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The History of Buddhist Thought c20: Chapter XII

The History of Buddhist Thought c20

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Chapter XII

c20.1

WITH Asoka in the middle of the third century B.C. Buddhism comes into the light of secular history. Both Pāli and Sanskrit schools possess legends about Asoka, and we have the contemporary evidence of his edicts.¹ The legends, as we have seen (ch. III), are late traditions, and the most important event for the history of Buddhism, the third Council, is unknown to the Sanskrit tradition and ignored in the edicts. But, even if the Council really took place, we learn nothing about the state of the Canon as a whole, for it was still unwritten, nor do we know what took place at the Council beyond the fact that the work the *Kathāvatthu* is said to have been spoken at it.

c20.2

¹ Pāli story of Asoka in *Mhvs.*, v, ff., and the commentaries on the Scriptures. Much of the Sanskrit story is extant in *Divy.* It has been dealt with more fully from Chinese sources by J. Przyluski in *La légende de l’empereur Aśoka*. The text and translation of the edicts in E. Hultzsch, *Inscriptions of Asoka*, Oxford, 1925, and also in R. Mookerji’s *Asoka*, London, 1928. D. R. Bhandarkar’s *Asoka*, Calcutta, 1925, also gives translations. Both these books deal ably with the historical problems. V. A. Smith has treated the subject in his *Asoka* and *The early history of India*.

c20.3

The edicts of Asoka are found in various places from the extreme north-west of India to as far south as Mysore. There is a set of fourteen rock inscriptions, which are found repeated in various places, six pillar-edicts, and a number of minor inscriptions. Two of the rock-edicts are dated in the twelfth year of Asoka’s consecration, which would make their date about 253 B.C.

c20.4

Among the references of religious interest is the statement in Rock-Edict XIII, that he has won the victory of *dhamma* (religion) “among all his borderers, even to the extent of six hundred yojanas, where (is) the Yona king Antiyoga [Antiochus II of Syria], and beyond this Antiyoga, (where are ruling) four kings Tulamaya [Ptolemy II of Egypt], Antekina [Antigonus Gonatas of Macedonia], Makā [Magas of Cyrene], and Alikyashudala [Alexander of Epirus or of Corinth], and likewise to the south the Choḍa-pamḍiyā [Cholas and Pāṇḍyas] as far as Tambapaṃni [Tāmraparṇī] ; likewise here in the king’s dominion among the Yonas and Kambojas, among the Nābhakas and Nābhapaṃtis, among the Bhojas and Pitinikyas, the Andhras and Pāladas, everywhere (people) are following Devānampiya’s instruction in dhamma . . .”

c20.5

From this we see that Asoka’s empire extended to the extreme north of India, where it included part of what is now Afghanistan and Baluchistan, and bordered on the Syrian Empire of Antiochus; to the south the bounds of his empire are shown by the mention of the Cholas and Pāṇḍyas at the end of the peninsula, and also Tambapaṃni. But where is Tambapaṃni? It is a well-known name of Ceylon, which the Greeks spoke of as Taprobane. But Hultzsch records the fact that it is also the name of a small river in the Tinnevelly District. This inscription hardly allows us to decide which of the two was meant, but the name also occurs in Rock Edict II, among the names of peoples, the Cholas, Pāṇḍyas and others, where it cannot be taken as indicating a boundary.¹ It is thus more likely that the name refers to Ceylon, but these two references are all the information that we get from the inscriptions about Asoka’s relation with the Sinhalese. The story of the introduction of Buddhism into Ceylon by Asoka’s son Mahinda belongs only to the Chronicles, and does not really add to our historical information. Asoka’s own account of his missionary efforts in so many directions makes it probable that he did not omit Ceylon, but what form the Scriptures had when they were introduced into the island is not known. Those now existing in Ceylon belong to a recension which was probably edited in the west of India, and there is nothing to connect them directly with Asoka’s mission.

