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Buddhist Logic v2.c19: Appendix II

Buddhist Logic v2.c19

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Appendix II

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Vācaspatimiśra on the Buddhist Theory of a radical distinction between sensation and conception (pramāṇa-vyavasthā *versus* pramāṇa-samplava).

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the *Gesta Romanorum*, the *Legenda Aurea* of Jacobus de Voragine, and the *Speculum Historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais. These were the books that fed the imagination of the Middle Ages, and they were the books that the Church, in its wisdom, provided for the instruction and edification of the faithful.

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But the Church did not merely provide books; it also provided the means of their dissemination. The monastic scriptoria, where monks labored in silence to copy the sacred texts, were the precursors of the printing press. And when the press finally arrived, it was the Church that first harnessed its power, using it to spread the word of God to the corners of the earth. The Gutenberg Bible, the first major book printed in Europe, was a testament to the Church's commitment to the written word.

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Yet, even as the Church championed the spread of knowledge, it also sought to control it. The *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, or List of Prohibited Books, was a tool used by the Church to suppress ideas it deemed dangerous or heretical. This tension between the desire to educate and the need to control would define the Church's relationship with literature for centuries to come.

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It is a complex history, one that is marked by both enlightenment and suppression. But it is a history that cannot be ignored, for it is the history of the very foundation of Western civilization. The Church, in its role as the guardian of knowledge, has shaped the way we think, the way we write, and the way we understand the world around us.

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Vācaspatimiśra on the Buddhist theory of a radical distinction between sensation and conception. (pramāṇa-vyavasthā versus pramāṇa-samplava).

§ 1. Preliminary

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The Indian realists, Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas etc., admitted two kinds of sense-perception, a primitive, simple sensation without participation of conception (nirvikalpaka), and a more determinate, complex perception with participation of conception or construction (savikalpaka). The difference between the two kinds of perception was for them one of degree, of distinctness and clearness. Dignāga starts, Pramāṇa-samuccaya, I. 2, by establishing a radical, essential and even, as will be seen, transcendental, difference between pure sensation and conception. The latter in his system includes judgment and inference. What the realists call perception and inference is by Dignāga replaced by sensation and conception; although he retained the terms, but gave them another interpretation and scope. We have thus in his system pure sensation and pure conception and the corresponding distinctions of pure object, which is identified with reality itself, or the thing in itself, and pure Universals. According to the realists the Universe contains particulars, universals and mixed things (vyakti-jāti-ākṛti). They are apprehended by different sense faculties and by ratiocination. The same thing may be cognized in many ways. There are no strict distinct limits for each source of knowledge. Dignāga opposed to this a sharp distinction between two sources corresponding to two kinds of objectivity. The objects are either Particulars or Universals and the sources of knowledge are, accordingly, either Sensation or Conception. Particular and Universal are empirically (sāmvyavahārika) conceived by the realists, transcendentally (paramārthataḥ) understood by Dignāga. His Particular is the point instant, the thing in itself, absolutely undifferentiated and radically different from all constructions of the conceptive faculty of our mind. The concrete individual thing (svabhāva-viśeṣa), being a meeting point of several Universals, is nevertheless treated as a particular in European logic, for the Buddhists it is a construction and therefore treated as a Universal cognized by inference. The presence of fire is perceived, according to the Realists, by two sense-faculties, the visual sense and the tactile sense, or it may also be inferred from the presence of smoke. This fire is the concrete, empirical, physical object fire. For the Buddhists the sense of vision apprehends only colour, the tactile sense only heat, and the distinct image of fire is a construction of productive imagination (kalpanā), a Universal, a conception by dint of its sameness with similar points of reality and its contrast with every thing dissimilar. Such construction by similarity and contrast is the essence of indirect, conceptual or inferential knowledge. It will be seen from the examples given by Vācaspati that even the perceptual cognitions of the form «this is blue», «this is a jar», «this is a cow» are treated as perceptual judgments, as conceptions, i. e., conceiving states of mind and, therefore, inferences, cp. Tātp., p. 338. 0, sa ca vikalpānām gocaro yo vikalpyate, deśa-kāla-avasthā-bhedena ekatvena anusandhiyate and Udayana adds anumānātmakatvād vikalpasya. —According to Sigwart, Logik, II p. 395, the perceptual judgment «this is gold» is an inference, — «sobald ich sage «es ist Gold», interpretire ich das Phänomen durch einen allgemeinen Begriff, und vollziehe einen Subsumtions-schluss». By a broader definition of inference all conceiving activity, all comparing knowledge (sārūpya-pramāṇa) is called indirect, i. e., non-sensuous cognition or inference. The Buddhist view receives the name of a «radical distinction» between the sources of our knowledge (pramāṇa-vyavasthā), the Realist maintains the view which is called their «coalescence» (pramāṇa-samplava).

