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A History of Hindu Chemistry from the Earliest Times to the Middle of the Sixteenth Century A.D. v2.c35: Appendix (by Principal Brajendranath Seal)

A History of Hindu Chemistry from the Earliest Times to the Middle of the Sixteenth Century A.D. v2.c35

Language
English

Contents

Appendix (by Principal Brajendranath Seal)

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*On the Scientific Method of the Hindus.*

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The Doctrine of Scientific Method :—A study of the Hindu Methodology of Science is absolutely essential to a right understanding of Hindu positive Science, its strength and its weakness, its range and its limitations. Apart from this rigorous Scientific Method, Hindu Chemistry, such as it is, would be all practical recipe, or all unverified speculation. This, however, would be a very inadequate and indeed erroneous view of this early achievement of the human mind. That the whole movement was genuinely and positively scientific, though arrested at an early stage, will appear from the following brief synopsis of the Hindu Methodology of Science.

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Criterion or Test of Truth :—The ultimate Criterion of Truth is found not in mere cognitive presentation, but in the correspondence between the cognitive and the practical activity of the self, which together are supposed to form the circuit of consciousness. That knowledge is valid which prompts an activity ending in fruition. (Cf. the distinction between सम्वादिज्ञान and विसम्वादिज्ञान । Also, प्रमाणतोऽर्थप्रतिपत्तौ प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यात् अर्थवत् प्रमाणम् — Vátsyáyana).

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Truth is *not* self-evidence, *not* the agreement between ideas, *nor* the agreement of the idea with the reality beyond, for this cannot be attained direct, but the harmony of experience (संवाद), which is implied when the volitional reaction, that is prompted by a cognition and that completes the circuit of consciousness, meets with fruition, *i. e.*, realises its immediate end (cf. Sríharsha, Khandana Khanda Khádya on the relation of प्रमा to लोकव्यवहार). This is the material aspect of Truth. The formal aspect is given in a principle which governs all presentations in consciousness, and which combines the three moments of Identity, non-Contradiction and Excluded Middle in every individual cognitive operation [ तदुक्तं तत् परिच्छिनत्ति (identity) अन्यद् व्यवच्छिनत्ति (non-contradiction) तृतीय-प्रकाराभावं च सूचयति (excluded middle) इति एकप्रमाणव्यापारः—Jayanta, Nyáya-Manjarí, प्रमाणद्वैविध्यखण्डनम्].

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Perception :—The conditions of perception, and its range and limits, were carefully studied. The minima sensibile (*e.g.*, the minimum visibile, the Trasarenu, the just perceptible mote in the slanting sunbeam), the infra-sensible (अनुद्भूतरूप सूक्ष्म, sometimes termed अतीन्द्रिय), the obscured (अभिभूत, *e.g.*, a meteor in the mid-day blaze), and the potential (अनुद्भूतवृत्ति), are distinguished ; but finer instruments of measurement were wanting, and this was a principal cause of arrested progress. It may be noted that the measurement of the relative pitch of musical tones was remarkably accurate and original (*vide* my Paper on Hindu Mechanics and Physics).

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Observation (दर्शन—Váchaspati and Udayana):—The entire apparatus of scientific method proceeded on the basis of observed instances carefully analysed and sifted. This was the source of the physico-chemical theories and classifications, but in Anatomy, the Hindus went one step further; they practised dissection on dead bodies for purposes of demonstration. Ingenious directions are given, *e. g.*, the body must be first disembowelled and wrapped round with the kusa and other grasses, then kept immersed in still water for seven days, after which the medical student should proceed to remove the layers of the skin with a carefully prepared brush made of the fresh elastic fibres of green bamboos;—which will enable the tissues, vessels and ducts to be observed. *Post-mortem* operations as well as major operations in obstetric surgery (the extraction of the fœtus, etc.) were availed of for embryological observations (*e. g.*, it is stated as a result of observation that the rudiments of the head and the limbs begin to appear in the fœtus in the third month, and are developed in the fourth; the bones, ligaments, nails, hair, etc. becoming distinct in the sixth);—and also embryological theories, *e. g.*, the indication of sexual character in the second month by the shape of the fœtus, the shape of a round joint indicating the male sex, and an elongated shape as of a muscle the female sex (cf. Charaka, Sutrasthána, Chap. IV,—द्वितीये मासि घनः सम्पद्यते पिण्डं पेश्यर्बुदं वा। तत्र घनः पिण्डः पुरुषः स्त्री पेशी अर्बुदं नपुंसकम्। Chakrapáni notes : घनः कठिनः। पिण्डो ग्रन्थ्याकारः। पेशी दीर्घमांसपेश्याकारः। अर्बुदं वर्त्तलोन्नतम् loc. cit.). In Phonetics (as in the Prátisákhyas, circa 600 B. C.), in Descriptive and Analytical Grammar (as in Pánini), and in some important respects in Comparative Grammar (as in Chanda's and Hemachandra's Grammars of the Prákrita Dialects), the observation was precise, minute and thoroughly scientific. This was also the case in Materia Medica, and in Therapeutics, especially the symptomology of diseases. In Meteorology, the Hindus used the rain-guage in their weather forecasts for the year, made careful observations of the different kinds of clouds and other atmospheric phenomena (e. g., they give the heights of the clouds, the distance from which lightning is ordinarily visible, or the thunder is heard, the area of disturbance of different earth-quakes, the height to which the terrestrial atmosphere extends, etc., vide Varáhamihira, Srípati, and the authorities quoted by Utpala). In Astronomy, the observation was, generally speaking, very defective as in the determination of the solar and the planetary elements, and this was probably due to the lack of practical interest, but the determination of the lunar constants entering into the calculation of lunar periods.

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and eclipses, matters in which the Hindus had a practical ceremonial interest, reached a remarkable degree of approximation (much above Græco-Arab computations) to the figures in Laplace's Tables, which can only be explained by the circumstance that in the case of these constants the Hindus carried out for more than a thousand years a systematic process of verification and correction by comparison of the computed with the observed results (like the navigator's correction of the course of the ship at sea), a process which was termed दृग्गणितैक्य. In Zoology, the enumeration of the species of Vermes, Insecta, Reptilia, Batrachia, Aves, etc., makes a fair beginning, but the classification proceeds on external characters and habits of life, and not on an anatomical basis. In Botany, the observation was mainly in the interests of Materia Medica, and the classification was as superficial as possible. (Vide my paper on the Hindu Classification of Plants and Animals).