c20.6

¹ V. A. Smith mistranslated it, and made it mean “as far as Tambapaṇṇi”, but, as Hultzsch and Mookerji show, it means “what is (known as) Tambapaṇṇi”.

c20.7

What Asoka meant by religion or morality (dhamma) doubtless varied in the course of his life. We find that he bitterly regretted the slaughter involved in his conquest of the Kalingas, and he appears to have undergone a conversion. He speaks of having for more than two years not exerted himself well as a lay disciple, but that afterwards he exerted himself greatly. He undertook religious tours, and he mentions his going to the Bodhi tree (*sambodhi*).¹ He teaches respect to parents and teachers and forbids the slaying of living creatures. There is no doubt that he was a Buddhist, but other sects were honoured by him, so that the dhamma which he fostered must have been chiefly the rules of morality. It has even been held that in his time Buddhism consisted of nothing but moral rules, and that the edicts show us an earlier stage of Buddhism, “une doctrine toute morale,” as Senart says. This theory implies not only that Buddhism was such in its first beginnings, but also that it was nothing more than that a century or two later. So that we are asked to suppose that not merely the doctrine of the Path was an invention of monks, but that it had not even been invented in the time of Asoka. One thing supposed to show this is that his edicts do not mention Nirvāṇa. He speaks of wishing to make all living beings happy in this world in order that in the other world they may attain heaven (R.E., vi), and again says that the practice of dhamma produces endless merit in the world beyond (R.E., ix). But this is merely ordinary teaching. To preach Nirvāṇa as a reward to people living in the world would be an absurdity. To preach heaven as a reward for good deeds is Buddha’s own doctrine. As Dr. Bhandarkar says, if it is once grasped that Asoka was himself a lay follower of Buddhism and preached to the householders, and that his teaching was based on what that religion ordained for its laity, there is nothing surprising in the fact that he makes no mention of Nirvāṇa or the Eightfold Way in his edicts, but on the contrary speaks of heaven, and holds it up as the reward of dhamma in the next life.²

c20.8

¹ Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar, I think, first pointed this out. It used to be translated “set out for enlightenment”, or even “arrivé à la vraie intelligence”; cf. Przyluski, *Le Bouddhisme*, p. 25. The inscriptions recording Asoka’s visit to Buddha’s birthplace and to the stupa of the previous Buddha Konākamana are extant, but as they were “discovered” by the forger A. Führer, they are suspect. Führer also claimed to have discovered the stupa itself, but no one else has ever seen it.

c20.9

² *Asoka*, p. 123; see also his essay in *Buddhistic Studies*, p. 619.

c20.10

Yet Asoka did recognize something more. He also addressed the Order, and to them he did not speak of heaven. In what is known as the Bhabru or Bairat No. 2 Rock Edict (now at Calcutta) he specifies a number of scriptural passages to be listened to and learnt. They show that he thought of the doctrine as something much more than purely moral rules. The whole inscription is as follows:

c20.11

“Priyadasi, the Magadha king, having saluted the Order speaks (to them the wish of) health and comfortable life. It is known to you, reverend ones, how great is my reverence and good will to Buddha, the Doctrine, and the Order. Whatever, reverend ones, has been spoken by the Lord Buddha, all that has been well spoken. But as for what, reverend ones, would appear to me that ‘thus the good Doctrine will be of long duration’, that I undertake to say. These expositions of the Doctrine, reverend ones: (1) *Vinaya-samukasa*, (2) *Aliya-vasāni*, (3) *Anāgata-bhayāni*, (4) *Muni-gāthā*, (5) *Moneya-sūta*, (6) *Upatisa-pasina*, and (7) *Lāghulovāda*, which was spoken by the Lord Buddha about falsehood—these expositions of the Doctrine I desire, reverend ones, that many groups of monks and nuns may repeatedly hear and bear in mind, and likewise laymen and laywomen. For this purpose, reverend ones, I am causing this to be inscribed, that they may know my intention”.