§ 2. A Passage of Uddyotakāra's Nyāya-Vārtika

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ed. Calcutta, 1897 (B. I), pp. 5. 5—5. 12.

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(5. 5). (The Buddhist) objects and maintains that the cooperation¹ (of the different sources of our knowledge in the cognition of one and the same object) is impossible, since each of them has its own special field of action. This we (Naiyāyiks) deny, because we do not admit that (each has its own special object). There is indeed such a theory. Every source of our knowledge is supposed to have a special object. Sensation² apprehends particulars (only), inference³ apprehends universals (exclusively). That alone is an object of our knowledge which is either a universal or a particular. Sensation is not intent upon a universal, and never is inference⁴ intent upon a particular.⁵ (5. 9). This we, (Naiyāyiks), deny, because we do not agree (with the reason). We neither admit that there are only two sources of knowledge, (sensation and conception⁶), nor that there are only two (quite distinct) objects of knowledge, (the particular⁷ and the universal), nor do we maintain that they cannot coalesce. Why? The sources are four in number, (perception, inference, analogy and testimony). The objects are of three kinds, the universal, the particular and the individual thing as possessor¹ of Universals, (concrete universals).

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¹ Or mixture — samplava = sankara = ekasmin viṣaye sarveṣām pramāṇānām pravṛttiḥ.

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² pratyakṣa, sense-perception according to the realists.

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³ anumāna, according to the Buddhists it includes conception.

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⁴ The Buddhist understands «conception».

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⁵ The Buddhist understands «the ultimate particular, the point-instant», the Naiyāyik understands the empirical concrete thing.

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⁶ The Naiyāyik understands «sense-perception and inference».

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⁷ i. e., the ultimate particular. This fundamental feature of the Buddhist system has been noticed and very well expressed by the learned editor of the Tattvasangraha, Introduction p. 43, — svalakṣaṇasya avācyatvam..., atyantika-

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¹ *tadvat* = *sāmānyavad-viśeṣaḥ*, it is really a « particular universal », a contradictio in adjecto, just as sensation-imagination.

§ 3. The Comment of Vācaspatimiśra

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Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā, Vizian. ed. pp. 12. 16 ff., Benares ed. (1925), pp. 17. 16 ff.

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(12. 16). There is a theory (of the Buddhists according to which Perception is Sensation, and Inference is nothing but Conception, they represent two originally independent sources of our knowledge), each apprehends a special, originally independent² (element) in the cognized object. When a reference to them is made in the plural (and not in the dual), their subdivisions are meant. (12. 17). Sense-perception, being produced by a stimulus coming from an object, is intent upon that object, (because it is produced³ by it. But moreover) only that thing is an object of perception whose presence invariably calls forth its image.⁴ (12. 18). A Universal cannot produce the same (results, it neither can exercise a stimulus, nor can it call forth an image of the

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² It is not enough to state that perception and inference have special (*viśiṣṭa*) objects of cognition, these objects represent originally independent (*bhinna*) elements, since empirically there is an element of sense perception when we infer the presence of fire on the hill, and there is an element of constructive thought in every percept, thus *pratyakṣayor anumānayor vā samplave na bādhakam uktam* (*viśiṣṭa-śabdena*), *tathāpi vijātīya - pramāṇa - samplava - nirākaraṇa - paro' yam granthaḥ* (V).

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³ It is not enough to mention that cognition is intent on the object (*artha-gocaras*) in order to imply that it is produced (*artha-sāmarthya-samuttha*) by it. This would be the standpoint of the Naiyāyiks and the Universals would be included among the causes of perception. Therefore emphasis is put upon *artha-sāmarthya*. Only an efficient object, only a particular is a cause (*hetu*) producing perception. This again is not enough, because there is always a plurality of causes. Therefore that cause alone is the object which calls forth in our cognition its own image (*ākāra-ādhāyaka*) (V).

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⁴ Lit., p. 12. 17—18. «That object alone is the field of perception which obliges its own knowledge-reflex to conform with a positive concomitance and its contraposition». — *jñāna-pratibhāsa* = *jñāna-ākāra* (V); *aniyata-pratibhāsa* is meant in the sense of N. b. ṭ., p. 8. 8.