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Experiments:—Experiments were of course conducted for purposes of chemical operations in relation to the arts and manufactures, e. g., Metallurgy, Pharmacy, Dyeing, Perfumery and Cosmetics, Horticulture, the making and polishing of glass (lenses and mirrors of various kinds are mentioned, the spherical and oval वक्र and वर्तुल, being well-known—Pliny indeed mentions that the best glass ever made was Indian glass). And the results of such experiments were freely drawn upon for building up scientific hypotheses and generalisations. But of experiment as an *independent* method of proof or discovery, the instances recorded in books are rare. I may note one interesting example in Udayana’s Kiranávali, relating to the weight of air. Udayana argues that air must be a distinct and independent Bhuta, for if air were a form of the Earth-Bhuta, it would have weight, and it has none. To prove the absence of weight, he refers to an experiment. A small bladder made of a thin membrane, filled with air, will not cause a greater descent in the scale than the same bladder weighed empty. Hence the air possesses no weight. Then Udayana makes an interesting statement. It may be objected, he says, by one who accepts the weight of air—that this argument is inconclusive. For a counter-experiment may be suggested. The balloon filled with smoke (or gas, धूम) rises in the air, whereas the air-filled balloon comes down. This would go to show that air has weight. Udayana replies that this would only show that both smoke (or gas, धूम) and air have no weight. The Hindus appear to have been ignorant of the principle of Archimedes. Vallabhácháryya in the Lílávatí, it is true, speaks of a peculiar resistance to sinking (or gravity) exercised by water, which explains the tendency in certain objects to float.

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or to come up to the surface of the water, but the description shows that he had no clear ideas on the subject.]

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Mathuránátha, again, states that the determination of the degree of purity (the carat) of gold by rubbing against the assaying stone and observing the character of the yellowish streak against the black smooth background, is only an indirect means of ascertaining weight (गुरुत्वलक्षण lit. specific gravity)—which seems to suggest that there was a more direct means of arriving at the latter. Probably this refers to the common Indian method of comparing the lengths of wires of uniform thickness that can be formed by drawing different pieces of gold of equal weight through the same diamond bore. I think it may be regarded as fairly certain that the Hindus were ignorant of Archimedes's discovery, an ignorance which, at any rate, they could not have well borrowed from the Greeks, no more than they could have thus borrowed their knowledge of things unknown to the Greeks themselves. [Cf. Udayana, Kiranávali:—

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वायूनिरूपनम्, किं च (वायोः) पृथिव्यौत्वे गुरुत्वमपि स्यात्। न च पवनापूरितस्य चर्मपुटकादेः अपूरणदशातः अधिकं अवनमनम्। उन्नयमानस्य धूमापूरितेन इदम् अनेकान्तिकं इति चेत्। न। अलं धूमदशायां। तत्रापि गरिमविशेषहेतोरवनतिविशेषस्य अप्रतीतेः।—cf. Vallabhácháryya, Lílávatí—गुरुत्वविशेषऽपि पाषाणालाबुप्रसृतिषु मज्जनोन्मज्जन नियमवत् अदृष्टहेतुक्ता साम्येऽपि पतनोत्पतन-नियमो भविष्यतौति।

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केचित् न । जलाधोगमनं जलेन धारणं पतनप्रतिवन्ध उन्मज्जनं एतच्च जलस्य योगस्य कस्यचिदेव पतनप्रतिवन्धसामर्थ्यात् । दृष्टहेतुकमेव मज्जनञ्च उन्मज्जनञ्च]—cf. Mathuránátha, सन्निकर्षवादरहस्य on Gangesa’s Tattvachintámani—तस्य (निकषोपलस्य) न सुवर्ण-पौताभिव्यञ्जकत्वं किन्तु पीतहारा गुरुत्वलक्षणव्यञ्जकत्वमेव तस्य ।

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Fallacies of Observation—Mal-observation and Non-observation :—These were carefully studied in relation to errors of observation, and Hallucination (भ्रम, अभ्यास, आरोप),—which were ascribed to three causes :—(a) Dosha, दोष, defect of sense organ, as of the eye in jaundice, or of the skin in certain forms of leprosy (leading to tactile insensibility, cf. Susruta), or defect of necessary stimulus, *e.g.*, too faint light, or undue distance or nearness, in vision; (b) Samprayoga, सम्प्रयोग, presentation of a part or an aspect instead of the whole; and (c) Sanskára, संस्कार, the disturbing influence of mental predisposition, *e.g.* expectation, memory, habit, prejudice, etc.

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The Doctrine of Inference :—Anumána (Inference) is the process of ascertaining, not by perception or direct observation, but through the instrumentality or medium of a mark, that a thing possesses a certain character. Inference is therefore based on the establishment of an invariable concomitance (Vyápti, व्याप्ति) between the mark, and the character inferred. The Hindu Inference (Anumána) is therefore neither merely formal nor merely material, but a combined Formal-Material Deductive-Inductive Process. It is neither the Aristotelian Syllogism (Formal-Deductive Process), nor Mill's Induction (Material-Inductive Process), but the real inference which must combine formal validity with material truth, inductive generalisation with deductive particularisation.

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An inference admits of a rigorous formal statement,—in the shape of five propositions, for dialectical purposes (i.e. in demonstrating to others),—or of three propositions when the inference is for oneself (स्वार्थानुमान):—(1) the probandum, the statement of the proposition to be established (प्रतिज्ञा, साध्यनिर्देश, e.g., yonder mountain is fiery (say, an active volcano); (2) the reason, the ascription of the mark (हेतु, लिङ्गपरामर्श),—e.g., for it smokes; (3) now, the general proposition, stating the invariable concomitance which is the ground of the inference,—clenched by an example bringing home the responsibility of the reasoner to establish a real relation, e.g., whatever smokes is fiery, as an oven; (उदाहरण);—(4) next, the application, the ascertainment of the existence of the mark in the present case (उपनय) e.g., yonder mountain smokes;—(5) finally, the conclusion, the probandum proved (निगमन), e.g., yonder mountain is fiery.

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1. Yonder mountain is fiery.
2. For it smokes.
3. Whatever smokes is fiery, as an oven.

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4. Yonder mountain does smoke.
5. Therefore, yonder mountain is fiery. For inference for oneself, only the first three or the last three propositions, are held to be sufficient.

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The Hindu Anumána, it will be seen, anticipates J. S. Mill's analysis of the syllogism as a material inference, but is more comprehensive ;—for the Hindu Udáharana, the third or general proposition with an example, combines and harmonises Mill's view of the major premise as a brief memorandum of like instances already observed, fortified by a recommendation to extend its application to unobserved cases, with the Aristotelian view of it as a universal proposition which is the formal ground of the inference. This Formal-Material Deductive-Inductive process thus turns on one thing—the establishment of the invariable concomitance (व्याप्ति) between the mark and the character inferred,—in other words, an inductive generalisation. The question is—what is our warrant for taking the leap from the observed to unobserved cases? Under what conditions are we justified to assert a Universal Real Proposition on the basis of our necessarily limited observation?

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The Chárváka view :—Among the Chárvákas there were two classes, the cruder school of materialists who accepted perception (प्रत्यक्ष) as a valid source of knowledge, as well as the reality of Natural Law (स्वभाव), and the finer school of sceptics, who impugned all kinds of knowledge, immediate as well as mediate, and all evidence, Perception as well as Inference, *vide* Jayanta's reference in the Nyáya-Manjarí to सुशिक्षितचार्व्वाकाः ; also चार्व्वाकधूर्त्तस्तु यथातथ्यं व्याख्यास्य इति प्रतिज्ञाय प्रमाणप्रमेयसंख्यालक्षणनियममशक्यकरणीयमेव व्याख्यातवान्—A'hnika I, Manjarí.