c20.12

Here seven passages appear to be mentioned. The first two are unknown, and much trouble has been taken in “identifying” them with passages with other names, and thus giving more or less likely guesses. Dr. Walleser explains them as not being titles at all.¹ The others have been identified with more plausibility.² They are all addressed to monks, and they teach, not heaven as the goal, but, although never neglecting moral action, inculcate the doctrine of release and enlightenment.

c20.13

¹ *Das Edikt von Bhabra*, 1923; *Nochmals das Edikt von Bhabra*, 1925.

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² *Anāgata-bhayāni* “dangers in the future”. There are four suttas discussing this subject. *Angut.*, iii, 100-110; *Munigāthā* “verses on the recluse” = *Munisutta*, *Sn.* i, 12; *Moneya-sūta*, “sutta on the state of a recluse” = *Nālaka-sutta*, *Sn.* iii, 11; *Upatisa-pasina* “question of Upatissa” = *Sāriputta-sutta*, *Sn.* iv, 16; *Lāghulovāda* “exhortation to Rāhula” = *Majjh.*, i, 414. (4) and (5) occur partly in *Mahāvastu*, iii, 110, 386. Cf. Hultzsch for earlier identifications, and D. Kosambi, *Ind. Ant.*, xli, 40.

c20.15

Dr. Mookerji says that this edict throws great light upon the history of the Buddhist canonical literature, but it is difficult to see in what way. It may be supposed that Asoka chose those passages which had impressed him and which he thought suitable for the monks. There is no mention in them of the Vinaya itself (even the word *vinaya* in *vinaya-samukasa* is disputed by Walleser) nor of the Abhidhamma, and only one or possibly two passages are in the four Nikāyas.

c20.16

About the state of the Canon in the time of Asoka neither the Edicts nor the Chronicles tell us anything positive, but much can be concluded from a comparison of the existing recensions. We have seen that the structure of the Vinaya must have been by this time already fixed, and this harmonizes with the importance attributed to the Sangha by Asoka. But the legendary portion of the Vinaya was always liable to addition. Any rule could be expounded by adding a story to explain its origin. This went much further in the Sarvāstivāda Vinayas than in the Pāli.¹ In Ceylon, on the other hand, the Vinaya seems to have more early become a closed text, probably when it was introduced into the island in a written form. It contains no legends, or legends disguised as prophecies, referring to the period of Asoka.

c20.17

¹ This can be seen from Rockhill's *Life of the Buddha*, which consists chiefly of Vinaya extracts.

c20.18

The arrangement of the four Nikāyas or Āgamas must also have originated before sectarian differences became acute. The same principle of division is found in all schools : one collection of long suttas, one collection of medium long, one of groups of connected subjects, and a numerical group. As there is no doubt that this grouping was earlier than the committing of the discourses to writing, it is easy to see how the same material might be grouped differently by different schools, though the collection of long suttas is nearly the same in all. Before the adoption of this arrangement there must have been much opportunity for the introduction of unauthorized material, but there was an evident desire to keep the text pure, and the elaborate subdivisions of the Nikāyas were a help in preventing the introduction of arbitrary additions. Not only was the matter in each group determined to some extent by its special character, but each group was subdivided into smaller groups and again into series (vaggas) of about ten each. At the end of each series the titles of each sutta were recorded in a memorial verse. There was the less temptation to introduce spurious passages owing to the fact that no attempt was made to include within the four Nikāyas everything that might claim to be the Buddha-word. When the four Nikāyas were organized, it would be natural that there should be some works which could not be included in the scheme, or which were suspect. A number of such unclassified passages are, in fact, found in most schools. In the Pāli and some other schools they have been formed into a fifth Nikāya, but even in the Pāli, which has carried systematization furthest, there has been no general agreement as to what should be admitted. In this group we have the Buddhist Apocrypha. Its very existence was likely to preserve the older collections from accretions, as it remained a repository for doubtful works. This does not take us back to a primitive tradition, but only to a stage when the recorded Buddha-word was classified and edited.