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vibhedaś cej jātaḥ svalakṣaṇāt, the particular is conceived as something unique and inexpressible, because possessing no connotation.

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object), since it is altogether devoid of any kind of (direct) causal efficiency.¹ (12. 19). (Nor can the empirical ² Particular, which is the meeting point of several Universals, do it. But the transcendental) Particular can. This alone is (pure reality), reality in the ultimate sense, (the thing in itself), because the essence of reality (according to the Buddhists) is just the faculty of being causally efficient. (12. 20). It is a point-instant (in time-space, it transcends empirical space and empirical time ³), it is just the thing in itself shorn of all its extensions.⁴ It is not an extended body.⁵ The ultimate reality is not a thing which is one and the same in different points of space.⁶ Nor has it duration through different instants of time. Therefore sense cognition,⁷ (sensation) apprehends the point-instant of reality,⁸ (the efficiency moment, the thing in itself, which alone ⁹ possesses the faculty of affecting our sensitivity).¹⁰

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¹ This is against the Naiyāyiks who admit that sense perception apprehends the particular and the Universals inhering in it as well, thus admitting a complex (samplava), qualified perception which the Buddhist denies as sense-perception; viśiṣṭa-viṣayatvam abhipretya sāmānyasya pratyakṣa-aviṣayatvam uktam (V).

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² sāmvyavahārikam svalakṣaṇam (P), = vyavahāra-mātra-viṣayaḥ=avastavam (V). sāmvyavahārikaḥ = anādi-vāsanā-vāsitaḥ (N. Kandali, p. 279. 15).

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³ artha-kriyā-sāmarthyena eva vastutva-vyāvasthāpanāt, kimartham tasya deśādy-ananugamaḥ? (V). — deśa-kāla-ananugatam vicāra-saham ity arthaḥ (P).

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⁴ asādhāraṇa.

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⁵ adeśātmaka.

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⁶ deśato 'nanugamena.

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⁷ pratyakṣam.

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⁸ svalakṣaṇa = kṣaṇa.

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⁹ artha-kriyā-siddhy-artham tad-abhidhānam (V).

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¹⁰ Lit., p. 12. 20—22. «This alone is its own non-shared (read asādhāraṇam) essence, that there is ultimate reality of the one which possesses an un-spatial Ego by not being extended (ananugama) in space (or by not being repeated in space), and there is momentariness by not running through (ananugama) time».

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(12. 22). That a Particular (of this kind) should also be cognized (by the conceiving, synthetic, faculty of our mind, or) by inference, is impossible. (The sphere of absolute particulars is not the sphere of inference). The latter cognizes relations,¹¹ and relations are of two kinds only, (either logical or real), either Identity or Causation.¹² In an absolute particular no relation can be found: (Uniformally) related ¹³ are always two Universals. (12. 24). (But a real Universal is an impossibility).¹ A thing cannot represent a unity and reside in different places, at different times and in different conditions. (12. 25). (Since Universals are thus illusory realities, and inferential knowledge has to deal with Universals only, does this mean that their knowledge is altogether objectless? ²). The Universals are indeed (not realities ³), they are logical constructions produced by a congenital capacity (of our Reason ⁴); we must admit that their objective existence in the external world, belongs (only) to the domain of our inferential knowledge, it is either a dialectical (superstructure upon reality) or an objectivized image.⁵

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¹¹ gṛhīta-pratibandha-hetukam.

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¹² Causation between «strings of events» (santāna) is also constructed, cp. N. b. ṭ., p. 69.

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¹³ pratibandhaḥ sāmānya-dharmāv āśrayate.

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¹ *paramārthasat sāmānyam vicāra-asaham (P), kārtsnya-ekadeśa-vṛtti-nirāsāt (V); the Buddhists admit a vyāvṛtti-rūpam, alīkam, anādi-vikalpa-vāsanā-vāsitam sāmānyam.*

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² *tat kim, sāmānyasya asattvāt, svalakṣaṇe ca pratibandha-graha-asambhavād anumānam nirviṣayam eva? (P).*

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³ *vikalpādhiṣṭhānam = (vikalpa)-viṣayo 'līkam iti yāvat (V).*

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⁴ *.....adhiṣṭhānam vikalpākārasya vā alīkasya bāhyatvam anumāna-go-caro... V. thinks that alīkabāhyatram and vikalpākāratvam refer to two different ideas (matāntaram), the first refers to an objectivized image, the second, as is seen from the sequel, — to a dialectical superstructure, having indirect reality.*

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⁵ Lit., p. 12. 23—26. «That indeed is caused by the apprehended mark of a (uniform) tie. And the tie consisting in identity-with-that and origination-from-that cannot be grasped in a particular as its object, it thus reposes on two Universals. And the one Universal cannot reside in different places, times and conditions. Therefore it is the place of construction originating from a beginningless Force, it must be assumed that the sphere of inference is the externality of a (dialectically) constructed form or an objectivized image (alīkasya)».