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The Chárvákas hold that the principle of causality, which the Buddhists assume to be a ground of an induction (व्याप्ति) is itself an induction (a case of Vyápti), which amounts to reasoning in a circle (चक्रक); that every inference is based on an unconditional invariable concomitance which itself must be inferred, as universal propositions cannot be established by our limited perceptions, and thus there is a regressus ad infinitum (अनादि परम्परा); and that the nexus between cause and effect, or between the sign and the thing signified (*e.g.*, smoke and fire) is only a mental step or subjective association based on former perception, a mental step which by accident is found justified by the result in a number of cases.

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The Buddhists—their Analysis and Vindication of Inference :—The Buddhists, however, take their stand on the principle of the Uniformity of Nature (प्रतिबन्ध, स्वभाव प्रतिबन्ध, Nyaya-Vindu). This uniformity, for scientific purposes, has to be divided into two different relations,—(1) the uniformity of succession in the relation of cause and effect, *e.g.*, of smoke to fire (कार्यकारणभाव, तदुत्पत्ति, Nyaya-Vindu) ; (2) the uniformity of co-existence (in the form of co-inherence in the same substrate) in the relation of genus and species, e.g., the relation of invariable concomitance expressed in the proposition,—all Sinsapás are trees,—which is not a relation of causality, but of co-existence or co-inherence in the same substrate (i.e., the co-inherence of the generic qualities of a tree with the specific characters of a Sisu tree, in this particular individual before me, a Sisu tree),—a relation which may be termed essential identity (तादात्म्य, स्वभाव—Nyaya-Vindu). To these two, the Buddhists add a third ground of inference, non-perception of the perceptible (अनुपलब्धि, दृश्यानुपलब्धि), which is employed in inferring the absence (प्रतिषेध) of a thing from the non-perception of something else. In all cases of inference based on the Uniformity of Nature, the relation is that of inseparableness or non-disjunction between the mark and the character inferred. The question is—how is this inseparableness (अविनाभाव) ascertained, and what is the warrant of our belief in it, in these cases?

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Ascertainment of Inseparableness or Non-disjunction : Buddhist Account :—First take the case of causation. The cause is the invariable antecedent of the effect. What is meant is that the specific effect (with all the distinctive and relevant accompaniments, कार्यविशेष) is invariably preceded by a specific cause (कारणविशेष). It is not that clouds always lead to rain, or that floods in the river valley always imply rain in the hills higher up. But this particular conjunction of antecedent circumstances (e.g. the appearance of a particular kind of clouds accompanied with flashes of lightning, the roll of thunder and flights of Valákás,—driven by the wind from a particular quarter of the horizon, and ascending in black masses, etc.) is as a rule the precursor of a particular assemblage of rain effects (rain with particular accompaniments). Again, this particular kind of flood (overflowing of the river banks accompanied with muddy discoloration of the water, rapid currents, the bearing down of tree trunks, etc.) is always preceded by rain in the hills higher up (though, no doubt, other cases of floods in a river may be due to a breach in an embankment or the melting of the snows). In other words, the Buddhists (and the earlier Nyáya Schools) avoid the difficulty arising from the plurality of causes by taking into consideration the accompanying phenomena, which, if properly marked, would always point to a specific cause of a specific effect.

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I quote Nyáya authorities, but this device to obviate the plurality of causes is common to the early Nyáya and the Buddhistic systems.

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पूर्വ്വवत्। यत्र कारणेन कार्य्यमनुमीयते। उदाहरणम्— मेघैर्नत्या भविष्यति वृष्टिरिति कारणेन कार्य्यानुमानम्। कथं

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पुनरस्य प्रयोगः। वृष्टिमन्तः एते मेघाः गम्भीरध्वनित्वे सति वहुलत्वाक- वत्वे सति अचिरप्रभावत्वे सति उन्नतिमत्त्वात् वृष्टिमन्तः भवन्ति।

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शेषवत् (यत्र कार्येन कारणमनुमीयते)—उदाहरणम्— उपरिवृष्टिमद्देशसम्बन्धिनो नदीस्रोत: शीघ्रत्वे सति पूर्णफलकाष्ठादि- वहनत्वे सति पूर्णत्वात् पूर्णवृष्टिमद्देशत्वादिति। (Udyotakara, Chap I. A'hnika I, Sútra 5). Váchaspati puts this clearly:--यद्यपि कारणमात्र व्यभिचरति कार्योत्पादं तथापि यादृशं न व्यभिचरति तत्र निपुणेन प्रतिपत्रा भवितव्यम्। अन्यथा धूममात्रमपि वह्नि- मत्तां व्यभिचरोति न धूमविशेषो गमको भवेत्। In other words, a single condition called a cause is not invariably succeeded by the effect, nor does the effect phenomenon in general point to any particular cause as antecedent, for there may be a plurality of causes of a general effect. The skilful observer will therefore select the full complement of causal conditions, which is invariably succeeded by the effect,--and also the specific effect (e.g., धूमविशेष) which points to a specific causal antecedent. Compare also Jayanta :--we infer an effect from a specific assemblage of causes--न च कारणमात्रस्य हेतुत्वं ब्रुमो येनास्य व्यभिचारः स्यात्। अपि च विशिष्टमेव कारणं हेतुः। न च कारणविशेषो दुरवगमः। गम्भीरगर्जितारम्भनिर्भिन्नगिरिगह्वराः रोलम्ब- गवलव्यालतालमालमलिनत्विषः ...वृष्टिं व्यभिचरन्तीह नैव प्रायः पयोमुचः। अनभ्युपगमे चैवमनुमानस जीवितम्। न स्याद्मविशेषाणामपि वोड्म- शक्तितः। Similarly we infer a specific cause from a specific assemblage of effects :--शेषवदिति यत्र कार्येण

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कारणमनुमीयते यथा नदौपुरेण उपरितने देशे वृष्टिरिति । दृष्टमत्- पृष्ठदेशसंसृष्टा इयं नदी फेनिलकलुषत्वादिविशिष्टपुरोपेतत्वात् । यत्तु सेतुभङ्गहिमविलयनादिनापि नदीपुरोपपत्तिर्दृष्टा इति तत्रापि उच्यते— प्रमातुरपराधोऽयं विशेषं यो न पश्यति । नानुमानस्य दोषोऽस्ति प्रमेयाव्यभिचारिणः ॥

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(Nyáya-Manjarí, A'hnika 2, on Gotama Sútra 5, A'hnika 1, Chap I.)

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A specific assemblage of causes, therefore, has only one specific assemblage of effects, and *vice versa*. Of course, the observer is to find out the essential or relevant features (as distinguished from the irrelevant ones) which, being included, will enable him to specify the particular cause of the particular effect.