c20.19

The scepticism which sometimes exists with regard to the antiquity of these collections often results from a shallow analogy with theories of Biblical tradition. The Buddhist Scriptures do not as a whole form a sacrosanct entity. It is true, as Asoka said, that whatever has been spoken by Buddha has been well spoken, but that does not make the whole Canon verbally inspired. This was fully recognized by the old commentators, who knew quite well that much of it was spoken by disciples. We find them from time to time pointing out that certain passages were added later, as they say, by the sangītikāras, the holders of the Councils. A modern critical analysis, even if it could be convincingly achieved, would doubtless go further. For our present purpose it is only necessary to recognize a body of ancient tradition common to all the older schools, which contains traces of development, but no evidence of violation of the primitive teaching.

c20.20

Development, however, did take place, and we find it in the Abhidhamma. The time of the growth and establishment of Abhidhamma may be placed between Asoka in the third century B.C. and Kanishka in the first century A.D. Of actual history in this period we know practically nothing, but before the end of it we find the Pāli Scriptures established in Ceylon, and, as the Ceylon tradition says, committed to writing by the end of the first century B.C. It is also this period which saw the rise of the Mahāyāna movement. We thus have the consolidating of the doctrine in the schools of Abhidhamma and the rise of new conceptions, new ontological theories, and a transformation of the Buddha doctrine, which can be seen already influencing or developing out of the Sarvāstivāda and Mahāsanghika schools.

c20.21

The Buddhist monasteries became places of education. What we actually know of them is the late reports of the Chinese pilgrims, but we can see in Abhidhamma a system of instruction which must have begun much earlier. Abhidhamma, “ special dhamma,” appears to have first meant a method of discussion and development of the principles of the Dhamma. Hence we find it recognized by different schools, but the works that have developed out of the study are sectarian and not common to all the schools. They all recognize a system of logical analysis, *paṭisambhidā* or *pratisamvit*.¹ This is divided into (1) analysis of the meaning (*attha*) of terms (or of things, for the terms define things), (2) analysis of *dhamma*, which the *Vibhanga* and Buddhaghosa explain as the knowledge of the causes of things, (3) analysis of grammar (*nirutti*), (4) analysis of *paṭibhāṇa*, the power of ready exposition.² These terms do not seem to have been always interpreted in the same way. According to the Chinese work *Tsa-tsi*,³ *attha* is the knowledge of proper and common characters, *dharma* the knowledge of synonyms.

c20.22

¹ *Vibhanga*, 293; *Mvyut.*, 13; *Dhs.*, 51; *Mvastu.*, iii, 321.

c20.23

² This is according to *Vibhanga* and *Vism.*, 440; see also Mr. Aung’s valuable notes in *Points of Controversy* for modern Burmese views.

c20.24

³ Quoted by L. de la Vallée Poussin in *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, 652.

c20.25

This method of study is illustrated in the *Niddesa*, a work in the Canon attributed to Sāriputta. There we find words interpreted by giving long lists of synonyms (*dhamma*), others have ordinary definitions (*attha*), as when a seat (*āsana*) is said to be “ where people sit ”, and is then followed by a list of eight synonyms. These lists of synonyms formed a rudimentary dictionary, which developed into *kośas*, the usual Indian dictionaries of synonyms. Dialect forms and unusual constructions also needed explanation. This is the *nirutti*. Besides this there is the interpretation of the doctrinal matter. For this the power of exposition (*paṭibhāṇa*) was wanted. Mr. P. Maung Tin calls it “ ready wit ”.

