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A History of Hindu Chemistry from the Earliest Times to the Middle of the Sixteenth Century A.D. v2.c35.72

A History of Hindu Chemistry from the Earliest Times to the Middle of the Sixteenth Century A.D. v2.c35.72

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English

v2.c35.72

Ascertainment of Vyapti according to the early Nyáya (व्याप्तिग्रहोपाय). —Briefly speaking, the observation of agreement in presence (अन्वय) as well as agreement in absence (व्यतिरेक), between two phenomena, with the non-observance of the contrary (व्यभिचारादर्शनम्), is the foundation of our knowledge of Vyápti (दर्शनादर्शने—Váchaspati). This suggests a natural relation (स्वाभाविकसम्बन्ध—Váchaspati) of invariable concomitance (नियतसाहचर्य—Váchaspati) between the phenomena, which is fortified by our non-observance (अदर्शन) of the contrary (व्यभिचार). But this does not establish the unconditionality of the concomitance (उपाधिविधुरसम्बन्ध), which is essential to a Vyápti. We have therefore to examine the cases carefully to see if there is any determining condition (Upádhi—i. e. some hidden or undetected but really operative or indispensable accompaniment ) which conditions the relation between the supposed sign or mark (Gamaka) and the supposed signate (thing signified, Gamya). Now let us consider what constitutes an Upádhi. It is a circumstance which always accompanies, and is always accompanied by, the supposed signate (the thing signified, Gamya), but does not invariably accompany the supposed sign or mark ( Gamaka ). If, therefore, in the set of positive instances where both the sign and the signate are present, nothing else is constantly present, there can be no Upádhi. Or, again, if in the set of negative instances where both the sign and the signate are absent, no other material circumstance is constantly absent, there is no Upádhi. This follows from the very definition of an Upádhi. It is impracticable to fulfil these requirements rigorously. Still, every one of the accompanying circumstances (of course the likely ones) may be taken successively, and it may be shown that the concomitance continues even when the suspected Upádhi (शङ्कितापाधि) is absent, and therefore it cannot be the Upádhi. And this is to be fortified by the observance of uniform and uninterrupted agreement in absence (Vyatireka) between the two concomitant phenomena. In this way, when we have disproved all suspected Upádhis, we conclude by establishing the Vyápti. It is true that we may still go on doubting. But doubt has a certain limit for the ‘experimenter’ and the thinking person (परोक्षक, प्रेक्षावान्). When doubt overthrows the foundation of all rational practice (प्रामाणिकलोकयात्रा), or leads to a stoppage or arrest of all practical activity (लोकव्यवहारा), it stands *ipso facto* condemned, and must be abandoned (व्याघातावधिशङ्का), Sríharsha and Udayana—व्याघात is mentioned by Váchaspati). Thus it is that Vyápti is ascertained. In this way, we observe innumerable instances of Vyápti. Now by means of repeated observations of this kind (भूयोदर्शन), we have established the principle of the Uniformity of Nature (स्वभावप्रतिवद्ध), and also of Causality; and these two principles thus ascertained may be made use of in their turn as the basis of an argumentation or deduction (Tarka, U'ha, तर्क) to confirm a particular Vyápti in a particular case. Tarka or U'ha, then, is the verification and vindication of particular inductions by the application of the general principles of Uniformity of Nature and of Causality, principles which are themselves based on repeated observation (भूयोदर्शन) and the ascertainment of innumerable particular inductions of uniformity or causality (भूयोदर्शन जनितसंस्कारसहितम् इन्द्रियमेव स्वाभाविकसम्बन्धग्राही—Váchaspati). Thus Tarka also helps in dispelling doubt (सन्देह). Sríharsha, however, questions the validity of this verification, —cf. the well-known couplet ending तर्कः शङ्कावधिः कुतः ।