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Now this being premised to be the exact meaning of the inseparableness or non-disjunction in the case of cause and effect, we come to the question with which we started--how is this relation to be ascertained or established between two phenomena or assemblages of phenomena? Obviously, mere observation of their agreement in presence (अन्वय) and their agreement in absence (व्यतिरेक) is no help in the matter. Take a concrete example. The ass is customarily employed to bring the fuel with which fire is lighted. In a hundred cases you have observed the ass among the antecedents of smoke. In a hundred cases you may have observed that when there is no ass, there is no smoke. This is no warrant for concluding a relation of cause and effect between an ass and smoke. It may be that you happen to have never observed smoke without an antecedent ass, or an ass without smoke following. Even this is of no avail. It is not agreement (unbroken and uniform though it be) in presence, or in absence, or in both, that can settle the matter. There is one and only one way of ascertaining the causal relation. Suppose *A* with certain accompaniments is found to precede *B* immediately. Now if *A* disappearing, *B* disappears, even though all other antecedents remain and there is no other change in the case, then and then only can the causal relation be ascertained. It is not a mere table of positive instances or negative instances (अदर्शनान्न न दर्शनात्);—it is this method which we may term the Method of Subtraction (the Method of Difference in its negative aspect) that is the only exact and rigorous scientific Method. Such was the statement of the earlier Buddhists (cf. Udyotakara's and Váchaspati's report of the Buddhist Doctrine of Inference—स हि प्रतिबन्धो न दर्शनमात्रावसेयः ।

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तस्मात् तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिनिबन्धन एव प्रतिबन्धः । यदाह कार्यकारणभावाद्वा स्वभावाद्वा नियामकात् । अविनाभावनियमोऽदर्शनान्न न दर्शनात् ।—a Buddhist Karika quoted in Váchaspati, Udayana, Sríharsha, Mádhava, etc.)—कार्यकारणभावश्च इदम्—अस्मिन् सति भवति—सतसु अपि तदन्येषु अस्मिन्नसति न भवति—एवमाकारः । न अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामतिरिच्यते ।... (एवं तादात्म्यमपि विपर्यये बाधक

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प्रमाणोपपत्त्या नियतत्वम्।...तस्मात् तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिभ्यामिव प्रतिबन्धो नान्यतः।—Váchaspati, Tátparyyatiká, Chap I, A'hnika I, Sutra 5, अनुमानलक्षणम्—व्याप्तिग्रहोपायः।)

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But the canon in this form is not sufficiently safe-guarded against possible abuse. Two points have to be emphasised:—(1) It must be carefully observed that no other condition is changed, (2) that the appearance and disappearance of *A* must immediately precede the appearance and disappearance of *B*. The definition of a cause is based on two fundamental characters, (1) the unconditional invariableness of the antecedence, and (2) the immediateness of the antecedence. The canon of the Method of Difference must therefore be stated in such a form as to emphasise each of these aspects. And one main difficulty in the practical application of the canon is that along with the introduction or sublation of an antecedent, some other phenomenon may be introduced or sublated unobserved. As a safe-guard against this radical vitiation of the Method, the later Buddhists formulated the canon of a modified Method, termed the Panchakárani, a Joint Method of Difference, which combines the positive and the negative Methods of Difference (the Method of Addition and the Method of Subtraction) in a series of five steps, and which equally emphasises the unconditionality and the immediateness of the antecedence as essential moments of the causal relation. This is neither agreement in presence, nor agreement in presence as well as absence (the foundation of J. S. Mill's Joint Method of Agreement ), but the Joint Method of Difference. The Panchakárani runs thus :—

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The following changes being observed, everything else remaining constant, the relation of cause and effect is rigorously established :—

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First step—The 'cause' and the 'effect' phenomena are both unperceived.

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Second step—Then the 'cause' phenomenon is perceived.

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Third step—Then in immediate succession, the 'effect' phenomenon is perceived.

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Fourth step—Then the 'cause' phenomenon is sublated or disappears.

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Fifth step—Then in immediate succession, the 'effect' phenomenon disappears.

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Throughout, of course, it is assumed that the other circumstances remain the same ( at least the relevant or material circumstances ).

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This Panchakárani, the Joint Method of Difference, has some advantages over J. S. Mill's Method of Difference, or what is identical therewith, the earlier Buddhist Method ; and the form of the canon bringing out in prominent relief the unconditionality and the immediateness of the antecedence, is as superior from a theoretical point of view to J. S. Mill's canon, and is as much more consonant than the latter to the practice of every experimenter, as the Hindu analysis of Anumána as a Formal-Material Deductive-Inductive Inference is more comprehensive and more scientific than Aristotle's or Mill's analysis of the Syllogism (or Mediate Inference).

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But even the Panchakárani is no sufficient answer to the question with which we started. The Panchakárani is only a method; it shows only how in a particular case the relation of cause and effect is to be established (प्रतिबन्धग्रहोपाय). But we want more than this—we require a warrant for the process. The Buddhists therefore supply the following proof of the Method:—Doubt is legitimate, but there is a limit to doubt. When doubt lands you in a contradiction of a fundamental ground of practice, and would thus annul all practical exercise of the will, the doubt must cease; else the doubt would be suicidal or sophistical. In this particular case, when the Panchakárani is satisfied, the antecedent in question must be the cause, for there is no other antecedent to serve as cause; the proof is indirect but rigid. If this be not the cause, there is no cause of the phenomenon. It was not, and it begins to be, without a cause; which would be a contradiction of the rational ground of all practice, for all volitional activity proceeds by implication on the principle of causality. If things could happen without a cause, all our motives to action would be baffled. The link between a presentation and the instinctive volitional reaction would snap, and the circuit of consciousness would be left incomplete. In fact, the Buddhists go further; they hold causal efficiency (अर्थक्रिया) to be of the essence of empirical (relative) Reality. The proof of the Joint Method of Difference, then, lies in a strict application of the principle of causality in its negative form (viz., there can be no phenomenon without a cause) and the truth of this last is guaranteed by the same ultimate criterion of empirical (relative) Reality as the truth of Perception itself, viz., the correspondence between the rational and the practical activity of the self.

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But invariable concomitance (or non-disjunction), the Buddhists argue, has another form, e.g., the relation of the genus to the species. We may have perceived a hundred instances of the association of certain characters with certain others; we may also have never perceived the former when the latter are absent; but this would not enable us to generalise and establish invariable and unconditional co-existence. We must be first satisfied that there is identity of essence (तादात्म्य स्वभाव). It is only when we perceive that the characters of a Sinsapá are co-inherent with the generic characters of a tree in the same individual object (a Sinsapá tree before me), and when we further perceive that the characters are held together by the relation of identity of essence, that we can say that all Sinśapás are trees. For as there is identity of essence, a Sinśapá would not be a Sinśapá, if it were not a tree. It would lose its self-identity which is a contradiction. Hence the relation of identity of essence (तादात्म्य स्वभाव), as in the relation of the species to the genus, is the sole ground for establishing uniformity of co-existence (प्रतिबन्ध, स्वभावप्रतिबन्ध).