c20.26

The whole of this method occurs in Abhidhamma works proper. The synonyms were applied in any context and used for any exposition, and we find much of the material repeated in various places in the Abhidhamma books.⁴ Some of it also occurs in the old verbal commentary on the *Sutta-vibhanga* in the Vinaya, evidently in an earlier stage, for there the definitions, which sometimes correspond with those in the *Niddesa*, explain the words in their context without lists of synonyms.¹

c20.27

⁴ See “ Buddhist Education in Pāli and Sanskrit Schools ” in *Buddhist Studies*, ed. by Dr. B. C. Law.

c20.28

¹ The *Kathāvatthu*, v, 5, rejects the doctrine that all knowledge consists of such analysis. This would be to ignore higher intuitive knowledge.

c20.29

In the sense of a method and a body of traditional material Abhidhamma is no doubt much older than the existing works of that name. Some of the classified lists occur in the suttas, and seem to imply that the method was already in existence when those suttas were revised. One case is of special interest as showing a direct connection between the Abhidhamma of Theravādins and of Sarvāstivādins. The *Sangīti-sutta* of *Dīgha*, iii, 207, is a purely Abhidhamma list of items or principles beginning with a class of ones up to a class of tens. It is a different recension of the *Sangīti-paryāya*, which is the second of the Sarvāstivāda books of Abhidhamma. The Theravādins appear to have put it among the suttas before there was a distinct Abhidhamma section. Both schools attribute it to Sāriputta. It was probably intended to be recited in chorus (*sangīti*) as the name implies.

c20.30

The actual Abhidhamma works were evidently compiled separately in the different schools, but based on common material. Those of the Theravādins do not give us a picture of the whole doctrine, nor, except in the case of the *Kathāvatthu* and *Puggalapaññatti*, do they show the development of new theories. They analyse the Dhamma, and starting from a psychological basis they discuss ethical and logical questions from this standpoint. What Mrs. Rhys Davids says of the first Abhidhamma work, the *Dhammasangani* applies to most of the other Pāli books in showing their standpoint, “the method of the book is explicative, deductive; its object was, not to add to the Dhamma, but to unfold the orthodox import of terms in use among the body of the faithful, and, by organizing and systematizing the aggregate of doctrinal concepts, to render the learner’s intellect both clear and efficient.”²

c20.31

² *Dhammasang*., transl., p. xvi.

c20.32

Abhidhamma is thus only indirectly psychological, but it involves much psychological analysis. Every study of the mind has to begin by dealing with the popular terms which already exist, and these furnish the categories according to which the science is likely to develop. The terms at hand were those of common experience, and they never acquired the scientific precision of Western psychology. Cognition, will or conation, and feeling have been in modern times made entirely distinct elements or aspects of mental states, but they never appear alone. The Buddhists never tried to treat them alone. Their classifications are classes of states in which one or other of these aspects are prominent. Will (*cetanā*) is an actual state, and hence a state of consciousness in which conation is predominant. Feeling (*vedanā*) is distinguished as pleasant, painful and non-pleasant, and non-painful. But it expresses not merely the three emotional aspects; it also implies three conscious states of feeling, so that it could also be distinguished according to the six senses. It is in consciousness that any actual state of feeling exists, and thus feeling was also classified according to the particular sense through which it was manifested.

c20.33

Materialism never became a serious problem in India. The few systems known survive only in refutations of their opponents. Its growth seems to have been prevented by the very abundance of terms for the non-material aspect of the individual. The terms were there, thought (*citta*), mind (*mano*), consciousness (*viññāṇa*), and heart (*hadaya*). All these occur in a list of synonyms of mind, and naturally have different shades of meaning. The difficulty was rather to deal with the superabundance of terms, and in spite of the tendency to assume that for a separate word there must be a corresponding separate thing, it is to the credit of Buddhist psychology that it did not unduly multiply entities. But it did classify. That is perhaps the chief feature of Abhidhamma psychology, and it is a further proof of the identity of method in the different schools that these methods and classifications correspond.