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(12. 26). Their essence,⁶ indeed, (is not positive, but relative, since they always contain) a correlative negation.⁷ (This is proved by three⁸ facts), 1) (reality is not their essential attribute), they are positive and negative,⁹ 2) (although internal mental constructions they have) resemblance with external reality, and 3) they are *distinct* ¹⁰ images, (i. e., they contain a sharp distinction from, or negation of, all other things).

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⁶ *niṣṭhā = svarūpam.*

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⁷ *anya-vyāvṛtti=apoha, anya-vyāvṛtti-niṣṭham=pratiyogi-niṣedha-svarūpam.*

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⁸ Cp. the somewhat different formulation of the three points Tātp., p. 340. 6 ff., translated in Appendix V.

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⁹ Cp. Bain, Logic, I. 54 ff. — Existence, is not their essence, their asādhāraṇa-dharma, in contradistinction from an ultimate particular (svalakṣaṇa) in which existence is inherent, which is only positive, since we cannot say «something is not», because this «something» is nothing but mere existence, pure reality. Cp. Tātp., p. 338. 1 and F. Brentano, Psychologie, II, p. 49 ff.

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¹⁰ *niyata-pratibhāsa = niyata-ākāra* as in N. b. ṭ., p. 70. 6, = *anya-vyāvṛttyā*; it is exactly the opposite of *niyata-pratibhāsa* in N. b. ṭ., p. 8—9, where it is = *arthena, indriyena vā, niyamita.*

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(As regards the first point the argument can be thrown into the form of the following syllogism).

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(Major premise). Whatsoever can alternately be affirmed and denied (has no existence in itself, but becomes existent relatively), as distinguished from something else.

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(Example). As, e. g., the fact of not being a body of limited dimensions.¹ It is found in consciousness (which is not impenetrable and) exists, and in the horns on the head of a hare which do not exist (and therefore are also not a body).

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¹ amūrta.

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(Minor premise). A (Universal, being) a mental construction,² can be alternately affirmed and denied, «there is a jar», «there is no jar».

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² vikalpa-gocaro.

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(Conclusion). («Jar» is not existence «in itself», it exists relatively to other things).

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(Verification). If «jar» were existence in itself,³ the words «it is» would never be used, being superfluous; nor would the words «it is not» be possible, because they would contradict (the existence which would then be included in the thing «jar»). If it were non-existence in itself, the same consequence would follow.⁴

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³ asādhāraṇo-bhāvo.

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(13.⁴). (As to the second point, it should be noticed that the Universal) is devoid of every direct efficiency, it is an (imagined) illusive Ens. There is no sameness between it and the point of absolute reality (represented by the element «this», so as to produce the perceptual judgment «this is a cow»), except the fact that both exclude⁵ the negation («non-cow»).⁶

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⁴ Cp. Bradley, Logic, p. 121, «It may be, after all, that everything «is» just so far as «it is not», and again «is not» just so far as «it is».

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⁶ Cp. Bradley, ibid. «If everything thus has its discrepant in itself, then every thing in a sense must be its own discrepancy».

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(13.⁵). (As to the third point, it must be noticed that) the distinct image of «a cow», and the definite connotative designation «a cow», would never be possible without (having present in the mind its) distinctions⁷ from horses or other (animals).⁸ (13.6). Therefore the Universal is nothing but the Negation of the Correlative,¹ it is (therefore) an internal² (mental construction, but related to external reality, since in our behaviour) we do not notice the difference,³ it is quasi-included in external reality⁴ and thus gives reality⁵ to our (conceptual, or) inferential knowledge. (13.7). Being thus indirectly connected with external reality, it has efficacy,⁶ it becomes consistent experience.⁷ Although it is an illusion of reality, it is nevertheless a source of right knowledge, in so far it belongs to a man who thinks (and acts) consistently.⁸

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⁵ Instead of manyate’ nya-vyāvṛtteḥ read anyato’ nya-vyāvṛtteḥ or anyatra vyāvṛtteḥ.