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(For the Buddhist Method of Induction, in its later form, the Panchakárani, vide Sarvadarsana Sangraha—Buddhist reply to the Chárváka attack on Inference:—

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यदभ्यधायि अविनाभावो दुर्बोध इति तदसाधीयः। तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिभ्यामविनाभावस्य सुज्ञानत्वात्। तदुक्तं—कार्यकारणभावात् वा स्वभावात् वा नियामकात्। अविनाभावनियमोऽदर्शनान्न न दर्शनात्। As for the Nyáya view अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ अविनाभाविनिश्चायकौ इति।—the Buddhist objects—ननु पक्ते साध्यसाधनयोरव्यभिचारी दुरवधारणः भवेत्। भूते, भविष्यति, वर्त्तमाने अनुपलभ्यमाने च व्यभिचारशङ्काया अनिवारणात्।—the Nyáya retorts ननु तथाविधस्थले तावकेऽपि मते व्यभिचारशङ्का दुष्परिहरा इति।—the Buddhist answers—मैवं बोचः, विनापि कारणं कार्यमुत्पद्यताम् इत्येवं विधायाः शङ्कायाः व्याघातावधिकतया निवृत्तत्वात्। तदेव हि आशङ्केत यस्मिन्नाशङ्कामाने व्याघातादयः नावतरेयुः। तदुक्तं व्याघातावधिरशङ्का इति। तस्मात् तदुत्पत्तिनिश्चयेन अविनाभावो निश्चीयते। तदुत्पत्तिनिश्चयश्च कार्यहेतोः प्रत्यक्षोपलम्भानुपलम्भपञ्चकनिबन्धनः।)

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कार्यस्योत्पत्तेः प्रागनुपलम्भः, कारणोपलम्भे सति उपलम्भः, उपलम्भस्य पश्चात् कारणोपलम्भात् अनुपलब्धः इति पञ्चकारण्या धूम-धूमध्वजयोः कार्यकारणभावः निश्चीयते । तथा तादात्म्यनिश्चयेन अपि अविनाभावः निश्चीयते । यदि शिंशपाः वृक्षत्वम् अतिपतेत् स्वात्मानमेव जह्यात् इति विपत्ते बाधकप्रवृत्तेः । अप्रवृत्ते तु बाधके भूयः सत्तभावोपलम्भेऽपि व्यभिचारशङ्कायाः को निवारयिता । शिंशपावृक्षयोश्च तादात्म्यनिश्चयः वृत्तोऽयं शिंशपा इति सामानाधिकरण्यबलात् उपपद्यते । तस्मात् कार्यात्मानौ कारणम् आत्मानम् अनुमापयत इति सिद्धम् । Sarvadarsana Sangraha, Bauddha-Darsanam.

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The Nyáya Doctrine of Inference :—The Nyáya easily demolishes the Buddhist contention about identity of essence. The Nyáya writers, being realists, do not impugn the reality of the genus (जाति) like the nominalists or the nominalistic conceptualists in the Mimansa Schools (भाट्टाः and प्राभाकराः); but they point out that the inseparableness (or non-disjunction) in such cases can only be established by the experience of unbroken uniformity (अव्यभिचारित्व i.e., by अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ, दर्शनादर्शने). Uniform agreement in presence with uniform agreement in absence, —not the mysterious identity of essence irresistibly perceived in any individual case or cases—is the only basis for constituting genera and species in Natural Classification. Indeed some of the later Nyáya writers point out that individuals do not always possess in Nature all the characters that go to form the definition of the class to which they are referred.

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Similarly, as regards the relation of cause and effect, a nexus is sometimes fancied to be perceived, a power in the cause to produce the effect (शक्ति), or an ultimate form (जाति सौक्ष्म्य), which is supposed to be present, whenever the effect (quality or substance) is produced (cf. Bacon's view of the 'Forms' of Simple Qualities). All this is neither a matter of observation nor of legitimate hypothesis. There is nothing except the invariable time-relation (antecedence and sequence) between the cause and the effect. But the mere invariableness of an antecedent does not suffice to constitute it the cause of what succeeds; it must be an unconditional antecedent as well (अन्यथासिद्धिशून्यस्य नियतपूर्ववर्त्तित, being the definition of कार्यकारणभाव). For example, the essential or adventitious accompaniments of an invariable antecedent, may also be invariable antecedents, but they are not unconditional but only collateral and indirect, in other words their antecedence is conditional on something else (न स्वातन्त्र्य). The potter's stick is an unconditional invariable antecedent of the jar, but the colour of a stick, or its texture or size or any other accompaniment or accident, which does not contribute to the work done (so far as we are considering it) is not an unconditional antecedent, and must not therefore be regarded as a cause. Similarly, the co-effects of the invariable antecedents, or what enters into the production of these co-effects, may themselves be invariable antecedents but they are not unconditional, being themselves conditioned by those of the antecedents of which they are effects. For example, the sound produced by the stick, or by the potter's wheel, invariably precedes the jar, but it is a co-effect,—and Ākāśa (ether) as the substrate, and Vayu (air) as the vehicle, of the sound, enter into the production of this co-effect, but these are not 'unconditional' antecedents, and must therefore be rejected in an enumeration of conditions or causes of the jar. Again, the conditions of the conditions, the invariable antecedents of the invariable antecedents, are not unconditional. The potter's father is an invariable antecedent of the potter who is an invariable antecedent of the jar, but the potter's father does not stand in a causal relation to the potter's handiwork. In fact, the antecedence must not only be unconditionally invariable, but must also be immediate (अव्यवहितपूर्वकाला वच्छेदेन कार्यदेशे सत्त्वम्). Finally, all seemingly invariable antecedents which may be dispensed with or left out, are *ipso facto* not unconditional, and cannot therefore be regarded as causal conditions; in short, nothing that is unnecessary is unconditional; for this class, *vide* Visvanātha:—नियतावश्यकपूर्वभाविनः अवश्यक्लृप्तनियतपूर्ववर्तिन एव कार्यसम्भवे । तद्भिन्नम् (अतिरिक्त) अन्यथासिद्ध—Visvanātha, Siddhānta Muktāvali, on Sloka 20. For example, it is the custom to point to spatial position or direction with the fingers, but finger-pointing, though invariably present, is not causally related to the perception of direc-tion or spatial position, because we can imagine such perception without finger-pointing, (अन्यथासिद्धतया अङ्गुल्या निर्देशस्य दिक्प्रत्यक्षत्वेन न स्वाभाविकः सम्बन्धः, Váchaspati, Tátparyya-Tiká, Chap. I, A'hnika 1, Sutra 5,—this shows that the doctrine of अन्यथासिद्धशून्य was long anterior to Gangesa).