c20.34

Buddhaghosa’s *Way of Purity* shows in its third part the conclusions which Abhidhamma study reached in the Theravāda school. He is not directly interested in the problems of Abhidhamma, but, as his title implies, in the Way. The fullest and most systematic exposition of Abhidhamma is the *Abhidharma-kośa* of Vasubandhu with his own commentary (*bhāshya*) and the supercommentary (*vyākhyā*) of Yaśomitra. It chiefly represents the Sarvāstivāda standpoint and also gives the views of other schools.

c20.35

Throughout the Abhidharma schools the same general conception prevails that existence does not consist of a primary substance, whether material or spiritual, but of a number of elements, *dharmas*. The classification of these and the problems of their interrelations form the primary question. The same material is classified in different ways from different points of view. The *dharmas*, of which there are seventy-five in Vasubandhu’s scheme, are either compounded or uncompounded. The uncompounded are three, space and two *nirodhas* or cessations, (1) cessation by comprehension of the truths, (2) cessation not through knowledge, but by extinction of the cause, as when a fire goes out. This distinction was denied by the Theravādins on the ground that it made two Nirvāṇas (*Kathāv.*, ii, 11).

c20.36

The other seventy-two *dharmas* are compounded, i.e. not permanent elements, but liable to change. These are also classified according to the five groups, *skandhas* (*khandhas*):—

c20.37

1. *Body* or matter (*rūpa*) with eleven divisions : the five sense-organs, their five objects, and also an interesting psychological concept called *avijñapti*, which may be called unmanifested action. A case of manifested action would be the taking of the vows. But a man who has taken the vows has produced a certain result, though he may not always be thinking of it. Through this *avijñapti* or subconscious effect his avoidance of a sinful action is a different thing from its casual avoidance by an ordinary man.¹

c20.38

¹ See La Vallée Poussin, *The Way to Nirvāṇa*, p. 71; *Abhk.*, i, 11.

c20.39

2. *Feeling* (*vedanā*).

c20.40

3. *Perception* (*saṃjñā*).

c20.41

4. The *saṃskāras*. This important group has a name which, whether translated aggregates, syntheses, or compounds, gives no idea of the meaning. The list itself makes it clear. The *saṃskāras* are chiefly conscious and unconscious manifestations of will. They were probably intended to include all the states of mind distinct from the other *khandhas* as well as forces or traits of the individual outside consciousness. They are consequently divided into (1) *saṃskāras* associated with consciousness, (2) those not associated with consciousness. Vasubandhu classifies them as follows ²:—

c20.42

² Stcherbatsky, *Central Conception*, p. 100; *Abhk.*, ii, 23.

c20.43

(i) *Saṃskāras* associated with consciousness:—

c20.44

(1) Ten generally present in consciousness : feeling, perception, will, contact (immediate sensation), desire, understanding, memory, attention, inclination, concentration.

c20.45

(2) Ten generally good: faith, courage, equanimity, modesty, disgust at things objectionable, absence of greed, of hatred, of desire to harm, dexterity of thought, zeal.

c20.46

(3) Six generally bad or indifferent: dullness, carelessness, clumsiness of thought, disbelief, sloth, excitement.

c20.47

(4) Two generally bad: immodesty and not feeling disgust at things objectionable.

c20.48

(5) Ten bad, of limited occurrence: anger, hypocrisy, envy, jealousy, approval of objectionable things, causing harm, unfriendliness, deceit, trickery, exhilaration.

c20.49

(6) Eight undetermined: remorse, torpor, reasoning, reflexion, passion, hatred, pride, doubt.

c20.50

(ii) The second group of fourteen saṃskāras are immaterial elements, but not associated with consciousness: acquisition (prāpti), a force which keeps together the elements of one stream of consciousness, non-acquisition (aprāpti), a force which keeps some of these elements in abeyance, allotment of groups (nikāyasabhāga), a force producing general classes, three forces which produce respectively unconsciousness (āsaṃjñika), the attainment of the unconscious, and the attainment of cessation, life force (jīvita), origination (jāti), continuance (sthiti), decay (jarā), impermanence (anityatā), the three forces giving signification to words (nāma), sentences (pada), and syllables (vyañjana).