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⁷ Cp. Bradley, ibid. «Everything is determined by all negation».

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⁸ Lit., p. 13. 5. «And the definite idea and designation «cow» not without the exclusion of horse etc.». — What is here called niyatā buddhiḥ refers to the same

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¹ anya-vyāvṛtti-rūpam.

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² abāhyam.

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³ bāhya-bheda-agrahāt, i. e., we do not think that «a cow» is not an external object.

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⁴ bāhyatvena avasīyamānam.

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⁵ pravartayati.

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⁶ prāpayat.

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⁷ saṃvā dakam sat.

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⁸ Our conceptual knowledge is thus a dream accompanying real facts. This theory will be expounded with more detail in Appendix V. — Lit., p. 13. 6—8. «Therefore the Universal whose essence is distinction from the different (anya-vyāvṛtti), being non-external, being plunged in the external through non-perception of the difference from the external, directs inference towards the external; and by being indirectly tied up to the external, it makes us reach the external; being consistent, although wrong, it is, by being located in the cognizer, a means of right knowledge».

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(13.9). Thus it is that the particular (as the ultimate reality) is not the object on which inference (or conception) is intent. That sensation, on the other hand, is not intent on Universals, has already been pointed out. Nor is there any other source of knowledge (except these two, sensation and conception). Whatsoever (has a claim to be) a source of right cognition is included in these two, or, if it is not included in them, it is not a source of right knowledge. Nor is there any other object of cognition different from the particular, (viz. the ultimately particular) and the Universal, (there is no mixed entity in the cognition of which) both sources of our knowledge could participate.

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thing which above p. 12. 27 was designated as niyata-pratibhāsa. It is evident that niyata is here used in the sense of «distinct», niyata-pratibhāsa = niyatā buddhiḥ = niyata-ākāra, not in the sense of «limited» niyata = arthena indriyena vā niyamita as in N. b. ṭ., p. 8. 9 and 8. 20, cp. above, p. 505 n. 10.

§ 4. The Answer of Uddyotakāra

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Nyāya-vārt., pp. 5. 9—14.

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(5. 9). This is wrong! We do not admit it. We, first of all, do not admit (the limitation) of two sources of knowledge, nor of two kinds of object, nor of the impossibility of their mixture. Why? The sources of our knowledge are, indeed, four in number, (perception, inference, analogy and testimony). The objects are of three kinds, the particulars, the universals and their mixture. (5. 11). A mixt (knowledge) is possible in that sense that the same object can be apprehended by any source of knowledge, as e. g., by the senses (etc.). (5. 12). A sense faculty is a source of knowledge, it illumines, (as it were), the objects. Sometimes it is limited, sometimes mixed. It is limited, e. g., in the cognition of odours (which can be apprehended by one sense faculty). It is not limited in the cognition of solid bodies which are cognized by two senses, (by vision and touch). As regards the perception of Existence or of the fact of possessing attributes, (i. e., the Categories of Substance and Quality), this is cognized by every sense.

§ 5. Comment of Vācaspatimiśra

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Tātp., p. 13. 12—13.

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(13. 12). In saying «this is wrong!» (the author of the Vārtika) rejects (the Buddhist theory) and explains (the reasons for doing it). That the theory is really such, (i. e., wrong), will be (repeatedly) stated here, (in the course of this our work).

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(Remark of Udayana, p. 114). If the Universal is unreal and the Absolute Particular alone ultimately real, the latter cannot be mixed with the former, because a combination of the real with the unreal is impossible. (The empirical individual thing is thus founded on an absurdity). The author says, «that this theory is wrong, (will be proved later on)». He wishes to say that the path (of Buddhist philosophy) leads into great depths (and cannot be lightly dealt with at present).

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(Remark of Vardhamāna, ibid.). Since the (Buddhist) onslaught leads into great depths, if the author would undertake to refute it here, it would make his text very heavy (reading ¹)!

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¹ This is the first short statement of Buddhist Idealism in the Tātparyaṭīkā. Its different phases will be repeatedly expounded and refuted in detail in the course of the work wheresoever the opportunity of doing it will present itself, cp. pp. 88 ff., 100 ff., 127 ff., 144 ff., 182 ff., 268 ff., 338 ff., 379. 25 ff., 463 ff. etc. etc. These subtlest Naiyāyiks, Udayana and Vardhamāna, deemed Buddhist philosophy an «impervious path», gahanaḥ panthāḥ.

Cites (3)