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[ Visvanátha in the Bhásha-Parichchheda mentions five kinds of अन्यथासिद्ध, conditional antecedents—(1) येन सहपूर्वभावः, (2) यस्य वा कारणमादाय (पूर्वभावः ), (3) अनं प्रति पूर्वभावे ज्ञाते यत्पूर्वभावविज्ञानम्, (4) जनकं प्रति पूर्ववर्त्तिताम् अपरिज्ञाय यस्य (पूर्ववर्त्तिता ) न गृह्यते, and (5) यद्यपि यत् नियतावश्यकपूर्वभाविनः अतिरिक्तं भवेत् (एतेषु पञ्चसु आवश्यकत्वसौ—Slokas 19, and 20), यस्य स्वातन्त्र्येण अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ न स्तः किन्तु स्वकारणमादायैव अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ गृह्येते तदन्यथासिद्धम्, Siddhánta Muktávali, loc. cit.—The Dinakarí points out that the first two cases are comprehended under the formula इतरान्वयव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तान्वयव्यतिरेकशालित्वम्। There are several classifications of these irrelevant antecedents (अन्यथासिद्ध ); I quote one of the best known].

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The unconditional (अन्यथासिद्धशून्य) as interpreted in this comprehensive sense is a far more fruitful conception than Mill's, and is well adapted to its work—the elimination of the irrelevant factors in the situation. In the end, the discrimination of what is necessary to complete the sum of causes, from what is dependent, collateral, secondary, superfluous or inert, (i.e. of the relevant from the irrelevant factors) must depend on the test of expenditure of energy. This test the Nyāya would accept only in the sense of an operation analysable into molar or molecular motion (परिस्पन्द एव भौतिको व्यापारः करोत्यर्थः—अतीन्द्रियस्तु व्यापारे नास्ति, Jayanta, Manjarī, A'hnika I); but would emphatically reject, if it is advanced in support of the notion of a mysterious causal power or efficiency (शक्ति). This is a peculiarity of the Nyāya—its insisting that the effect is only the sum or resultant of the operations of the different causal conditions—that these operations are kinetic, being of the nature of motion, in other words holding firmly to the view that causation is a case of expenditure of energy, in the kinetic form,—but at the same time absolutely repudiating the Sánkhya conception of power or productive efficiency as metaphysical or transcendental (अतीन्द्रिय), and finding nothing in the cause other than an unconditional invariable complement of operative conditions (कारणसामग्री) and nothing in the effect other than the consequent phenomenon which results from the joint operations of the antecedent conditions (समुदितसकलकारकनिकर परिस्पन्द एव—Jayanta—सामग्री कार्य्य—सामग्रीकार्य्यत्वे तु कार्य्य- मस्तु किमन्तरालबर्त्तिन्या शक्त्या—Jayanta, ibid, A'hnika, I, शक्तिनिराकरणम्—it may be noted that the Nyāya, while repudiating transcendental power (Sakti) in the mechanism of nature and natural causation,.

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does not deny the existence of metaphysical conditions like merit (धर्म), which constitute a system of moral ends that fulfil themselves in and through the mechanical system and order of Nature—vide Jayanta, अतीन्द्रियं किमपि कारणं कल्पितमेव धर्मादि—A'hnika I, शक्तिनिराकरणम् ).

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The causal relation, then, like the relation of genus to species, is a natural relation of concomitance (व्याप्तिः स्वाभाविकः सम्बन्धः—Váchaspati) which can be ascertained only by the uniform and uninterrupted experience of agreement in presence and agreement in absence, and not by deduction from a certain a priori principle like that of Causality or Identity of Essence.

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Nyáya objection to the Buddhist Method of Difference as a means of ascertaining causality.

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Take for example the Buddhist deduction of Causality in any particular conjunction by means of the negative Method of Difference, or of the Panchakárani. The ascertainment of the causal relation by these Methods is open to the following objections :—(1) The unconditionality of the antecedent cannot possibly be ascertained. As the Chárváka rightly points out, the Methods enable you to eliminate irrelevant antecedents that are or can be perceived ; but the introduction or sublation of latent or undetected antecedents can be imagined against which the Method of Difference is powerless. In the case of the production of smoke, for example, by fire,—what if I say that an invisible demon intervenes in every case between the fire and the smoke, that this demon (पिशाच) is the immediate antecedent and real cause of the latter, and that the fire is an accident which, in every such case, is brought about by its own causal antecedents;—in saying this, I do not go counter to the principle of causality and am landed in no contradiction (व्याघात) such as strikes at the very roots of all practice, or baffles the completed circuit of consciousness, however much I may violate probability.

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(2) In the second place, even supposing that the fire, in this particular case (which satisfies the Method of Difference rigidly) is ascertained to be the cause of the smoke, how can I know that fire is the cause in other cases, or that there is no other cause. You will perhaps argue that if there were an indefinite number of causes of the same specific phenomenal effect, it would violate the principle that phenomena are all conditioned, *i.e.*, exist only under certain conditions (कादाचित्कत्व),—which is more comprehensive than the principle of causality, and the contradiction of which equally overthrows all rational practical activity. Yes, I accept the conditionality of phenomena, but this is not violated by supposing that one specific assemblage of phenomena has more than one cause. It is true that if you suppose such plurality of causes, you cannot establish the invariableness of the particular conjunction (green-wood fire and smoke) which your Method of Difference fixes upon as a case of cause and effect; in other words, with your special principle of Causality so restricted, and without any general principle of Uniformity of Nature to fall back upon, you cannot ascertain, from the present case, or from any number of similar cases that you may have observed, that *all* green-wood fires are followed by smoke; *i.e.*, you are helpless in demonstrating with apodictic certainty (or ascertaining indubitably) the relation of cause and effect. But this is an objection against your own position, not mine. Why not admit at once that certain phenomena are naturally connected (as invariable concomitants or antecedents) with other phenomena, and take your stand on observed concomitance (uniform and uninterrupted experience of agreement in presence as well as absence) without assuming causality as an *a priori* principle and making deductions therefrom, and without the trouble of ascertaining the relation of cause and effect in every individual case. I am free to admit that theoretical objections of irresistible force (like those of the Chárváka Sceptics) can be urged against this ascertainment of universal invariable and unconditional concomitance (व्याप्तिग्रहोपाय) on the basis of mere observation. Doubts of this kind can no more be laid by my view of the matter than by your canons of causality and essential identity ( तदुत्पत्ति and तादात्म्य ). Ultimately we all have to fall back on the rational practice of thinking persons ( प्रेक्षावन्तः ), and such persons are always content to act on practical certitude instead of hankering after an unattainable apodictic certainty in the affairs of life ( प्रामाणिकलोकयात्रामनुपालयता यथादर्शनं शङ्कनीयम् ). This same practical certitude is also the ultimate warrant of the Deductive-Inductive Inference by which we ascertain the characters of things without direct perception and through the medium or instrumentality of a mark.