c20.51

5. The remaining skandha of consciousness (vijñāna).

c20.52

In this classification, which is largely made up by the enumeration of empirical items, it is not surprising that there was not perfect agreement in different schools. Even the Sarvāstivādins had variant lists of the saṃskāras.¹ There is a Theravādin list of fifty-one in Dhammasaṅgaṇi, but it does not entirely correspond to the forty-six of Vasubandhu, as it contains several of the group of those not associated with consciousness. The Kathāvatthu discusses several doctrines, which show other differences in detail. It rejects the view that there are still other uncompounded elements, such as the four Truths, and the Causal Formula (vi, 1), the view that there are no mental states other than mind (vii, 3), and that morality belongs to the non-conscious (x, 7). These instances show to what a large extent the doctrines discussed by the Kathāvatthu are of a minor character, and such as might be held within the same school. On all fundamental questions Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins were agreed. Throughout the whole work there are only three distinct doctrines said to be held by the Sarvāstivādins against the Theravādins, and only one of these affects the doctrine of the Path. It is the question of the falling back of an arhat (p. 131). New doctrines, it will be seen, do make their appearance, but they are intrusions arising out of the buddhological speculations of certain schools, not out of Abhidhamma.

c20.53

¹ See the lists in Mvyut., 104; Dharmasang., 31, 32.

c20.54

The doctrine which has given the Sarvāstivādins their name is the theory that “everything exists” (sarvam asti). As being an ontological doctrine it does not essentially affect the teaching about the Way. It is an attempt to solve the problem of time. The Kathāvatthu (i, 6) refutes it by taking a number of instances and showing the absurdity of asserting that they are existent both in the present, the past, and the future. Professor Stcherbatsky, however, says : “When the principle ‘everything exists’ is set forth, it has a meaning that nothing but the twelve bases of cognition are existent. An object which cannot be viewed as a separate object of cognition or a separate faculty of cognition is unreal, as e.g. the soul, or the personality. Being a congeries of separate elements, it is declared to be a name and not a reality, not a dharma.” This interpretation is entirely unlike that of the Kathāvatthu. It would make the problem not the problem of the nature of time, but of the reality of certain concepts according as they come within the scheme of the “bases of cognition”, the āyatanas.

c20.55

The twelve āyatanas are also, like the scheme of the khandhas, a means of classifying everything. They consist of the six senses : sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, and mind or consciousness, and of the six objects of the senses : body, sound, odour, objects of taste, tangibles, objects of consciousness. “Everything” is thus classified under the six channels of knowledge and their objects, but in whatever way everything is classed, the essential question is how it exists. The Theravādins understood it to mean that the Sarvāstivādins asserted that “the past exists, the future exists, the present exists”.¹ As O. Rosenberg said, the name of the school means the view which says that everything is, in which “everything” does not refer to all dharmas, in the sense of dharmas of every kind, but to the dharmas of all the three times.¹

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¹ Points of Controversy, p. 85.

c20.57

¹ *Probleme*, p. 249.

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Another attempt to solve the problem of time was the doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*). It was a remarkable application of the atomic theory to time. Time was reduced to a series of atomic moments, and the only actually existent time was the present moment. Its origin is unknown, but it is late, and we know most about it from the prominence which is given to its refutation in brahmin and Jain works. The *Kathāvatthu* (xxii, 8) in one of its latest sections attributes it to some south Indian schools, and states the doctrine in the form, “ all things are momentary units of consciousness.” This, as well as the atomic theory developed by some schools, belongs rather to the history of Indian logic and natural science than to the history of Buddhism.

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