about their aims. This makes an analysis impossible. (4. 19). Thus it is that the word «cause»⁴ has been omitted, and the word «precedes» used in order to suggest that right knowledge, when it is not immediately followed by action, is worthy of being analysed.

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² *artha-kriyāyā nirbhāsaḥ = artha-kriyā-sādhana-nirbhāsaḥ*, cp Tipp.. p. 12. 11.

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¹ *artha-kriyā-samarthe* must be interpreted as *artha-kriyā-sādhana-samarthe* (Tipp., p. 12. 13, read *evam uttaratrāpi* . . .). But an alternative explanation is likewise suggested by the Tipp., p. 12. 13-15, according to which *artha-kriyā-jñānam* would be *anantara-kāraṇam* in the first case, and with respect to behaviour it would then be *vyavahitam sādhana-nirbhāsa-jñānam*.

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² *abhilāṣa*, desire.

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³ *artha-kriyā-nirbhāse jñāne*, lit., «when there is knowledge (sc. conscionsness) reflected in purposive action».

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⁴ Vinitadeva has interpreted *pūrvaka* as meanig *hetu*.

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(4. 21). Human action has an aim. That which is aimed at is an object, i. e., that which is desired.⁵ There are objects to be avoided and objects to be attained. An object to be avoided is an object which we wish to avoid. An object to be attained is an object which we wish to attain.⁶ There is no other class of objects different from these two. The indifferent object, since it is not desired, belongs to the class of undesirable ones.⁷

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⁵ *artha* is here derived from the root *arth*, the usual etymology is from the root *ṛ* with the *uṇādi* suffix *than*.

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⁶ Vinitadeva has explained *artha-siddhi* as meaning *prayojana-niṣpatti*, but this is wrong, since *samyag-jñāna* is a *jñāpaka-hetu*, not a *kāraka-hetu*, cp. Tipp., p. 13. 3.

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⁷ Indifferent objects are assumed by the Naiyāyiks, cp. Tātp., p. 65. 1 ff.

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(4. 23). Success is the (actual) attaining or avoiding of the object. When success is achieved by causes, it is called production. But when it is achieved by knowledge it is called behaviour.⁸ It consists in avoiding the avoidable and attaining the attainable. Behaviour consisting in such activity is called succesful action.

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⁸ *anusthāna*.

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(5. 2.). When the (prefatory sentence) mentions «all successful human action» the word «all» is used to indicate the totality of the objects, but not the different ways of action. Therefore it is not meant that the (above stated) two varieties of purposive action depend upon right knowledge, but it is suggested that every successful action, whatsoever it may be, the totality of actions, depends upon right knowledge. Accidental success through false knowledge is impossible.¹

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¹ Vinitadeva and Śantirakṣita (?) think that a succesful action may happen accidentally when acting upon a supposition, as e g., when you approach a well and reach water without knowing beforehand whether there really is water in the well. They thus interpret the word «all» as referring to both ways of behaviour, obtaining and abstaining. They maintain that success is mostly (bāhulyena) achieved when acting upon right knowledge, but may be accidentally produced by uncertain or wrong cognition. Dh. denies that, but he has a special theory about accidental successful action explained in his Pramāṇa-viniścaya-ṭīkā, cp. Tipp., p. 10. 13, 13. 12 ff., and infra p. 17, 3. Cp. also Kamalaśila, p. 404. 2 and Dh.'s own words above, p. 3–4.

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(5. 5). Indeed, successful action is possible when (knowledge) has rightly constructed² the object whose (existence) has been pointed out by sensation.³ And this is done by right knowledge alone, not by wrong knowledge.⁴ How could cognition which has not rightly constructed (its object) lead to successful action? Wrong knowledge indeed does not lead to it. That knowledge which alone leads to it is right knowledge. (5. 8). For this very reason it must be carefully investigated. And since it is the only cause of every successful human action, therefore the author, when stating this, (has emphasized) that «all» (success) is preceded by right knowledge.⁵ (5. 10). Thus the meaning of the (prefatory) sentence runs as follows,— because every efficient action is preceded by right knowledge, therefore this knowledge is investigated in the present treatise.

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² prāpayati, cp above, p. 4 n. 3

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³ pradarśana = ādarśana = upadarśana = ālocana = nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa.