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[ To the earlier Buddhist canon of the Method of Subtraction, *i. e.*, the negative Method of Difference, Udyotakara and Váchaspati of the Nyáya School pertinently and acutely object as follows :—

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सत्यं यत् किञ्चित् क्वचित् दृष्टं तस्य यत्र प्रतिबन्धः, तदिदः तस्य तत्-
गमकं तव इति अनुज्ञानौमः । स एव तु प्रतिबन्धो न तावत् तदुत्पत्त्या
सम्भवति । का पुनरियं तदुत्पत्तिः । धूमस्य किं वह्न्यनन्तरं भावः । स
तादृशः अस्ति रासभस्यापि । ततप्रतिबद्धोऽपि धूमः स्यात् । अथ तदनन्त-
रमेव भावः, न च रासभानन्तरं भवनपि तदनन्तरमेव भवति, तस्मिन् सति
अपि असति अग्नौ तदभावात् । असति अपि तस्मिन् सत्याग्नौ तद्भवति
वह्नौ तद्भावात् । अथ यद्यपि धूमस्य वह्निभावानुविधानं तवोपलब्धं,
तथापि देशान्तरादिषु तद्भावोऽस्य कुतः । तथा हि भूयो भूयो
रासभे दृष्टे धूमीदृष्टः, तदभावे च अदृष्टः, न स तत्कार्यः । तज्जातीय-
स्यैव धूमस्य रासभं विना सति वह्नौ भावात्, एवं सत्यपि अग्नौ पिशाचेन
जनितो धूमः, क्वचिद्देशादौ तज्जातीय एव रासभवद्वह्निभावेऽपि पिशाचा-
देव भविष्यति, इति अवश्यं शङ्कया भाव्यं नियामकं अपश्यताम् । न च सति

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भावमात्रं नियामकं, तस्य रासभादिषु अविशेषात् । तदनन्तरमेव इति च अवधारणस्य शङ्कायामभावात् । अवधारणं तु शङ्कापनयने परस्परश्रय-प्रसङ्गात

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Buddhist reply :—स्यादेतत् । यो यो धूमोदृष्टः स वह्निसाहचर्याद्रेन्धनसहित वह्निानन्तरमेव, न पिशाचानन्तरं । स च कादाचित्कतया निमित्तमपेक्षमाणो यदनन्तरमेव गम्यते तदेव अप्रतीतव्यभिचारं निमित्तं करोति, न तु प्रतीतव्यभिचारं रासभादि । नापि सर्वथाऽनुपलभ्यपिशाचादिः । यदि न तन्निमित्तं कस्मात् विनाऽपि वह्निं कचित् धूमो न उपलभ्यते । अथ असौ ( पिशाचः ) सर्वथा वह्निसाहचर्यवत् तथा सति आर्द्रेन्धनवत् कथं वह्निंरपि न कारणं । कारणं चेत् कथं तमनतरेण धूमभाव शङ्का । Now the phenomenon that is contingent (कादाचित्क) cannot be uncaused—अकारणस्य हि कार्यस्य नित्यं सत्त्वं असत्त्वं वा स्यात्, अनपेक्षत्वात् न कादाचित्कत्वम् । And with the limitation of a specific effect, there must be only one specific cause, for an unrestricted plurality of causes would amount to the denial of uniformity in causality (i. e., of the unconditional invariable antecedence)—

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नापि अनेकं कारणं, अकारणत्वप्रसङ्गादेव । वह्निानन्तरमेव भाव इति हि धूमस्य वह्निकार्यत्वम् । स चेत् वह्नेरपि अनन्तरं, न एवकारार्थः स्यात्, इति न वह्नेः कार्यम् । एवम् अन्यस्यापि न कार्यं । न हि अन्यानन्तरमेव भवति, वह्नेरपि अन्तरं भावात्, ततश्च अहेतुको धूमः स्यात् । तथा च कादाचित्कत्वव्याहतिः ।

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Nyáya rejoinder :—सत्यम् । यद्यपि विना वह्निं नोपलव्धो धूमः, यद्यपि च पिशाचान्तरं नोपलभ्यते तेषामनुपलव्धः, तथाऽपि पिशाच- कार्य्य एव धूमः। तत्र तत्र वह्नेः कुतश्चित् स्वहेतोः उपनिपतितः, रासभ इव, न धूमस्य जनकः। तेन तदभावेऽपि तज्जातीय एव कारणभेदजन्मा कदाचित्, कादाचित्को धूमः स्यात्। इति अनिवृत्तिरेव शङ्कायाः। न च दृष्टसम्भवे नादृष्टं कल्पयितुं युक्तम् इति शक्यं भवाद्वक्तुम्। अनुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्य अशक्यनिराकरणत्वात् (vide Nyāya Vindu)। न च अनुपलब्धान्तराणि अपि तन्निषेधे प्रभवन्ति। तस्मात् अनन्तरमेव इति अवधारणाभावात् नैवं कार्य्यकारणभावावधारणं युक्तम्। न च यदन्यसहितानन्तरं उपलब्धं तत्, तदन्यरहितात् तस्मात् भवत् भिन्नजातीयं भवति। उक्तं हि रामबसहितात् वह्नेः यादृशो धूमः तादृश एव तद्रहितात् वह्नेरिति। तस्मादेवंविधा शङ्कापिशाचौ स्वनिवारकं तदुपत्तिनिश्चयमास्कन्दतौ न शक्या निवारयितुम्।

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The Nyāya proceeds to point out that what is contingent need not necessarily be produced by a cause. It is enough if there is natural connection with something else, a relation of antecedence and succession (or concomitance), without any element of productive efficiency or causation.

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अपि चास्तु तदुपत्तिनिश्चयः तथाऽपि कस्मात् कारणान्तरेण न कार्य्यं भवति। तथा च सति अनपेक्षतया कादाचित्कत्वविहतिः इति चेत्। अस्तु तर्हि सम्बन्धः स्वाभाविकतया अन्यानपेक्षः अव्यभिचारी गमकलिङ्गम्। स च यो वा स वा भवतु। कृतं कार्य्यकारणभावावधारणायासेन। यथा चैतत् तथा अग्रे दर्शयिष्यामः। Váchaspati, Tátparyya-Tíká, Chap. I, A'hnika 1, Sutra 5, व्याप्तिग्रहोपायविचारः।]

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The Nyāya analysis of the causal relation continued:—Co-effects:—In the enumeration of different varieties of irrelevant antecedents (अन्यथासिद्ध), we have already noticed that co-effects of the same cause are apt to be confounded as cause and effect. In some cases, the co-effects may be simultaneous, *e. g.*, the case of the ascending and the descending scale in a balance, which are co-effects of gravity (*vide* Pártha-sárathi Misra on Kumárila, Sloka-Vártika—तुलानमनोन्नमनयोस्तु न मिथ: कार्य्यकारणत्वम्, उभयोरेककारणत्वात्,—sloka 157, Súnya-Váda). In other cases, the co-effects may be successive effects of the same cause, and here the risk is great of mistaking the antecedent co-effect to be the cause of the succeeding co-effect; *e.g.*, the case of ants moving in a line to carry their eggs upward, which is observed before the summer rains;—where the movement of ants and the rains are not cause and effect, but successive effects of the same cause, *viz.*, the heat (उष्मा), which disturbs the elements, *viz.*, the earth and the atmosphere (महाभूतक्षोभ); the ants being affected by this heat earlier than the atmospheric movements which bring the clouds and the rain.

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(Udyotakara, and Váchaspati—म च पिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चरणं वर्षस्य कारणमनुपलम्भसामर्थ्यात् । असत्यपि तस्मिन् वर्षस्योत्पत्तेः । वर्षमूलकारणस्य तु महाभूतक्षोभस्य पिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चरणं पूर्व्वकार्य्यम् । कथ्यमाना: खलु पिपीलिका भौमेनोष्मणा स्वानि अण्डानि भूमिष्ठानि उपरिष्टात् नयन्ति—Tátparyya—Tiká II, 2, Sutra 37).

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Synchronousness of Cause and Effect.—This is resolved into a case of simultaneous co-effects of the same ultimate cause, e.g., the ascent of one scale and the descent of the other in the balance, which are not related as cause and effect, but are simultaneous effects of gravity. In other cases, the synchronousness is only apparent, the interval between the antecedent and the consequent being too small ( सूक्ष्मकाल ) to be apprehended ( यौगपद्याभिमान ) e.g., in the case of the needle piercing a hundred soft lotus petals laid one upon another, where the steps are really successive; or the illumination of the whole room by the light of a lamp, where the succession is unperceived owing to the inconceivable velocity of light (cf. Kumārilá, Sloka-Vartika,—हेतुहेतुमतां सिद्धं यौगपद्य-निदर्शनम्,—यत् प्रदीपप्रभाद्युक्तं, सूक्ष्मकालोऽस्ति तव नः। दुलंचस्तु यथा वेधः पद्मपत्रशते तथा। Sunyaváda, Sloka 156-157.—I quote Mimansa authorities, but the view is common to the Mimánsá and the Nyáya-Vaiseshika).

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The time-relation in a chain of causes and effects:—A careful study of the time-relation in a chain of causes and effects is a peculiarity of the Vaiseshika system (and the later Nyáya). A moment (ultimate unit of time, Kshana, क्षण) is defined to be the time-interval between the completion of the sum of conditions and the appearance of the effect. The Vaiseshika conceives the unit to be determined by reference to the division of one atom from another (विभागानुतपाद्यविभागप्रागभावस्वङ्कर्मावच्छिन्नः कालः क्षणः—Sapta Padàrthí, Sivàditya ;—i.e., the ultimate unit of time is the time during which motion exists in an atom prior to its division from another atom, in a case of division due to motion ). The Sánkhya, we have already seen, determines this ultimate unit by reference to the motion of a Tanmátra.

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The number of such units will determine the time-interval between a given set of physical conditions and a particular effect, for between a so-called sum of causes and a so-called sum of effects, there intervenes a series of atomic (or molecular) motions, with conjunctions and disjunctions which form the causal chain. However crude in the practical application, the fundamental idea is, in connection with the principle of work and energy (for which both the Sánkhya and the Nyáya-Vaiseshika furnish a rudimentary basis), immensely suggestive of a possible Time Calculus.

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Plurality of Causes :—This will be discussed, when we consider the relation of Vyápti to the principle of Causality.

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The Nyáya Ground of Inference—Vyápti (नियतसाहचर्य—Váchaspati) :—Inference, then, in the Nyáya, depends on the ascertainment, not of the causal relation, nor of the relation of genus to species, but of a natural relation, between two phenomena, of invariable and unconditional concomitance ( उपाधिविधुरः स्वाभाविकः सम्बन्धः व्याप्तिः — Udyotakara and Váchaspati). Of the two phenomena so connected, one is called the Vyápya or Gamaka (the sign, mark or indicator), and the other Vyápaka or Gamya (the thing signified, marked, or indicated). In the relation of fire and smoke, for example, smoke is the Vyápya or Gamaka (sign or mark); and fire, the Vyápaka or Gamya (the thing signified or marked). Now the relation of Vyápti between A and B may be either unequal or equipollent (विषमव्याप्ति or समव्याप्ति). When A is the sign of B, but B is not the sign of A, the Vyápti is one-sided or unequal, and here a Vyapti is said to exist between A and B, but not between B and A. For example, smoke is a sign of fire, but fire is not universally a sign of smoke. When, therefore, the relation of Vyápti is an unequal one, as between smoke and fire, it is expressed in the proposition :—Wherever the Vyápya (sign or mark, e.g., smoke) exists, the Vyápaka (the thing signified or marked, e.g., fire) also exists. From this it follows by necessary implication (a sort of अर्थापत्ति) that whenever the Vyápaka (e.g., fire) is absent, the Vyápya (e.g., smoke) is also absent (व्यापकाभावे व्याप्याभावः). Again, the Vyápti may be a mutual or equipollent one, i.e., A and B may be signs of each other, e.g. green-wood fire and smoke. Here each in turn is Vyápya and Vyápaka, and this is expressed in the two propositions :—(1) Wherever there is smoke, there is green-wood fire, and (2) wherever there is green-wood fire, there is smoke. By necessary implication it follows—(1) where there is no green-wood fire, there is no smoke ; (2) where there is no smoke, there is no green-wood fire. We have seen that a Vyápti exists between smoke and fire, for wherever there is smoke, there is fire. But we cannot say that a Vyápti exists between fire and smoke, for we cannot say that wherever there is a fire, there is smoke. The combustion of an iron-ball (अयोगोलक), for example, is a case of fire without smoke. But it would be correct to say that a Vyápti exists between green-wood fire and smoke, as well as between smoke and green-wood fire. The question, therefore, is—What is the relation between fire and smoke ? The relation between fire and smoke is a conditional relation ; *i. e.*, on condition that the fire is green-wood fire, it would be a sign of smoke. In other words, a Vyápti implies unconditional invariable concomitance, and the relation between fire and smoke is not therefore a Vyapti (natural unconditional concomitance), for fire requires a ‘condition,’ Upádhi, *viz.*, green-wood, to be followed by smoke. Smoke, on the other hand, requires no ‘condition’ to indicate fire. For the purposes of Inference, therefore, relations between phenomena may be considered as of two kinds:—(1) Contingent conditional relations, holding good on the fulfilment of a certain condition or Upádhi, and (2) Vyápti, or unconditional invariable relation, between a mark and that which it marks, a relation without any Upádhi or determining condition (उपाधिविधुरः सम्बन्धः). It is this latter kind of relation that serves as the ground of Inference. If we can ascertain that a Vyápti exists between A and B, then A is a sign of B, and an inference of the presence of B from the presence of A, and of the absence of A from the absence of B, would be warranted. The question, therefore, is—how to ascertain the relation of Vyápti between two phenomena.

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