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⁴ Lit., p. 5. 6. «What produces the reaching of the shown is right knowledge only, what does not produce the reaching of the shown is wrong knowledge».

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⁵ Lit., p. 5. 10. «The word iti is used in the sense of «therefore», yad and tad are necessarily correlative».

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(5. 14). The word «investigated» refers (to the method adopted) which consists in expounding the subject (indirectly) by refuting all contrary opinions. They are fourfold, in so far as they concern the number of varieties, their definition, their object and their result.

§ 3. Varieties of Right Knowledge

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(5. 15). In order to reject misconception regarding the number of its varieties, it is said,—

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2. Right knowledge is twofold.

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(5. 17). It is twofold, it has two varieties. By stating the number, the division into two varieties is indicated. There are two varieties of right knowledge. When the division into two varieties has been stated, it becomes possible to make a definition of right knowledge which (will consist of definitions) confined to each variety separately. (5. 19). Otherwise it is impossible to indicate a unique essence which would embrace all varieties. Therefore the indication that there is a number of different (varieties) is nothing but an (indirect) way of stating that the essence (of knowledge) is double. Without mentioning the number, i. e., the different varieties, it is impossible to express this double essence. The number has thus been stated at the beginning, because this is the only way to specify the essence of knowledge.¹

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¹ This remark is a repetition of what later on, p. 17, text, is said in regard of the twofold division of inference. But there it is quite natural, since two absolutely different things are designated by the term «inference», a method of cognition and its expression in propositions. In this place the remark is strange, since the author has just been dealing at some length with a general definition of right knowledge. It may be Dharmottara had the feeling that his definition of right knowledge as uncontradicted by experience was, to a certain extent, merely verbal, meaningless without reference to its both varieties of direct and indirect cognition. Vinītadeva's comment contains the remark about the impossibility of a general definition only in the right place, i. e., with regard to the definition of inference.

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(5. 22). Now, what are these two varieties?

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3. Direct and indirect (perceptive and inferential).

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(6. 2). The word for direct knowledge (or perception) means knowledge dependent upon the senses.² (This meaning) of a knowledge dependent upon the senses is suggested by the etymological analysis¹ of the word, not by its actual use² (in philosophy). The idea of being dependent upon the senses contains, as its implication,³ the idea of direct knowledge⁴ which is thus being suggested.⁵ This alone is the real meaning⁶ of the term perception. Therefore any knowledge that makes the object (appear) before us directly is called perceptive. (6. 6). If the proper use of the word involved nothing but dependence upon the senses, then sense-knowledge (or sensation) alone could be called direct knowledge, but not (the three remaining varieties of it), mental sensation etc. Thus it is, e. g., that the (sanscrit) word *go* «cow», although it is etymologically derived from the root *gam* «to move», is actually used to express the idea of a cow. This idea is incidentally suggested by the fact of motion when it is inherent in the same object. But then it comes to be generally accepted to denote a cow, whether she moves or not.⁷

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² Lit., p. 6. 2. «Pratyakṣa means that the sense-organ is approached, reposed upon. The compound word is composed according to (the rule) that prepositions like ati etc. in the sense of (ati)-krānta etc. can enter into composition with (their complement) in the accusative case. In words compounded with prāpta, āpanna, alam and prepositions (the rule) according to which the gender of the compound must be the same as the gender of its last member is not observed, (and therefore) it agrees in gender with the object to which it is referred, (and thus) the word pratyakṣa is established as (an adjective which can be used in any gender)», cp. Vārt ad Pāṇini, II, 4. 26.

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¹ *vyutpatti*.

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² *pravṛtti*.

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³ *samāveta*.

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⁴ *artha-sākṣāt-kāritva*.

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⁵ *lakṣyate*.

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⁶ *pravṛtti-nimitta*. The Tib. translation contains, p. 13. 5, a characteristic addition *pratyakṣa* has not the meaning of being dependent upon the senses» This definition (*akṣam pratītya jñānam*) belongs to Praśastapāda, p. 186. 12.

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⁷ The word *go* «cow» is explained as deriving from the verbal root *gam* «to go» in order to conform with the general conception of the Pāṇinean school of grammarians according to which every word must be necessarily explained as deriving from some verbal root. According to this interpretation of the term «perception» it will embrace also the supernatural mystic intuition of Saints, Bodhisattvas and Yogins.

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(6. 10) (The word for inference means etymologically «subsequent measure»). The word «measure» suggests an instrument (by which an object is measured, i. e., cognized). A source of knowledge is thereby indicated, whose characteristic essence is coordination.⁸ It is called «subsequent measure», because it appears after the logical mark (or middle term) has been apprehended, and its concomitance (or major premise) has been brought to memory. (6. 11). When the presence of the mark upon the subject (i. e., the minor premise) has been apprehended, and the concomitance between the minor and the major term, (i. e., the major premise) brought to memory, the inference (or conclusion) follows. Therefore it is called «subsequent».

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⁸ Coordination (*sārūpya*) is a characteristic not only of inferential, but also of perceptive knowledge in its final stage (*pramāṇa-phala*), cp. *infra*, p. 15 (text). Pure sensation (*nirvikalpaka*)-alone contains no coordination.

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(6.12). The word «and» (connecting direct and indirect knowledge) coordinates perception and inference as having equal force.¹ Just as perception is a source of right knowledge, because being always connected with some (real) object it leads to successful purposive action, just the same is the case of inference. It likewise is a source of right knowledge always connected with some (real) object, in as much as it leads to the attainment of an object circumscribed by its mark.

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¹ The tenet that there are only two sources of cognition, the senses and the intellect, has a capital importance for the whole Buddhist system. Cp. the discussions about *pramāṇa-samplava* and *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*, in Nyāyavārt., p. 5. 1, and Tātparyaṭ., p. 12. 3 ff.; cp. Candrakīrti’s polemic against it in my Nirvāṇa p. 141 ff. The realistic systems admit a greater number of *pramāṇas* and maintain at the same time that perception is the chief *pramāṇa*. In the Buddhist view both are mental constructions on the basis of pure sensation, in this they have equal force. Perceptive knowledge is directly produced by an object (*vastu*), inferential is indirectly produced through the medium of something identical with it or through its effect (*tādātmya-tadutpatti*), cp. Vinitadeva, p. 39. 1. The Buddhist division pretends to be exhaustive since it corresponds to the double essence in every object, the particular (conceived as the extreme concrete and particular, the unique, the *kṣaṇa*, the *sva-lakṣaṇa*) and the general, or the coordinated, the similar. The concrete individual object as far as it represents a complex of general features is not considered as a particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*). All general charecteristics are universals even when included in a concrete object. Every cognition of a universal is not sense-cognition. The term inference thus has a much wider connotation than our inference. When so understood perception and inference represent the passive and the active part in cognition, the senses and the intellect. They have thus an equal force, because they produce knowledge together, they can produce no real knowledge separately. Without any possible sensation it will be pure imagination, without any inferring or comparing (*sārūpya*) it will be pure indefinite sensation

§ 4. Perception Defined

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4. Direct knowledge means here neither construction (judgment) nor illusion.

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(6.16). The word «here» indicates localization,² but it is (moreover) used to indicate a selection. Thus the meaning of the sentence is the following one. «Here», i. e., among direct and indirect knowledge — this is a reference to the inclusive whole, «direct knowledge» — this refers to one part of it. A part is thus separated or selected from the whole, because the latter is the general term³ (with reference to the former). (6.18). Direct knowledge is here taken as subject and the characteristics of non-constructive and non-illusive (cognition) are predicated. (It is not a definition of its essence.¹ What its essence is) you and I very well know (in general). It is a kind of cognition which makes us (feel) that the objects are present to us directly. It is (now intimated) that it should be viewed as (something) non-constructive and (something) containing no illusion. (It may be objected, that since we do not very well know what these characteristics mean, we neither can know what direct knowledge is. But this is not so!) We must not imagine that if (the notions of) non-constructive and non-illusive are not familiar to us, we must refer them to some different special kind of direct knowledge which has been given this name and is here spoken of. The term «direct knowledge» (or perception) is familiar to everybody from its application (to that variety of direct cognition) which makes the object present to our sense-faculties and which is invariably connected with them.

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² *saptamī-arthe*.

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³ *pratyakṣatva-jātyā* = Tib. *mṅon-sum-ñid-kyi rigs-kyis*, cp. Ṭip p., p. 17.2—*pratyakṣāṇām bahutvāt*.

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¹ As e. g., in the sentence «sound is impermanent» impermanence is a characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of the sound, but not its essence (svarūpa). These remarks are directed against Vinitadeva who has interpreted the sūtra as containing a definition and has even reversed the order of subject and predicate by stating that «whatsoever is non-constructive and non-illusive is direct knowledge» (p. 39. 12). The same is done by Kamalaśīla, op. cit. p. 366. 25, who maintains that, although pratyakṣa is here the lakṣya, it is also the predicate (vidhiyate). Cp. Tipp.., p. 17—18. The term pratyakṣa is greater in extension than sense-perception (indriya-jñāna), cp. above. text p. 6. 6—7. But a thing must be known in general when its special characteristics are given and what «direct knowledge» is in general that everyone knows from the example of sense perception.

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(6. 22). This (perception) is referred to, and the characteristics of being neither a construction nor an illusion are predicated. Not² to be a construction means to be foreign to construction, not to have the nature of an arrangement (or judgment). «Not an illusion» means not contradicted by that (underlying) essence of reality which possesses efficiency. This essence consists of patches of colour which are the substratum underlying the arrangement (of parts in an object).¹ Non-illusive means knowledge which is not at variance with this (direct reality).

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² Thus this celebrated definition (kalpanāpoḍha) of Dignāga which is discussed almost in every sanscrit work on philosophy or logic is not at all supposed to represent any exhaustive definition of perception, but only an indication of one of its characteristics. The feeling of the presence of the object in the range of our senses is its essential function (sākṣāt-kāritva-vyāpāra) and it is followed by a construction or judgment (vikalpena anugamyate). The Buddhists admit both pure sensation (nirvikalpaka = kalpanāpoḍha) and definite perception (savikalpaka), the latter under the names of pramāṇa-phala, artha-pratīti, sārūpya-jñāna. The same distinction is already contained in Nyāya-sūtra I. 4, where, according to the interpretations of Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakāra and Vācaspati, the word avyapadeśya refers to the nirvikalpaka, and the word vyavasāyātmaka — to the savikalpaka pratyakṣa. The difference between both conceptions consists in the prominence given by Dignāga to pure sensation (nirvikalpaka) as the only source of knowledge through which we come in touch with «absolute reality» (paramārthasat), with the «thing in itself» (sva-lakṣaṇa). In my «Logic and Epistemology» (German translation, p. 192) I ascribed the distinction of pure sensation and definite perception to Dignāga, and its introduction into brahmanic Nyāya to

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¹ By pure sensation we may cognize the presence of an object which is a patch of blue colour, (we shall have nīla-vijñānam = nīlasya vijñānam), but we will not know that it is blue (we will not have the nīlam iti vijñānam), since this knowledge is arrived at by contrasting it with other objects and contrast (vyāvṛtti) is the work of intellect, not of pure sensation, cp. my Nirvāṇa, p. 162 n. 3. The reading varṇātmaka is supported by the Tib. transl. The alternative reading dharmātmaka conveys just the same idea since varṇa (or rūpa) is here a dharma, an ultimate element in the system of Hinayāna, cp. Central Conception, p. 11.

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(7. 3). (However, as they stand) these two characteristics are intended to clear away wrong conceptions, not (alone) to distinguish (direct from) indirect cognition. The characteristic of «not being a construction» would have been alone quite sufficient for that. (7. 4). But if (the second characteristic) of «not being an illusion» were not added, (the following misconception would not have been guarded against. (There are some who maintain that) the vision of a moving tree (by an observer travelling by ship) and similar perceptions are right perceptions, because (there is in this case an underlying reality which) is not a construction. (7. 5). Indeed a man acting upon such a perception reaches something which is a tree,² hence (it is supposed) that experience supports³ his perception. It would thus be consistent knowledge and so far would be direct, as not being a (mere) construction. (7. 7). In order to guard against this view the characteristic of «not being an illusion» has been inserted. It is an illusion. It is not a (right) perception. Neither is it an inference, since it is not derived from some mark in its threefold aspect.⁴ No other way of cognition is possible. We maintain therefore that the vision of a moving tree is error. (7. 8).

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